

NAVAL STAFF HISTORY

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH
NAVAL OPERATIONS
KOREA 1950-53

1967

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NAVAL STAFF HISTORY

B. R. 1736(54)

British Commonwealth Naval
Operations, Korea, 1950-53

September 1967

By Command of the Defence Council

J. Dunnett

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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

HISTORICAL BRANCH (NAVAL)

HS 2/63

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Abbreviations

A.A.	anti-aircraft
A/C	aircraft
A.D.	destroyer tender (U.S.)
A.G.C.	amphibious force flagship (U.S.)
A.H.	hospital ship (U.S.)
A.K.A.	assault cargo ship (U.S.)
A.M.	minesweeper (U.S.)
A.M.S.	auxiliary motor-minesweeper (U.S.)
A.O.	oiler (U.S.)
A.O.G.	gasoline tanker (U.S.)
A.P.	transport (U.S.)
A.P.A.	assault transport (U.S.)
A.P.D.	high-speed transport (U.S.)
APX-6	I.F.F. Mk 10; indicator, friend or foe
A.R.D.	Air Repair Department (H.M.S. <i>Unicorn</i>)
A R.H.	repair ship, heavy hull damage (U.S.)
A.R.L.	repair ship, landing craft
A/S	anti-submarine
A.S.I.S.	armament store issuing ship
A/S.P.	anti-submarine patrol
A.T.F.	ocean tug, fleet (U.S.)
A.V.	seaplane tender (U.S.)
A.V.P	seaplane tender, small (U.S.)
B.O.A.C.	British Overseas Airways Corporation
B.N.L.O.	British Naval Liaison Officer
B.S.T.	British Summer Time
C.A.	heavy cruiser (U.S.)
C.A.G.	carrier air group
CANFLAGPAC	Canadian Flag-Officer, Pacific
C.A.P.	combat air patrol
C.A.S.	close air support
C.C.F.	Captain, Coastal Forces
CCRACK	Covert, Clandestine and Related Activities, Korea (U.S.)
C.-in-C.	Commander-in-Chief
C.L.	light cruiser (U.S.)
C.O.	commanding officer
COMCARDIV	Commander, Carrier Division (U.S.)
COMNAVFE	Flag-Officer Commanding, Far East (U.S.)
C.O.S.	Chief(s) of Staff
C.S.O.	Chief Staff Officer
C.T.E.	Commander, Task Element
C.T.F.	Commander, Task Force
C.T.G.	Commander, Task Group
C.T.U.	Commander, Task Unit

ABBREVIATIONS

C.V.A.	fleet carrier (U.S.)
C.V.E.	escort carrier (U.S.)
C.V.L.	small carrier (U.S.)
D.D.	destroyer (U.S.)
D/F	direction finding/finder
D.G.	degaussing
D.M.S.	destroyer-minesweeper (U.S. and R.N.)
DUKW	amphibious truck
EUSAK	8th United States Army, Korea
F.A.A.	Fleet Air Arm
F.A.V.O.	Fleet Aviation Officer
F.E.	Far East
F.E.A.F.	Far East Air Force (U.S.)
F.E.O.	Fleet Engineer Officer
F.G.O.	Fleet Gunnery Officer
F.I.O.	Fleet Intelligence Officer
F.L.O.	Fleet Liaison Officer
F.N.C.O.	Fleet Naval Constructor Officer
F.N.O.	Fleet Navigating Officer
F.O. 2i/c F.E.S.	Flag-Officer, 2nd in Command, Far East Station
F.R.M.O.	Fleet Royal Marine Officer
F.R.O.	Fleet Physical and Recreational Training Officer
F.S.	French Ship
H.D.M.L.	harbour defence motor-launch
H.D.W.S.	high-definition warning (surface)
H.E.D.A.	high explosive with delayed action
H.Q.	headquarters
I.F.F.	indicator, friend or foe
J.I.C.	Joint Intelligence Centre, Korea (U.S.)
J.M.L.	motor-launch, Japanese built (U.S.)
J.O.C.	Joint Operations Centre, Korea (U.S.)
K.O.S.B.	King's Own Scottish Borderers
L.C.I.	landing-craft, infantry (U.S.)
L.C.M.	landing-craft, mechanized (U.S.)
L.C.P.R.	landing-craft, personnel, ramped (U.S.)
L.C.T.	landing-craft, tank (U.S.)
L.C.V.P.	landing-craft, vehicle and personnel (U.S.)
L.S.D.	landing-ship, dock (U.S.)
L.S.M.	landing-ship, medium
L.S.M.R.	landing-ship, medium, rocket (U.S.)
L.S.T.	landing-ship, tank (U.S.)
L.S.U.	landing-ship, utility (U.S.)
L.V.T.	landing-vehicle, tracked (U.S.)
L.V.T.A.	landing-vehicle, tracked, armoured (U.S.)

ABBREVIATIONS

M.A.A.	Master-at-Arms
M.L.	motor-launch
M.S.B.	L.C.V.P. fitted for minesweeping (U.S.)
M.T.B.	motor torpedo-boat
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
N.K.P.A.	North Korean People's Army
N.O.i/c	Naval Officer in charge
N.S.I.S.	naval store issuing ship
O.C.	Officer Commanding
O.C.A.S.	Officer in Charge of Armament Supply
O.R.	other rank
O.T.C.	Officer in Tactical Command
P.C.	submarine chaser (U.S.)
P.C.E.C.	escort amphibious control vessel (U.S.)
P.F.	frigate (U.S.)
P.T.	motor torpedo-boat (U.S.)
P.I.R.	Partisan Infantry Regiment
P.o.W.	prisoner of war
R.A.	Royal Artillery
R.A.F.	Royal Air Force
R.A.A.F.	Royal Australian Air Force
R.A.N.	Royal Australian Navy
RATOG	rocket-assisted take-off gear
R.C.N.	Royal Canadian Navy
R.C.T.	regimental combat team (U.S.)
R.F.A.	Royal Fleet Auxiliary
R.M.	Royal Marines
R.N.	Royal Navy
R.Neth.N.	Royal Netherlands Navy
R.N.Z.N.	Royal New Zealand Navy
R.o.K.	Republic of Korea
R.o.P.	Report of Proceedings
R/T	radio-telephony
S.A.R.	sea/air rescue
SCAJAP	Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Japan (U.S.)
S.C.O.	Squadron Signals and Communication Officer
S.E.O.	Squadron Engineer Officer
S.G.O.	Squadron Gunnery Officer
S/M	submarine
S.M.O.	Senior/Squadron Medical Officer
S.N.O.	Senior Naval Officer
S.O.	Senior Officer
S.O.I.	Staff Officer, Intelligence
S.O.O.	Staff Officer, Operations
S.S.O.	Staff/Squadron Supply Officer
S.T.A.S.O.	Squadron Torpedo and Anti-Submarine Officer
T.A.C.	Tactical Air Co-ordinator (U.S.)
T.A.D.C.	Tactical Aircraft Direction Centre (U.S.)

ABBREVIATIONS

TARCAP	combat air patrol over target
T.E.	Task Element
T.F.	Task Force
T.G.	Task Group
T.U.	Task Unit
U.K.	United Kingdom
U.N.	United Nations
U.S.	United States (of America)
U.S.A.	United States of America, United States Army
U.S.A.F.	United States Air Force
U.S.M.C.	United States Marine Corps
U.S.N.	United States Navy
U.S.S.R.	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
v.h.f.	very high frequency
V.S.I.S.	victualling store issuing ship
W/T	wireless telegraphy
Y.M.S.	motor-minesweeper (U.S.)
Y.T.B.	harbour tug, big (U.S.)

Introduction

THE end of World War II in 1945 left Asia ripe for change. Despite her defeat, Japan had, during the years of her apparent success, made good headway with her 'Asia for the Asiatics' propaganda. The Far East seethed with unrest in 1946 and the years following; and everywhere Communist agents were at hand to exploit the local situation in favour of Russia against her erstwhile allies.

In particular, communism spread ominously through China, weakened by 35 years of revolution, civil war, and latterly, invasion. For three years Marshal Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Government strove against Mao Tse-tung's Communist armies. By the end of 1949, only the island of Formosa was left to Chiang Kai-shek, where, under the wing of the United States Navy, he was re-organizing the battered remnants of his forces. On the mainland, Mao Tse-tung, with a large veteran army to carry out his behests, proceeded with the communization of China.

Throughout this struggle the 'cold' war was being waged between Soviet Russia, who supplied arms and munitions to the Communists, and the Free Nations, especially the United States, who did the same for the Nationalists. With the Communist victory, it became increasingly clear that Korea was destined to be the scene of the next tug of war between Communism and the Free Nations.

The Korean peninsula, projecting to the southward from the mainland of Asia to within 100 miles of Japan, is bounded on the north by Manchuria and the Russian Maritime Province. It covers some 85 000 square miles—an area little less than England, Scotland, and Wales—and has a population estimated at about 30 million.

After a long history of virtual independence under the suzerainty of Imperial China, it was recognized as an independent state as the result of the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, and was subsequently annexed outright by Japan in 1910. For the next 35 years its story was one of shameless exploitation by the Japanese.

With the conclusion of World War II, the 'Korean question' at once became a matter of international concern.

In the Cairo Declaration of 1st December 1943, China, the United Kingdom, and the United States had expressed their determination that 'in due course Korea shall become free and independent'—an intention reaffirmed in the Potsdam Declaration of 1945. Japanese control of Korea ended in September 1945. Unfortunately, Soviet Russia had come into the war against Japan a few days before it ended, and thereby gained an opportunity of getting a footing in the country. In order to fill the political vacuum created by the withdrawal of the Japanese, it was occupied by Russian forces in the north and by United States forces in the south, the dividing line between the areas of occupation being fixed, under an *ad hoc* agreement, as the parallel of 38° north latitude. The northern part of Korea, which was under Soviet occupation, is mountainous, containing most of the

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industry and mineral deposits of the country, whereas the United States zone was mainly agricultural. About two-thirds of the total population inhabited the United States zone.

In December 1945, the Moscow Agreement, signed by the U.S.S.R., the United States, and the United Kingdom, and later adhered to by China, proposed the re-establishment of Korea as an independent State. The agreement proposed a Four-Power trusteeship which, for a period not exceeding five years, would assist the Korean people to develop a democratic government. As a first step, a joint American-Soviet commission was given the responsibility of setting up, in consultation with Korean 'democratic parties and social organizations', a provisional Korean Government. Agreement, however, could not be reached on the method of consultation with the Korean groups, since the Soviet Union insisted on conditions which would have meant, in practice, that consultation would have been confined to the Communist party and its fellow-travellers. The joint Commission therefore adjourned indefinitely in May 1946.

Under these circumstances, and following the Soviet rejection of a proposal for a Four-Power conference on Korea, the United States referred the problem to the General Assembly of the United Nations in September 1947. Two resolutions, sponsored by the United Kingdom and the United States, and designed to enable the Korean people to obtain their independence by establishing a freely elected government, were adopted by the General Assembly by 43 votes to none, with six abstentions by the Soviet bloc. A United Nations temporary commission was set up to observe the elections, to assist the Korean National Assembly in taking over the government of the country, and to arrange for the withdrawal of the armed forces of the occupying powers within 90 days.

The Soviet authorities in North Korea flouted the United Nations resolutions, and all the Commission could do was watch elections held in the United States zone, where a National Assembly was elected and a Government of the Republic of Korea was formed. On 24th August 1948, it was announced that the U.S. Army's role as governing authority in South Korea had ended. Four days later, 'elections' of the usual Communist character were held in North Korea, and a 'Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea' was proclaimed.

When the Commission submitted its report to the U.N. General Assembly, there were Soviet resolutions to exclude consideration of the report from the agenda, and to allow representatives of the so-called North Korean Government to take part in discussions in committee, but these were defeated. On 12th December, the Assembly, apart from the Soviet representatives, approved the report and replaced the Temporary Commission by the U.N. Commission on Korea, which was to establish the unification of Korea and to observe the withdrawal of the occupation forces. The same resolution declared the Government of the Republic of Korea, having been lawfully established and having effective control over that part of the country in which most of its nationals lived, to be the only such government in Korea. This Government was then recognized by the United Kingdom and other nations of the Free World.

The United Nations Commission on Korea met with no better fortune at the hands of the Soviet authorities than had the Temporary Commission; offers to observe the withdrawal of the Soviet troops were ignored, but the Soviet Government stated that all its forces had left by 1st January 1949. Before leaving, however, they had trained and equipped an army of some 60 000 North Koreans, in addition

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to constabulary, rail/road guards, and troops under training; they also left the 'Government', on the approved Communist model, completely in control. The U.N. Commission confirmed the completion of the withdrawal of the U.S. occupation troops on 29th June 1948, except for a military advisory group, which remained at the request of the Government of the Republic.

On 8th September 1949, the Commission published a report in which it stressed the hopelessness of trying to make contact with, or gain access to, North Korea. It accused the Soviet Government of fostering the breach between South and North Korea and described the northern régime as 'the creature of a military occupant' that denied its subjects any chance to express their opinion upon its claim to rule.

As the result of this report, the General Assembly decided that the Commission should continue indefinitely. Owing to the attitude of the North Korean 'Government', it could not further the unification of Korea, but in the south it was able to observe and help the democratic development of the Republic of Korea. Here a good start was made in several directions, and a second general election, held on 30th May 1950, made it clear that the prospects for representative government were good. But for some time before this, the North Koreans had been indulging in vituperative broadcasts, and in attacks across the border by guerrilla bands; these actions culminated in a large-scale Communist attack across the 38th parallel on 25th June 1950.

The war that ensued presented many features that were unique. For the first time force was employed to give effect to a United Nations decision to arrest aggression. The speed and unanimity with which the United Nations acted, and the integration of the forces of some seven nations under unified command without difficulty or friction was encouraging to those concerned in administering and operating such a force against a Communist attack.

'The Korean war produced some astonishing spectacles. The fighting on land, though not perhaps typical of the battles that a future war may bring, saw, at one time, the heavily armed and mechanized forces of world Powers, with undisputed command of the air and sea, retreating before a mass of lightly-equipped, oriental foot-soldiers. Our air forces with no opposition were yet unable to prevent the movement of vast numbers of enemy troops, their concentration, supply and subsequent attack. In a major amphibious operation our powerful fleet lost command of the sea for ten important days through the laying of enemy mines from fishing boats. Though this was in a very limited area it held up a huge invasion force.'¹

The geographical configuration of Korea renders it singularly susceptible to the pressure of sea power, and the U.N. naval forces played a big part in sealing off the Communist coasts from any seaborne supplies, in providing mobility for the armies in the form of massive amphibious landings and redeployments, and in providing extensive gun-fire both for planned bombardments and direct army support. Carrier-borne aircraft, too, proved of great value against enemy rail and road lines of communication and other objectives. But the greatest naval contribution to the war was, as not infrequently happens, the least spectacular,

¹ Vice-Admiral Sir William Andrewes's Report on Experience in Korean Operations, pp. 2, 3.

INTRODUCTION

namely the immense logistical achievement of the United States in maintaining a steady flow of personnel and supplies—on which all operations by ground and air forces were entirely dependent—across the vast distances of the Pacific Ocean.¹

It is true that the United Nations naval forces were virtually unopposed by surface forces, submarines, or air forces. To that extent their task was facilitated to a degree perhaps unlikely to occur again; but the lessons brought out by their experiences are by no means invalidated on that account.

The Korean War fell into six well-defined phases (Figure 1):

1. 25th June—6th August 1950. The initial invasion which carried the North Korean armies over the greater part of South Korea.
2. 6th August—14th September 1950. The establishment and retention of a beach-head where all U.N. efforts were concentrated on maintaining a foothold in Pusan from which its forces could be built up.
3. 15th September—25th November 1950. The U.N. counter-attack, rendered possible by a large-scale amphibious operation at Inchon. United Nations forces almost reached the Yalu, and it appeared that the war was won.
4. 26th November 1950—14th January 1951. The Chinese came to the assistance of the North Koreans in strength and advanced to the southward of Seoul. U.N. forces evacuated from Chinnampo and Wonsan, and redeployed.
5. 15th January—12th June 1951. The United Nations counter-attack; Seoul once again changed hands and a line just north of the 38th parallel was reached by the middle of March. A heavy Chinese offensive in April and May was checked with little loss of ground, and by mid-June the U.N. forces were back on the line north of the 38th parallel reached in March, and advancing steadily on the whole front, when for political reasons a halt was called.
6. 23rd June 1951—27th July 1953. Long, drawn-out truce talks, with frequent adjournments. Static warfare on shore, with guerrilla operations and occasional large-scale attacks. Naval blockade was maintained, and attempts at 'interdiction' by gun-fire, raiding parties, and carrier-borne and shore-based aircraft were carried out. Political considerations and the fear of the development of a third world war prevented the exertion of the full power of the United Nations forces during this period.

¹ Seattle—Dutch Harbour—Kiska—Tokyo, 4835 miles. San Francisco—Pearl Harbour—Midway Islands—Tokyo, 6200 miles. Tokyo—Seoul, 720 miles.

Some interesting figures in this connexion are as follows:

- a. Six out of every seven Americans who went to Korea went by sea. 4 918 919 passengers were handled by the Military Sea Transport Service between June 1950 and June 1953.
- b. Fifty-four million tons of cargo, 22 million tons of petroleum products went to Korea by ship.
- c. Every U.S. soldier landed in Korea was accompanied by five tons of equipment, and it took 64 lb every day to keep him there.
- d. For every ton of trans-Pacific air freight, there were 270 tons of sea freight; and for every ton of air freight, four tons of fuel for the aircraft had to be delivered by ship.

The Sea War in Korea, Cagle and Manson.

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


Figure 1. Phases of the Korean War

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Each of these phases called for a somewhat different type of naval effort; but the blockade of the Communist-held coasts was continuous. It was with this unspectacular but arduous work on the west coast that the British Commonwealth naval forces were mainly concerned.

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Outbreak of War

Section

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1

AT 0400, 25th June 1950, a large-scale attack by the North Korean Communists was launched on South Korea.

It was by no means a contemptible army, judged even by Western military standards, that smashed through the Republic of Korea defences after crossing the 38th parallel. Seven infantry divisions and an armoured division were employed with two infantry divisions in reserve. The main effort was a two-pronged attack on the South Korean capital, Seoul, conducted by the N.K.P.A.¹ 1st Infantry Division, advancing through Kaesong and Munsan, while the 3rd and 4th Divisions, with elements of the 105th Armoured Division, proceeded via the Yonchon-Uijongbu and Pochon-Uijongbu corridors. Nearly 100 tanks and as many aircraft were employed with these two main columns advancing on Seoul. On their right the 6th Infantry Division quickly overran the isolated Ongjin peninsula, and then thrust eastward towards Kaesong. On the left, the 2nd and 12th Infantry Divisions covered the offensive by attacking Chunchon, while the 5th Division made rapid gains along the east coast.

Against a surprise attack of this weight the South Korean forces, lacking in tanks, military aircraft, and artillery, could do little, the invaders advancing almost at will during the first four days. On 27th June, President Syngman Rhee and the R.o.K.² Government moved from Seoul to Taejon, about 100 miles to the south. Seoul fell on the 28th, and the N.K.P.A. forces halted for regrouping. They then held a ragged line stretching from Chumunchin on the east coast through Chunchon, Kapyong, and Seoul to the port of Inchon (Chemulpho) on the west coast. The beaten R.o.K. Army was falling back through Suwon in the hope of establishing

¹ North Korean People's Army.

² Republic of Korea.

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new positions of defence, but their movements were impeded by hordes of fugitives, who, fleeing southward in an endless stream, choked every road.

It must have seemed to the Communist commanders that the war was already won; but in their preparations they had left one factor out of their calculations, which was to prove their undoing—sea power.

Their own naval forces were negligible, though probably sufficient to deal with the South Korean Navy.¹ But the moment the United Nations came in, the relentless pressure of sea power clamped down on them. Thanks to it, a foothold was retained around Pusan in the extreme south where the land forces could be built up. These, supplied and supported by the navies, repelled the invasion, and three months later drove their armies helter-skelter across the frontier.

2

Meanwhile, the reaction of the United Nations to the North Korean aggression had been swift and unambiguous. The news reached Mr Trygve Lie, the Secretary-General, in New York at about 0300, 25th June,² some fourteen hours after the invasion had commenced. An emergency meeting of the U.N. Security Council was held that afternoon, and by a unanimous vote of nine member-nations,³ the blame for the aggression was placed squarely on the North Koreans, who were called on to cease hostilities immediately and to withdraw from R.o.K. territory. The invasion continued.

On 27th June, the Security Council branded the N.K.P.A. attack a breach of world peace, and authorized member-nations to assist the Republic of Korea in repelling the invasion and 'to restore international peace and security'. Within three days, 32 of the 59 member-States of the U.N. had endorsed this recommendation, and many had offered military or economic assistance. The British decision to support the Security Council resolution was announced by the Prime Minister⁴ in the House of Commons on 27th June; the President of the United States⁵ ordered U.S. air and sea forces to give South Korean troops cover and support, and the U.S. 7th Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa by the Chinese Communists. Admiral A. W. Radford, C.-in-C. of the U.S. Pacific Fleet based at Pearl Harbour, had already (26th June) been directed to organize another task group for service in the western Pacific. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, who commanded the U.S. occupation forces in Japan from his headquarters at Tokyo, was placed

¹ The North Korean Navy consisted of about 50 vessels, including one escort vessel (750 tons), five patrol craft (100 to 300 tons), fifteen small patrol craft (20 tons), five Y.M.S.s (260 tons), seven ex-German R-boats.

The Republic of Korea started the war with one ex-U.S. patrol craft (280 tons), eleven small patrol craft (20 tons), 26 Y.M.S.s., ex-U.S. and ex-Japanese (150 to 260 tons), one L.C.I. (280 tons). These forces were considerably increased as the war progressed. By mid-1952 they included four frigates (P.F.), ten motor-minesweepers (Y.M.S.), five 173-ft S/M chasers (P.C.), nine ex-Japanese S/M chasers, four motor-torpedo boats (P.T.), three L.T.S.s, four L.S.I.s, eight transports, besides various coastal craft, minor amphibious craft, tugs, etc.

² New York time, zone plus 5, or 1800, 25th, Korean time, zone minus 10.

³ Yugoslavia abstained from voting. The U.S.S.R. was not represented, Mr Malik, their representative, having boycotted the Council since January 1950. This did not prevent the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr Gromyko, from sending a note to Washington on 29th June, alleging that South Korea had provoked the conflict.

⁴ The Right Honourable C. R. Attlee.

⁵ President Harry S. Truman.

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in command of United States forces in the whole area. The next day, Mr Attlee announced that British naval forces in Japanese waters were placed at the disposal of U.S. authorities to operate on behalf of the Security Council; the Canadian Government offered naval support, followed on the 29th by Australia and New Zealand, on the same terms.

On 30th June, President Truman ordered a naval blockade of the whole coast of Korea, and authorized General MacArthur to send troops to Korea and employ air forces for attacks on North Korea.

Thus, within a week of the original attack on South Korea, the United Nations had not only condemned an aggression but had decided to appeal for force to restrain the aggressor, and steps were well under way to enforce their decision.

It remained to be seen whether Russia would openly espouse the cause of North Korea by force of arms.

3

A word should be said here about the political situation in Japan at this time. Nearly five years had elapsed since the termination of the Pacific War by the unconditional surrender of Japan (2nd September 1945). Since then, the Emperor and the Japanese Government had functioned subject to the control of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAJAP), General MacArthur. Under him, the occupation and control of Japan were predominantly American, though there was a British Commonwealth occupation force under an Australian C.-in-C. (Lieutenant-General Sir H. Robertson) based on Kure. United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Indian contingents, which had originally formed part of this force, had soon been withdrawn, and by 1950 it had dwindled to one Australian battalion and a unit of the Royal Australian Air Force. A commander, R.A.N., controlled Kure dockyard.

Efforts to secure agreement between the Allies on the terms of a peace treaty with Japan had been frustrated by Soviet Russia and Nationalist China, and no serious effort was made to break the deadlock till 1950. Meanwhile, from 1946 onwards, diplomatic missions of certain Powers, including one from Great Britain under Sir Alvary Gascoigne, had been established in Toyko; they were not accredited to Japan, but constituted a liaison with the Supreme Commander, with the title of Liaison Missions.

The forces immediately available to the United Nations on the outbreak of the Korean War were mainly the American occupation forces stationed in Japan and were extremely slender to counter an attack of such a nature.

General MacArthur's ground forces consisted of the 7th, 24th and 25th Infantry Divisions, and the 1st Cavalry Division (dismounted) of the U.S. 8th Army. These divisions were at only about 70 per cent strength, regiments being limited to two instead of three battalions. Armoured units had only light M24 tanks in place of the heavier types normally employed, because of the weakness of the bridges in Japan.

His air forces, under Lieutenant-General Stratemeyer, consisted of eight and a half combat groups, which were responsible for the defence of Japan, Okinawa, the Philippines, and Guam.

The U.S. naval forces in Japanese waters,¹ under Vice-Admiral C. T. Joy,

¹ See Appendix B.

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consisted of the light cruiser *Juneau*, four destroyers, and six minesweepers. There was also a complete amphibious force, consisting of five units, which was carrying out exercises, and whose value was very soon to be proved.

Also in Japanese waters was a welcome reinforcement in the shape of a detachment of the British Far East Fleet¹ under Rear-Admiral Andrewes, consisting of the light carrier *Triumph*, the cruisers *Belfast* and *Jamaica*, two destroyers, three frigates, and some fleet auxiliaries. The remainder of the Fleet (the light cruiser *Kenya*, five destroyers, five frigates), was employed in patrols off the River Yangtze and Malaya, undergoing refitting, and so on.

Further afield, but within easy steaming distance, was the U.S. 7th Fleet under Vice-Admiral Struble, comprising the fleet carrier *Valley Forge*, the eight-inch-gun cruiser *Rochester*, and eight destroyers. This force had various commitments, but was available for operations in Korean waters when circumstances permitted.

4

Admiral Sir Patrick Brind, then C.-in-C., Far East Station, had decided early in 1950 to keep as many ships as practicable in Japanese waters during the summer months of the year. This was to enable the ships' companies to have a change from the heat of Hong Kong and Singapore; while there, they would form part of the occupation forces of Japan under Vice-Admiral C. T. Joy, U.S.N. (COMNAVFE), a measure welcomed by General MacArthur. British ships were, therefore, in close contact with the American naval authorities in Japan when, on the 25th June, the North Korean forces crossed the 38th parallel.

At this time, Admiral Brind, who had himself been cruising in Japanese waters, had just left Okinawa in the dispatch vessel *Alert* for Hong Kong. Rear-Admiral Andrewes, his Second-in-Command, with his flag in H.M.S. *Belfast*, was at Hakodate in north Japan. In addition to the *Belfast*, H.M. ships then readily available² for service in Japanese waters consisted of the light carrier *Triumph*, which had just sailed from Ominato for Hong Kong, the destroyers *Cossack* (D8) and *Consort* at Ominato, the frigates *Black Swan* (F3) and *Alacrity* at Tokyo, and *Hart* on passage from Hong Kong to Yokosuka. The cruiser *Jamaica* had left Hong Kong for Kure the day before (24th June). There were also R.F.A.s *Green Ranger* and *Fort Charlotte* at Kure, and H.M. Hospital Ship *Maine* at Kobe.

The news of the invasion reached Admiral Andrewes in the evening of 25th June; he at once decided to move to the southward,³ and put to sea at 0130⁴ next morning, 26th, passing through the Tsugaru Strait bound for Yokosuka.

¹ See Appendix A.

² See Appendix A.

³ 'At that time H.M.S. *Belfast* was the only H.M. ship in northern Japanese waters, and for many reasons I decided I should move south. Briefly, they were that Hakodate is a long way from Yokosuka and Tokyo, the centre of American naval activities in Japan, and further from Kure. Moreover, the other ships under my command were either at sea, or in southern Japanese ports, and I wished to be able to concentrate the Fleet if necessary without delay. It also seemed probable that any action required would be off southern Korea and finally I thought that, should Russia intervene, my best place would be further south.' F.O. 2i/c R.o.P. No. 1.

The Commander-in-Chief subsequently remarked—'The prompt action of Flag-Officer, Second-in-Command, in sailing from Hakodate to visit Tokyo was very helpful . . .'

⁴ Zone minus 10 time (K) is used throughout unless otherwise stated.

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That day the C.-in-C. had offered the use of the Fleet to Vice-Admiral Joy, U.S.N., for 'any humanitarian mission' he might require.¹ Later he informed Rear-Admiral Andrewes that the Fleet might be called on for action under the United Nations Charter, and ordered the recall of the *Triumph* to Japanese waters.²

After a very rough passage, Admiral Andrewes arrived at Yokosuka at about noon, 27th, and leaving the *Belfast* there to complete with fuel, immediately drove to Tokyo to visit Admiral Joy. Admiral Joy, who had just left General MacArthur, took a serious view of the situation on land in Korea. As all British and U.S. nationals who so wished had been evacuated, he did not require British ships for this purpose, or any other humanitarian duty. Being ignorant of what the immediate Russian reaction might be to any direct intervention by U.S. forces, he was anxious not to have too many ships in Japanese ports. It was therefore agreed that Admiral Andrewes should concentrate his ships as soon as they had fuelled, and where possible provisioned, to the southward of Japan.

After visiting the head of the British Mission, Sir Alvary Gascoigne, at the Embassy, Admiral Andrewes returned to Yokosuka, and that afternoon sailed in the *Belfast* to the south-westward.

At 2300, 27th June, the situation as regards Admiral Andrewes's forces was as follows:

Black Swan, Alacrity, at Tokyo.

Hart, approaching Yokosuka.

Belfast, off Yokosuka, southward bound.

Triumph, Cossack, Jamaica, approaching Kure.

Consort, Green Ranger, Fort Charlotte, at Kure.

Maine, at Kobe.

During 28th June the three frigates fuelled and sailed from Yokosuka, meeting very bad weather at sea. The *Triumph, Jamaica*, and *Cossack* fuelled and took in some provisions at Kure; the *Belfast* continued to the south-westward to rendezvous with the ships from Kure, being joined by the *Jamaica* and *Cossack* in 32° 25' N., 133° 15' E. (east of the Bungo Channel) at 0600, 29th June.

On this day, orders from the Admiralty arrived directing the C.-in-C., Far East Station, to 'place the Royal Navy at present in Japanese waters at the disposal of the United States Naval Commander for Korean Operation [Admiral Joy] in support of the Security Council resolutions'.³ Shortly after noon, Admiral Andrewes received directions from Admiral Joy, as a result of which the following movements were ordered.

H.M.S. *Jamaica* to proceed through the Inland Sea, and with the *Black Swan* and *Alacrity* to join Rear-Admiral Higgins, U.S.N. (C.T.G. 96.5), flying his flag in the cruiser *Juneau*, off the east coast of South Korea.

¹ C.-in-C., F.E.S., 260431 Z [1431 K, 26th June].

² C.-in-C., F.E.S., 261350 Z [2350 K, 26th June].

³ A.M. 281702A [0202 K, 29th June].

On receipt of this signal, Commander J. M. D. Gray, R.N., who was naval adviser to the U.K. Liaison Mission in Japan, with the approval of the head of the Mission, put himself at the disposal of Vice-Admiral Joy. The Admiral at once invited him to become a member of his staff as Naval Liaison Officer, with accommodation in his operations room and full authority to see all classified signals. Writing on 25th September, Admiral Brind remarked that Commander Gray 'carried out a difficult task . . . with initiative, tact and skill . . . at a time of stress when faulty handling might have impaired the close relationship and trust which has been built up between the two navies'.

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The *Hart* was sent to Tokyo to act as communications link;¹ the *Maine* was ordered to join the *Green Ranger* and *Fort Charlotte* at Kure, while Admiral Andrewes in the *Belfast*, with the *Triumph* and *Consort*, which had joined his flag that afternoon, and *Cossack* in company, steered to join Vice-Admiral A. D. Struble, U.S.N. (C.T.F. 77), commanding the 7th Fleet at Okinawa, where he arrived on 1st July. His force was joined by H.M.A.S. *Bataan* that afternoon.

5

It will be convenient at this stage to consider briefly the chain of command of the United Nations forces that came into being with the outbreak of hostilities. This is shown in Figure 2. Naturally, modifications occurred as the war progressed; these will be mentioned as the story unfolds.

Unlike the Allied Commands of the Second World War, there was the initial advantage in the Korean War of having a ready-made high command—that of the United States in Japan. As has already been mentioned, General of the Army MacArthur was Supreme Commander; under him Vice-Admiral Joy, U.S.N., commanded the naval forces in Japanese waters, Lieutenant-General Stratemeyer, U.S.A.A.F., the air force, and Lieutenant-General Walton Walker the army. Unfortunately there was no joint headquarters; each Service had its entirely separate organization, and held separate daily briefings.

It was obvious that the United States would bear the brunt of the war, and General MacArthur was speedily appointed United Nations C.-in-C. on 7th July 1950.²

The naval forces provided by the United Nations fell naturally under this command system as they arrived, and came under the operational control of Vice-Admiral Joy (Commander, Naval Forces, Far East). Vice-Admiral Joy was himself under the over-all naval command of the C.-in-C., Pacific Fleet, Admiral Radford, at Pearl Harbour, as was Vice-Admiral Struble, the Commander of the 7th Fleet who, though senior to Admiral Joy, was on the same level in the command set-up. Their relation to Admiral Radford was similar to that of Rear-Admiral Andrewes to Admiral Brind.

Prior to the outbreak of war, Admiral Joy's command had solely related to the small naval occupation forces in Japan, to the supervision of the naval stations at Yokosuka and Sasebo, and to commands such as the shore-based Fleet Air Wing at Iwakuni, mine clearance, and so on. His staff was small, and the organization was not at first geared to active operations.³

The immediate problem was how, and at what level, the forces of the 7th Fleet and the Royal Navy could best be integrated. On 6th July Admiral Joy decided that Rear-Admiral Andrewes with British Commonwealth and Allied ships should form the West Korean Support Group, and Rear-Admiral Higgins, U.S.N., with

¹ The *Hart* arrived at Tokyo in the evening of 30th June, but was not used as communications link, as the next day she was urgently required to escort the U.S. Amphibious Force to Sasebo.

² In response to a special appeal for ground reinforcements from Mr Trygve Lie on 14th July, contingents were offered by Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Greece, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.

³ The staff was quickly expanded. By 1st November 1950 it had 210 members, including two rear-admirals and eleven captains. See Appendix F.

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


Figure 2. Chain of command at the beginning of the war

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U.S. ships, the East Korean Support Group, both operating directly under him. The 7th Fleet, because of its separate command and responsibilities had to operate independently.

The weakness of this arrangement was that it did not include the following forces, which were separately controlled by Admiral Joy or Admiral Struble, even though operating in the same waters:

Carrier Task Force. The heavy carriers under Admiral Struble who was also responsible for operations off Formosa, etc. Though under Admiral Joy's operational control as far as operations in the Japan/Korea area were concerned, this force at first operated there only intermittently, and its activities were not co-ordinated with those of other forces.¹

Escort Carrier Group. Under Rear-Admiral Ruble, U.S.N., carrying U.S. Marine air groups, this group operated from Sasebo as required to provide close air support for the Marines ashore.²

Naval Aviation. Flying-boats (including R.A.F. Sunderlands) and seaplanes were operated by Rear-Admiral Henderson, U.S.N., based at Iwakuni.

Amphibious Force. Based at Yokosuka, under Rear-Admiral Doyle, U.S.N., this force launched various clandestine coastal operations, unknown to other commands, as preliminaries to the big assaults.³

Minesweeping Group. Under Captain Spofford, U.S.N., this group was based first on Yokosuka, and later on Sasebo.

Escort Group. Initially made up from any spare British and U.S. frigates, with destroyers attached when available, it became, at a later date, a purely U.S. group under Captain Williamson, U.S.N.

R.o.K. Navy. Comprised some 40 small warships and a number of auxiliary vessels, with their own C.-in-C. (Admiral Sohn), but placed under Commander Luosey, U.S.N., for operational control.

As can be imagined, this set-up caused considerable overlapping in the restricted waters which surround the Korean coastline. Moreover, Admiral Joy in Tokyo had so many policy, inter-Service, and political problems to deal with that he could not at first give sufficient personal attention to day-to-day operations and movements of ships, the co-ordination of which suffered until a large staff had been built up. In order to get over this difficulty, Rear-Admiral Andrewes pressed for a co-ordinating naval authority, with a suitable intelligence staff, to be set up at Sasebo, and in due course steps were taken to implement this suggestion.

The Royal Navy command set-up was complicated *vis-à-vis* the United States owing to the fact that Rear-Admiral Andrewes had four separate but interrelated duties to perform, viz.,

¹ Initially based at Okinawa, they later moved to Sasebo, and finally to Yokosuka, whence the main body of the 7th Fleet was by then operating.

² This group was later dispersed.

³ The planning, preparation, and mounting of the assaults were entrusted to Rear-Admiral Doyle by Admiral Joy, but the Commander, 7th Fleet, usually became the force commander for the operation.

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- a. The operation of United Nations ships placed under his operational control by Admiral Joy.
- b. The logistic support of the British Commonwealth and Allied ships forming part of the United Nations forces.
- c. The organization in Japan, with the base and resulting staff.
- d. As Flag-Officer, Second-in-Command, British Far East Station, the administration of all H.M. ships on the station.¹

The C.-in-C., Admiral Sir Patrick Brind, who normally flew his flag at Singapore, did all he could to ease the burden on Rear-Admiral Andrewes's shoulders, readily acceding to all his requirements, and not infrequently anticipating them.²

Rear-Admiral Andrewes kept him fully informed at frequent intervals in a series of detailed reports on the progress of events. Perusal of these reports, and of Sir Patrick Brind's covering letters and remarks, makes it clear that their relationship might well serve as a model for that which should exist between a C.-in-C. and a detached junior flag-officer. Rear-Admiral Andrewes could at all times feel sure of the support and sympathetic response of his C.-in-C., who, having complete confidence in the Rear-Admiral, was content to leave the conduct of his operations to his unfettered judgement. Much of the success of the British Commonwealth's efforts at sea in the Korean War can be ascribed to this happy relationship.

6

On arrival at Okinawa, Rear-Admiral Andrewes called on Vice-Admiral Struble, in the U.S. cruiser *Rochester*. Admiral Struble³ proposed moving the British and American ships into the Yellow Sea as a combined force, and striking against targets in North Korea with aircraft from the carriers *Valley Forge* and *Triumph*. For this purpose Rear-Admiral Hoskins, U.S.N., commanding the 3rd Carrier Division would be in tactical command. Planning for the operation was started at once, and at 1630 that afternoon Admiral Andrewes sailed in the *Belfast* (Captain Sir Aubrey St Clair-Ford, Bt),⁴ with the *Triumph* (Captain A. D. Torlesse), *Cossack* (Captain R. T. White), and *Consort* (Commander J. R. Carr) to the northward, followed by the American squadron consisting of the *Rochester* (flag Vice-Admiral Struble, C.T.F. 77), the *Valley Forge* (flag Rear-Admiral Hoskins, C.T.G. 77·4), and eight destroyers⁵ under Captain Parker, U.S.N. (C.T.G. 77·2), an hour and a

¹ On the Far East Station the Commander-in-Chief maintained his headquarters at Singapore in order to be in direct contact with the Commanders-in-Chief of the other Services and the Commissioner-General for South-east Asia. The Second-in-Command operated, administered, and trained the Fleet, subject to the general control of the Commander-in-Chief for all matters of policy.

² Writing to the C.-in-C. on 5th August 1950, Rear-Admiral Andrewes remarked, 'I must say again how noticeable has been the way in which your administrative staff seems so frequently to have anticipated our requirements. Once or twice it has almost seemed as though someone among them has possessed the power of thought-reading'.

³ For chain of command see Chapter 12 and Appendix E.

⁴ A party of officers was left in the *Valley Forge* to complete the plans and to rejoin by helicopter next day.

⁵ U.S.S.s *Shelton* (C.T.G. 77·2), *Maddox*, *Moore*, *Radford*, *Brush*, *Fletcher*, *Taussig*, *Eversole*.

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half later. The two squadrons effected their rendezvous at about 1100, 2nd July; the British element then became T.G. 77.5.

Throughout the day a northerly course was maintained at about 22 knots, and normal routines of flying off anti-submarine patrols, the transfer of staff officers and orders by helicopter, and so forth went on continuously. No difficulty was experienced by the British ships in working with the Americans. 'It all seemed so familiar . . .', wrote Rear-Admiral Andrewes, 'as it was just what we had done so often during the exercises in March with very similar forces. We didn't feel out of things and were already getting back into the easy use of American signal books.'¹

During the 3rd and 4th July the carrier-borne aircraft carried out attacks on airfields and lines of communication in North Korean territory with the object of slowing up the Communist drive to the south.

The first naval air strikes of the war were flown off between 0545 and 0615, 3rd July, from U.S.S. *Valley Forge* and H.M.S. *Triumph*.² Eight Corsairs, sixteen Skyraiders, and twelve jet aircraft from the former attacked Pyongyang and other airfield targets, destroying fifteen to twenty aircraft on the ground and two in the air. Twelve Firefly and nine Seafire from the *Triumph*, armed with rockets, attacked Haeju airfield; damage was done to hangars and buildings, but no aircraft were sighted. The railway, which was a subsidiary objective, was shrouded in mist. All the aircraft returned safely; flak had been negligible, but slight damage had been inflicted by small-arms fire.

That afternoon the *Valley Forge* flew off another strike of 26 Corsairs and Skyraiders, supported by two fighter sweeps of twelve jets each. On Admiral Hoskin's direction, a second strike from the *Triumph* was not launched, as no escort was available.

Air attacks were continued the next day, 4th July, the *Valley Forge* flying off strikes at 0615 and 1330, which damaged two gun-boats in the Taedong, destroyed one small railway bridge and damaged another, and destroyed or damaged about fifteen locomotives and sundry railway stock.

The *Triumph* could not fly off till 1100, as in the light prevailing southerly wind the *Valley Forge's* morning operations had taken the force too far to the southward for her Fireflies to operate till some northing had been made. Twelve Fireflies and seven Seafires then attacked the railway between Yonan and Haeju, scoring two hits on a bridge. Targets of opportunity were also attacked, including a column of troops in transit. Two U.S. and one British aircraft were damaged by flak.

Of these operations, Admiral Andrewes subsequently remarked that choice of targets for the British aircraft was limited severely by the Firefly's strike-radius, which could not be planned for more than 120 to 130 nautical miles. The versatility of the U.S. aircraft was marked in comparison with the British; both the Skyraider and the Corsair could apparently carry mixed loads of bombs and rockets and drop-tanks, and could be catapulted with any of them.

In spite of the low wind speeds, and the difference of 7 to 8 knots in the maximum speeds of the carriers, the force never became unduly dispersed.

¹ F.O. 2i/c R.o.P. No. 2.

² H.M.S. *Triumph* carried No. 13 Carrier Air Group (Lieutenant-Commander P. B. Jackson), consisting of No. 800 Squadron, twelve Seafire 47 (Lieutenant-Commander I. M. MacLachlan) and No. 827 Squadron, twelve Firefly 1 (Lieutenant-Commander B. C. Lyons).

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As soon as the air strikes were completed, course was shaped to the southward, and this was continued throughout the night. At 0600, 5th July, Rear-Admiral Andrewes in the *Belfast*, together with the *Cossack* and *Consort*, parted company and steered for Sasebo, leaving the *Triumph* with the United States ships. Before separating, an appreciative signal was received from Vice-Admiral Struble congratulating all hands in the British ships on the way they had 'taken their responsibilities, and at the successes already achieved'.

'In fact', wrote Admiral Andrewes, 'things did work well, thanks very largely to our previous practice and knowledge of American ways, signals, and frequently, language.'¹

7

Meanwhile, as the carrier forces were proceeding to their flying-off positions in the Yellow Sea, the *Jamaica* (Captain J. S. Salter) and *Black Swan* (Captain A. D. H. Jay), who, it will be remembered, had been sent to the east coast of Korea, were taking part in the first naval engagement of the war. The *Jamaica* cleared the Shimonoseki Strait at 0830, 30th June, and, after some difficulty in establishing the whereabouts of Rear-Admiral Higgins, U.S.N. (C.T.G. 96.5), eventually joined him a few miles south of latitude 38° N. at dusk that evening.

Admiral Higgins's force consisted of the *Juneau*, and the destroyer *de Haven*; another destroyer, the *Collett*, joined shortly after the *Jamaica*. That night, and throughout 1st July, they cruised in very bad visibility roughly within the area bounded by latitudes 37° 41', 37° 31' N., longitudes 129° 07', 129° 20' E. Their object was to prevent the landing of North Korean forces and agents south of the 38th parallel, and to give all possible support by gun-fire to South Korean forces engaged on the coast; but the situation ashore was very confused, and support by gun-fire was rendered most difficult by the infiltration tactics of the North Koreans, differentiation between the two rival factions being well nigh impossible.

The *Black Swan* and *Alacrity* joined about midnight 1st/2nd July; the *Alacrity* was immediately sent to the west coast, and later on the *Collett* too was detached.

The remaining four ships continued their patrol throughout the night. On 2nd July the weather throughout the day was the exact opposite of that so far experienced—brilliantly fine with exceptionally good visibility.

At daylight, several small craft including four fast motor-boats were sighted steering to the southward close inshore². Admiral Higgins at once ordered action stations and all ships turned to engage. The four M.T.B.s for their part steered straight towards the cruisers at high speed; they made no attempt to attack with torpedoes, but confined themselves to ineffective gun-fire. All four craft were very heavily engaged; one blew up, one beached herself and was destroyed later, one was stopped and subsequently sunk, and the fourth escaped to seaward, zigzagging at high speed. Three other craft, somewhat similar to large motor-launches, were then engaged and destroyed.

Just as this action had been completed, shore batteries opened fire with small-calibre guns; all ships withdrew out of range, which was 12 000 to 14 000 yards. One shot fell close to the *Juneau*'s port quarter, but otherwise nothing fell near.

¹ F.O. 2i/c R.o.P. No. 2.

² None of these vessels had been detected by radar. Their proximity to the land probably accounts for this.

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At about 1100 the *Black Swan* was ordered to close Chumunchin (about nine miles to the northward), where it was thought hostile craft might be sheltering, and to carry out a bombardment of the harbour, the *Juneau* and *Jamaica* covering her in order to counter-attack any shore batteries which might open fire. There was, however, no opposition, but the *Black Swan* was doubtful of the value of the bombardment, observation being very difficult. Another bombardment was carried out that afternoon, again with doubtful results; and after an unidentified radar contact, suspected of being a submarine, the force withdrew to the southward.

That evening the *Jamaica* proceeded to Sasebo to fuel; she rejoined Admiral Higgins on the 5th, who then parted company, leaving Captain Salter in charge of the area.

During the next few days the patrol was continued; various bombardments at cliff roads, bridges, oil tanks, and the harbour of Chumunchin were carried out.

H.M.S. *Hart* relieved the *Black Swan*, and the U.S. destroyer *Swenson* joined the *Jamaica* on 7th July. That day the three ships bombarded Yangyang—the first target in North Korean territory to be bombarded—with apparently satisfactory results. No opposition was encountered either from shore batteries or from the air.

On 8th July there occurred the first British casualties of the war. The *Hart* had been detached to Sasebo at daylight; the *Jamaica* and *Swenson*, having bombarded the coast road in latitude $36^{\circ} 52\frac{1}{2}'$ N., proceeded to Cape Rimuon Ma, on each side of which were 'very attractive' cliff-road targets, which had been bombarded previously. Both ships took these targets under fire with satisfactory results. Effective bombardment of this type of target demands great accuracy, for which close range and slow speed are mandatory; the *Jamaica* was steaming at six knots when a shore battery, whose existence was unknown, opened fire at about 3000 yards range. The battery was promptly taken under fire and silenced, but not before a lucky shot had exploded on the starboard tripod of the mainmast, killing two men outright and wounding a number of others—mostly soldiers from Hong Kong who had embarked as passengers for the summer cruise, and who had volunteered to act as supply parties. No material damage was done to the ship, and it was most unfortunate that a small shell (probably about 75-mm calibre) should have wounded so many men.¹

After retiring to a distance of about 10 000 yards, bombardment of the original objective was continued for a short time, after which both ships patrolled to the southward. Captain Salter had intended to range the coast during the night between latitudes 37° and $37^{\circ} 40'$ N., harassing any motor traffic detected on the coast road, and thwarting any attempt to repair the road block; but at about 2245 an urgent signal from Admiral Higgins arrived to the effect that the South Korean naval base at Pohang was surrounded, expecting imminent attack, and in dire need of support by naval bombardment from the sea. Course was accordingly shaped to the southward, but on arrival in the Pohang area, the whole thing turned out to be a false alarm. The *Jamaica* and *Swenson*, and U.S.S. *Mansfield*, who had also been sent to Pohang, remained in the vicinity for the remainder of the night.

Next morning the *Jamaica* left for Sasebo, stopping to exchange information with Admiral Higgins, whom she met returning to the east coast in the *Juneau*.

¹ Six men were killed outright or died of their wounds (five military other ranks and one able seaman) and were buried at sea next day in latitude $36^{\circ} 02' N.$, longitude $129^{\circ} 42' E.$

Rear-Admiral Andrewes had arrived at Sasebo in the evening of the 5th July, and the next day with Rear-Admiral Higgins, who arrived that morning in the *Juneau*, he visited Admiral Joy in Tokyo.

Both General MacArthur and Admiral Joy had been taken by surprise by the United Nations decision to intervene with force, though each was convinced of the correctness of the decision. No plans were in existence for such an eventuality, and as has been mentioned their forces were scanty.¹ The crucial question was whether the R.o.K. Army could be sufficiently stiffened by the United Nations forces immediately available to retain a foothold in the peninsula for the build-up and deployment of the U.N. reinforcements as they arrived.

Admiral Joy explained to the two Rear-Admirals that he wished them to implement the blockade of Northern Korea, United States forces working on the east coast and British on the west coast. He made it clear that he would issue only broad instructions and would leave the details to the flag-officers concerned. After further talks on 7th July, in which Admiral Joy took the opportunity of mentioning future plans, Admiral Andrewes returned to Sasebo.

There he found much to occupy him. In addition to having to work out his operational plans for the blockade of the west coast, he had to deal with many problems in connexion with a base and the administration of his forces in Japanese waters. The problem was in many ways reminiscent of the Abyssinian War, when the Mediterranean Fleet was based at short notice and for an unknown period at Alexandria. The Far East Fleet was similarly based at Sasebo in July 1950, but in this case the logistical and administrative problems were far more difficult. Alexandria is only about 820 miles from Malta and 2840 miles from the United Kingdom by sea, from which there was also an invaluable daily service by Imperial Airways; Sasebo is 1079 miles from Hong Kong and about 10 580 miles from the United Kingdom. At Alexandria, too, there were docking facilities for small ships as well as some repair facilities and two depot ships; these were lacking at Sasebo.

Sasebo has a good harbour, well protected from the weather; there were, however, no defences. Admiral Andrewes had expected to find a fairly large base, but in fact it was all on a small scale. 'Ashore', he wrote, 'the picture is of a place of what we would call "small port party" status, thrust into the limelight at very short notice and with all members of the party fully extended.' This was due to the use of the port by United States warships in unusually large numbers in addition to Admiral Andrewes's squadron, and to elements of the U.S. 8th Army passing through, the U.S. Navy having taken over from the U.S. Army all transportation of the army and the air force on 1st July. Commander Whalley, U.S.N. (Commander, Fleet Activities), in charge of the base was making progress in providing for the ships using Sasebo, and a measure of logistic support was already available, though not yet highly organized.

It appeared that the British naval forces would soon be fairly well off as regards provisions and fuel. Meanwhile, the R.F.A. *Fort Charlotte*, whose stocks were however getting low, was there, and Admiral Andrewes received a prompt and generous offer of food from the British Commonwealth occupation forces, in

¹ *The Sea War in Korea*, Cagle and Manson.

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addition to American help. The latter had to be used sparingly in order to save dollars.

As regards repair facilities, the base itself was only able to cope with boats and craft up to L.C.T. in size, but the Sasebo Shipbuilding Company—third largest shipyard in Japan, which had little work in hand at the time—was able to take on work on a much larger scale.

Sasebo had little to offer the Fleet in the way of amenities, and the two existing clubs for U.S. ratings proved too small to absorb the numbers landing from H.M. ships when a cruiser and two destroyers were present. A further difficulty arose as both clubs accepted only scrip dollars. It was clear that a larger club for Commonwealth ratings would be necessary, and agreement was reached with the Commander, Fleet Activities, for the loan of another building in which to set up a Fleet canteen.

H.M.H.S. *Maine*, due at Sasebo on 9th July, was, in accordance with the wishes of Admiral Joy, placed at the disposal of Commonwealth and Allied ships entering Sasebo.

Owing to bombardments, the expenditure of 6-inch and 4-inch ammunition had been very heavy; arrangements were accordingly put in hand for replenishment from Hong Kong and the East Indies.

It was plain that the Commander, Fleet Activities, would need someone to provide continuity of liaison from the British side. As a first step Lieutenant (S) McGoldrick, of Admiral Andrewes's staff, was landed with four ratings, and shortly afterwards Lieutenant (E) Pinder, Fleet Engineer's Assistant, joined him to help over fuelling and repairs.

Experience had already shown that Admiral Andrewes—while also going to sea for operations as necessary—would need a headquarters ship at Sasebo to enable him to administer the forces allotted to the west coast blockade and escort force by Admiral Joy, and as early as 7th July he asked for a depot ship. Unfortunately none was available. To meet immediate needs the C.-in-C. sent his dispatch vessel, H.M.S. *Alert*, which arrived at Sasebo 3rd August. Later a Yangtse River steamer, S.S. *Wusueh*, was taken up, renamed *Ladybird*, and commissioned as Headquarters Ship; she arrived at Sasebo in September 1950, and served in that capacity till relieved by H.M.S. *Tyne* in April 1953.

There was also the question of replacement and upkeep of the *Triumph's* aircraft. A choice of programme for H.M.S. *Unicorn* for this purpose were suggested by the C.-in-C., viz.,

- a. Move to air station in the forward area (possibly Iwakuni) with all available aircraft and act as aircraft repair and replenishment ship; or
- b. Disembark A.R.D. plus workshop equipment and stores to H.M.S. *Simbang* (the air station ashore at Singapore) and act as replenishment ship only.

At first it appeared to the C.-in-C. that the first suggestion would be the more efficient, as saving much passage time, but both Admiral Andrewes and Captain Torlesse preferred the second for the following reasons:

- a. It would not be easy to find the *Unicorn* a suitable base for her task. Admiral Joy was averse to basing carriers in Japanese waters, and though it would have been practicable to base her at Okinawa, this would have been unsatisfactory.

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- b. Work would progress more surely at *Simbang* and the policy of manning and equipping the air station would be maintained.
- c. H.M.S. *Unicorn* would not be a drain on logistics in the forward area. On these grounds the second alternative proposed by the C.-in-C. was adopted.

Admiral Andrewes had already on 4th July requested R.A.F. Sunderland co-operation with his task group. The Air Officer Commanding, Hong Kong (Air-Commodore Davies), and the Commanding Officer 88 Squadron visited him at Sasebo on 8th July, and though Air Ministry approval for R.A.F. operations in Korea had not yet been received, it was arranged that one Sunderland should be based in Japan for communication duties with the Royal Navy. This aircraft would also be available for occasional patrol duty as required by Admiral Andrewes when approval for operations was given. Sasebo not being an all-weather air base, facilities for the Sunderland were arranged at Iwakuni, where the U.S. Navy was concentrating its flying-boats.

9

While these administrative matters were being put in hand, plans for implementing the blockade were being worked out. Over-all instructions on matters of policy were issued by Admiral Joy. These included notes on the international law governing blockade and directions for the treatment of ships attempting to evade it.¹ The instructions for the United States Navy governing maritime and aerial warfare were adopted for all United Nations ships participating.

No-one knew at that time to what extent the Russians were prepared to intervene on behalf of their North Korean puppets, and obviously it was desirable to avoid an 'incident'. United Nations warships were enjoined to keep well clear of Manchurian and Russian coasts.

A somewhat ticklish question arose regarding the policy to be adopted towards unidentified submarines. Admiral Joy's original instruction read:

' Unidentified submarines are a threat to our operations when in the vicinity of friendly forces. They will therefore be attacked and driven off.'

Admiral Brind felt that this policy could result in incidents with Russian submarines which might have awkward political repercussions, and he therefore suggested that all warships not engaged in Korean police action should be warned publicly to **keep** away from a defined war zone. This, however, was not acceptable to the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations in Washington, (Admiral Forrest P. Sherman), but Admiral Joy's instructions were amended (25th July) to read:

' An unidentified submarine can be attacked and driven off by any means available in self-defence, or when offensive action against our forces is indicated. . . . Submergence of unidentified submarine in position to attack our forces operating against North Korea is considered to indicate offensive action against our forces.'²

¹ As a matter of policy, Soviet and other warships (except North Korean) not under the operational control of C.-in-C., Far East, might be permitted to enter North Korean ports. Entry was to be denied to all transport and supply vessels and merchant ships, armed or unarmed.

² Reference to reports of such attacks was to be classified TOP SECRET.

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In reporting this decision to the Admiralty, Sir Patrick Brind remarked that an attack carried out in accordance with these instructions might possibly be construed as aggression, but 'there is little doubt that a submerged submarine is up to no good', and he recommended that no further comment should be made on the instructions. There the matter rested; in the event, no such situation arose during the war.

As regards air attack, it was laid down that aircraft endangering ships might be fired on at any time.

On 8th July 1950, Rear-Admiral Andrewes issued his first operation order to his ships, known as Task Group 96·8, in which he outlined his intentions for operations in western Korean waters. He laid down as his object:

- a. Enforcement of blockade of the coast occupied by North Koreans.
- b. Prevention of infiltration by sea on coasts held by South Koreans.
- c. Provision of naval support as required against North Korean maritime forces or land targets.

The operational area was bounded on the north by the parallel of 39° 30' N. and on the east by the west and south coasts of Korea as far as longitude 128° E. (55 miles west of Pusan). No western or southern limit was laid down.

To carry out these duties, Admiral Andrewes divided his task group into three task units, viz.,

T.U. 96·8·1. *Belfast, Cossack, Consort*, under Rear-Admiral Andrewes.

T.U. 96·8·2. *Jamaica, Black Swan, Alacrity*, under Captain Salter (*Jamaica*).

T.U. 96·8·4. *Kenya*,¹ *Cockade*, under Captain Brock (*Kenya*).

Each of these units worked separately, and carried out patrols in the blockade area in rotation, as ordered, arranging the details of its own patrol in the light of current intelligence and so on, and informing Vice-Admiral Joy, Rear-Admiral Andrewes, and Rear-Admiral Higgins, whose Task Group 96·5 carried out similar duties from longitude 128° E. up the east coast of Korea, of its intentions before sailing.

Though the objects of these British and American patrols were similar, their operations differed considerably owing to the geographical differences between the east and west coasts. The east coast is steep to, with few islands, so that a close blockade of inshore traffic could be maintained. The west coast, on the other hand, is fringed by many islands, and the sea is very shallow near the coast owing to extensive mud-flats and silting. Consequently, blockade by large vessels close inshore was difficult, and there was danger of the enemy sending supplies in shallow-draught junks by inshore routes out of reach till carrier-borne aircraft became available to examine and deal with them.

A further feature of the east coast, not repeated on the west coast, is the narrowness of the coastal strip between the sea and the high range of hills running roughly

¹ The *Kenya, Cockade* and *Comus* had arrived in Japanese waters early in July. The two former were assigned to Rear-Admiral Andrewes's Task Group 96·8, the *Comus* to H.M.S. *Triumph* working with the 7th Fleet.

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north and south; this rendered road and rail communications to the eastward of the hills very vulnerable to naval gun-fire.

The other main geographical consideration was the large range of tides on the west coast—as much as 31 feet at Inchon; this had its disadvantages, but later on, when the enemy mining campaign started, it was of assistance, as it caused mines to be uncovered at low water, and enabled them to be safely passed at high water.

10

At 0600, Sunday 9th July, Rear-Admiral Andrewes sailed in the *Belfast* with the *Cossack* and *Consort* in company to inaugurate the blockade of the west coast of Korea. These operations will be described in some detail, as being typical of the work carried out throughout the war.

The *Cossack* proceeded to Pusan to pick up South Korean liaison teams¹ which were then embarked in each ship. The passage north of Quelpart Island, apart from bad weather, was uneventful, and course was then set up the west coast of Korea.

Throughout the patrol Admiral Andrewes kept the force concentrated for mutual protection against possible air attack, as air cover could not be provided at the distance from our bases at which most of it took place (over 400 miles from Sasebo). A zigzag was carried out, and the destroyers, except when detached for some special purpose, maintained a 'bent-line' screen ahead of the *Belfast*. Once in the Yellow Sea, the weather on this occasion was almost continuously good off that notoriously foggy coast.

At dawn² 10th July, the force was off Inchon and a sweep was made sufficiently far in to sight both the main channel and the Flying Fish Channel, and to explore behind the islands off the entrance. A few junks were engaged in fishing, but that was all, so the force stood to seaward and then shaped course to the northward to intercept any ships on passage from Chinnampo to Inchon. Nothing was sighted; it seemed as though the sea had been swept clear of anything larger than small fishing vessels. On arrival south of the Techong islands, the *Cossack* was detached to pass inside the group. Still nothing was sighted, and as soon as the *Cossack* rejoined, a cast was taken to the west-south-west and later to the north to cover the comparatively narrow waters (about 100 miles) between Choppeki Point and the Shantung promontory. During the night the routes between Dairen and Chinnampo were covered by a sweep extending north to 38° 40' N., 123° 40' W. On several occasions they were deceived by radar 'gremlins', and more than once increased speed and made for a shadow that broke up and vanished; but no shipping was encountered.

Next morning, 11th July, dawn found T.U. 96·8·1 again off the Techong islands, and a sweep was made to the entrance to Inchon. A few junks were questioned, but no shipping was met with, and Admiral Andrewes turned north,

¹ These teams consisted of a South Korean naval officer, a civilian interpreter, and in some cases a naval signal rating. They were useful for supplying information on their country, identifying their own naval craft which patrolled South Korean waters, and for interrogating Korean fishermen and the like. Some anxiety was, however, felt over the civilians who, collected at short notice, had not been properly screened. It was therefore decided to land them, keeping only the naval personnel.

² Sunrise 0621; civil twilight started 0551 (zone minus 10).

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again passing close to the Techong group, this time sending the *Consort* inside. Again nothing was sighted, so he proceeded to the entrance to Chinnampo. The southern limit of the entrance is well marked, but to the north are endless shoals and shallows, the port lying over 20 miles up a narrow and tortuous approach. That night much the same movements as the night before were carried out, in order to cross the possible northern shipping routes, and to be off Choppeki Point at dawn.

Early in the morning of the 12th July, came the one excitement to break the monotony of the patrol. Admiral Andrewes had just started to sweep to the southward, detaching the *Cossack* (Captain White) at about 0600 to pass inside the Techong islands. She had barely been lost to sight behind the island when she was engaged by shore batteries on Pengyong do, the largest and most northerly of the group. 'This', remarked the Admiral, 'surprised me a lot, as I did not think the enemy would have had field artillery on an outlying island.'

A short but hot engagement ensued in which the *Cossack* silenced two guns at ranges of from 5000 to 8000 yards, firing about 140 rounds. Ten or more enemy shells fell within 200 yards of her, but she was undamaged, and in due course rejoined Admiral Andrewes, who had increased speed to support her from the south in case of further action from either of the other islands. All was quiet, however, and course was resumed for the entrance to Inchon. As its outlying islands were approached from the north-west, a good deal of air activity was noticed over the land within about 25 miles.

After standing to the southward for an hour or so, course was altered to the northward, and during the afternoon the approaches to the Seoul River were examined, after which the usual sweep to the north-west was undertaken.

About midnight 12th/13th July, a signal reached Admiral Andrewes, which reported that the crew of a B-29 had baled out near Poromu to (37° 40' N., 126° 10' E.), and that a flying-boat was being sent to search the area at 0900—'could the Admiral give support?'. Poromu lies in the estuary of the Seoul River; shoals and mud-banks run some 30 miles to seaward of it, and the last survey of the area had been made some 68 years previously.

Admiral Andrewes took his force to seaward of the shoals and remained in that vicinity. By 1030, 13th, nothing further had been heard. The *Cossack* had just been ordered to approach Poromu to cautiously in the hope that the survivors might be making their escape by junk or sampan, when the flying-boat made contact and reported that a thorough search had revealed nothing. So Admiral Andrewes reluctantly abandoned the search¹ and set course to the southward to meet Captain Salter's group—the *Jamaica*, *Alacrity* and *Black Swan*—which took over the patrol that afternoon, the Admiral with his group returning to Sasebo, where he arrived at 1015, 14th July.

'During all this time of uncertainty yet great activity', he wrote, 'the morale of ships' companies has been high and their keenness undoubted. For a great many officers and ratings this has been their first experience of war conditions and routine and they have conditioned themselves quickly.'

¹ All but three of the crew of the B-29 were picked up later by Captain Salter's force.

CHAPTER 2

U.N. Retreat to Pusan

Section

- 11 Fighting on shore, July–August 1950.
- 12 Bombarding operations, east coast, 17th–21st July.
- 13 H.M.S. *Triumph* with U.S. 7th Fleet.
- 14 Conferences at Sasebo.
- 15 Reorganization of U.N. naval forces.
- 16 Operations on west coast, 28th July–2nd August.
- 17 H.M. Ships *Belfast* and *Kenya* bombard Inchon.
- 18 Doubts about efficacy of blockade.
- 19 Departure of H.M.S. *Belfast*: ‘split-staff’ organization.
- 20 West coast operations, August–September.
- 21 Arrival of 41st Independent R.M. Commando.
- 22 Fighting on shore and east coast operations, August–September.

II

WHILE the initial measures to mobilize the United Nations forces were being put in train, the drive of the North Korean armies to the south had continued relentlessly.

Advance elements of the U.S. 24th Infantry Division had arrived in Korea by air on 2nd July, and of these, a small force first came into action with greatly superior enemy forces at Osan, some eight miles south of Suwon, on the 5th. The remainder of the 24th Division, having arrived by sea, were in action two days later. They were followed by the 25th Division, which completed its movement to Korea on the 14th. These formations had to be employed piecemeal, as they arrived, to stiffen the much-battered R.o.K. forces; but they could merely fight a series of delaying actions.¹ By the 15th July the line ran approximately from Chonju in the west through Taejon to Yongdok on the east coast; still the pressure continued. See Figure 3.

At this time the prospects for holding a foothold in the peninsula seemed poor.

¹ General MacArthur summarized the situation thus:

‘The immediate problem is that of blocking the advance of the enemy ground and flanking units now advancing on every highway and trail in Korea from coast to coast. Our estimates construe that the North Koreans are employing a total force of nine divisions supported by attached armour. The morale of their forces is extremely high and is being spurred by a continuous advance southward . . .’

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


Figure 3. North Korean advance, 25th June - 30th July 1950

U.N. RETREAT TO PUSAN

The port of Pusan was already congested, and the refugee-jammed roads from Pusan to Taejon could accommodate no more troops or trucks.

The situation was saved by the landing of the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division at Pohang on the east coast by Rear-Admiral Doyle's Amphibious Force on the 18th July. They arrived just before the North Korean forces, driving down the coast, reached the little port, and their landing was unopposed. From then onwards, the North Korean advance was gradually slowed, owing to increased resistance and the extension of their lines of communication. But a dangerous situation arose in late July owing to a swift advance by the North Korean 6th Division. Using skilful infiltration tactics and moving mostly at night down the west coast, they arrived at Mokpo, the South Korean naval base in the extreme south west of the peninsula, by 24th July. There were few U.N. ground forces in the 150 miles separating them from Pusan, and the 8th Army was faced with the danger of encirclement. Close support by carrier-borne aircraft played an important part in coping with this crisis.

It was not until mid-August, after very heavy fighting, that the front was stabilized on a line from Chindongni, 30 miles west of Pusan, running north roughly along the line of the River Naktong to Waegwan, and thence east to Pohang. Using the natural barrier of the river, U.N. forces were able to hold heavy attacks by the North Koreans while, for the next month, the build up in the Pusan area of their own forces for a counter-offensive continued steadily.

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Rear-Admiral Andrewes's visit to Sasebo, which he reached on 14th July after the west-coast patrol, was not of long duration. With the enemy pressing down the east coast, H.M.S. *Belfast*, having heavier guns than the *Juneau*, might be of great assistance to Rear-Admiral Higgins's T.G. 96·5 in the combined duty of patrol and army support. He therefore offered the *Belfast* and *Cossack* to Admiral Joy to assist on the east coast for a few days, to which Admiral Joy assented, subject to the stipulation that a minimum of three ships should be permanently on the west coast.

Admiral Andrewes therefore spent only about 48 hours at Sasebo—a period which he described as one of operational and administrative stocktaking.

While he was there, H.M. Government decided to stop all supplies of oil to Communist China. A tanker, S.S. *Fusus*, carrying motor spirit was then about to enter the Yellow Sea bound for Tientsin; she was diverted to Sasebo by the *Jamaica*.

By this time reinforcements from overseas were beginning to arrive, and on 16th July, H. Neth. M.S. *Evertsen* (Lieutenant-Commander Van Doorninck) joined Admiral Andrewes's flag, 'her business-like appearance making a very favourable impression'.

Early next day, the Admiral sailed in the *Belfast* with the *Cossack* in company for a week on the east coast. After communicating with Pusan, he met the U.S. destroyers *Mansfield* and *de Haven*, which were operating roughly abreast of where the front line lay that evening. Commodore Allan, U.S.N. (S.O. 9th Destroyer Squadron), and Major Bennett, a U.S. artillery officer, at once boarded the *Belfast* to discuss how they could best assist the army. Lack of communications, the fluid situation on shore, and lack of observers made close support impracticable, and it

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was decided that the two American destroyers should remain near the front line, while the *Belfast* and *Cossack* proceeded up the coast to exercise blockade and harass the enemy whenever possible.

After firing a brief unobserved harassing bombardment at two targets given by Major Bennett, the two British ships proceeded to the northward. During the night the lights of enemy traffic negotiating the tortuous road along the coast were engaged on several occasions, and at dawn, 18th July, the *Belfast* carried out a direct bombardment of Yangyang ($38^{\circ} 06' N.$) while the *Cossack* fired at the harbour installations at Sukcho ($38^{\circ} 13' N.$), a small North Korean naval base. Then, proceeding south, both ships bombarded harbour installations at the former South Korean naval base at Mokko ($37^{\circ} 31' N.$), the *Belfast* later succeeding in demolishing a stretch of the cliff road where it ran round a headland ($36^{\circ} 52' N.$). While these activities were going on, Rear-Admiral Doyle's Amphibious Force was busy landing the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division at Pohang, some 50 miles to the southward.

That afternoon Admiral Andrewes met Admiral Higgins in the *Juneau*, with the *Mansfield* and *de Haven* in company, and shortly afterwards the *de Haven* and the *Cossack* were detached—the latter being required for the west coast patrol. The situation ashore was still obscure, and communication with the army almost non-existent, so the Fleet Gunnery Officer (Commander H. R. Law), and the Bombardment Liaison Officer (Captain K. McQueen, R.A.), with an officer from the *Juneau*, were landed at Kokodo ($36^{\circ} 28' N.$) to find out what was happening. They managed to get in touch with the H.Q. of an American battalion, which, with an artillery regiment were the only U.S. troops in the locality. The R.o.K. line had been broken, and the enemy was only about three miles to the north.

Arrangements for communications¹ between two artillery observers and the cruisers *Juneau* and *Belfast* having been made, the party returned to their ships that evening. While they were on shore, the *Belfast* had bombarded enemy concentrations in the Yonghae area ($36^{\circ} 33' N.$) with aircraft spotting; the results, which included blowing up an ammunition dump, appeared satisfactory.

The spotting arrangements made the previous evening, though still 'elementary', proved their worth the next day (19th July). Both the *Belfast* and the *Juneau* engaged enemy troops and gun positions with air observation and with observers on the ground. 'The reported results seemed more optimistic than the spotting corrections seemed to warrant . . .', remarked Admiral Andrewes, but 'the effect of shore or air observation was to make an enormous improvement in value of bombardments as compared with the unobserved fire of the previous day.'²

During the afternoon, three further bombardments were carried out by the *Belfast* in the Yongdok area, using ground observers. After the last of these shoots, the observer announced that Yongdok no longer existed. In the course of the day she had fired 350 rounds of 6-inch, and there is little doubt that the naval gun-fire was largely instrumental in stemming the enemy advance during the afternoon and evening. 'H.M.S. *Belfast*'s guns spoke with authority . . .', signalled Rear-Admiral Higgins. 'Experienced shore-observer reports results of bombardment as "terrific".' He also referred to her 'fast-firing crew'.

¹ The army was given one naval wireless set, and one army set was taken from the army. This provided two support channels depending on one set at each end.

² The Admiral also remarked that there is little doubt that, except for an important value in raising the morale of our own troops and upsetting that of the enemy, the unobserved bombardment is of little value.

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The *Belfast* remained in the vicinity, firing occasionally on enemy troops as opportunity offered for the next couple of days, and on 21st July carried out a prearranged shoot with the *Juneau* and a destroyer for an hour in support of R.o.K. forces which recaptured Yongdok. That afternoon, Admiral Andrewes parted company with Admiral Higgins and set course for Sasebo. There had been some anxiety about the progress of a typhoon (nicknamed 'Grace') towards the area of operations, but by that time it was filling in, and apart from encountering a wind of force 6 to 7, no difficulty was experienced. 'There is no doubt, however', Admiral Andrewes remarked, 'that war in the summer months in these waters is made more difficult and more anxious by reason of typhoons.'

H.M.S. *Belfast* reached Sasebo at 0700, 22nd July without further incident. The *Unicorn* had arrived there a couple of days earlier, with spare aircraft for the *Triumph*, and a large mixed cargo of stores and ammunition. The *Triumph* arrived later in the day to repack a stern-gland which had long been giving trouble.

13

H.M.S. *Triumph*, after parting company with Rear-Admiral Andrewes on 5th July, had proceeded to Buckner Bay, Okinawa, with Admiral Struble's 7th Fleet. There she remained, except for one day's training at sea, until 16th July, when she and the *Comus* accompanied T.F. 77 to sea to cover the U.S. landing operations under Rear-Admiral Doyle at Pohang on 18th July.

At Pohang, there was a usable airfield, a fair anchorage, and a thousand-yard stretch of sandy beach. A single-track railroad ran westward into Taegu, and thence north-westward to Taejon. On 10th July it had been decided to land the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division there—at that time a safe distance from the advancing North Korean armies. Plans and preparations were made remarkably quickly. Between the 11th and 13th, a reconnaissance by staff officers of the Amphibious Force was carried out on shore, while two army transports were rapidly fitted out as assault cargo ships, and six ex-Japanese L.S.U.s¹ were got ready at Yokosuka and added to Rear-Admiral, Doyle's Command. The assault forces left Yokosuka on 15th July, not knowing whether their objective would be in enemy hands or not; but all went well—largely owing to Rear-Admiral Higgins's bombarding operations previously mentioned; the landing was effected without opposition on 18th July, and by that evening 10 027 troops, 2027 vehicles, and 2729 tons of cargo had been put ashore. A week later this division was blunting the enemy's drive down the Taegu-Pusan highway.

As soon as it was clear, early on the 18th, that the landing would be unopposed, Rear-Admiral Doyle released the 7th Fleet aircraft from their support role. Vice-Admiral Struble had already decided to attack targets of opportunity north of the 38th parallel after the landing; he accordingly proceeded to the northward, and that afternoon, 21 aircraft from the *Valley Forge* (eleven A.D. Skyraiders, each carrying one 1000-lb and one 500-lb bomb, and two high-velocity aircraft rockets; and ten F-4U Corsairs, each carrying two rockets) attacked the Chosin oil refinery² south of Wonsan, completely destroying it.

¹ Landing-ships, utility.

² This refinery was the largest in Korea, with an estimated annual output of 1 700 000 barrels.

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Further strikes against North Korean targets were carried out by the *Valley Forge* aircraft on the 19th. Typhoon Grace prevented operations on the 20th, and the task force remained at sea in the vicinity of Uruyon to (37° 30' N., 130° 55' E.), shaping course towards Tsushima Strait in the evening.

During these operations, H.M.S. *Triumph* played a strenuous if unspectacular part—that of providing anti-submarine and combat air patrols for the task force. On 18th July, 32 sorties (65 flying-hours), and on the 19th, 37 sorties (75 flying-hours) were flown. Apart from the recovery of a downed pilot from the *Valley Forge* by the Sea Otter in difficult sea conditions there were no incidents of interest. Rear-Admiral Andrewes described the restriction of H.M.S. *Triumph's* aircraft to the C.A.P. and A/S.P. roles as 'galling',

'but unquestionably correct in the circumstances. The Seafire 47 is superior to the Corsair as a defensive fighter, while the strike radius of the Firefly is only half that of the U.S. Skyraider'.

All this time the condition of the *Triumph's* starboard stern-gland, owing to steady deterioration of the packing, had been causing trouble, and on 21st July, Captain Torlesse decided that it would be unwise to remain at sea for the further two days' operations then in prospect. The *Triumph* and *Comus* were accordingly detached to Sasebo, where they arrived the next day, shortly after Rear-Admiral Andrewes. There, the repacking of the stern-gland was at once put in hand, and the opportunity taken to embark twelve aircraft and 136 tons of stores from the *Unicorn* and *Fort Charlotte*.

H.M.S. *Triumph* did not stay long at Sasebo. On 24th July, an urgent call came from the army for assistance by carrier-borne aircraft. That day, U.S. naval air reconnaissance reported large movements of unidentified troops in south-west Korea, and it was suddenly realized that these troops, who, during their progress down the west coast had been reported by the R.o.K. police as merely guerrillas, were in fact regular North Korean Army units in force, and that the U.S. 8th Army was in serious danger of encirclement. Close air support was imperative; there were, however, difficulties in the way of its provision.

At this time, there were two systems of operating U.S. aircraft for close support. In the U.S. Air Force, as in the R.A.F., far greater importance and priority was given to 'strategic air' than to 'tactical air'. Command over close-support aircraft was not exercised by front-line units, but was jointly co-ordinated at army level. Strike aircraft were assigned to a particular mission by the Joint Operations Centre, and were then controlled by liaison-type aircraft, not by ground parties. Close-air-support targets were considered to be those within the battle zone, as much as ten miles away from the front line. Owing to the functions of the Army and the air force in Japan prior to the outbreak of the Korean War, no air/ground training had been carried out, nor was there a tactical control system in existence.

The navy/Marine system, on the other hand, had been largely developed in the Pacific War as an integral part of an amphibious assault. A certain number of aircraft were allocated to the ground commander, who could make use of them as and when he saw fit. A few aircraft constantly orbited the battlefield, ready to strike at close-air-support targets that were within 50 to 200 yards of the immediate front lines. The pilots received information and directions from a trained crew directly in the front line. The efficacy of the support obviously depended on the efficiency of the ground crew and their communications.

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Faced with the dangerous situation created by the appearance of the enemy in force in south-west Korea, the 8th Army urgently appealed to Vice-Admiral Struble for the assistance of his naval aircraft. Admiral Struble wasted no time in replying that the carrier-borne aircraft would be made available, but he included a warning that their value for close air support depended entirely on satisfactory communications and control.¹ At midnight, 24th/25th July, he proceeded to sea with Task Force 77 (including the *Triumph* and *Comus*) and steered for the area north of Quelpart Island. During 26th and 27th July, aircraft from the *Valley Forge* operated over the Kunsan-Chonju-Kwangju area, but the results were very minor owing to lack of satisfactory air-ground communications. The Fleet withdrew to the south during the night of the 27th, refuelling the destroyers, and then, in deteriorating weather, proceeded to the west coast for further air strikes, on the 28th and 29th. These were more successful than on the first two days, but a satisfactory system of control and air-ground communication obviously could not be produced from nothing without considerable organization and training.

The *Triumph* continued her role of supplying anti-submarine and combat air patrols, averaging 42 sorties (84 flying-hours) on each of the four days the strikes were carried out. An unfortunate incident occurred on 28th July when Commissioned Pilot White of 800 Squadron was shot down by a U.S.A.F. B-29 'for no very apparent reason'.² Mr White was picked up, suffering from burns, by a U.S. destroyer and transferred to the *Triumph* later in the day.

On 30th July, the *Triumph's* service with the 7th Fleet came to an end. Throughout the operations, her stern-gland had caused considerable anxiety, and she was detached with the *Comus* to Kure for ten days' self-maintenance. By the end of that period, another U.S. carrier, the *Philippine Sea*, had joined Admiral Struble's force, and the *Triumph* then became part of Rear-Admiral Andrewes's west coast patrol.

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While the carrier forces were engaged on these operations, Rear-Admiral Andrewes had remained at Sasebo. Shortly after his arrival there on 22nd July, Vice-Admiral Struble put in with the 7th Fleet, and also two 8-inch-gun cruisers, U.S.S.s *Helena* and *Toledo*, recently arrived to augment the east Korean forces. In addition, there were H.M. Ships *Belfast*, *Triumph*, *Unicorn*, and *Kenya*. With such tempting targets in the harbour, Admiral Andrewes stationed a destroyer in the entrance as sonar guard, which he kept there till the 24th, when all the heavy ships except the *Belfast* had left.

During this stay at Sasebo, various senior officers visited the port, and Admiral Andrewes had some valuable conferences. The visiting officers included Sir Patrick Brind's Chief of Staff, Commodore G. F. Burghard, with whom he discussed 'the whole gamut of our needs and troubles, refit programmes, personnel, logistics, my headquarters ship and so on'; and senior Royal Air Force officers from Singapore and Hong Kong, with whom the employment of Sunderlands in the

¹ Admiral Joy, in answering the 8th Army emergency signal, sounded the same note. To Admiral Struble he signalled: ' . . . The calculated risk of damage to friendly forces must be accepted. The ground situation is so critical that commencement of operations on 25th is highly desirable . . . '

² H.M.S. *Triumph* R.o.P., 1st August 1950.

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Korean operations was considered. Admiral Andrewes was 'shocked to learn that there were no air-gunners available to man the defensive armament of these aircraft, and little prospect of getting any'.¹ It was agreed that day air patrols over the Yellow Sea were not acceptable, and that the Sunderlands should be employed on night patrols and in more local A/S work, but the Admiral made it clear that he would not be operating them; they would be under the control of Captain Alderman, U.S.N. (C.T.E. 96·21), who was responsible for all operations by shore-based maritime aircraft in the Korean theatre.

Meetings also took place with Vice-Admiral Joy, who arrived from Tokyo, Rear-Admiral Hartman, U.S.N., who had arrived in the *Helena*, and Rear-Admiral Higgins, who put in to shift his flag from the *Juneau* to the *Toledo*. Almost every side of the war as it affected the naval forces was discussed. Admiral Joy outlined his general proposals for the organization of his forces with a view to making the combined effort more flexible. He also mentioned that he was sending a section of the highly organized American fleet train (a destroyer depot ship, provision, refrigerator ships, and so on) to Sasebo, and pressed Admiral Andrewes to make every use of its many facilities for his forces.

Actually, our own supply arrangements—oil, food, stores and ammunition—were working very satisfactorily² at the time, and the arrival from Hong Kong of S.S. *Choyang*³ as temporary armament stores issuing ship, assured the British Commonwealth ships an adequate ammunition reserve for current operations, with the sole exception of 4·7-inch ammunition.

Meanwhile, the west coast blockade had been maintained without incident by the *Kenya*'s and *Jamaica*'s task units, and the movements of the Escort Element under Captain Jay, R.N., were continued between Sasebo and Pusan as necessary. The east coast patrol, about to be reinforced by the *Helena*, *Toledo*, and four additional destroyers, was carrying out frequent bombardments against enemy troops in the Yongdok area, against bridges and the coast road.

15

By this time, substantial naval reinforcements were arriving in the theatre of war, and Vice-Admiral Joy promulgated a reorganization of his forces, which took effect on 27th July, placing all blockade and support ships in a single task group, known as T.G. 96·5, under the command of Rear-Admiral Hartman, U.S.N. This appointment was a step towards the establishment of the co-ordinating authority at Sasebo recommended by Rear-Admiral Andrewes;⁴ but as Admiral Hartman wore his flag in the *Helena*, and was also in tactical command of a 'task element' on the east coast, he himself was frequently at sea, and the co-ordination suffered accordingly.

As before, the task of blockading Korea was divided between the east and west

¹ F.O. 2i/c R.o.P. No. 7.

² This was only because ships were still within their stores endurance. Spare gear was not yet a problem. Later, shortages arose—e.g., a dearth of radio and radar valves—which endangered the operational capacity of the Fleet.

³ S.S. *Choyang* had a northern Chinese crew, and it was known that on recent voyages to Tientsin this crew had received indoctrination by Communists. A seaman guard from Hong Kong was maintained on board.

⁴ See p. 14.

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coasts, the west coast being the responsibility of Rear-Admiral Andrewes, to whom were assigned all British Commonwealth and Allied (other than U.S.) forces (T.E. 96·53) except the frigates¹, which joined the Escort Element (T.E. 96·50) commanded by Captain Jay, working directly under Admiral Joy, and the *Triumph* and *Comus*, which until the 30th remained part of the 7th Fleet. The east coast continued to be the responsibility of the United States forces working in two elements, viz., T.E. 96·51 under Rear-Admiral Hartman (flag, *Helena*), and T.E. 96·52 under Rear-Admiral Higgins (flag, *Toledo*).

Rear-Admiral Andrewes divided his task element into three task units as before, destroyers being allocated to these units as required, viz.,

T.U. 96·53·1. *Belfast*: C.T.U. Rear-Admiral Andrewes.

T.U. 96·53·2. *Jamaica*: C.T.U. Captain Salter.

T.U. 96·53·3. *Kenya*: C.T.U. Captain Brock.

Admiral Joy had stated that there were strong indications that the North Koreans were using Inchon for resupply, and he also thought they might be using South Korean fishing craft further south. Admiral Andrewes accordingly modified his instructions for the patrol, stressing the importance of a close blockade of Inchon and Kunsan, and accepting the necessary reduction in the efficiency of the patrol elsewhere. R.o.K. units were to be used for inshore patrol, where shoals and off-lying islands made it difficult for the larger ships to operate.

16

On 28th July, Rear-Admiral Andrewes left Sasebo in H.M.S. *Belfast* with H.M.A.S. *Bataan* and H.M.S. *Charity* (T.U. 96·53·1), and the next day relieved the *Kenya*'s task unit on patrol. The *Charity* was detached to the Kunsan area, and the *Belfast* and *Bataan* carried on to Inchon.

It did not take the Admiral long to confirm his opinion that no appreciable deep-sea or coastal movement of seaborne supplies was taking place in waters that could be reached by cruisers or destroyers, but he found that the R.o.K. patrol vessels had been patrolling too far to seaward, and he set about remedying this. These vessels were diesel-engined coastal craft, some of Japanese and some of American origin, similar to our H.D.M.L.s in general characteristics, though not in appearance. Three² of them, based on an L.S.T. lying off Taehuksao (34° 40' N., 125° 25' E.), were operating in the Inchon area. The senior officer, Commander Lee, R.o.K.N., in No. 702—'a clean little ship with plenty of "go" about her'³—spoke good English and was very ready to fall in with the Admiral's plans. Two days before (27th), Nos 702 and 703 had fallen in with a convoy of twelve motor supply vessels of about 50 tons each near Takuchaku to (37° 17' N., 126° 08' E.)—some 27 miles to seaward of Inchon—and destroyed them all by gun-fire. The first known attempt at running the blockade had ended badly for the Communists.

While on patrol, the *Belfast* saw a good deal of No. 702, providing her with food and water, getting her radar to work, and carrying out various small repair and

¹ H.M.S.s *Black Swan*, *Hart*, H.M.A.S. *Shoalhaven*, H.M.N.Z.S.s *Tutira*, *Pukaki*.

² Nos 702, 502, 313; four others, Nos 309, 505, 513 and 703, were operating further south.

³ F.O. 2i/c, R.o.P. No. 8.

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maintenance jobs¹ for her to enable her to remain at sea without returning to her base 180 miles to the south. 'We have become quite attached to 702', wrote Admiral Andrewes. 'She comes like a dog when called, accepts what we can give, and goes off hunting with vigour. If the others were equally good, I am sure they would be a useful force'

The activities of the R.o.K. inshore patrol off Inchon and Kunsan were, however, soon interrupted. Namhae Island, lying off the south flank of the U.N. forces about 50 miles west of Pusan, was occupied by about 1000 enemy troops, and on 2nd August, a concentration there of R.o.K. vessels under the control of a destroyer was ordered by Admiral Joy.

So far as the interception of shipping was concerned, the patrol was completely uneventful; but on 31st July the *Charity* fired a few rounds at a villa, about 20 miles north of Kunsan, believed to contain a North Korean headquarters.

On 1st August, there occurred the first Australian naval engagement of the war. H.M.A.S. *Bataan* (Commander Marks, R.A.N.), patrolling the northern approaches to the Seoul River, was in position 37° 40' N., 125° 35' E., when at 1840 a shore battery of seven guns opened a well-directed fire on her. The *Bataan* replied with 150 rounds and silenced four of the guns. The *Belfast*, which had been sweeping to seaward, closed on hearing the firing and fired a further 56 rounds in failing light at the remnant of the battery, the *Bataan* flank-marking for her.

On the 2nd August, the *Cossack* (Captain White) and *Cockade* (Lieutenant-Commander Lee), which had sailed from Sasebo the day before, entered the narrow waters off Mokpo and carried out a prolonged bombardment, with air spotting by Lieutenant Handley of the *Triumph* for the *Cossack*, and by Captain Thompson, R.A., for the *Cockade*. The object of the operation was to create a diversion in the rear of the North Korean forces which were thrusting towards Pusan from the westward. Fire was opened at 0820, and continued for a couple of hours, by which time nearly 1000 rounds of 4.5-inch ammunition had been expended. Fires were started, and buildings in the factory area, oil tanks and refinery, railway sidings and rolling-stock were damaged. There was no opposition from the shore, indeed the *Cockade* remarked that the town appeared to be deserted.

Rear-Admiral Andrewes considered that the operation was well planned and executed, especially as neither of the spotters had had any opportunity of working with the ships previously. He thought it might well have discouraged the enemy from using Mokpo as a port from which to ship supplies eastwards along the south coast to the advancing army, but that was the most that could be hoped for, since not being on the direct line of advance, it was unlikely that any considerable numbers of the enemy were in the town.

Having completed the bombardment, Captain White took his two ships to the northward and joined Admiral Andrewes, who had turned over the patrol to the *Kenya* earlier in the day. Some redistribution of the destroyers on patrol was ordered, and the *Belfast* and *Cossack* then steered for Sasebo. That afternoon a signal was received from Admiral Joy ordering a bombardment of Inchon by two cruisers on 5th August. This did not allow much time for preparation; speed was increased, and immediately on arrival at Sasebo next morning, the Fleet Gunnery

¹ This assistance was much appreciated, for No. 702 had recently come across the Pacific from the United States, and on arrival in Korea after only one day in Chinhae, had come out for this patrol, on which she had then been for over fifteen days.

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and Staff Communications Officer set off for Tokyo by air to obtain intelligence and concert arrangements for the operation.

At Sasebo, Admiral Andrewes found that the ships under his administrative control had been increased by the arrival, while he was at sea, of the Canadian destroyers *Cayuga* (Captain J. V. Brock, R.C.N.—S.O.), *Athabaskan*, and *Sioux*, the New Zealand frigates *Tutira* and *Pukaki*, and the French frigate *La Grandière*. That forenoon, H.M.S. *Alert* (Commander Brooke) arrived to act temporarily as headquarters ship, and a start was made on the problems involved in her taking over this duty¹ and in the departure of the *Belfast*, which was due to sail for the United Kingdom in a few day's time.

The two staff-officers arrived back from Tokyo in the forenoon of 4th August, and Admiral Andrewes lost no time in sailing for Inchon in the *Belfast* with the *Cossack* and *Charity*; the *Kenya* was to leave her patrol and join the flag next morning.

17

The bombardment of Inchon had been ordered as the result of reports that the North Koreans were using it as a base. Targets included school buildings, believed to be in use as barracks, an electric power station, a railway station, oil tanks and storage, a truck park, and so forth.

As soon as the *Belfast* was clear of Sasebo, operation orders were got out and distributed to the destroyers that evening and to the *Kenya* on joining next morning. Two P-2V (Neptune) aircraft had been provided by the Americans for spotting, which was carried out by the same two officers as at Mokpo, and two Corsairs from U.S.S. *Sicily* (T.E. 96·23), whose aircraft were carrying out strikes in the vicinity, gave fighter cover.

Inchon lies some eighteen miles to the westward of Seoul on the east bank of the estuary of the River Salee, which joins the River Han, or Seoul River, about 20 miles further north. Many islands, rocks, and shoals extend to seaward some 40 miles to the west and south westward. Tidal streams of about three knots increasing to as much as six knots in the narrower passages could be expected. Several channels lead through the shoals; after careful consideration the north-western or the Flying Fish Channel was chosen as the most suitable, and it was decided to start the bombardment about an hour before high water, which was due to occur at 1032 on the 5th August, with a rise of about 25 feet.²

Intelligence was meagre, but several islands had been reported as occupied by the Communists; whether batteries had been mounted on any of them, experience would show.

The passage of the *Belfast* during the night was uneventful, and after the *Kenya* had joined course was set for Seun Cheup Tan island, where a rendezvous with the spotting aircraft had been arranged. Soon after 0745, they and the fighter escort were heard and communications established. About half an hour later the force

¹ As a measure of the problem with which the Commanding Officer H.M.S. *Alert* was faced, his ship was required to accommodate an additional eleven officers and 60 ratings. Limited accommodation and galley space made this impossible in full, but by transferring some of the *Alert*'s crew to the *Jamaica* and by accommodating some of the staff in the *Jamaica* and a few ashore, a plan was evolved which would enable the *Belfast* to sail, and leave the staff and communications at Sasebo, and reasonably accessible.

² See Plan 1.

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entered the narrows between Soya do and Batsu to (37° 11' N., 126° 13' E.), H.M.S. *Cossack* followed by the *Charity* leading, with the *Belfast* and *Kenya* twelve cables astern. It was thought that there might be some opposition from Soya do, the island to port, as a Communist garrison had been reported there, but nothing happened. The island looked particularly peaceful, with its wooded hills rising to a considerable height, and its steep-to rocky shore. 'As we passed through the narrows, a series of most attractive bays opened up The island looked an ideal holiday resort.'¹

The squadron continued at eighteen knots on a flood-tide, and an hour later reached the selected bombardment position close to Kitachoshis to (38° 19·7' N., 126° 28·9' E.), a lighthouse in midstream, about eleven miles south of Inchon, in one of the few parts of the approach where it is possible to manoeuvre within range of the town and harbour. The *Belfast* operated in the sector between 000° and 090° from this lighthouse, and the *Kenya* between 000° and 270°, while the *Cossack* to the north-westward, and *Charity* to the southward, stood by to deal with any interference with the bombarding ships from the shore. Just to the northward of the *Belfast* was a small conical island (Palmi do²), which was watched with interest, as one of the R.o.K. patrols had reported being fired on by a battery on it; but on this occasion, 'if indeed there were any enemy on it, they made discretion the better part of valour and remained spectators only, though admittedly with a ringside seat'.³

The spotting aircraft with their escort had arrived over the squadron about twenty minutes before its arrival at the bombarding position; at 0921 H.M.S. *Belfast* opened fire, the *Kenya* following soon after. There was still a noticeable flood-stream running; the *Kenya* anchored, but the *Belfast* remained under way holding her position near a danbuoy she had dropped. The bombardment lasted for an hour and three quarters; the *Belfast*, with Captain Thompson, R.A., spotting, engaged eight targets and fired 252 rounds of 6-inch; only on one occasion was an initial spotting correction of more than 200 yards necessary. The *Kenya*, with Lieutenant Handley as spotter, in approximately the same time fired 163 rounds. Of these, 24 were direct hits on what were for the most part pin-point targets, only 25 falling further than 200 yards from their mark. Visibility from the air was quite good; fortunately the wind blew the smoke from an oil tank, found burning on arrival, clear of the town. Admiral Andrewes remarked that had there been no wind, or had it been in the wrong direction, the smoke might have obscured the town from the spotters and ruined the whole operation. Except for a slight delay at the beginning in establishing communications between the *Kenya* and her spotter, air-ship communication throughout was perfect.

There was no reaction of any kind from the enemy. If the Communists had any guns on the islands flanking the approach they may well have been intimidated by the strength of the force. During the bombardment, ships were kept outside the range of reported gun positions (except Palmi do); but they were stopped in narrow waters for nearly two hours, within a few miles of the enemy's main air-fields, without any sign of enemy air activity being observed.

During the withdrawal, the two cruisers fired a few rounds of 4-inch at what

¹ F.O. 2i/c R.o.P. No. 10.

² Admiralty Chart 1270; also referred to as Hachibi to and Yodolmi do.

³ F.O. 2i/c R.o.P. No. 10.

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appeared to be pill-boxes on one of the islands, and at 1240 the *Kenya* parted company to rejoin the *Evertsen* and *Cockade* on patrol, while the *Belfast*, *Cossack* and *Charity* steered for Sasebo.

That evening a signal was received from Admiral Joy relaying a report that 300 junks had been sighted to the westward of Inchon in 37° 40' N., 125° 50' E.; Admiral Andrewes, though he doubted the accuracy of the report, detached the *Cossack* to strengthen the *Kenya's* patrol.

18

At this time considerable doubt was being expressed in certain quarters regarding the efficacy of the blockade, especially on the west coast. Admiral Joy was in entire agreement with Admiral Andrewes's opinion that the movement of seaborne enemy supplies, if any, was negligible, but he found it difficult to get this view accepted at General MacArthur's headquarters. Six weeks had elapsed since the outbreak of war, and by then, roads, bridges, locomotives, and rolling-stock all over Korea had been reported destroyed by American aircraft—it was claimed that the railways were unworkable, at any rate in daylight. Obviously, the advancing army of about 140 000 Communists needed vast quantities of munitions, supplies, food, and reinforcements; it seemed clear to the military mind that as they could not come by land, they must be coming by sea. This illusion was nourished by many air reports, such as that of the 300 junks off Inchon, which turned out to be an innocent fishing fleet, and a further report that a 10 000-ton ship had been sunk while off-loading trucks in Inchon harbour on 4th August. No sign of such a ship, either sunk or floating, was seen by the air spotters on 5th August, nor did photographs reveal anything of the sort, yet another report stated that five merchant ships were unloading at Inchon on the day the British cruisers were bombarding; and on another occasion, the *Kenya* and *Cockade*, while on patrol, were mistaken for blockade-runners.

It was not till some time later that the realization came of the astonishing aptitude of the Communists for improvisation in keeping their land communications running, when photographs revealed camouflaged bypass railway tracks around the ruined bridges (often running over crude log caissons placed in the river-beds), and tunnels, which showed smoke from trains hiding in them waiting for nightfall to carry on with their journeys. Such measures, combined with an inexhaustible supply of coolie labour, sufficed to ensure that the armies were kept supplied with all they required without recourse to the sea.

Meanwhile, the irksomeness inseparable from blockade duties was considerably enhanced by these suspicions and ill-advised reports of imaginary blockade-runners. The *Triumph*, however, was due, in a few days' time, to join Rear-Admiral Andrewes's flag as part of the west coast blockade force, the Admiral intending to use her aircraft to back up the blockade, by which means he hoped soon to set at rest all doubts regarding its efficacy.

19

H.M.S. *Belfast* arrived back at Sasebo from Inchon early on 6th August, and after a busy day disembarking the staff and transferring some of her ammunition and such stores as time allowed to other ships, sailed for the United Kingdom that

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evening, much to the regret of Admiral Andrewes who described her departure as ' a terrible blow to our organization here '.

Several other changes in his force occurred about this time. A misfortune occurred on 9th August when H. Neth. M.S. *Evertsen* grounded off the south-west coast of Korea while on her way from patrol to Pusan. She was soon refloated and taken in tow by the *Cockade*, but had suffered serious damage. ' I am more than sorry ', wrote the Admiral. ' Apart from losing a good ship, even only temporarily, I feel very much for the captain and crew, sole representatives of their country here, keen and courageous.'¹ The *Triumph* and *Comus* arrived at Sasebo on 10th August, and next day the Rear-Admiral hoisted his flag in the carrier. Another ship whose services he was very sorry to lose, the *Cossack*, sailed for Hong Kong and Singapore to refit.

Meanwhile, the *Alert* had been berthed alongside in a billet conveniently close to the offices of the Commander, Fleet Activities (Commander Whalley, U.S.N.), who provided a nearby hut for use as a staff office, and cordially gave all the assistance he could.

While these arrangements were being made, Rear-Admiral Andrewes took the opportunity of visiting Admiral Joy at Tokyo, with whom he had useful discussions on the west coast blockade.

The departure of H.M.S. *Belfast* brought to the fore the question of staff accommodation and organization. For the purpose of administering and operating the ships of the Far East Station, a number of Fleet staff officers were on semi-permanent loan to the Flag-Officer, Second-in-Command, who himself had only a normal cruiser squadron staff of his own.² In the early days of the war this staff was adequate, and could function in the flagship, but the whole staff could not readily fit into the *Belfast*, much less a Colony-class cruiser. As already mentioned, the necessity for a headquarters ship at Sasebo had been early apparent; the *Alert* had arrived as a stopgap, and the *Wusueh* was being converted as fast as possible at Hong Kong, the biggest item being the W/T installation.

To meet these conditions Admiral Andrewes decided to introduce a ' split-staff ' system. The basis of this system was that the Admiral was free to embark, as F.O. 2i/c Far East Station (Afloat) and C.T.G. 95·1, in any ship he wished, with whatever staff he wished, for any patrols and operations he considered should be under his personal supervision. While he was away, the Chief Staff Officer, Captain U. H. R. James, as F.O. 2 i/c Far East Station (Ashore) and C.T.G. 95·10, carried on all administration and such operational movements as did not directly concern the task element in which the Admiral was afloat. The Secretariat was permanently established at Sasebo, which thereby added to the continuity of the

¹ F.O. 2i/c R.o.P. No. 11.

² The combined staff on board H.M.S. *Belfast* when war broke out was as follows, having been embarked for the summer cruise:

C.S.O.	Secretary	Flag-lieutenant
S.O.O. (F.N.O.)	Assistant secretary	
F.G.O.	3 lieutenants (S)	
F.A.V.O.		
F.R.O.		
F.R.M.O. (S.O.I. (Afloat))		
S.C.O.		

With ships' officers as staff officers: S.M.O., S.S.O., S.T.A.S.O., S.E.O., S.L.O., F.E.O., F.L.O., F.N.C.O., F.I.O. (F.Met.O.) had been left at Hong Kong.

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administration of the 30-odd ships concerned. By these measures it was found possible to avoid setting up a separate base staff.¹

This split-staff system stood the test of this particular war extremely well. Admiral Andrewes remarked that its success depended on the very close co-operation which existed between the members of his staff and his own confidence in Captain James, but that it was important that the two parts of the staff should be brought together immediately he reached Sasebo in order to ensure that all problems were common to, and understood by, both parts, and so avoid any divergence. This was confirmed by the experience of the subsequent commanders. So long as the split periods did not exceed about ten days, the C.S.O. could make decisions in complete confidence that he knew the mind of the Flag-Officer. Similarly (and nearly as important) the Flag-Officer could visualize the administrative and logistic situation, and thereby avoid giving undertakings—e.g., promises of a visit to Hong Kong, attachment to the east coast force and so on—which would throw out the S.C.O.'s nicely balanced programmes.

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Rear-Admiral Andrewes spent from 12th to 16th August in the *Triumph* in the Yellow Sea, carrying out a series of air searches and strikes with the object of tightening up the blockade of the west coast. The inclusion of the *Triumph* in T.E. 96·53 greatly increased the efficiency of the blockade, and during the latter half of August and the beginning of September—the period which saw the last desperate efforts of the North Korean armies to overrun the Pusan bridgehead finally checked—she was almost constantly at sea.

During daylight hours one Firefly combined A/S patrol with investigation of local radar and visual contacts; two Seafires were maintained as C.A.P. either airborne or in Condition 10. No submarines or hostile aircraft were sighted throughout the operation. For purposes of air reconnaissance, the coastal traffic routes were divided into fourteen areas, each with a code name for ease of reference, the length of each area being designed to allow adequate time for the investigation of any traffic encountered, the aircraft working in pairs.

As the Admiral had anticipated, there was practically no movement of enemy shipping. In the south, Mokpo and Kunsan appeared completely deserted; further north, a few small craft were spotted in the Taedong estuary, which were attacked by six Seafires and six Fireflies, armed with rockets. Hits were obtained

¹ The only extra officers who had to be added were:

- | | |
|---|-----------------------------|
| a. Maintenance Commander | (C.O. of H.Q. ship) |
| Base Supply Officer | (Supply Officer, H.Q. ship) |
| Base Engineer Officer | (Lieutenant (E)) |
| British Naval Liaison Officer | (Lieutenant) |
| Commissioned Shipwright Officer | |
| Naval Provost Marshall | (Commissioned M.A.A.) |
| b. Fleet Gunnery Assistant | (Lieutenant-commander) |
| Assistant Staff Officer, Operations, who formed the nucleus of the operations staff of F.O. 2i/c (Ashore) when the admiral was at sea | (Lieutenant) |
| c. Fleet Naval Information Officer, who was sent out from the U.K. to act as liaison with the press | (Commander, R.N.V.R.) |

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on a 2000-ton freighter (already damaged and beached), an 800-ton coaster, and a camouflaged minesweeper.

H.M.S. *Triumph* returned to Sasebo on 16th August for 48 hours. She arrived dressed with masthead flags, the news of the birth of H.R.H. Princess Anne having just been received; foreign ships present in harbour followed suit and sent congratulatory messages. At noon, guards were paraded and a royal salute was fired; 'then we all spliced the main brace and felt that we had given the royal infant of a naval officer and his wife a royal welcome'.¹

Rear-Admiral Andrewes was again at sea in the *Triumph*, from 18th to 22nd August. Up to date there had been no enemy air activity over the Yellow Sea, and on this occasion the 7th Fleet with its C.A.P. was operating in the area. The Rear-Admiral therefore decided to dispense with C.A.P., which cost more than half the Seafire effort available, and to content himself with the one Firefly airborne on A/S and investigation patrol. This patrol was found very useful for examining surface radar contacts and sightings, and linking with ships out of direct v.h.f. touch. As before, there were no really worth-while shipping targets, and pilots were authorized to attack military targets in port areas. Seafires sank a camouflaged P.C.-type vessel in the Taedong estuary; a couple of small motor-coasters were sunk at Kunsan, and railway trucks were attacked and damaged near Mokpo. Otherwise, nothing suspicious was sighted, nor did an occasional extended reconnaissance from Shantung to the Yalu detect anything of interest.

Another brief stay at Sasebo between 22nd and 26th August gave Rear-Admiral Andrewes an opportunity to meet Admiral Sherman, U.S.N., Chief of Naval Operations, and Admiral Radford, U.S.N., C.-in-C., Pacific Fleet, who arrived there, accompanied by Vice-Admiral Joy, in the course of a visit to the theatre of war. A number of the commanding officers of the 'International Force' were introduced to them. Also present in harbour were Vice-Admiral Struble in U.S.S. *Rochester*, Rear-Admiral Hartman (C.T.G. 96.5, in U.S.S. *Helena*), Rear-Admiral Hoskins (COMCARDIV 3, in U.S.S. *Valley Forge*), and Rear-Admiral Ewen (COMCARDIV 1, in U.S.S. *Philippine Sea*).

From 26th to 30th August, Rear-Admiral Andrewes was again at sea in H.M.S. *Triumph*. After an enemy air attack on H.M.S. *Comus* a few days previously,² it was deemed prudent to maintain C.A.P. over the carrier, with consequent diminution in the number of aircraft available for strikes. The situation in the four main ports (Chinnampo, Inchon, Kunsan, and Mokpo) showed little change. Only a few sailing junks and sampans were seen under way. Most potential supply craft lay up in creeks during daylight. Two motor-coasters of about 100 tons each were destroyed by rockets near Antung, as were various small craft and motor junks lying up inshore, between Inchon and the south-west point of Korea. A pontoon landing stage at Kunsan was hit by armour-piercing rockets; two of the three pontoons had sunk by the following morning.

On 29th August, a curious and tragic accident occurred in H.M.S. *Triumph*. A Firefly, having failed to catch a wire in landing, broke her propeller on the barriers. Half of one of the blades with the root hit the operations room port scuttle end on, shattered the glass, and struck Lieutenant-Commander I. M.

¹ F.O. 2i/c R.o.P. No. 14.

² See p. 41.

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MacLachlan, C.O., No. 800 (Seafire) Squadron, causing him injuries from which he died some hours later. Lieutenant-Commander MacLachlan was buried at sea with full naval honours that evening.¹

All the time, the blockade patrols by cruisers and destroyers, with the R.o.K. shallow-draught craft working close inshore, were maintained. Little occurred to break the monotony, but each patrol demanded hard work and constant vigilance from all hands, especially the captains and navigating officers—often operating in shoal water and thick weather. Conditions were also aggravated by ill-founded air reports of imaginary blockade-runners, which still frequently came in. Difficulties arose, too, through the unexpected arrival of units of the U.S. 7th Fleet in the west coast patrol areas; no regrettable incident occurred, however, and steps were taken in due course to ensure that advance information was given of such movements.

There were occasional incidents which are worth recording. There were, for example, periodical bombardments against targets on shore as they became known. H.M.S. *Jamaica* and H.M.C.S. *Athabaskan* partially destroyed some factory buildings situated on the north side of Kunsan harbour entrance on 15th August; though unknown at the time, it was interesting to learn later that these buildings were in use as a Communist headquarters.

The next day the *Kenya* was fortunate in being near enough to rescue the crew of ten of a U.S. Neptune aircraft which was set on fire by a North Korean patrol vessel off Chinnampo and came down near Choppeki Point. 'The smart performance of the *Kenya* . . .', signalled Vice-Admiral Joy, 'is another fine demonstration of initiative and fast action of the part of H.M. ships serving under my control'

On 18th August, R.o.K. Marines landed from R.o.K. Ship No. 702 and occupied the island of Taku Chaku in the south-west approaches to Inchon. H.M.C.S. *Athabaskan* anchored in position 37° 11' N., 126° 11' E. to support the landing, while the *Kenya* patrolled in Flying Fish Channel, handy to provide supporting fire if required. There was, however, no resistance, and the ships resumed their patrols that afternoon. Another unopposed landing supported by the *Athabaskan* was carried out at Ryanku on 20th August, while at the request of the R.o.K. Navy, H.M.C.S. *Sioux* bombarded a North Korean military position at Popusumpo (35° 20·5' N., 126° 27' E.), which had been previously engaged by the *Athabaskan* on the 17th.

On the night of 20th/21st August, the *Consort* and *Comus* stood by to provide covering fire for the U.S.S. *Horace A. Bass* (A.P.D.), which was landing a reconnaissance party on a beach on the west coast. The reconnaissance was completed in dark hours, and the destroyers' fire was not required. The *Consort* then proceeded to the Kunsan area and carried out a good shoot at military targets, a Seafire from the *Triumph* spotting for her.

Hitherto, nothing had been seen in the Yellow Sea of the North Korean Air Force, but on 23rd August, H.M.S. *Comus* (Lieutenant-Commander Hennessy) was attacked by two Shturmovik aircraft, about 85 miles west of Kunsan. The aircraft attacked singly, the first from astern dropping four bombs; the ship was holed on the port side; one rating was killed and one wounded. The second aircraft's bombs

¹ Lieutenant T. D. Handley succeeded him as C.O. No. 800 Squadron.

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missed ahead. The *Comus* was able to steam at fifteen knots, and escorted by the *Consort* and covered in the air by U.S. Marine Corps fighters, promptly provided by U.S.S. *Sicily* (Captain Thach, U.S.N.), she proceeded to Kure for repairs.

As it could not be known whether this was merely a sporadic attack or whether it heralded a new policy to attempt to break the blockade, Admiral Andrewes ordered Captain Salter, who was senior officer on patrol at the time, to keep T.U. 96·53·2 concentrated for mutual support after the *Comus* was clear to the southward. Actually, the attack proved to be an isolated incident, but it had its effect in causing the *Triumph* to keep a C.A.P. in the air for the immediate future while she was at sea.

The loss of the services of the *Comus*, coming so soon after that of the *Evertsen*, was a serious reduction of the blockading force; but the arrival of H.M.S. *Whitesand Bay* (Lieutenant-Commander J. V. Brothers) on the 24th August, enabled H.M.C.S. *Cayuga*, which had been lent to the Escort Element, to take her place.

Little mention has been made of the work of the Escort Element (T.E. 96·50). From the beginning of the war, it had carried out its monotonous but valuable task of escorting small convoys daily from Sasebo to Pusan, and also meeting and escorting independently routed ships—either troopships for Pusan or fleet auxiliaries on their way up the coast to refuel the blockading destroyers. On 10th August, there was a change in the command. Captain Jay sailed in the *Black Swan* for Hong Kong, his place as C.T.E. 96·50 being taken by Captain J. H. Unwin, who had arrived in H.M.S. *Mounts Bay* the day before.

On 29th August the first U.N. ground forces, other than United States and South Koreans, to reach Korea arrived at Pusan. These were two battalions from the Hong Kong garrison—the 1st Argyles and the 1st Middlesex—who took passage in H.M.S.s *Ceylon* (Captain C. F. J. Lloyd-Davies) and *Unicorn* (Captain Hopkins), escorted by H.M.A.S. *Warramunga* (Commander O. H. Becher, R.A.N.). Brigaded as the British 27th Brigade, they moved north, and a few days later were in action against North Korean attacks to the south-west of Waegwan. As soon as they were landed, the ships proceeded to Sasebo. The *Unicorn*, transferred her remaining fourteen aircraft to the *Triumph*, the *Ceylon*, on loan from the East Indies Station, and the *Warramunga*, joined Rear-Admiral Andrewes's flag, the latter in place of the *Shoalhaven* which sailed for Australia on 1st September.

Rear-Admiral Andrewes arrived back at Sasebo from patrol in H.M.S. *Triumph* on 30th August, and shifted his flag to H.M.S. *Alert*, where it remained till 12th September. A large-scale assault landing at Inchon was being planned, and this enabled him to take part in conferences at Tokyo or Sasebo with the Americans, and also to deal with various administrative matters which required his attention.

During these early days of September, the usual blockade patrols were maintained. On the 5th, the *Jamaica* bombarded Inchon, and the next day Kunsan, the *Triumph* providing air spotting. The object of these bombardments, apart from harassing the enemy, was to accustom him to ship bombardments, so that those which would be a preliminary to the assault landing at Inchon would not suggest to him that a landing would follow. These firings were not so accurate as the majority of those previously carried out, owing to bad weather at Inchon and to large spreads and initial errors at Kunsan.

On completion of these bombardments, H.M.S. *Triumph*, screened by H.M.A.S.s *Warramunga* and *Bataan*, and H.M.C.S. *Athabaskan*, proceeded to the east coast, whence the 7th Fleet carriers had been withdrawn for storing and maintenance.

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There she operated in an area about 60 miles east of Wonsan during 8th and 9th September. Various targets were attacked, from as far north as Yonghung (39° 32' N., 127° 15' E.), to the southward; a locomotive and box-cars were damaged by rockets and 20-mm cannon; roads, railway lines, and both ends of three tunnels were damaged; and a small patrol vessel on the coast was attacked. Considerable interference was suffered through bad weather.

The whole of this operating period, during which 107 sorties were flown, took a heavy toll of aircraft. Apart from operational losses, several Seafires had become unserviceable through wrinkling of the fuselage—an old World War II complaint—and the fourteen aircraft received from the *Unicorn* were the oldest and least satisfactory of the reserves, whose issue had therefore been left to the last, and were correspondingly more difficult to maintain. The *Triumph* with her destroyers arrived back at Sasebo on 10th September.

Meanwhile, a new complication had arisen on the west coast, which was to exercise considerable influence on the naval operations for the remainder of the war—the start of mine warfare. It was H.M.S. *Jamaica*, operating with the *Charity* some 25 miles to seaward to the Chinnampo approaches on 7th September, who first sighted a number of mines on the surface.¹ They resembled British Mark 1 or Russian Mark 26, and might have been moored mines, carelessly laid, or floating. The next day, the *Ceylon*, then on her first blockade patrol, sighted similar types of mines to the southward of Fankochi Point.

Admiral Andrewes had been expecting this move on the part of the enemy for some time. 'They are of a type', he wrote, 'that could be laid by any reasonably-sized junk, and present a very grave danger to ships patrolling, for, if the patrols are to be effective, they must cover certain focal points which are as well known to the enemy as they are to us.'² As a first step, he ordered ships to take precautions and to run paravanes when inside the 40-fathom line; but later it seemed that a number of the mines might be floating with snag-wires or a length of broken mooring wire attached, in which case the paravanes might have been more danger than protection, and he therefore cancelled the order.

From then onwards the danger from mines was always very much in the Admiral's mind. One of his greatest anxieties was the possibility of Russian submarines taking a hand. They could have done it so easily without anyone knowing, successes being attributed to mines laid by Korean fishermen from sampans. This menace, however, never materialized, nor, as things turned out, did any Commonwealth ship fall a victim to the mines laid by the North Koreans.

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At about this time, there arrived in Japan the 41st Independent Commando, Royal Marines. Though too late for inclusion in the impending operations at Inchon, some account of the genesis of this distinguished unit will not be out of place at this stage.

The Commando was formed in August 1950, in response to a signal asking for volunteers to create a small special raiding force for the Korean War. More than

¹ U.S.S. *McKean* had reported mines at the entrance to Chinnampo harbour on 4th September.

² F.O. 2i/c R.o.P. No. 17.

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half of the eventual force of 240 officers and other ranks was formed at the Commando School in Great Britain. The rest, who were on their way to reinforce the 3rd Commando Brigade in Malaya, were diverted to Japan. Lieutenant-Colonel D. B. Drysdale, M.B.E., R.M., an experienced Commando leader in the Second World War, was appointed commanding officer and Major D. Aldridge, M.B.E., R.M., became his second-in-command.

After short preliminary training in England, the Commando was flown out to Japan. To avoid the possibility of international complications, they travelled as civilians in three special B.O.A.C. Argonaut flights. The unit formed at Camp Magill near Tokyo on 10th September. The American authorities accepted responsibility for its logistical support and equipment. The Commandos wore British battle dress and the distinctive green beret, but were armed with American weapons, such as the M1 Garand rifle and various carbines, the M3 'squirt' gun, the Browning machine-gun, and the 81-mm mortar. For a fortnight they underwent intensive training in these new weapons, instruction being given by specialists from the U.S. Marine Corps.

The American Marines welcomed the R.M. Commando as men with a 'can do' attitude. Of their initial training, the American commanding officer remarked: 'They seemed to enjoy having more thrown at them than they could possibly assimilate in the short time available and rose to the occasion by becoming a well-trained and co-ordinated raiding team in a remarkably short time.'

By the time the training was completed, Inchon had fallen to the United Nations, and the rapidity of the enemy's retreat left little scope for the activities of raiding parties. It seemed that the 41st Commando had little future in Korea. They need not have worried. As will be seen, before Christmas the unit was to fight shoulder to shoulder with the U.S. Marines in some of the bloodiest battles of the campaign, and to earn the high praise of the Commanding General, U.S. Marine Corps.

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Meanwhile, on shore, the North Korean offensive, though slowed up, had by no means been abandoned. The arrival of the U.S. 1st Provisional Marine Brigade at Pusan on 2nd August¹ had provided the U.N. forces with a welcome reinforcement. The Marines took the field to the westward of Pusan, and on 7th August—the 8th anniversary of their landing at Guadalcanal—captured Chinju, which thus checked the Communist flanking movement causing so much anxiety. The North Koreans then increased pressure in the central part of the perimeter in the Yongsan area and, fording the Naktong on 6th August, secured a bridgehead. After bitter fighting they were driven back across the river ten days later by the U.S. Marine brigade and two regiments of the 24th Division.

At about the same time, U.S. naval forces carried out a smart piece of work on the east coast, when they came to the rescue of the R.o.K. 3rd Division. This division, supported by Rear-Admiral Hartman's T.G. 96.51 had for five days blocked the enemy's advance down the east coast, while inland units were withdrawn. It then found itself isolated and in danger of annihilation near Yonghae,

¹ It had been the intention to disembark the Marines at Kobe to prepare for an amphibious assault on the enemy's rear as soon as the position of the 8th Army could be stabilized, but the critical situation at the end of July caused them to be diverted direct to Pusan.

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30 miles north of Pohang. On the night of the 16th August, U.S.S. *Helena* with escorting destroyers and four L.S.T.s took station off shore. Covered by naval gun-fire the L.S.T.s beached and the R.o.K. division began an orderly embarkation. Before daylight broke, six officers and seventeen O.R.s of the U.S. Korean Military Advisory Group, 327 officers, 5480 troops, 1260 civilian evacuees, and 100 vehicles had been loaded without loss. The next day the 3rd R.o.K. was landed at Kuryongpori (ten miles east of Pohang) ready for further action.

On 25th August, the Communists commenced a full-scale attack on the Naktong defence line, and on 31st, the situation was described as critical; after fierce fighting, in which the North Koreans suffered very heavy losses, the attack was repulsed.

Throughout all these operations, naval aircraft rendered valuable support. From 5th August to 3rd September, Task Force 77 launched 2481 strikes from the fleet carriers *Valley Forge* and *Philippine Sea*¹ in support of the troops, controlled by the Joint Operations Centre in the style practised by the U.S. Air Force.² The escort carriers *Sicily* and *Badoeng Strait*, carrying U.S. Marine air groups, mainly supported the Marine brigade; up to the 14th September, the *Sicily* flew 688 sorties and the *Badoeng Strait* 671. These 2481 strikes by the 7th Fleet aircraft, and 1359 sorties of the Marines, resulted in great damage to enemy troops and equipment at, and near, the front lines, and in the slowing up of their advance on Pusan. 'The Navy carriers', wrote General MacArthur, 'were a vital factor in holding the Pusan perimeter, especially until our land bases were developed effectively to handle the air phase of the campaign. Even then they provided a powerful adjunct to the land-based aircraft supporting our ground operations.'³

Not for the first time the strategical immobility of shore-based aircraft had been overcome by carriers acting in the role of mobile airfields, and their value in providing the air component in areas inaccessible to shore-based aircraft had once again been demonstrated.

Summing up the importance of the navy's part in this opening phase of the war Admiral Joy remarked—'It is not an exaggeration to say that without the Navy the Pusan perimeter could never have been held. The unspectacular role of carrying personnel and supplies to Korea was perhaps the Navy's greatest contribution.'⁴ Next in importance was the Navy's support of the 8th Army by bombardment, interdiction, and close air support missions, as well as the timely landing of the 1st Cavalry Division at Pohang. The vital role played by our carriers in this connexion cannot be over emphasized . . . '⁵

The long period of retreat and desperate defensive fighting was at last nearing its end. By 7th September, the final big effort of the Communist army to break into the Pusan perimeter had been defeated. A week later, General MacArthur launched his dramatic counter-attack, which in a matter of days reversed the whole trend of the war and drove the enemy armies helter-skelter out of South Korea.

¹ U.S.S. *Philippine Sea* had arrived from Pearl Harbour on 1st August.

² See p. 30.

³ *The Sea War in Korea*, Cagle and Manson.

⁴ Seattle via Aleutians to Tokyo: 4835 miles. San Francisco via Pearl Harbour to Tokyo: 6200 miles.

⁵ *The Sea War in Korea*, Cagle and Manson.

CHAPTER 3

Landing at Inchon

Section

- 23 Inception of landing at Inchon.
- 24 U.S. Amphibious Force.
- 25 Plan of assault.
- 26 Forces employed.
- 27 Preliminary bombardments.
- 28 Capture of Wolmi do.
- 29 Invasion at Inchon.
- 30 Commonwealth naval operations, Inchon.

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THERE was probably no army commander in the world who was more aware of the potentialities of sea power than General MacArthur, with his unrivalled personal experience in the war against Japan.

From its geographical configuration, the whole of Korea, like any other peninsula, was very vulnerable to the application of sea power. Moreover, the North Koreans were in no position seriously to dispute the United Nations command of either the sea or the air.

It was therefore not surprising that from the very first the Supreme Commander had decided to base his strategy on these factors, and as early as 7th July he informed the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff that his basic operating plan would be to stop the enemy armies, to exploit fully the control of the sea and the air, and by amphibious manoeuvres, to strike behind the mass of the enemy ground forces.

To give effect to this idea he determined that, as soon as sufficient forces had been accumulated in the Pusan beach-head to break out towards the north, he would land a large force near Inchon, which would rapidly work to the eastward and recapture Seoul, and thereby cut the enemy's main lines of communication. The North Korean armies would then find themselves trapped between the two U.N. forces. In the words of President Truman, 'it was a bold plan, worthy of a master strategist'¹ but it involved obvious risks and difficulties of a serious nature, and it is generally conceded that save for the personal vision and insistence of General MacArthur, it would never have been adopted. The Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Omar Bradley, was opposed to the venture, as were both the Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff (General Lawton Collins and Admiral Sherman); the latter two flew from Washington to Tokyo to discuss the whole matter with General MacArthur in mid-August.

The obstacles in the way of its successful execution were certainly impressive.

¹ Harry S. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, Vol. II, English Edition, p. 367.

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From the naval point of view, the principal objection to Inchon was its inaccessibility. Mention has already been made of the navigational dangers in the long approach. With the absence of navigational lights and the possibility of enemy gun-fire and mines, the passage of an invasion fleet of the size contemplated through those intricate channels, with their strong tidal streams, would in itself be a hazardous proceeding. The tides at Inchon are among the greatest in the world, with a range of 31 feet; owing to the extensive mud-flats surrounding the land area, a tidal height of 29 feet was necessary for the L.S.T.s to reach the landing beaches. This limited the date and time of the landings to four days¹ a month at approximately high water. These requirements militated against flexibility and, since the North Koreans would be equally aware of these limiting factors, against surprise.

Inchon itself presented peculiar difficulties. The last eight miles of the approach had a width of only a mile or less, leaving little room for manoeuvre or action in case of accident. The island of Wolmi do, lying some 800 yards west of the port, to which it was connected by a causeway, was admirably placed to dominate not only the approaches, but also the beaches on which the landings would take place. Not much about its defences was known with accuracy, but they were believed to be substantial. It was clear that it would have to be neutralized before the assault, and at least two days' naval bombardment and air attack was deemed necessary to effect this; this again might alert the North Koreans to the possibility of a landing. The beaches, too, over which the assaults would have to be made, were mud, backed by stone sea-walls, and the crowded eastern city running to the water's edge would give excellent cover to the defence forces. There was only a limited space for beaching the L.S.T.s, and there would be little room for the troops to manoeuvre once they were ashore. The port facilities, too, left much to be desired; its pier space was restricted, its unloading areas were several miles apart, and its cargo-handling facilities were inadequate.

From a military point of view, it was urged that the depth of the turning movement was too great, and also that it would absorb all the 8th Army's reserves: should the landing prove a failure, no reserve troops could reach Korea for at least four months.

These conditions might well daunt the boldest of men, but General MacArthur remained convinced that the undertaking had a good chance of success. Indeed, from one point of view he seems to have welcomed them, relying for surprise on the sheer audacity of the proceeding. The North Koreans, he argued, would consider a landing at Inchon insane and impossible, and consequently it would be lightly held²; but in his final briefing, he himself referred to it as a gamble, quoting its odds as 5000 to 1 against success, adding, however, that he was accustomed to taking such odds.

This, of course, was an overstatement. If the operation was a gamble, it was a gamble in which the risks had been carefully calculated and weighed against the advantages he hoped to reap. The whole conception well illustrates the application of what has been termed the 'lost principle of war', viz., that nothing decisive can be achieved without taking risks.³

¹ That is, in 1950, within a day or so of 15th September, 11th October, or 3rd November.

² In the event this assumption proved correct.

³ This does not mean, of course, that risks should be blindly courted; but it does mean that having been recognized and assessed, and every provision made to minimize them, they must be accepted for an adequate object.

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His choice of Inchon for the assault was governed by strategic, military, psychological, and political considerations. His plan involved not only the rapid cutting of the enemy's main supply lines, most of which ran through Seoul, within 20 miles of Inchon, but also the envelopment of his army. Strategically, Inchon was the only port on the west coast that would satisfy both these requirements. Other places, presenting less technical difficulties to the assault, were suggested, such as the neighbourhood of Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, or Kunsan in the south. The former, some 250 miles from the Pusan perimeter, the General turned down as being too far distant; Kunsan, on the other hand, he considered too near the fighting front. A landing there would not succeed in trapping the North Korean armies, which would merely have to retreat a few miles to contain the assault forces.

'The deep envelopment, based on surprise', he wrote, 'which severs the enemy's supply lines, is and always has been the most decisive manoeuvre of war. A short envelopment, which failed to envelop and leaves the enemy's supply system intact, merely divides your own forces and can lead to heavy loss and even jeopardy.'¹

From the military point of view, a successful landing at Inchon would in his view shorten the war, save many casualties, and possibly obviate a winter campaign. Psychologically, it would not only reverse the course of the war, but revive the Western World's waning prestige throughout the whole of the Far East. Politically, the landing at Inchon and capture of Seoul would reap gains almost as important as the military.

The decision to proceed with the undertaking was taken at a final meeting between General MacArthur, General Collins, and Admiral Sherman in Tokyo on 23rd August; the two Chiefs of Staff then returned to Washington, and a day or so later the formal approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was received.

24

Before briefly considering the planning of the Inchon landing, a word should be said about the U.S. Amphibious Force, without which its execution would not have been possible. The United States Navy maintains permanently in being the lift for a division of troops. This is a balanced assault force with headquarters and communications ships, support ships and landing-ships, and craft for personnel and vehicles. The organization did not include any provision for minesweeping, an omission which might have had serious consequences.

The Amphibious Force included two flag-officers with large staffs;² operations could therefore be mounted and conducted by specialists at very short notice.

As it happened, landing operations with U.S. troops stationed in Japan were being exercised in the summer of 1950; there was thus the majority of the equipment for an amphibious landing immediately available on the outbreak of war. Little more needed to be added other than troop transports and freighters to carry a larger force, and thus it was that the Americans were able to land the 1st Cavalry

¹ *The Sea War in Korea*, Cagle and Manson.

² Rear-Admiral Andrewes remarked that it was 'most noticeable that no army or air officers are appointed permanently to the staff of the Commander of the Amphibious Groups'. Report of Experience in Korean Operations, July-December 1950.

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Division on the beaches at Pohang¹, only three weeks after the outbreak of war, and two months later the 10th Corps with over 70 000 men at Inchon.

'Such a feat as the organization of these landings in such a very short time', wrote Rear-Admiral Andrewes, 'was indeed an eye-opener, and was only possible as a result of maintaining in commission a sufficient force of the necessary type of vessels and trained groups of personnel for all the necessary activities It would be impossible for the British to mount such an operation, and yet its tremendous effect on the war was immediately obvious We should have been quite unable to stage anything of the kind.'² Complementary to the Amphibious Force were the U.S. Marines. Their highly specialized training in amphibious warfare over many years, and their close association with the navy, fitted them to spearhead an assault with the minimum of special briefing and without rehearsal. The assault landings could be confidently entrusted to the Marines, other troops, who would have required weeks of intensive training, providing the follow-up.

As the story unfolds, it will be seen that the Amphibious Force exercised a great influence throughout the war, not only on account of the landings and redeployments actually carried out by it, but also because the mere knowledge of its existence by the enemy created in him an uncertainty as to where it might appear next. 'The enemy is always afraid of its being used', wrote Admiral Andrewes, 'and a very small "preparation", such as minesweeping or bombardment of an area, faces him with a very real threat of assault.'

Many competent judges were convinced that the long 'stalemate' from June 1951 to July 1953 could have been broken at any time by suitable amphibious landings in conjunction with frontal assault, save for the decision on political grounds not to force the issue.

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Once the decision had been taken to make the attempt on Inchon, no time was lost in getting on with the planning. Three officers³ were principally concerned—Vice-Admiral Struble, who was placed in over-all command, with the title Commander, Joint Task Force 7; Rear-Admiral Doyle, the commander of the Amphibious Force (C.T.F. 90), who was responsible for the naval side of the assault; and Major-General Oliver S. Smith, U.S.M.C., commanding the 1st Marine Division, and responsible for the military side.

Admiral Struble received word at Sasebo on 25th August that he was to command the invasion. He at once flew to Tokyo with a small staff to commence planning; on his arrival he found that the date of the landing had been fixed for 15th September, leaving less than three weeks for the planning of this complex operation which involved the movements of about 250 ships⁴ and the landing of some 70 000 men with all the machinery of modern war in the face of the enemy. That the plans were worked out in time can be ascribed to the experience of the three commanders,

¹ This landing was in fact unopposed, but the force was prepared to land in the face of the enemy if need be.

² Report of Experience in Korean Operations, July–December 1950.

³ Each of these officers, as it happened, had had exceptional experience of amphibious operations during World War II.

⁴ 55 warships (frigates and above), 22 submarine-chasers and minesweepers, 169 transports, landing-craft, store ships, and so on. All these were American except sixteen British Commonwealth warships, one French, and fifteen R.o.K. (four submarine-chasers and eleven motor-minesweepers).

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their large¹ and well-trained staffs, and the fact that accommodation was found for them all at Tokyo where the staffs could work in close contact with each other². As the plans took shape, Admiral Struble held conferences with his other subordinate commanders, either himself flying to Sasebo for the purpose, or summoning them to Tokyo.

Bold as the whole conception and subsequent execution of the project was, certain circumstances—unlikely, perhaps, to recur in a future war—greatly favoured it. The North Korean air and sea forces could be of little more than nuisance value. The total strength of their air force on 28th August was estimated as nineteen obsolescent Soviet-built aircraft, of which ten were Yak-7B or Yak-7 fighters. It was deemed that they would be capable of mounting a maximum of seventeen sorties over a 24-hour period for a limited time; they might make sporadic raids on U.N. vessels, troop concentrations, port facilities, and the like, or act in support of their ground operations. The North Korean Navy originally consisted of a small number of patrol-type vessels, with four divisions based at Wonsan on the east coast, and one division at Chinnampo. United Nations forces had already destroyed most of them and, so far, bottled up the remainder. Their possible activities seemed limited to surprise M.T.B. attacks on U.N. forces in the Inchon approaches, small-scale mining operations, and the destruction or alteration of navigational aids. There was no likelihood of submarine attack unless the Russians took a hand.

The main opposition was expected to come from the shore defences. The major portion of the N.K.P.A. was committed along the Pusan perimeter or adjacent rear areas in South Korea, but units of regimental size or smaller were reported to be garrisoning key rail junctions, and storage and supply points along the Pyongyang–Seoul–Taejon–Kumchon rail and road axis. They might improve defences and reinforce forces in the Inchon area, destroy existing port facilities, or defend approaches to Seoul by delaying actions between Seoul and the River Han, and defend the River Han line.

Briefly, the plan evolved was as follows (Figure 4):

- a. Air attack and naval bombardment of Wolmi do for some days prior to the assault (D-day). In order not to call undue attention to Inchon, air attacks were also to be made on the Pyongyang and Kunsan areas.
- b. An initial landing at Wolmi do by one battalion of Marines to seize the island before the main landings. This initial landing was to be made at the morning high water (L-hour) about 0630³ on D-day, 15th September.

¹ Commenting on the operation, Rear-Admiral Andrewes remarked: 'Security was sadly lacking, and I was aware of the fact that both time and place were being discussed at Sasebo. I believe this is always likely to occur, bearing in mind the vast numbers of American staff officers who must know vital details of a plan. I do not believe, however, that such a plan could possibly have been produced and put into operation so quickly had not a huge army of people worked at it, and there is no doubt that in one respect the enemy must have been completely wrong. He cannot possibly have guessed at the strength of the blow. That had to be seen to be believed' (F.O. 2i/c R.o.P. No. 18).

² Actually Rear-Admiral Doyle had got a flying start, having made a study of Inchon early in July, when an unopposed landing there was under consideration for reinforcing the retreating R.o.K. Army. The retreat was too fast and the plan had to be abandoned, but the studies made then formed the basis of the amphibious planning in August and September.

³ Zone minus 9 time (I) is used throughout this chapter.

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


Figure 4. Assault on Inchon

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- c. The Wolmi do landing to be followed by assault landings by the 1st Marine Division (less one R.C.T. reinforced) at afternoon high water (H-hour) about 1700 D-day on Red and Blue beaches at Inchon.
- d. Rapid expansion of the beach-head to seize Kimpo airfield and the River Han line west of Seoul, thence to secure Seoul and an area to the south. The 7th Infantry Division and 10th Corps troops to land as ordered after the beach-head had been secured, and then to operate as directed by the G.O.C. 10th Corps (Major-General Almond).
- e. Bombardment and fire support to be provided by cruisers and destroyers. Air cover, strikes, and close support to be provided by fast-carrier and escort-carrier aircraft within the objective area.

The actual landing operations were entirely a United States affair, other United Nations ships, with the exception of two British cruisers working with the Gun-fire Support Group, carrying out special off-shore patrols and maintaining the blockade.

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The following table shows the composition of the naval, Marine, and military forces assigned to the Inchon operations, with their task force organization. All ships were American, except where otherwise stated.

JOINT TASK FORCE 7 (Vice-Admiral A. D. Struble)

I. Naval Groups

T.F. 90. Attack Force (Rear-Admiral J. H. Doyle)

TASK GROUP NUMBER	DESIGNATION	COMPOSITION	REMARKS
90·00	FLAGSHIP ELEMENT (H.Q.)	2 Amp. Force flagships (A.G.C.)	{ U.S.S. <i>Mount McKinley</i> (Rear-Admiral Doyle) U.S.S. <i>Eldorado</i> (Rear-Admiral L. A. Thackrey)
90·01	Tactical Air Control Element	Tactical Air Squadron I	
90·02	Naval Beach Group Element	—	H.Q., Beachmaster, underwater demolition, etc.
90·03	Control Element	3 fast transports (A.P.D.) 1 escort amp. control vessel	—
90·04	Administrative Element Service Unit	1 hospital ship (A.H.) 12 L.S.U.s	Plus 8 on arrival
90·04·2	Repair and Salvage Unit	3 ocean tugs (A.T.F.) 2 repair ships 3 L.S.D.s 1 harbour tug	

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TASK GROUP NUMBER	DESIGNATION	COMPOSITION	REMARKS
90·1	ADVANCE ATTACK GROUP		
90·11	Transport Element	1 L.S.D. 3 L.S.U.s embarked	Land one bn U.S.M. on Wolmi do: afterwards join T.U. 90·04·2 and T.E. 90·03
90·11·1	Transport Unit	3 fast transports	
90·2	TRANSPORT GROUP	5 assault transports (A.P.A.) 8 assault cargo ships (A.K.A.) 1 transport 2 L.S.D.s	U.S. 1st Marine Division To join T.U. 90·04·2
90·3	TRACTOR GROUP	47 L.S.T.s 1 L.S.M.	
90·4	TRANSPORT DIVISION 14	3 assault transports (A.P.A.) 3 assault cargo ships (A.P.A.) 2 L.S.D.s	7th R.C.T., U.S. Marines. Marine Air Group
90·5	AIR SUPPORT GROUP (Rear-Admiral R. W. Ruble)		
90·51	C.V.E. Element	2 escort carriers	U.S. Marine aircraft
90·52	C.V.E. Screen	4 destroyers	
90·6	GUN-FIRE SUPPORT GROUP (Rear-Admiral J. M. Higgins)		
90·61	Cruiser Element (Fire-support Unit 1)	2 heavy cruisers 2 light cruisers	BRITISH
90·62	Destroyer Element		
90·6·2	Fire-support Unit 2	3 destroyers	
90·6·3	Fire-support Unit 3	3 destroyers	
90·63	L.S.M.R. (Fire-support Unit 4)		
90·7	SCREENING AND PROTECTIVE GROUP	2 destroyers 8 frigates 7 minesweepers ¹	{ 2 BRITISH, 2 NEW ZEALAND, 1 FRENCH
90·8	SECOND ECHELON MOVEMENT GROUP	7 transports 12 freighters	
90·9	THIRD ECHELON MOVEMENT GROUP	3 transports 13 freighters	{ 7th Infantry Division 10th Corps troops

¹ Not fitted for minesweeping.

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T.F. 91 Blockade and Covering Force
(Rear-Admiral W. G. Andrewes)

TASK GROUP NUMBER	DESIGNATION	COMPOSITION	REMARKS
91·1	NORTHERN GROUP		
91·11	Carrier Element	1 escort carrier	BRITISH
91·12	Support Element	1 light cruiser	BRITISH
91·13	Screen Element	5 destroyers	3 BRITISH, 2 AUSTRALIAN
91·14	Coastal Element	R.o.K. vessels available	Plus 1 destroyer from T.E. 91·13
91·2	SOUTHERN GROUP		
91·21	Escort Element	3 destroyers	CANADIAN
91·22	Coastal Element	R.o.K. vessels available	Plus 1 destroyer from T.E. 91·21

R.o.K. Naval Forces
(Commander M. J. Luosey, U.S.N.)

		4 submarine-chasers 11 motor-minesweepers	
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T.F. 77. Fast Carrier Group
(Rear-Admiral E. C. Ewen)

77	FAST CARRIER GROUP	3 carriers	Maintain air supremacy in objective areas; isolate objection area; air cover and support for assault landings
77·1	SUPPORT GROUP	2 light cruisers	
77·2	SCREEN GROUP	14 destroyers	

T.F.79. Service Squadron 3
(Captain B. L. Austin, U.S.N.)

79·1	MOBILE LOGISTIC SERVICE GROUP	2 oilers 1 ammunition ship 1 store ship	Provide refuelling, re-ammunitioning, repair facilities, and so on, in objective area
79·2	OBJECTIVE AREA LOGISTIC GROUP	1 oiler 1 cargo ship 1 assault cargo ship 3 light cargo ships	
79·3	LOGISTIC SUPPORT GROUP	2 destroyers 2 repair ships 2 tankers 2 assault cargo ships 1 store ship	

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TASK GROUP NUMBER	DESIGNATION	COMPOSITION	REMARKS
79·4	SALVAGE AND MAINTEN- ANCE GROUP	1 ocean tug 1 repair ship	

T.F. 99 Patrol and Reconnaissance (Rear-Admiral G. R. Henderson)

99	—	3 seaplane tenders	Long-range reconnais- sance and air patrols covering whole area of operations
99·1	SEARCH AND RECONNAIS- SANCE GROUP	Patrol Squadron 6 88 Squadron, R.A.F. 209 Squadron, R.A.F.	
99·11			
99·12			
99·13			
99·2	PATROL AND ESCORT GROUP	Patrol Squadron 42 Patrol Squadron 47	
99·21			
99·22			

II. Military Groups T.F. 92·1 1st U.S. Marine Division (Major-General O. P. Smith)

TASK GROUP NUMBER	COMPOSITION	REMARKS
92·1	ASSAULT LANDING FORCE, 1ST MARINE DIVISION	
92·10	H.Q., Signals, Ordnance, Medical, M.T., etc.	
92·11	1st Marine Regiment (3 bns)	
92·12	5th Marine Regiment (3 bns)	92·12·3, 3rd Bn Wolmi do
92·13	17th R.o.K. Infantry Regiment (3 bns)	
92·14	Artillery Group, 11th Marines	
92·15	Shore Party	Beach parties, engineers, and so on
92·16	Amphibian Group (L.V.T.s)	
92·17	Tank Battalion	
92·18	Vehicle Maintenance Unit	
92·19	Engineers	

T.F. 92·2 Follow-up (Major-General E. A. Almond)

92·2	7th Infantry Division 10th Corps Troops	
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Preliminary operations against Wolmi do commenced on 10th September, when Marine aircraft from Rear-Admiral Ruble's Carrier Division 15 (U.S.S.s *Badoeng Strait* and *Sicily*) dropped 95 tanks of napalm in a systematic pattern all over the island. Photographic reconnaissance next day showed 39 out of 44 buildings in the warehouse area destroyed, the entire dwelling area burnt out, and buildings in the north 80 per cent destroyed. Further air strikes were delivered at intervals during the next two days.

On 13th September (D minus 2), the naval bombardments started. These were carried out for two days before the assault by the advance group commanded by Rear-Admiral Higgins, U.S.N. The advance group¹, consisting of the U.S. heavy cruisers *Rochester* (flag, Vice-Admiral Struble), *Toledo* (flag, Rear-Admiral Higgins who remained in tactical command, despite the presence of the Vice-Admiral), H.M. Ships *Kenya* (Captain Brock) and *Jamaica* (Captain Salter), preceded by six destroyers² entered Flying Fish Channel at 1030. It was a perfect day, with a fresh easterly wind and exceptional visibility. Fortunately, the arrival off Inchon had been timed for low water. As the destroyers approached Hachibi to, a number of floating mines which would otherwise not have been seen, were sighted to the westward, in the area from whence the *Belfast* and *Kenya* had bombarded on 5th August; most of these were sunk by gun-fire. The cruisers arrived at the bombarding position (from north of Palmi do to the south-eastward) at 1245 and opened fire a quarter of an hour later. Only one aircraft had been provided by the Americans to spot for each pair of ships; this proved unsatisfactory, and both the British cruisers resorted to indirect fire.

Meanwhile, the destroyers had proceeded right up to Inchon, and anchored abreast of Wolmi do (then under heavy air attack by T.F. 77 aircraft) which they engaged with great gallantry at a range of 800 yards³. The island replied vigorously, and three of them were hit, without, however, suffering serious damage; at 1400 they were recalled and rejoined the cruisers. As they steamed clear, aircraft from T.F. 77 resumed their attacks. The cruisers continued to bombard till 1645, and the force then withdrew to seaward for the night.

The next day, 14th, the bombarding force returned, anchoring in the same area at 1130, and carried out much the same programme. The destroyers again closed the island, but on this occasion their fire was not returned. By 1215 the cruisers' efforts, combined with a heavy air strike, had silenced Wolmi do. Further bombardment was carried out during the afternoon; excellent air spotting by Corsairs was available on this occasion. 'A much more enjoyable day', remarked Captain Brock of the *Kenya*⁴.

After the bombardment the task group again withdrew to seaward to meet the Advance Attack Group carrying the 3rd Battalion of the U.S. 5th Marines for the dawn assault on Wolmi do.

¹ The advance group comprised the same ships (less three L.S.M.R.s) as T.G. 90·6 on the day of assault.

² *Mansfield, de Haven, Swenson, Collett, Gurke, Henderson.*

³ It was planned that the destroyers should operate so close to Wolmi do in order to draw the enemy fire and thereby reveal the hidden gun positions.

⁴ *Kenya*, R.o.P. in M.0935/51. Two small parties from the *Kenya* visited Wolmi do a few days later. 'Considerable effort had been put into fortifying the island', wrote Captain Brock, 'but the impressive feature was the devastation created . . . the enemy gunners were either very brave or very stupid to continue firing for so long as they did.'

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Concurrently with these preliminaries off Inchon, diversionary operations were staged at various points on the coasts. For example, on the night of 12th/13th September, H.M.S. *Whitesand Bay* (Lieutenant-Commander Brothers) landed a small mixed force of U.S. Marines with a few Royal Marines and seamen from 41st Commando¹ on a beach near Kunsan. After an exchange of shots with a machine-gun post, which cost the Americans two fatal casualties, the party re-embarked and the *Whitesand Bay* stood to seaward, returning after dark to give a rocket display in the offing.

On the east coast too, an unsuccessful minor amphibious operation, initiated by the 8th Army H.Q. in Korea, unknown to Naval H.Q. in Tokyo, created a diversion. This was an attempt to land some 700 or 800 R.o.K. troops near Samchok, in rear of the enemy troops attacking Pohang. Their L.S.T., however, grounded and came under heavy gun-fire. The battleship *Missouri*,² newly arrived from the United States, with the *Helena* and several destroyers employed on bombarding duties, came to her rescue on the 14th September; but it was not till the 18th that the survivors, many of them wounded, could be taken off, much equipment and the L.S.T. being lost.

Meanwhile, for the last 48 hours the convoys had been converging on the Inchon estuary. At sea, Rear-Admiral Andrewes's Task Force 91 had been covering the whole route up to the west coast, and at the same time maintaining the blockade.³ During the night of 14th/15th September, Task Group 90.7, the Screening and Protective Group, consisting of two destroyers, eight frigates, and seven mine-sweepers, was disposed as a screen on an arc about 50 miles long some 40 miles to the south-west of Inchon, with an inner screen of R.o.K. coastal craft. There they remained throughout the operations.³ Further to seaward, the carrier forces were taking up their flying-off positions, ready to make their dawn attacks.

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At 0200, 15th September, Rear-Admiral Higgins's bombardment force once more entered Flying Fish Channel, this time with the Advance Attack Group—three fast transports and an L.S.D. carrying the 3rd Battalion of the 5th Marines—and three L.S.M.R.s in company.

Aided by the light on Palmi do, which had been lighted at midnight by Lieutenant E. F. Clarke, U.S.N.,⁴ who had been employed on a special mission ashore in the

¹ See p. 43.

² U.S.S. *Missouri* subsequently made an important contribution to the breakout from Pohang and advance up the coast of the R.o.K. troops. She then proceeded to the Inchon area, arriving 19th September, and carried out some 16-inch bombardments against troop concentrations on the road leading north from Suwon.

³ See Section 29.

⁴ Lieutenant Clarke, with two specially-picked South Koreans, had been landed on Yonghong do island, less than 14 miles from Inchon, on 1st September to pick up what local intelligence he could. The islanders were friendly and helpful, and there he remained till after the invasion, despite attempts by North Koreans from adjacent islands to dislodge him. Nightly he sent loyal South Korean boys into Inchon to measure mud-flats and heights of sea-walls, count defending troops, chart positions of guns, observation posts, trenches, etc. In the course of his activities he discovered that Palmi do light had been only partially damaged, and so was able to make this important contribution to the safe passage of the assault forces. For his admirable work on this very dangerous mission Lieutenant Clarke was awarded the Navy Cross.

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approaches to Inchon, the approach was safely negotiated, and the cruisers arrived at their usual bombarding position at 0525; the destroyers and rocket ships, followed by the transports, closed Wolmi do. Half an hour previously the first aircraft from Task Force 77 had started orbiting over the area.

Just before dawn¹ Rear-Admiral Doyle's flagship, U.S.S. *Mount McKinley*, in which General MacArthur himself had embarked, arrived in the narrows. At 0545 Admiral Higgins's four cruisers opened fire² on Wolmi do for a final bombardment, the destroyers joining in as they reached their positions abreast of the island, while Marine aircraft also attacked. Just before L-hour (0630) the cruisers' fire was shifted to targets in Inchon pointed out by the aircraft spotters, and as the L.C.V.P.s carrying the Marines started for the shore, the rocket ships steamed across ahead of them, deluging the defences with rockets.

At 0633 the first wave of the Marines stormed ashore; there was practically no resistance from the partially stunned defenders. As the Marines advanced, Marine aircraft gave close support, flying 50 yards ahead of the troops, and spraying their route with machine-gun bullets. They were followed by ten tanks which landed from three L.S.U.s at 0646. At 0655, 22 minutes after the first landing-craft hit the beach, the American flag was displayed on a shell-torn tree on the crest of 'Radio Hill'.

At this point, General MacArthur rose from the swivel chair in which he had been viewing the operation from the bridge of the *Mount McKinley*. 'That's it', he said. 'Let's get a cup of coffee.'³

By noon the whole island, including So Wolmi do (the islet connected by a causeway to the south) was firmly in American hands. The total casualties of the Marines amounted to seventeen wounded. Of the 400 North Koreans who had formed the garrison, 108 were dead, 136 were prisoners, and the remainder were presumed to lie entombed in battered emplacements and caves throughout the island.

The first part of the operation had gone exactly to plan. It remained to be seen whether the North Koreans, alerted to the probability of the evening assault on Inchon itself, would be able to organize a serious resistance against the main landing. Throughout the day the Marines on Wolmi do remained practically unmolested; they employed the time in preparing emplacements for three battalions of light artillery, which were to be landed on the island with the main attack to support the landings, and in preparing their tanks to cross the causeway to join the main assault forces. The cruisers continued to bombard targets pointed out by the spotting aircraft at intervals. A shot from the *Jamaica* hit an ammunition dump which blew up with by far the most spectacular explosion of the day. In the afternoon, the *Kenya* was ordered to withdraw to the 'cruiser-ready area' some fifteen miles off, in Flying Fish Channel, in order to clear her bombardment area (north of Palmi do) for sweeping operations before the arrival of the transports that were to anchor there. On her way she passed them carrying the 1st Marine Division in, 'a heartening sight, though it increased our disappointment at missing the landing.'⁴

¹ Sunrise, 0615; nautical twilight commenced 0517 (zone minus 9).

² For this occasion, air spotting had been arranged for each cruiser, that for the *Kenya* and *Jamaica* being provided by H.M.S. *Triumph*.

³ *U.S. Marine Operations in Korea*, Volume II, p. 90.

⁴ *Kenya*, R.o.P., M.0935/51.

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The final bombardment of Inchon, while the Marines, embarked in over 500 landing-craft¹, were on passage from the transports to the beaches, lasted for three quarters of an hour, with cruisers, destroyers and aircraft all taking part in a co-ordinated plan;² twelve aircraft from T.F. 77, too, were kept continuously in the air for deep support missions designed to freeze all enemy activity within a radius of 25 miles. At 1705 (H minus 25) the cruisers and destroyers ceased fire, and the three L.S.M.R.s then came into action, firing upwards of 6000 rockets into Red and Blue landing areas in the next 20 minutes.

During the bombardment, rain squalls started drifting past Inchon; gradually, heavy cloud mingled with the thick smoke from explosions and fires in the city, and heavy overcast settled over large areas, especially in the vicinity of Blue beach. Later on, this short visibility considerably hampered the landings on this beach.

Neither of the landing places were 'beaches' in the strict sense of the word; both consisting at low water of impassable mud-flats which ran right up to 15-foot, solid-stone sea-walls, over which the assaults took place at high water. Scaling ladders were provided lest the tide should not be high enough—as proved to be the case—on the arrival of the first flights. Red beach lay just north of the causeway from Wolmi do, Blue beach some two and a half miles to the south-eastward, near the salt-pan.

Twenty-three waves of L.V.T.s assaulted Red beach, and fifteen waves of L.V.T.A.s and L.V.T.s, and six waves of L.C.V.P.s Blue beach. The first waves arrived at each beach almost exactly on time (1730), roughly an hour before high water and sunset, which coincided.³

At Blue beach the later waves had considerable difficulty in getting ashore owing to the short visibility; fortunately there was little resistance, and as they arrived, the Marines pressed on inland in the gathering darkness.

At Red beach the opposition was stiffer. The first wave in eight L.C.V.P.s got ashore without much difficulty, but enemy fire increased as the second and third waves approached, and casualties were incurred on the northern flank. From Wolmi do the 3rd/5th Marines' machine-guns, mortars, and supporting M26 tanks covered the landing with a hail of bullets and high explosive, and the attackers were soon pushing their way through the city towards their objectives. By midnight the beach-head was firmly established. The total casualties of the Marines in these assaults amounted to 20 killed, one died of wounds, one missing and 174 wounded.

Meanwhile, at 1830, one hour after the first wave reached the shore, eight L.S.T.s, carrying some 3000 tons of supplies and heavy equipment, had followed the Marines into Red beach. These L.S.T.s ran right up to the sea-wall and remained with their bows against it, dried out on the mud-flats for the night. They ran a serious risk, providing extremely vulnerable sitting targets, laden with highly lethal cargoes; however, the supplies they carried were essential to the Marines, and the risk had to be accepted. Four of them were hit, and two set on

¹ Nearly 200 L.C.V.P.s, 70 L.C.M.s, eighteen L.V.T.A.s, 164 L.V.T.s, 85 DUKWs twelve L.S.U.s.

² In order to minimize the damage to this South Korean port, gun-fire was limited to known military targets and those which offered the greatest potential hazard to the assault troops.

³ Sunset, 1843; nautical twilight ended 1940.

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fire; the flames were quickly mastered, however, and unloading continued throughout the night. But they might well all have been lost, had the defence been more vigorous.

On 16th September (D plus 1) the ground forces advanced against light resistance on an arc radiating five miles from Red beach, while South Korean Marines mopped up enemy forces in the town. Air interdiction was successful in preventing effective enemy reinforcement, and many tanks, vehicles, and mortars were attacked with rockets and machine-guns on the Seoul-Inchon road. Admiral Higgins's Gun-fire Support Group, too, fired on targets of opportunity with good results; neither the *Jamaica* nor the *Kenya* were called upon to fire that day. The latter took the opportunity to reammunition from the U.S. auxiliary *Ryer*, which had been loaded with British ammunition.

Unloading on the waterfront, which had been very slow at first, improved as time went on, and general unloading started in the forenoon, as ships moved up to berths close off the harbour entrance. The development of unloading facilities commenced in the inner harbour.

At 1800, 16th, Major-General Smith, commanding the 1st Marine Division, assumed command of the landing-force elements on shore.

At dawn, 17th September (D plus 2) there occurred the first intervention by the North Korean Air Force against the ships off Inchon. At about 0555, a single aircraft, taken to be friendly, flew slowly from north to south at a height of about 1000 feet down the line of ships anchored in the approach channel. Shortly afterwards, it dived gently towards Admiral Struble's flagship, U.S.S. *Rochester*, which was lying south-east of Palmi do, and dropped two bombs close astern of her; a second aircraft following it also attacked, one bomb hitting the airplane crane without exploding. The two aircraft then made for H.M.S. *Jamaica* at anchor nearby, who greeted them with fire from 4-inch, and close-range weapons. The first made off to the southward and the second was shot down, but not before it had raked the *Jamaica*'s port side with tracer and machine-gun fire, causing three casualties, one of them fatal.¹ Captain Salter remarked that there was nothing novel in the tactics of the aircraft—a Yak-3 and an Il-10 (Shturmovik)—‘but it was a little foolhardy of them to go for two cruisers when they had a choice of transports and freighters galore’.²

On shore, the advance of the 1st Marine Division continued to the east and north throughout the day (17th September) against light resistance. Kimpo airfield was secured that evening. It was comparatively undamaged, and next day arrangements were put in hand to base a Marine air group there; the first of these aircraft arrived on the 19th. Meanwhile, the U.S. 7th Infantry Division had commenced an orderly landing in afternoon of the 17th.

With the stage thus set for the advance on Seoul, the success of General MacArthur's dramatic stroke at Inchon was plain to all. For a few days longer the Gun-fire Support Group supplied bombardment as necessary on call; then, as the troops progressed further inland, the calls became more infrequent, and the ships gradually dispersed.

¹ A 15-mm, solid, armour-piercing bullet penetrated the one-inch armour plating at the back of Y turret, much to the surprise of the only rating in the turret, who had his leg grazed by it.

² *Jamaica*, R.o.P. M.02461/50.

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After the air attack on the 17th, H.M.S. *Jamaica* shifted to a berth 3600 yards from Wolmi do; the *Kenya*, having finished embarking ammunition the night before, was already at anchor a couple of miles to the southward, and had carried out a short bombardment at enemy troops. The *Jamaica* fired most of that night at an area without spotting, with the object of containing enemy formations and paving the way for an advance of American troops in the morning. The results were subsequently reported as good, and the troops advanced as planned. This was the last bombardment carried out by the British cruisers, apart from a very few rounds called for from the *Jamaica* early in the mornings of the 18th and 19th. No target could be found for the *Kenya* on either of these days, though search was made by aircraft from the *Triumph*.

On 19th September the services of the two British cruisers at Inchon came to an end, and they were detached to rejoin Rear-Admiral Andrewes's Command. Before leaving, the *Jamaica* ammunitioned from the U.S.S. *Hewell*,¹ south-east of Seun Cheup Tan, and then proceeded to Sasebo, where she arrived in the afternoon of the 20th. On the same day the *Kenya* relieved the *Ceylon* on patrol.

During the Inchon operations, including the preliminary bombardments, the *Jamaica* had fired a total of 1290 6-inch and 393 4-inch, and the *Kenya* 1242 6-inch and 205 4-inch. It had been a strenuous time for all hands. Throughout the whole period, the ships' companies had to be kept at an abnormally high state of readiness to guard against floating mines, air attacks, saboteurs, and other threats, as well as having to be ready at all times of the day and night to meet calls for fire from the army ashore. There was little sleep or rest for anyone. Captain Salter gave particular credit to the engine-room department, who kept steam virtually at immediate notice throughout the week, and whose duties kept them down below where they could see none of the excitements going on all round, and to the wireless staff, who had a particularly gruelling time. Both Admiral Struble and Admiral Higgins subsequently expressed their great appreciation to Admiral Andrewes.

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While these stirring events at Inchon had been taking place, Rear-Admiral Andrewes's relatively small British Commonwealth forces had been carrying out important, if unspectacular, duties in support of the invasion.

For the operation, it will be remembered, Rear-Admiral Andrewes was designated Commander T.F. 91, which was known as the Blockade and Covering Force. He flew his flag in H.M.S. *Triumph*. The tasks assigned to T.F. 91 were as follows:

- a. Conduct special reconnaissance and covering missions prior to D-day.
- b. Provide cover for units of the attack force *en route* to the Inchon area.
- c. Perform interdiction missions on D-day and thereafter. To this was added air spotting for the *Jamaica* and *Kenya*.
- d. Maintain the blockade of the west coast of Korea south of latitude 39° 35' N.

¹ While doing so, a jet aircraft from the *Valley Forge* which had been damaged by the enemy came down into the water almost alongside. The *Jamaica* picked up the pilot unharmed, and later returned him to U.S.S. *Virgo*, which was at anchor half a mile off.

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To carry out these duties, Admiral Andrewes adopted the following organization:

T.G. 91·1 NORTHERN GROUP

C.T.G. 91·1, Rear-Admiral Andrewes in H.M.S. *Triumph*.

- T.E. 91·11. CARRIER ELEMENT, H.M.S. *Triumph* and destroyers assigned under Captain Torlesse, C.O. *Triumph* (C.T.E. 91·11).
- T.E. 91·12. SUPPORT ELEMENT, H.M.S. *Ceylon*, Captain Lloyd-Davies (C.T.E. 91·12).
- T.E. 91·13. SCREEN ELEMENT, H.M.A.S. *Warramunga* and *Bataan*, H.M.S. *Charity*, *Cockade*, *Concord* under Commander Becher, C.O. *Warramunga* (C.T.E. 91·13).
- T.E. 91·14. COASTAL ELEMENT, R.o.K.N. vessels available and one destroyer from Screen Element, under C.O. destroyer (C.T.E. 91·14).

T.G. 91·2 SOUTHERN GROUP

C.T.G. 91·2, Captain Brock, R.C.N., C.O. *Cayuga*.

- T.E. 91·21. ESCORT ELEMENT, H.M.C.S. *Cayuga*, *Sioux*, *Athabaskan* under C.O. *Cayuga* (C.T.E. 91·21).
- T.E. 91·22. COASTAL ELEMENT, R.o.K.N. vessels available and one destroyer from Escort Element, under C.O. destroyer (C.T.E. 91·22).

R.F.A. *Wave Prince* and subsequent relief tankers were attached to the U.S. Mobile Logistic (or Underway) Service Group (T.G. 79·1).

Admiral Andrewes's general plan for the Blockade and Covering Force operations was simple. On D-days minus 2 and minus 1, the *Triumph* was to provide air cover for the Attack Force on its passage to the Inchon area from the meridian 126° E. round the south-west corner of Korea to latitude 36° N. On D-day and the following days, she was to operate with the *Ceylon* and three or four destroyers as A/S screen to the westward of the Inchon area, taking advantage of the protection afforded by the strong air patrols from the 7th Fleet, which would be working in the vicinity. From this area, the *Triumph* would fly blockade patrols to the north and south of Inchon; she would also be conveniently placed for such duties as the provision of spotting aircraft or interdiction operations on either flank.¹

By this time, the air effort of which she was capable was severely limited. The number of aircraft operational was seldom more than a dozen, and the importance of each sortie had to be weighed carefully before it was flown. To maintain a small C.A.P. at stand-by, to keep two spotters on station, and to fly the normal blockade patrols as far north as Chinnampo, was the maximum she could do.

At the same time, two barrier patrols, each consisting of one destroyer and three R.o.K. vessels, were to be established—one to the northward of Inchon, near

¹ On D minus 1, Admiral Struble decided that air interdiction would not be required, but that the provision of spotting aircraft for the *Jamaica* and *Kenya* was necessary.

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Fankochi Point; the other to the southward between Inchon and Kunsan—to prevent any reinforcement of the enemy by sea.

Preliminary movements started on 11th September, when H.M.C.S. *Cayuga* left Sasebo to meet and escort the U.S. Underway Service Group; she was joined by the *Athabaskan* on the 14th. Admiral Andrewes sailed on the 12th in the *Triumph*, which had spent a couple of days replenishing at Sasebo after her operations on the east coast, with the destroyers *Warramunga*, *Concord*, *Charity* and *Cockade*; the *Bataan*, which had been delayed for minor repairs, joined the flag during the night.

Considerable anxiety was felt about typhoon 'Kezia' which was plotted as approaching Sasebo, and at one time seemed likely to affect the whole operation; the typhoon turned off to the north, however, and apart from giving the invasion forces a rough passage, did no appreciable harm.

On 13th September (D-day minus 2), while Admiral Higgins's force was carrying out the first bombardment of Wolmi do, the various convoys were approaching the Inchon estuary, the slower ones already around the south-west corner of Korea. Two searches, checking up on their positions, and a blockade patrol of the Mokpo area were flown from the *Triumph*, while a C.A.P. was kept at immediate notice on deck. Air cover for a minor, diversionary landing by South Korean forces at Ochin do (36° 8' N. 126° E.) could not be spared; as things turned out it was not required.

Admiral Andrewes kept his force in the operating area till sunset, and then withdrew to the westward for the night, which was 'uneventful, or as uneventful as a night was likely to be when a large carrier force, two small ones, and a replenishment group were all moving about in a somewhat restricted area, through which the shipping of a large seaborne invasion was approaching its target'.¹

Much the same routine was carried out on 14th September (D-day minus 1), a C.A.P. being kept at immediate notice, and blockade patrols flown over Kunsan and Mokpo as well as reconnaissances over the convoys. As they approached their objective and the fast convoys overtook the slow ones, the concentration of shipping off the west coast became intense. During the dog-watches, the destroyers refuelled from R.F.A. *Wave Prince*, and the *Ceylon* and *Sioux*, which had hitherto remained on patrol, left their area, after carrying out a short bombardment of Fankochi Point—the *Ceylon* to join Admiral Andrewes, and the *Sioux* to the Southern Blockade Group.

At midnight 14th/15th September, H.M.S. *Charity* was detached to take over the northern blockade off Fankochi Point. The disposition of the British Commonwealth forces was then complete:

To the north, H.M.S. *Charity*.

To the south, H.M.C.S. *Sioux*.

To the westward of Inchon, H.M. Ships *Triumph*, *Ceylon*, *Cockade*, *Consort*,
H.M.A. Ships *Warramunga*, *Bataan*.

With the Service Group, H.M.C. Ships *Cayuga*, *Athabaskan*.

¹ F.O. 2i/c R.o.P. No. 18.

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The Commonwealth frigates including F.S. *La Grandière* forming part of the American T.G. 90·7 were escorting the assault forces prior to forming a protective screen round the approaches to Inchon; their activities will be referred to later.

On D-day, 15th September, as already related, the assault on Wolmi do went in at 0630, but long before that, when the first glimmering of dawn was just visible to the eastward, the first pair of spotting aircraft took off from the *Triumph* to attend on the *Jamaica* and *Kenya*. The carrier was operating some 60 miles from the objective area, and in order to reduce the frequency of reliefs, six Fireflies were fitted with two 45-gallon overload tanks, which gave them a comfortable two hours over the target. Blockade patrols of Seafires and Fireflies were flown in the course of the day; small craft were attacked at Chinnampo and considerable damage was inflicted.

The *Charity* and *Sioux* maintained their patrols to the north and south of Inchon estuary, though no R.o.K. vessels arrived till the 16th; nothing worthy of mention occurred.

Before the end of the day the following signal was received by Admiral Andrewes from General MacArthur:

‘My heartiest felicitations on the splendid conduct of the Fleet units under your command. They have added another glamorous page to the long and brilliant histories of the Navies of the British Commonwealth.’

Presumably this included the *Jamaica* and *Kenya* whom, in conjunction with the *Triumph*'s spotters, Admiral Struble referred to as an ‘air-surface bombardment team’ in a congratulatory signal. Actually, many of the air crews had not spotted before, but no real difficulty was experienced, and some effective shooting was achieved.

Rear-Admiral Andrewes's T.F. 91 remained at sea carrying out these duties for the next five days. Each evening it withdrew to seaward for the night, closing the shore in the early mornings. The destroyers topped up with fuel as opportunity offered—usually from the *Ceylon*, which came to be known by her ship's company as ‘R.F.A. *Wave Ceylon*’.

Air spotting for the *Jamaica* and *Kenya* was provided daily by the *Triumph*, for as long as it was required. Her blockade patrol aircraft lost no opportunity in attacking small freighters, junks, and coasters in enemy waters, with satisfactory results.

Occasional bombardments were carried out. For example, the *Charity* silenced two guns which had fired on an R.o.K. vessel in 37° 46' N., 125° 32' E. (near Haeju) on 17th September, and the *Ceylon* bombarded gun emplacements near Fankochi Point (37° 41' N., 125° 20' E.) on the 20th. The *Triumph* supplied air spotting on each of these occasions.

By 20th September the success of the Inchon invasion was assured, and Admiral Andrewes reinstated the normal blockade routine, leaving the *Ceylon*, *Concord* and *Charity* on the northern patrol and *Cayuga*, *Sioux*, and *Athabaskan* to the southward, while he himself in the *Triumph* with the *Cockade*, *Warramunga*, and *Bataan* proceeded to Sasebo, where he arrived on 21st September.

The work of the British Commonwealth frigates (including the French *La Grandière*) working under Captain J. H. Unwin of H.M.S. *Mounts Bay* during, and for a considerable period after, the Inchon landings deserves special mention as an example of endurance with none of the excitement of action. They formed

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part of Task Group 90·7 under Captain Spofford, U.S.N., which consisted of two destroyers, eight frigates and seven minesweepers,¹ disposed on an arc about 50 miles in length some 40 miles to the south-west of Inchon; R.o.K. vessels formed an inner screen.

Their functions included:

- a. Action against enemy aircraft, surface craft, submarines (including midgets), suicide boats, and swimmers carrying limpet mines,
- b. Prevention of barge and fishing-craft movement, and enemy movement between the islands and the mainland and islands.
- c. Detection and destruction of mines.

The fact that in the event none of these enemy activities was attempted, possibly on account of the presence of the screen, in no way detracted from the arduous nature of its task. The ships had to be continually under way in narrow waters close to indifferently-charted land and shoals in very strong tides. The strain on the commanding officers, navigating officers, and officers of watches under these conditions can be imagined. The traffic in and out of the port was very heavy, and every ship entering the patrol area by day or night had to be challenged and identified. Advance information of movements was seldom available, and the reluctance of merchant ships and darkened R.o.K. patrol vessels to answer challenges added to their difficulties. The danger of air attack was always present, though actually none of the screen was attacked; but there were generally a great many aircraft about, all of which had to be identified. For the first eight days, A.A. armament was kept manned in two watches day and night. Constant vigilance was necessary lest the enemy should attempt to strew mines in the only two main channels to the port.

Apart from the bombardment of a large party of Koreans constructing gun emplacements on the south shore on 23rd September, when H.M.S. *Mounts Bay* fired 118 rounds of 4-inch shell at them, there was no direct contact with the enemy by any ship of the screen throughout the whole period of the patrol. While bombarding, the *Mounts Bay* grounded for 20 seconds on a mud-bank (36° 59' N., 126° 13' E.) in charted depth of seven fathoms; no structural damage was suffered.

After ten days the *Rowan* and *Newport* were detached on other duties, and on 30th September, all the U.S. minesweepers were withdrawn. Captain Unwin then became C.T.G. 90·7, and with the *Mounts Bay*, *Whitesand Bay*, *Tutira*, *Pukaki*, *La Grandière*, and two R.o.K. motor-minesweepers² maintained the screen till 14th October. After the 25th September, each ship was allowed a three-day maintenance period in turn.³

¹ Destroyers, U.S.S.s *Rowan*, *Southerland*.
Minesweepers, U.S. Ships *Pledge* (C.T.G. 90·7, Captain Spofford, U.S.N.), *Partridge*, *Mocking Bird*, *Kite*, *Osprey*, *Redhead*, *Chatterer*.
Frigates, H.M. Ships *Mounts Bay*, (C.T.E. 90·71, Captain Unwin, R.N.), *Whitesand Bay*, H.M.N.Z. Ships *Tutira*, *Pukaki*, U.S. Ships *Bayonne*, *Newport*, *Evansville*, and F.S. *La Grandière*.

² H.M.S. *Morecambe Bay* joined Captain Unwin on 13th October, the day before the screen was discontinued.

³ Maintenance was carried out either alongside or at anchor near the U.S. repair ships *Hector* or *Piedmont*, who were extremely co-operative and helpful.

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The whole operation provided valuable experience in screening, patrolling, and long periods of sea-keeping without recourse to their base. The work of the engine-room departments was particularly noteworthy; ships were constantly under way for 28 or 29 days out of 32, bursts of high speed were frequent, and all this immediately followed an intensive period of escort work. Not a single ship suffered any breakdown at all. The communications departments, too, were called on to handle an exceptionally heavy volume of signals, and the hands were closed up at action stations in two watches by night and two or four watches by day. In short, for everyone, officers and men, it was a prolonged and wearing experience. 'And beyond fatigue', wrote Captain Unwin, 'there was always the danger of boredom to combat; though something was always happening, the scene changed not. But like his predecessors over many centuries the sailor of today obviously enjoys being at sea; the spirit of all ships British, Commonwealth, and French, remained splendid throughout'¹

On 14th October the 'Iron Ring' round Inchon, as the screen was known by the Americans, was discontinued, and the frigates proceeded to Inchon for a well-earned rest; but not for long. Forty-eight hours later they embarked on another operation.

¹ Captain (F) 4th Frigate Flotilla R.o.P. in M.02495/50.

CHAPTER 4

U.N. Offensive, September–November 1950

Section

- 31 Sasebo as Commonwealth naval base: administrative and logistical problems.
- 32 Reorganization of blockade command: mine warfare.
- 33 Naval operations after Inchon.
- 34 Rout of North Korean Army.
- 35 Political considerations.
- 36 U.N. invasion of North Korea.
- 37 Commonwealth naval operations, October 1950, and reduction of forces, November 1950.

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ON arrival at Sasebo on 21st September, Admiral Andrewes found great advances had been made on board his headquarters ship, H.M.S. *Ladybird* (Commander Diack), which had arrived at Sasebo on 9th September, just before the Inchon operation took place. The staff promptly transferred from the *Triumph* to her, the Admiral himself going to the *Alert* while the finishing touches were being put to his quarters in the *Ladybird*.

By this time, H.M.S. *Triumph*'s aircraft had been reduced to an operational total of eight Firefly and three Seafire, all of which were virtually obsolescent and had reached the end of their operational life. Each trip in them over enemy territory held a high element of risk for the air crews, and Admiral Andrewes did not consider this risk justifiable for routine blockade operations, though he would have used them in an emergency. However, no important operations were impending, and H.M.S. *Theseus* was due in about a week, so he decided to sail her for the United Kingdom. The way in which she had persisted in her duties, despite her engine-room difficulties and shortage of aircraft, had been highly creditable to Captain Torlesse and to all concerned, and Admiral Andrewes 'heartily endorsed' the following signal from Admiral Joy:

'On the departure of H.M.S. *Triumph* from the Command of the Naval Forces, Far East, I take pleasure in saying to the captain, the officers, the flying personnel and the crew of this splendid fighting ship—well done. Your enthusiastic and effective efforts have contributed immeasurably to the United Nations cause in Korea.'

H.M.S. *Triumph* sailed from Sasebo on 25th September.

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The arrival of H.M.S. *Ladybird*, from which the activities of the Commonwealth naval forces were thenceforward controlled, coincided with the close of the first phase of the war, and at this stage it will be convenient to consider briefly the set-up at Sasebo, and some of the administrative problems which arose. As already mentioned, there was a small American organization there, and throughout the war the U.S. Navy continued to run the harbour and base organization.

The British authorities were handicapped from the outset by uncertainty about the duration of the war. Had they been aware that it would drag on for years, much more extensive administrative provision would have been made from the first. But the uncertainty continued for the whole war. By the end of November 1950, for example, the North Koreans had been defeated, and all the arrangements at Sasebo were being closed down or removed to Kure; Admiral Andrewes had actually withdrawn to Hong Kong when the intervention of Red China enforced his hurried return. Again, some six months later, the start of the armistice negotiations seemed to hold out a prospect of a fairly speedy end to hostilities; and when the armistice was eventually agreed in 1953, it came so suddenly that there was not time for the British Admiral to attend its signature.

The most serious weakness of the British set-up at Sasebo was the lack of a depot ship. Hong Kong dockyard had done an excellent job in the conversion of the *Wusueh*, and her arrival as H.M.S. *Ladybird* greatly eased administration; but she was not a depot ship, and could fulfil very few of the functions of one. Within her limits she did very well, and earned for herself a high reputation among all the U.N. forces that had dealings with her. But apart from the communications set-up, the conversions carried out in her consisted mainly of adaptations of cabin and saloon accommodation for the Admiral's quarters, wardroom, and staff office. For the rest, cabin accommodation which might be suitable for a 48-hour journey up-river was scarcely conducive to health and efficiency over a period of months. Only the operational staff lived in the *Ladybird*, the administrative and technical staff officers being accommodated in an overflow mess and offices ashore, situated near her berth, which were provided by the Americans. Despite these drawbacks, the relations between the staff and the Fleet were of the happiest, partly possibly because of these alfresco conditions, and partly because nearly all the members of the staff went out on operational patrols from time to time. But, except for the *Ladybird*, the many facilities at Sasebo and Kure, close co-operation with the American Navy and Army, and Hong Kong and Singapore in the background, the running and administration of the Fleet would probably have broken down.

'What was wanted during the Korean War', wrote Admiral Andrewes (and this was abundantly confirmed by his successors), 'and would be wanted during any similar occasion in the future, is a depot ship to provide:

- a. 'A headquarters for the flag-officer and staff at times when he was not away at sea.
- b. 'A headquarters and centre for the main part of the administrative and logistic staff at all times.
- c. 'A repair organization to carry out minor running repairs to the Fleet.
- d. 'Alongside berths with light, power, and other facilities for small ships.
- e. 'A small supply of stores and spare gear.

- f. ' A holding point for officers and men joining or leaving the Fleet. (One of the worst bottlenecks in the organization at Sasebo was the complete lack of transit accommodation, and it caused much extra staff work, signal traffic and discomfort.)¹
- g. ' A base from which technical staffs would operate (Gyro E.A., etc.).
- h. ' A depot for amenities—films, books, sports gear, etc.
- i. ' A Fleet mail office.
- j. ' Testing facilities.
- k. ' Communication facilities for the Fleet or the command.

' Above all, a depot ship provides mobility for all the above facilities.'²

As the war wore on, the need became more acutely felt. Piecemeal building on shore was resorted to, but even so, facilities and amenities were inadequate. This spreading ashore, together with the *Ladybird's* lack of sea-keeping qualities, caused loss of mobility, and underlined the lesson that the command and administration should be fully mobile and self-contained.

In the words of Admiral Scott-Moncrieff, who in due course succeeded Admiral Andrewes:

' Under modern conditions there will never be room for a full staff in fighting ships, and therefore it must be borne in a ship of the Fleet train. It is just as important for the Fleet to move round with its administrative and technical staffs as it is to move round with any of the other commodities of the Fleet train.'³

En passant, it may be remarked that the Americans kept three (and sometimes four) depot ships stationed at Sasebo. They were most willing to help the Commonwealth ships, but the procedure was so complicated that in practice it was found preferable to use shore facilities; their lavish equipment of machine tools and skilled technical personnel, however, proved invaluable in emergencies.

The U.S. Navy and Army alike had only small canteen and club facilities ashore. They were very forthcoming in allowing the Commonwealth forces to use them, but the numbers to be dealt with were large. From the beginning, the army was sending about a 1000 men a day through the port, the U.S. Navy could put ashore 6000 or 8000 liberty men an afternoon, and the Commonwealth Navies up to 4000. So, almost the first thing done was to set up a NAAFI canteen. This could not be done on an adequate scale, partly because of the impermanence of

¹ At intervals, several hundred men would arrive at Sasebo in one or other of the trooping carriers (e.g., H.M.S. *Warrior*) which ran between the United Kingdom and the Far East Station, and several hundred men would have to be removed. Accommodation for men who had to await the arrival of ships from sea therefore became an acute problem. Sometimes they were lodged in U.S. depot ships, but in the end it was found necessary to *adjust operations*, so that ships for whom there were large numbers of men were present in harbour when the trooping carrier arrived.

² Report of Experience in Korean Operations, July–December 1950, Part IV, Section 1, in M.01178/51.

³ Report of Experience in Korean Operations, January–June 1951, Part IV, in M.02231/51.

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the situation, and partly because European buildings were at such a premium in wartime Sasebo. Later a canteen for chief and petty officers was obtained.

Attempts, too, were made to provide facilities for games, and gradually a fairly extensive selection of playing fields—some borrowed from the Americans, and some kindly lent by Japanese schools in the neighbourhood—were gathered together, but all were some distance from the naval base, and transport was not easy to arrange. Otherwise, it was very difficult to provide healthy recreation for ships returning from long periods at sea, and the only real antidote was a complete change from Sasebo itself with its predominantly American atmosphere, its hordes of Japanese ladies of the town, gift shops, 'pedi-cabs', cabarets, and other examples of Japanese ingenuity at relieving the sailors of their money. Some change was provided by sending parties on bus trips around the neighbourhood, and occasionally (when notice for steam permitted), to resorts some distance away; but the main means of giving ships' companies a change was to send the ship away from Sasebo, either to Kure in the British Commonwealth zone of occupation, or to Yokosuka, which is within easy reach of Tokyo.

Very soon after the outbreak of war, it was apparent that ships would have to be brought up to war complement if they were to fulfil their functions; shortages of technical and specialist personnel were especially serious. At first, some men whose reliefs had arrived on the station were retained, but efforts were made to restart the ordinary flow of personnel as soon as possible. Meanwhile, prompt measures were taken by the Admiralty. These involved the dispatch of about 1500 men to the Fleet, who had to be found by various expedients, including suspension of discharges at the end of men's engagements, and the calling up of certain reservists; but despite these efforts, the Fleet was not generally brought up to war complement before the beginning of October 1950, when hostilities had been in progress for three months. A difficulty then arose in that most ships could not reasonably accommodate their whole war complement; in the case of Colony-class cruisers, for instance, it was deemed preferable in the interests of habitability for the ships to remain 40 or 50 ratings below their full complement. To cope with this, Admiral Andrewes suggested the following steps in future:

- a. To reassess ships' war complements against the equipment that has to be manned in various states of readiness and weigh the result against the accommodation.
- b. To assess and introduce what may be termed a 'tepid-war' complement for ships on unsettled stations and far from sources of supply of personnel.

The administration of discipline did not cause very much trouble, and the main anxiety was the provision of detention accommodation, and cell accommodation for offenders from small ships. Cases for the former were sent either to Kure, where there was an Australian Army military detention quarters,¹ or to Hong Kong. The latter were accommodated in cruisers and carriers, and later, as the war dragged on, cell accommodation was built ashore at Sasebo. It might have been thought that difficulty would have arisen in co-ordinating the disciplinary procedures of the various members of the United Nations present, but in fact there was none.

¹ This was not a satisfactory solution, as the discipline was lax, and offenders were apt to regard it as a rest-cure from war conditions at sea.

U.N. OFFENSIVE, SEPTEMBER-NOVEMBER 1950

The Australians and New Zealanders carried out Royal Navy procedure precisely; the Canadians did not need a flag-officer's approval to award detention, but were scrupulous in keeping the Admiral informed as a matter of courtesy, and in order to allow him to co-ordinate. The French and the Dutch dealt with their offenders in their own fashions but were willing to comply with any disciplinary measures thought necessary; for example, the Dutch authorities readily submitted the case of the *Evertsen's* grounding to a board of enquiry composed entirely of British officers.

Under the split-staff system introduced by Admiral Andrewes, administration was carried out by the Chief Staff Officer, who with most of the staff and the secretariat remained at Sasebo when the Admiral was at sea. It was found early on that under the particular conditions and working from Sasebo an operating cycle of nine or ten days in the operational area, and the same amount, less passage time, at the base gave about the best conditions. This was particularly so with the Carrier Element whose period in the operational area was largely determined by the need to re-arm the British light fleet carrier after this period. The British ammunition ship was unsuitable for replenishment at sea, so the carrier had to return to Sasebo. When an American light fleet carrier became available to work on the west coast, this interval between operations also gave an adequate break to air crew and handling parties of the carrier which was standing off. It is believed that this method of operating them largely contributed to the exceptionally high output of sorties achieved.

This period also fitted in well for the cruisers and smaller ships of the Blockade Force. Of course, on occasions they remained in the operating area for much longer periods, but as a basis for planning it was sound; ships could be worked in 'watches', and changed from one element to another without dislocation. It also fitted in well with the maintenance cycle which aimed at getting ships to Kure (24 hours further away from the operational area) every alternative period in harbour. The planned requirement for destroyers and frigates was for five days alongside without steam after every 30 days. Allowing for steaming to and from the operational area, the planned employment of ships worked out as follows in every 36 days:

Eighteen days in the operational area	50 per cent.
Six days on passage	17 per cent.
Total at sea on operations	67 per cent.
Five days' maintenance (minimum)	14 per cent.
Seven days (alternative harbour period) as spare at four hours' notice ¹	19 per cent.

As with all good plans, emergencies, defects, and the like occurred, and it did not work out quite so neatly in practice, but it was remarkable how nearly the over-all figure of 67 per cent at sea on operations worked out over a long period.

On the whole, maintenance worked satisfactorily, but this was mainly due to the availability of the well-equipped and hard-working Japanese dockyards at

¹ Included time for replenishment, sea training (including A/S training at Yokosuka), unforeseen duties, additional calls, and so on. Ships seldom spent this full period in harbour.

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Sasebo and Kure, which, with British supervision, did an enormous number of jobs in very quick time. Had these dockyards not been available, a depot/repair ship would have been a *sine qua non*. Apart from this assistance, the biggest factors in ensuring proper maintenance were:

- a. Full technical complement in H.M. ships.
- b. Sufficient technical supervision and repair facilities at bases.
- c. Sufficient, planned, harbour periods to enable *a* aided by *b* to catch up with outstanding jobs that could not be done at sea.
- d. Ready availability of technical stores and equipment in good condition.

Given these maintenance facilities, ships did not suffer at first by doing a great deal of seetime, but as the war progressed this amount of maintenance proved inadequate for the aging ships on the Far East Station, and in 1952 both maintenance and notice for steam were increased.¹

An important aspect of the work of the staff at Sasebo lay in the logistic arrangements for the supply of the Commonwealth Fleet. It was fortunate that when war broke out the Fleet was cruising in Japanese waters, with a certain amount of logistic support afloat (H.M.H.S. *Maine*, two Ranger-class tankers, and the victualling and store ship *Fort Charlotte*). Otherwise, the Fleet was dependent on Hong Kong and Singapore for fuel, spare gear, ammunition, and stores of all kinds.

When Sasebo became the base, adequate logistic support had to be made not only for the British ships, but also for almost all Commonwealth and Allied ships, except of course the United States.²

In order to cope with these problems, Admiral Andrewes virtually gave up his secretary, Commander (S) G. H. Stanning,³ who, with the Chief Staff Officer, made all the arrangements. The first care was to arrange for an ammunition ship and for an adequate flow of fuel. The outbreak of war found the Fleet with its advanced base at Sasebo, over 1000 miles from Hong Kong, and the nearest ammunition supply and issuing ship in the United Kingdom.⁴ Three commercial cargo shipments of ammunition replaced the early expenditure, and some ships leaving for Hong Kong replenished ships which were short, while the S.S. *Choysang*

¹ Standard notice for steam at Sasebo changed from four hours for full speed to four hours for half power or one unit: twelve hours for full power. Destroyers and frigates, notice during maintenance changed from eight hours to 24 hours.

Allowance of maintenance: *a*. Cruisers increased from six days every two months to fourteen days every two months. *b*. Destroyers and frigates from five days a month to seven days after a month.

The carrier operating 'watch and watch' with a U.S. carrier got ample maintenance time.

² These included: Two Australian destroyers } entirely.
Two New Zealand frigates }
Three Canadian destroyers } all except some food and clothing.
One Dutch destroyer }
One French frigate, very little.

Two Siamese frigates and a depot ship were administered by the Americans, but as the frigates were ex-British, some spares had to be provided for them.

³ Later a commander (S) was appointed for this duty.

⁴ The F.E. Station had been without an A.S.I.S. since February 1950 when R.F.A. *Fort Sandusky* was withdrawn. The need for an A.S.I.S. on a large station where the two main bases were 1500 miles apart was recognized by the Admiralty, but none could be spared. One was held at six weeks' notice for arrival on the station.

was fitting out and loading as a temporary A.S.I.S. Two caves at Sasebo were allocated to the British Command, and they, together with one or two open lighters, were used for the storage of this ammunition. R.F.A. *Fort Rosalie*, loaded with the bulk of the war reserve and replacements for what had been expended already, arrived from the United Kingdom three months after the outbreak of war. Forward-area reserves were then divided, with two-thirds in the *Fort Rosalie*, which supplied the bulk of the ammunition to ships at Sasebo, and one-third in the *Choysang*, which in addition was used for freighting ammunition from Hong Kong and Singapore. It was not possible to establish satisfactory stocks of all types at Kure, and special arrangements had to be made for ships carrying out self-maintenance there. The gun team, inspection team, and officer in charge of armament supply staff were accommodated in the *Fort Rosalie*, which thus fulfilled many of the duties of an armament depot.

It was seldom necessary to send ammunition to the operational area on the west coast. On special occasions—e.g., the bombardments during the Inchon operation—small U.S. cargo carriers (A.K.L.) were available on request.

As regards furnace fuel, there was at no time any concern over the supply to the forward area. U.S. stocks in Japan were more than sufficient to deal with immediate demands while tankers were being diverted to meet all Commonwealth and foreign requirements. By the end of October 1950, Royal Navy credit stocks were at least equal to two weeks' off-take, and were increasing. The small capacity of the Ranger tankers was a handicap. They were very useful for base work, but too small to be more than stopgaps when away from source of supply. In addition to one or two Rangers, it was found necessary to maintain a Wave tanker in the Korea/Japan area continuously.

Avgas was available from shore stocks in Japan, though the correct octane fuel could not always be obtained from U.S. sources, and they could not use British.

The supply of lubricating oils became quite critical in the early days. No U.S. equivalent of Admiralty compound was held in Japan, and the consumption of the *Maine* and the reciprocating-engined frigates considerably exceeded the original estimates. Later, both the Rangers and the *Fort Charlotte* carried stocks of major grades of lubricating oils.

For naval stores, provisions of every kind, clothing, mess gear, tobacco, and so on, as well as NAAFI stores, the Fleet depended mainly on R.F.A. *Fort Charlotte*. A routine was evolved whereby she would stay at Sasebo for four to six weeks, and then be absent for about a month to replenish at Hong Kong. Her absences were commendably short, but always caused anxiety. No spare-parts distributing centre was established at Sasebo, and the need for a depot ship, in which such an organization could be carried, was again underlined; but it was usually possible to anticipate requirements sufficiently for items to be brought from Hong Kong or Singapore in time. There were occasional anxieties over asdic domes and firebricks when damage caused unexpected requirements, and there was perennial anxiety over radar and radio valves, even when the *Fort Charlotte* was present.

The absences of the *Fort Charlotte* gave rise to a spate of improvisations, and a second N.S.I.S./V.S.I.S. would have been a great help. On these occasions the following arrangements were made:

Naval stores. After making sure that all ships thoroughly topped up, some were stowed ashore at Sasebo.

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Dry provisions, clothing, etc., NAAFI stores. As much as possible was stored ashore at Sasebo and later also at Kure. When the stocks got low they were replenished from Hong Kong by any suitable ships coming up.

Refrigerated stores, and at first, fresh provisions were obtained from the Americans. Later, partly for convenience and partly to save dollars, locally-grown fresh produce was purchased ashore.

The value of this U.S.N. logistic support was great, and for a long time tended to mask the extreme need for logistic support for the Commonwealth ships; but it was interesting to discover how few of their items of provisions were 'compatible', i.e., sufficiently acceptable to British sailors to be worth getting.


When ships were up the west coast of Korea for between one and two months at a time, the supply of provisions and stores at Sasebo alone was not sufficient measure. To meet these requirements, provisions together with any naval or NAAFI stores, and of course the mails were sent up by any available means—British, U.S., or Allied—that came to hand.

Throughout the war, air stores were provided either by the Royal Naval Air Station, Sembawang, or from the United Kingdom.

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To return to the west coast.

On 25th September, Task Force 91—the British and Commonwealth Blockade Force covering the Inchon operation—was dissolved, and became Task Group 95¹ with the same general blockading duties as before the operation. At the same time the organization of the 'United Nations Blockade and Escort Force' for which Admiral Andrewes had been pressing since the beginning of hostilities was adopted, Rear-Admiral A. E. Smith, U.S.N., being appointed to co-ordinate its activities, with his flag in the destroyer depot ship *Dixie* at Sasebo. The chain of command then became as follows:



¹ It will have been noticed that a special command set-up had been introduced for the Inchon operation. This worked well, except for the process of bringing it into force and dissolving it, because, being superimposed on the normal organization, and being classified as TOP SECRET until D-day, it was very hard to know at what stage one melted into the other. At one time the original organization was still in force, the joint task force organization in force, but TOP SECRET, and a post-landing organization issued, to be brought into force when the joint task force dissolved, which happened in stages.

As before, Rear-Admiral Andrewes's international force was responsible for the west coast, and Rear-Admiral Hartman's American force for the east coast. But their tasks were considerably complicated by the enemy's mine warfare, which had first been noticed just before the Inchon operation, and was being intensified. The enemy used mines in three ways, viz.,

- a. Moored defensive minefields.
- b. Moored mines laid by junks in special areas, designed to catch blockade patrols on their normal runs.
- c. Floating mines sent down on the ebb tide from Haeju and Chinnampo.

Thanks to the very great range of tides in the Yellow Sea, moored mines were not infrequently sighted on the surface at low water, which thereby gave away the position of the minefield. Air searches for mines were arranged, but a complication arose because the Yellow Sea abounds in very large, circular jelly-fish, some measuring as much as four feet and a half in diameter. They float a few feet below the surface and look exactly like mines. Even their colour—some greyish, others dark brown—added to the deception. 'Looking down from the bridge', wrote Admiral Andrewes, 'these jellies look so like moored mines that it is almost possible to imagine horns on them—but enough of this fishing story . . . I feel sure that some of the "mines" sighted from the air are jelly-fish.'¹

Altogether, U.N. ships and aircraft reported mines on 54 separate occasions during September 1950, most of them in the Yellow Sea between Chinnampo and Inchon, but some off the east coast of Korea, and it was there that the first casualties occurred, when U.S.S. *Brush* was mined on 26th September, and U.S.S. *Mansfield* on the 30th; both these destroyers were severely damaged and suffered heavy casualties, but eventually were got into port. Two South Korean Y.M.S.s also, were badly damaged by mines—No. 509 on 28th September and No. 504² (off Mokpo on the south-west coast) on 1st October; on the same day the U.S. minesweeper *Maggie* was sunk by a mine 30 miles north of Pohang.

At this time there were very inadequate minesweeping facilities in the theatre of war.³ On 3rd August 1950, Captain R. T. Spofford, U.S.N., had been appointed in command of the sweepers (Mine Squadron 3); he lost no time in representing the inadequacy of his resources,⁴ but owing to what was considered the higher priority of other types of vessels, no increase in minesweepers was forthcoming for the time being. The events of September left no doubt as to the reality of the menace, and the Americans then took energetic steps to rectify matters.

¹ F.O. 2i/c R.o.P. No. 21.

² With her engines wrecked and her hull taking in water, her commanding officer, in reply to offers of assistance, signalled that Y.M.S. 504 would 'soon be ready to kill more Reds'.

³ Since World War II the United States minesweeping establishment had been severely reduced in the interests of economy. When the Korean War broke out, Admiral Joy had in commission one steel-hulled fleet minesweeper (A.M.) and six wooden-hulled sweepers (A.M.S.); these had been employed in sweeping Japanese harbours and channels in which mines had been laid by U.S. aircraft in World War II. In addition there were three fleet minesweepers in 'caretaker' status and twelve Japanese minesweepers under contract—a total of 22 ships on the station.

⁴ As regards number of ships, material, personnel, and training.

The blockade patrol on the west coast of Korea, as already mentioned, was taken over by H.M.S. *Kenya* (Captain P. W. Brock) on her release from the Inchon bombardment force on 20th September. The *Kenya* with the *Charity* and *Concord* operated in the north, mainly off Fankochi Point, while the *Cayuga*, *Athabaskan*, and *Sioux* worked in the area to the south of the Gulf of Inchon.

Movements were largely governed by the risk from the increasing number of floating mines; ten mines sighted to the westward of Fankochi Point in three days, not as the result of deliberate search but purely by chance sightings, gave the impression of a big enemy effort. To minimize the risk, Captain Brock kept the patrols during dark hours either well inshore under a lee or well out to sea. Three R.o.K. patrol craft worked close inshore; Lieutenant-Commander McLaughlan of the *Concord*, who saw much of them, remarked that their conduct was admirable, their senior officer, Commander Chea in No. 701, in particular being most helpful in probing inaccessible areas and collecting information.

A bombardment of trenches, gun emplacements, and a concentration of enemy troops in the Fankochi Point area was carried out by the *Kenya* and *Charity* on 22nd September; several guns were destroyed and considerable damage and casualties were inflicted. This area was again heavily bombarded by U.S.S. *Manchester* and four destroyers, and also attacked by two heavy air strikes from T.F. 77 on the 28th.

H.M.S. *Charity* had an unpleasant experience during the night of 24th/25th September, searching for a U.S.N. pilot reported down in position 38° 20' N., 124° 30' E. in the mined area to the north and west of Choppeki Point; all went well, however, and she escaped unscathed. The pilot was eventually picked up by the U.S. destroyer *Chevalier*.

The patrol was taken over by H.M.S. *Ceylon* (Captain Lloyd-Davies) and the *Cockade* on 25th September, H.M.C. Ships *Athabaskan* and *Sioux*, and later H.M.A. Ships *Warramunga* and *Bataan* operating in the southern area. Captain Lloyd-Davies considered that the best way of both enforcing the blockade and preventing organized minelaying (as opposed to floating mines) in the northern area, was to bring certain focal points under control and maintain R.o.K. patrols from them. These were:

- a. The Techong group of islands, dominating the channel between them and the mainland.
- b. The island of Kirin, dominating the approaches to Ongjin.
- c. The island of Teyonpyong which controls the entrance to the Haeju River.

As Teyonpyong do was already in U.N. hands, steps were taken to secure the Techong group. Shosei to and Techong do had been evacuated by the Communists; this was confirmed by an armed reconnaissance party landed by the *Ceylon* on 28th September, and from then on the R.o.K. Navy operated patrols from Techong do to the eastward. Pengyong do, the largest of the Techong islands, from whence the *Cossack* had been fired on in July, was still occupied by the enemy. A demand for surrender having failed to elicit response, the island was bombarded on 30th September by the *Ceylon* and *Cockade*, and again on 2nd October, this

time with air spotting provided by T.F. 77, which also put in two air strikes on the island.

Mines were a continual anxiety; in the course of their operations the two ships demolished ten. The American mine reconnaissance aircraft working from Inchon were most co-operative, and were always prepared to fly ahead of the ships and search out an area if so requested.

In the southern area, the destroyers were mainly concerned with Kunsan. On 22nd September the *Cayuga* and *Athabaskan* bombarded targets in Beiju Bay (north of that port) with good effect. On the 25th, four moored mines were found off the entrance to Kunsan; one of these was secured for investigation, and another countermined. Gun positions were bombarded on 30th September and 2nd October by the *Warramunga* and *Bataan*, which had relieved the Canadian destroyers; and cover was given to a division of United States minesweepers while they swept the approaches to Kunsan between 1st and 3rd October.

All this time the heavy carriers of T.F. 77 and the escort carrier *Badoeng Strait* had been operating in the Yellow Sea, carrying out heavy air strikes in support of the army operations on shore. Gun-fire support, as long as the fighting front was within range, was provided by the battleship *Missouri* and the cruisers *Toledo*, *Manchester*, *Rochester*, and destroyers that had remained in the Inchon area after the landing. In the early days of October, the heavy carriers and most of the ships of the 7th Fleet were withdrawn from the west coast to replenish and prepare for further operations designed to exploit the favourable situation resulting from General MacArthur's master-stroke at Inchon.

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Meanwhile, on shore the fighting had gone almost exactly as General MacArthur had anticipated. In the south, for 48 hours after the Inchon landing, there was no relaxation of enemy pressure on the Pusan perimeter¹; then, in the evening of 17th September it slackened, and thereafter the advance of General Walton Walker's 8th Army was swift. One column struck west towards Kunsan, while the remainder drove north. By 26th September, the 1st Cavalry Division had advanced over 100 miles, and the line ran from approximately Suwon through Chonan to Chungju, while on the east coast R.o.K. units were approaching Samchok. See Figure 5.

In the north, after sharp fighting, the U.S. Marines entered Seoul on 25th September, three months to the day after the North Koreans started their invasion, and the capital was recaptured by them and elements of the 10th Corps by the 27th.

On 29th September, a ceremony was held in the war-scarred and somewhat battered government buildings in Seoul, at which General MacArthur officially handed back South Korea to its President, Mr Syngman Rhee, in the presence of the Chairman of the U.N. Commission on Korea and a large number of the senior officers engaged in the war. Among them was Rear-Admiral Andrewes who

¹ General MacArthur himself doubted that the intended purpose of the landing had been realized. On 17th September he expressed his fear to Admiral Doyle that the landing had not achieved the results he had hoped for, and directed him to commence planning another amphibious landing, this time near Kunsan. In a few hours, however, a dispatch from General Walton set his mind at rest. (Cagle and Manson)

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


Figure 5. U.N. offensive, 15th September - 1st October 1950

arrived at Inchon that morning in H.M.A.S. *Warramunga* in response to an invitation from Admiral Struble.¹

By this time, the shattered North Korean Army was in full retreat. Entire divisions had completely disintegrated and were scattered over the countryside in disorganized units. Many troops were cut off in the south-west corner of the peninsula. Completely blockaded at sea, and with their supply lines severed, they were in desperate straits; the roads so recently thronged by refugees fleeing before them were now littered with their abandoned tanks, mortars, artillery, small-arms, and equipment of all sorts.

As soon as Seoul had been captured, the U.S. Marines (supported by Corsair fighters from Task Group 96·8) pushed northward to take Uijongbu, a vital road junction twelve miles from the capital, which had served for a short time as the headquarters of the retreating N.K.P.A., while to the southward, the 7th Division captured the important railway junction of Osan and other avenues of retreat.

By the end of the month of September, 23 600 prisoners had been taken by the U.S. 8th Army; many disorganized bands were groping their way through the mountain passes towards the north. In addition, the Inchon–Seoul operations had cost the Communist defenders about 16 400 prisoners and casualties. The remnants of the North Korean armies, who but a fortnight earlier had stood on the very threshold of Pusan, were back over the 38th parallel, striving desperately to form some sort of defence for their own territory, while the U.N. forces lined up to the southward, ready to carry the war across the frontier of the aggressors.

Rarely, if ever, in history can the efficacy of the amphibious weapon, applied by a master mind at the strategically correct time and place, have been so conclusively and dramatically demonstrated, or the application of sea power produced results so swift and startling.

On 30th September 1950, General MacArthur broadcast a demand to the enemy C.-in-C., Kim Il-sung, who was also Premier of North Korea, for the surrender of the North Korean forces.

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By 1st October 1950, the first objective of the United Nations—‘to repel the armed attack’—had thus been achieved, but as long as the North Korean Army remained in being and defied the demand to surrender, the second objective—‘to restore international peace and security in the area’—remained unfulfilled. Although the United Nations had never recognized the political division of the country by the 38th parallel, advance over it (except by South Korean forces) was halted while the United Nations General Assembly considered further action.²

¹ Admiral Struble boarded the *Warramunga* on her arrival at Inchon and, acting on the personal instructions of General MacArthur, presented the U.S. decoration, the Silver Star, to Admiral Andrewes. After the ceremony at Seoul, Admiral Andrewes returned to Sasebo.

² Since the end of July, the U.N. Security Council had been hampered in dealing with the Korean situation, Mr Malik, the Soviet representative, having terminated his boycott and taken his place as President on 1st August. In this capacity, by introducing a number of resolutions unacceptable to the majority of other members, he managed to prevent any further action being taken on the aggression by North Korea. On 1st September, the Presidency passed to Sir Gladwyn Jebb (U.K. representative) and on the 6th a resolution was put to the vote requesting all States to bring pressure to bear on North Korea as a means of terminating the conflict. This was vetoed by the Soviet representative (the North Koreans appeared to be winning at that time).

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Most of the U.N. members felt that the 38th parallel had ceased to exist as a frontier from the moment the North Koreans violated it on 25th June. In any case, to call off the pursuit of a defeated army still at large merely because it had reached its homeland would indeed have been something new in war. The Communist bloc, however, took violent exception to this view; Mr Vyshinsky, the Soviet leader in the General Assembly, actually had the effrontery to declare that if the U.N. forces crossed the 38th parallel, they themselves would become 'aggressors'.

The object of this obstruction was of course to gain time—time for their puppets to rest and reorganize their army, and, more important, time for Chinese Communist troops to come to their rescue.

For with the North Korean Communist State on the verge of dissolution, the possibility of Chinese intervention had to be reckoned with. General Kim Il-sung made no reply to General MacArthur's call for surrender, but two days later the Chinese Foreign Minister, Mr Chou En-lai, publicly asserted that Red China would not 'supinely tolerate seeing our neighbours being savagely invaded by "imperialists"', and on the same day he informed the Indian Ambassador in Peking that China would intervene should United Nations forces cross the 38th parallel, but not if such action was confined to R.o.K. forces.¹

On 29th September, a resolution, originally drafted by the British Government, was submitted by eight Powers to the Political Committee of the U.N. Assembly. This declared the U.N. aim in Korea to be 'the establishment of a unified, independent, and democratic government in the sovereign State of Korea', and made three recommendations, namely, the establishment of a new U.N. commission for the unification and rehabilitation of Korea, to supersede the former Commission; the holding of elections under U.N. supervision; and the withdrawal of the U.N. forces as soon as these aims were achieved. A Soviet counter-resolution professed the same ultimate aim, but urged that it should be achieved by an immediate cease-fire and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea. The Soviet resolution did not appeal to the large majority, however, and on 4th October a resolution on the lines of that submitted by the eight Powers was passed. The authority of the U.N. forces to implement United Nations policy in Korea was clearly established by a resolution passed in the General Assembly.

General MacArthur received authorization to proceed north of the 38th parallel in a directive from the American Chiefs of Staff. This laid down the destruction of the North Korean armed forces as the military objective, and to achieve this he was authorized to conduct military operations, including amphibious and airborne landings or ground operations, north of the 38th parallel; but the shadow of a possible third world war still loomed large, and a proviso was added that at the time of such operations there should have been neither entry into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Communist forces, nor announcement of such intentions, nor a threat to counter U.N. operations militarily in North Korea. Stringent orders were given that under no circumstances were his forces to cross the Manchurian

¹ At the time, it seemed that this threat might well be bluff, designed to gain time for the N.K.P.A. to reorganize. On the other hand, the liquidation of North Korea by U.N. forces would mean a very severe 'loss of face' throughout the East for all Communist régimes.

As late as 15th October it was General MacArthur's view that there was very little chance of Chinese intervention, and that if it did occur, it would be ineffective. *Years of Trial and Hope*, Volume II, p. 387.

or U.S.S.R. borders of Korea (and as a matter of policy only R.o.K. troops were to be used in the borderland provinces), nor was naval or air action in support of his operations to be undertaken against Manchurian or Soviet territory.

R.o.K. forces had already crossed the 38th parallel on the 1st October and were pushing rapidly up the east coast towards Wonsan. On 9th October, General MacArthur issued a second message to the Premier of Northern Korea calling for the surrender of his armed forces, and on the same day, United Nations forces started a general advance into North Korea. Two days later, Peking Radio reiterated that after the crossing of the parallel by American troops the Chinese people could not stand idly by.

At this time, General MacArthur had been in the Far East for nearly fourteen years, without paying a single visit to the United States, and he was necessarily somewhat out of touch with the situation at home and the world-wide picture as seen in Washington. Divergencies of opinion had occurred between him and the Home authorities—for example, in August 1950 he had caused such embarrassment by voicing views at variance with the United States declared policy with regard to Formosa that President Truman felt obliged to direct him to withdraw his statement.

President Truman and General MacArthur had never met each other, and at the juncture now reached in the Korean War, the President felt that it was essential to establish personal contact, both to explain his own views and policies and to obtain from the General first-hand information and his judgment of affairs in the Far East, especially as regards the Peking threats of Chinese intervention in Korea. It was undesirable that General MacArthur should leave the theatre of war for as long as a trip to America and back would take; the President therefore suggested that they should meet somewhere in the Pacific, and Wake Island was agreed on as a convenient rendezvous.

The meeting took place on 15th October.¹ A wide range of subjects was discussed and the President was well satisfied with the conference. In the light of after events, General MacArthur's appreciation of the Korean War situation at this time is of interest. He considered the war as won, and was convinced that all resistance in the whole of Korea would be over in a few weeks and that he would be able to withdraw the 8th Army to Japan by Christmas, leaving a couple of U.S. divisions and the contingents of other U.N. countries in Korea till elections had been held there, which he thought might be as early as January 1951. There was very little chance in his view of Chinese intervention in force; they might be able to get 50 or 60 thousand men into Korea, but since they had no air force, these would suffer very severe casualties. The Russians could not bring in any great number of ground troops before the advent of winter; in the event of their air forces attempting to support Chinese ground units, it 'just would not work'.²

By the end of the forenoon the talks had been finished; President Truman started his long flight home, and General MacArthur returned to Tokyo.

The next day, Chinese Communist contingents crossed the Yalu into North Korea.

¹ Local time, Wake Island. The date in Washington and London was 14th October.

² *Years of Trial and Hope*, Volume II, Harry S. Truman.

The events leading up to this conference, and the conference itself, are discussed in some detail in this book, as well as the aftermath.

The United Nations plan for carrying the war into North Korea was again simple and once more was based on their sea supremacy. It was to withdraw General Almond's 10th Corps from their positions around Inchon, move them by sea to the east coast and land them at Wonsan, whence they would attack the enemy from behind any line he might be holding and drive across the country towards Pyongyang and Chinnampo, while the 8th Army, attacking from the south, would also direct its line of advance on the northern capital.

The U.S. Navy rather questioned the necessity for an amphibious operation, as it seemed that it would have been simpler for the 10th Corps to move overland direct to Wonsan. But from the army's point of view it would have been difficult to move the heavy equipment across country. Furthermore, communications from Pusan were considerably strained to supply the large U.N. forces engaged, and it was desired to open up another port to cater for the 10th Corps.

The whole operation entailed a complex movement and considerable preparation, such as sweeping the approaches to Wonsan, where it was known that extensive minelaying had been taking place.¹ The scale and organization of the operation was much the same as for the landing at Inchon, Vice-Admiral Struble again being in over-all command as Commander, Task Force 7, and Rear-Admiral Doyle being in charge of the assault forces, spearheaded, as before, by the U.S. Marines under Major-General Smith.

At the request of Rear-Admiral Andrewes, who did not wish all the British and Commonwealth naval forces to be confined to a purely holding role on the west coast, H.M. Ships *Ceylon* and *Cockade*, H.M.C.S. *Athabaskan*, and H.M.A.S. *Warramunga* were included in the Gun-fire Support Group under Rear-Admiral Hartman (T.G. 95·2); and H.M.S. *Mounts Bay*, H.M.N.Z. Ships *Pukaki* and *Tutira*, and the French Ship *La Grandière* formed part of the Minesweeping and Protection Group under Captain Spofford, U.S.N. (T.G. 95·6).

As for Inchon, the planning was carried out exceedingly quickly, despite a serious lack of intelligence. During the first week in October the 10th Corps troops, as they were relieved by units of the 8th Army, proceeded by road and rail to Pusan, where they embarked. The Marines embarked later at Inchon, which they left between 15th and 17th October.

Meanwhile, the Gun-fire Support Group, T.G. 95·2, consisting of U.S. Ships *Missouri*, *Helena*, *Rochester*, *Toledo* and *Worcester*, and a number of destroyers, H.M. Ships *Ceylon* and *Cockade*, H.M.C.S. *Athabaskan* and H.M.A.S. *Warramunga*, had been operating off the north-east coast under Rear-Admiral Hartman. On 12th October, the whole force bombarded Changjin (latitude 41° 47' N., longitude 129° 49' E.), only 60 miles from the Soviet/Korean frontier, for a couple of hours; the next day the force split, and engaged various targets on the coast. For example, at Songjin (latitude 40° 40' N., longitude 129° 12' E.), a road bridge was destroyed and three railway bridges damaged by the *Ceylon*, working with the *Athabaskan* and U.S.S. *Worcester*.

The assault landing at Wonsan had been fixed for 20th October, but it was known before the Marines left Inchon that it would be unopposed, the South Korean 1st

¹ How extensive was not known, and came as an unpleasant surprise, which caused a delay that might have been most serious.

Corps having rapidly advanced up the coast and, supported by U.S.S. *Leyte's* air group, occupied Wonsan on 10th October, after which they pushed on to the north. But an exasperating delay was to occur before the U.S. troops could be put ashore.

Minesweeping in the approaches to Wonsan had started on 10th October. It had been estimated that it would take about five days to clear a channel; actually it took fifteen. Only six minesweepers, soon increased to nine, were available. At first, all went well; aided by a helicopter from U.S.S. *Worcester*, which was found most useful for spotting mines beneath the surface, a 3000-yard-wide channel was swept from the 100-fathom line to the 30-fathom line—a distance of about 12 miles—on the first day, 21 contact mines being destroyed. Then, in the evening, as the 30-fathom line was reached, the density of the mines greatly increased. Thereafter, progress was slow. Efforts at countermining with 1000-lb bombs dropped by aircraft from the *Philippine Sea* and *Leyte* were not satisfactory. The meagre minesweeping force found itself confronted by a major sweeping operation, in the course of which the fleet minesweepers *Pirate* and *Pledge* were mined and sunk, as was the R.o.K. Y.M.S. *516*, with heavy loss of life. Finally, when it was thought the channel was almost completed, magnetic mines were found close inshore, which caused a further delay.¹

U.S.S. *Mount McKinley*, with Rear-Admiral Doyle and Major-General Almond on board, arrived off Wonsan on 19th October; they there found Vice-Admiral Struble flying his flag in the battleship *Missouri*, at anchor in the approaches. The Vice-Admiral informed them of the check the minesweeping programme had received, and that he had decided to postpone the landing till a channel was cleared.² At dusk, accordingly, all groups of the invasion fleet strung out off the coast reversed course; course was altered back again at daylight, 20th, and reversed again at dusk, and this continued for another four days, till finally, the mine clearance had been completed. Thus, a division of troops with their ancillaries and the many ships lifting them were kept waiting about at sea for five days, because control of sea communications in that particular area had been temporarily lost.³

All this time, Captain Unwin's five frigates (*Mounts Bay*, *Morecambe Bay*, *Pukaki*, *Tutira*, and *La Grandière*) spent a busy time with the waiting convoys, escorting transports, transferring mails and orders for their groups, occasionally searching for missing aircraft, and so forth. The weather for the most part was poor, with a high wind and fairly heavy swell. Following immediately on their prolonged patrol off Inchon⁴ this entailed a heavy strain on the frigates. They

¹ About 3000 mines had been laid in the approaches to Wonsan. All were of Soviet manufacture. See Plan 2.

² Admiral Struble subsequently stated that if the assault operations against Wonsan had been vitally important on 20th October, he would have been prepared to carry out the landing despite the mines, but that, owing to the unexpectedly rapid R.o.K. advance beyond Wonsan, he decided that the acceptance of the mining risk to the transports was unnecessary and therefore unjustifiable.

³ Rear-Admiral A. E. Smith, U.S.N., the Advance Force Commander, in reporting the minesweeping situation to the Chief of Naval Operations (Admiral Forrest Sherman) in Washington, opened with the words 'The U.S. Navy has lost command of the sea in Korean waters . . .'. With this view both Vice-Admiral Joy and Admiral Sherman concurred; the latter remarked, 'if you can't go *where* you want to *when* you want to, you have not got command of the sea'.

⁴ See Section 29.

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were released when the convoys entered the swept channel on 25th October, and proceeded to Sasebo in company, where they arrived on the 27th, the *Pukaki* being detached to Kure for maintenance *en route*. 'Thus ended a period for the frigates', wrote Captain Unwin, 'of 46 days' operational duty away from their base, under U.S. command, of which no ship except *Morecambe Bay*, who joined up towards the end, spent more than six days at anchor; each ship steamed some 9000 miles during this time. Relations with the U.S. authorities and ships were, as ever, excellent and all were extremely co-operative and helpful These operations have completed the welding of the frigates into a united family . . . an excellent team-spirit prevails throughout all ships of the escort group This was an arduous period for all, though of course as with most frigate work there were few highlights. No ship ever broke down or failed to do what I asked of her

'The companies of all ships are very young . . . given adequate lead, the modern young sailor responds with great cheerfulness, keenness, and enthusiasm, and can always be relied on to play his part to the full. The standard of entry into the Royal Navy is as high as it ever was.'¹ This encouraging opinion of the young seaman of 1950 was warmly endorsed by both Rear-Admiral Andrewes and the C.-in-C.

The American Marines eventually landed on 25th October, and leaving elements to protect the Wonsan-Kojo-Majon-ni area, advanced to the northward, reaching Hamhung by the end of the month. As the R.o.K. troops had driven the enemy beyond Iwon (latitude 40° 20' N., longitude 128° 40' E.), some 90 miles north-east of Wonsan, and since investigation showed that this harbour was not mined, the 7th Division was landed there on 29th October, and started moving in a northerly direction.

In the meantime, United Nations² forces attacking strongly along the west and central sectors had broken the enemy front, which suddenly collapsed. The advance became rapid; Pyongyang was captured on 18th October, and by the end of the month, elements of U.N. forces arrived at the Manchurian border in the vicinity of Chosan on the River Yalu. A map of the invasion is shown in Figure 6.

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While these events were taking place on the east coast and on shore in Korea the bulk of Rear-Admiral Andrewes's Task Group 95.1 continued to operate in the Yellow Sea.

After his return from the liberation ceremony at Seoul at the end of September, Admiral Andrewes remained at Sasebo for about a week, while the normal blockade

¹ Captain (F) 4, R.o.P. in M.02495/50.

² By this time, though the United States contribution was vastly preponderant, the forces under General MacArthur's command were becoming truly international in character. Besides United States and Republic of Korea troops, contingents from Australia, Great Britain, and the Philippines, and a Swedish field-hospital unit were operating in the field; infantry from Thailand and Turkey were being disembarked in Korean ports, and Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France and Greece were preparing ground units for movement to Korea.

Naval assistance had come from Australia, Canada, Colombia, France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Norway.

Altogether, counting in monetary and supply contributions, 42 nations had by then offered their aid to the United Nations.




Figure 6. U.N. invasion of North Korea

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patrols were maintained by the cruisers and destroyers. Little occurred to break the monotony. Some interesting details about the minefield in the approaches to Kunsan was obtained by H.M.S. *Charity* (Lieutenant-Commander P. R. G. Worth) who was able to interview some of the party who had laid the field. Forty-nine mines, some magnetic, but mostly inertia, had been laid from junks in the night of 9th September, expressly to catch the *Jamaica* should she return to repeat the bombardment she had carried out on the 6th.

The retreat of the North Korean forces on the mainland brought to the fore the plight of the islands on the south-west and west coasts. Most of these islands had at one time or another been held by the Communists, but the situation was changing daily; some were still in Communist hands; in several, the South Korean inhabitants were known to be on the verge of starvation. A comprehensive plan was accordingly worked out for the three Canadian destroyers under Captain J. V. Brock, R.C.N., with some R.o.K. vessels to eject any remaining Communists and to rehabilitate the islanders. After a few days, however, the South Koreans undertook this work themselves, and on 5th October the Canadian destroyers were freed for other duties.

This period was marked by a visit to Japan of the C.-in-C., F.E. Station, Admiral Sir Patrick Brind. This gave him an opportunity to discuss the whole situation with Rear-Admiral Andrewes. In the course of his visit he saw the layout of the base at Sasebo, went on board several of the Commonwealth ships, and met a large proportion of the officers and ships' companies present in harbour. He also visited Tokyo and met many of the American senior officers. On the conclusion of his visit he signalled to the First Sea Lord:

' I have seen General MacArthur, Admirals Joy and Struble, and spent four days at Sasebo. From what I have seen myself and have heard on all sides, the Commonwealth ships under Andrewes have met all calls made upon them exceedingly well and have made a great reputation for themselves. They have reached a high standard of efficiency, the bearing of the ships' companies is most creditable and health is good. Andrewes himself plays a much larger part than commanding the Commonwealth forces, for his experience and counsel are used to the full and are greatly appreciated . . .'¹

Several changes in Rear-Admiral Andrewes's force took place about this time. H.M.S. *Theseus* (Captain A. S. Bolt) arrived at Sasebo on 5th October. She carried No. 17 Carrier Air Group under Lieutenant-Commander Stovin-Bradford, consisting of No. 807 Squadron, 21 Sea Furies XI (Lieutenant-Commander M. P. G. Smith) and No. 810 Squadron, 12 Fireflies V (Lieutenant-Commander K. S. Patisson). Her air group had been augmented by a number of new pilots on leaving the Home Fleet, but vigorous flying training had been carried out while on passage, and by the time she arrived she was all ready to take part in operations. Arrangements were made to establish a pool of reserve aircraft for her, with the necessary maintenance staff, at Iwakuni.

On 6th October, H.M.S. *Alert*, having turned over her duties as headquarters ship to H.M.S. *Ladybird* (Commander N. H. Pond), and H.M.S. *Warrior*, which had brought up reliefs and a large quantity of stores, sailed for Hong Kong. On the same day, the U.S.S. *Gardiners Bay*, flying-boat tender, with her four two-

¹ C.-in-C., F.E. Station 081025 October 1950, personal to First Sea Lord.

engined flying-boats (then based at Inchon), and five Japanese minesweepers¹ were added to Admiral Andrewes's Command. With these additions he then had under his operational control ships of the following nationalities: Australian, British, Canadian, Dutch,² Japanese, South Korean, and United States. With Captain Unwin were a French ship and New Zealanders; and a commander in the Thai Navy was at Sasebo to discuss a contribution of three Thai frigates. 'What we now want', wrote the Admiral, 'is the gift of tongues so graphically described in the second chapter of the Acts of the Apostles, a chapter which has proved the downfall of many an unwary lay reader before now. Luckily we have no signs yet of any recruits from Phrygia or Pamphilia.'

Task Group 95·1 was reorganized in the following task elements on 7th October:

- T.E. 95·10. C.T.F. 95·1 representative ashore at Sasebo (Chief Staff Officer).
- T.E. 95·11. Air Patrol and Blockade Element: H.M.S. *Theseus* and destroyers attached.
- T.E. 95·12. Surface Patrol and Blockade Element: cruiser and destroyers attached.
- T.E. 95·13. Screen Element: H.M.C.S.s. *Cayuga* (Commander) *Sioux*, H.M.A.S. *Bataan*, H.M. Ships *Constance*, *Concord*, *Charity*.
- T.E. 95·14. Minesweeping Element: H.M.S. *Whitesand Bay* and five Japanese minesweepers.
- T.E. 95·15. Inshore Element: commander to be nominated with R.o.K.N. vessels as available.
- T.E. 95·16. Reconnaissance Element: U.S.S. *Gardiners Bay* and four flying-boats (Mariners).

As already mentioned, H.M.S. *Ceylon* and three destroyers were detailed to work with the American forces on the east coast prior to the landing at Wonsan, leaving the *Theseus*, *Jamaica*, *Kenya*, six destroyers,³ and the *Whitesand Bay* in charge of the five Japanese minesweepers, available for duty on the west coast.

The tasks laid down for this force in the general plan—while the U.N. Army was advancing on Pyongyang in the west, and the Wonsan operation was developing in the east—were *a.* to continue the blockade in the Yellow Sea, *b.* to conduct air strikes and surface bombardments of selected military targets in the Chinnampo–Haeju area, in order to simulate preparations for landing operations, and *c.* to keep the enemy off balance and prevent his reorganization.

Admiral Andrewes's plan for implementing these instructions was as follows. Approximately half H.M.S. *Theseus*'s aircraft would be required for a continuous

¹ These minesweepers were withdrawn on 31st October.

² H. Neth. M.S. *Evertsen* was refitting at Hong Kong.

³ *Cayuga*, *Constance*, *Charity*, *Concord*, *Sioux*, *Bataan*.

Rear-Admiral Andrewes put the *Cayuga* at the disposal of Vice-Admiral H. T. W. Grant, the Canadian Chief of Naval Staff, who had been visiting the Canadian destroyers, and she did not rejoin his flag till 17th October.

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A/S and minespotter patrol over the carrier force, and a combat air patrol over the inshore force (minesweepers and supporting cruiser); the remainder would carry out attacks over a defined area¹—roughly the south-west corner of North Korea including Haeju, Chinnampo, and Sariwon.² The targets for air attacks, mainly coast defences and communications,³ were chosen to create the impression of an imminent United Nations landing.

Minesweeping operations were designed to enhance this impression. The five Japanese sweepers were too few and too slow to deal with more than one area; Haeju was chosen for their activities. Bombardments would be ordered as and when circumstances might dictate. Concurrently, the blockade of the shrinking Communist-held coast was to be enforced; and the *Gardiners Bay's* four Mariners were to continue the anti-mine patrols they were already carrying out over the west coast of North Korea and the Gulf of Inchon.

With these intentions, Rear-Admiral Andrewes sailed from Sasebo on 8th October in H.M.S. *Theseus*, with the *Kenya*, *Constance*, *Sioux*, and *Cayuga* in company; the latter, with Vice-Admiral Grant on board, was detached to Inchon later in the day. An unfortunate incident occurred in the *Theseus* that afternoon. After A.A. practice firings, aircraft were launched for training and C.A.P. In landing, one Firefly jumped both barriers, wrecking itself and two other Fireflies in the deck park, and thereby reduced the strength of No. 810 Squadron by about 25 per cent before the operations had started.⁴ H.M.S. *Jamaica*, which was on patrol, was met with next morning; after exchanging mails and information, she proceeded to Sasebo.

The period of operations which followed can conveniently be divided into three phases, separated by two intervals for replenishment at Inchon. The first phase lasted from 9th to 11th October, during which air attacks were directed against enemy defences and communications in the defined area.

On the first day (9th October), as a precautionary measure, the Fleet Aviation Officer (Commander E. S. Carver) visited the local Tactical Air Control Centre ashore at Kimpo, to make sure that they knew Admiral Andrewes's general plan and the types of aircraft that would be operating. It was well that he did so, for he found that the 5th Air Force had omitted to inform the Control Centre of any British carrier operations in the area. Commander Carver also brought back information of a helicopter rescue flight based at Kimpo and the means of contacting them.

While Commander Carver was away, the air attacks were confined to the coast and ports, mainly on targets in Haeju and Chinnampo. A reconnaissance of coastal defences found no activity or guns, and gave the impression, subsequently strengthened, that the enemy had largely withdrawn from the Haeju-Ongjin area. During

¹ All concerned were informed of this area. Some anxiety was felt lest the presence of a new type of aircraft (Sea Furies) in the theatre might give rise to unfortunate incidents; in fact no such incidents occurred.

² In the event this plan was followed very closely, and in the later stages it was possible to increase the offensive effort by cancelling the inshore combat air patrol.

³ The only two enemy airfields in the vicinity had never been active, and it was considered that no more than a watch on them was necessary.

⁴ On the conclusion of the operation, Admiral Andrewes remarked: 'The regularity with which all nine Fireflies appeared each day went far to mitigate the . . . loss of the other three.'

the two following days, aircraft went over the whole road and rail system in the area. No movement was seen, even at first light; but there were indications that the enemy was attempting to form a defence line on the Changyan–Sariwon axis, and various minor targets in this region were attacked. The Fireflies had an early bombing success on 10th October when they destroyed the two centre spans of a railway bridge near Changyan, but subsequent attacks on road bridges were not so successful. Furies attacking a stores depot encountered considerable light A.A. fire, and Lieutenant S. Leonard was shot down. He succeeded in crash-landing his aircraft some five miles from the target, and was later rescued, severely injured, by a U.S.A.F. helicopter in the face of opposition.

By midday, 11th October, bad weather appeared to be approaching from the south-east and the Admiral decided to put into Inchon and replenish his destroyers.

The second phase of the operations extended from 12th to 16th October. Sailing from Inchon on the 12th, H.M.S. *Theseus* resumed flying operations that afternoon against the same area. Various targets were attacked, but with no notable results; a photographic reconnaissance of Chinnampo was abandoned owing to low cloud which forced the aircraft uncomfortably close to the flak, damaging two escorting Furies.

H.M.S. *Whitesand Bay* (Commander A. N. Rowell who had succeeded Lieutenant-Commander Brothers in command) with the Japanese minesweepers arrived in the approaches to Haeju on 12th October. A minespotting patrol on 10th October had already reported several mines in the Fankochi Point–Teyongpyong do area; a further mine reconnaissance over Haeju was flown on the 13th, and a considerable number of mines were reported about four feet below the surface, but subsequent experience suggested that these were actually jelly-fish. About 30 contact-mines had been laid however, and it was not till 31st October that a channel was swept, by which time 21 mines had been accounted for, when the Japanese minesweepers were returned to the Americans. Admiral Andrewes gave great credit to the officers and ship's company of the *Whitesand Bay* for their efforts, and remarked that Commander Rowell gained such a measure of the regard and respect of the Japanese minesweepers that they would do anything he demanded.

By the 13th October it was clear that the majority of the enemy had evacuated the Haeju–Ongjin area. This, coupled with the advance of the U.N. troops towards Haeju, meant that the deception part of Admiral Andrewes's task was no longer serving a useful purpose. He accordingly revised his plans, informing C.T.F. 95 (Rear-Admiral Smith) of his further intentions. Briefly, these were to continue sweeping the approaches to Haeju, which he envisaged as a useful minor supply port, and, while continuing harassing attacks on Chinnampo, to interdict communications in the general area north and west of the line Changyan–Sariwon–Hwangju.

Three strikes attacked dockside stores and buildings at Chinnampo with bombs and rockets on 13th and 14th October, causing much destruction; the Fireflies' dive-bombing was highly accurate in these attacks. Furies attacked two junks at Ho do, blowing the stern off one and riddling the other. Each craft was fitted with three sets of rails for laying mines over the stern, and had a cargo of fifteen mines on deck under primitive camouflage. Two similar craft, but without mines on board, a tug, and various large sheds on the waterfront were destroyed by Furies at Mongumpo on 16th October. Other air operations on 15th and 16th October

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included interdiction on the railway north of Sariwon, where rolling-stock was damaged, and a rocket strike on warehouses at Chinnampo. By this time U.N. land forces were driving fast towards Pyongyang and the south bank of the River Taedong. Villages and dwellings were burning both south and north of 38° N., and pilots reported many cases of communities waving white flags.

The force entered Inchon again in the afternoon of 16th October, the destroyers fuelling from R.F.A. *Wave Premier* and the *Theseus* from R.F.A. *Green Ranger*, which had been delayed by bad weather, on her arrival on the 17th.

The third phase of the operations covered the period 18th–21st October. Uncertainty as to the positions of the rapidly-advancing U.N. troops, and a request from the 8th Army that air attacks south of Anju (40 miles north of Pyongyang) should be limited to locomotives and moving trains, apart from actual enemy defences, led Admiral Andrewes to suspend all attacks on land targets in his prescribed area till the situation clarified. The sea escape route from Chinnampo was covered by regular coastal patrols and formations flew over that town and Pyongyang to discourage resistance; actually Pyongyang fell to the United Nations the 21st. On the 19th October weather was unsuitable for flying, but on the 20th and 21st the *Theseus's* aircraft operated over Sinanju–Chongju–Sonchon area, the only unrestricted area on the west coast. Virtually no intelligence was available as to targets, and the strikes were therefore in the nature of armed reconnaissance. American aircraft were also operating in the area; very few targets were found intact, all important bridges and a large number of buildings being destroyed. In the two days, the F.A.A. aircraft destroyed or damaged a number of railway trucks, vehicles, stores, and industrial buildings.

At noon, 21st October, Admiral Andrewes brought his operations to a close, and with the *Theseus*, *Constance*, and *Sioux* shaped course for Sasebo, leaving the *Whitesand Bay* and her sweepers to complete the clearance of Haeju, and the *Kenya* and *Bataan* on patrol.

Commenting on the two weeks' operations, Admiral Andrewes remarked that H.M.S. *Theseus* carried out her air tasks in a most efficient manner and met every demand made on her. The air plan aimed at sustained rather than intensive operations, the required duration being unknown. At no time was the *Theseus* fully extended, and if an important target had suddenly offered, there was a reserve of effort available to deal with it. There was, of course, no air opposition, so that full war conditions were not reproduced, but much valuable practice was gained by intercepting the large numbers of U.S. Air Force B-29 aircraft passing through the area daily.

The increased radius and endurance of the Sea Furies and Fireflies V as compared with the *Triumph's* Seafires and Fireflies I was a most welcome advantage, as was the ability to launch Fireflies with bombs regardless of natural wind. The Furies demonstrated their accuracy with rockets, but in the later stages tier stowage had to be abandoned owing to damage to rocket posts and mainplanes on firing. Another drawback to the Furies was their inability to take photographs; vertical photography was unsuccessful owing to the rapid oiling-up of the lens, and none of them was equipped for oblique photography.

As regards H.M.S. *Theseus* herself, the authorized stowage capacity of rockets, and to a lesser degree bombs, was quite inadequate. Nearly three times the normal outfit of 60-lb H.E. rocket-heads were fired, but foresight and improvisation prevented any question of running short. During the operations, the *Theseus* had to

catapult every operational sortie owing to aircraft loading, RATOG restrictions, and the deck park. On her return to harbour, the reeving was found to be so stranded as to render the catapult unusable. This was serious, and during her second patrol, 27th October to 5th November, she had to operate her aircraft without rockets, bombs or drop-tanks, and this could only be done at the expense of landing six Fireflies of No. 810 Squadron at Iwakuni for the duration of the patrol, in order to reduce the deck park. The air role was thus confined to providing C.A.P. over the ship and over the American minesweeping force which was then carrying out a large sweeping operation at Chinnampo. On the conclusion of this patrol only about 40 miles of coastline remained in enemy hands, and it was unlikely that supply by sea would be attempted; H.M.S. *Theseus* was therefore sailed for Hong Kong, to test her catapult wires which had been renewed by the ship's staff.

When Admiral Andrewes arrived back at Sasebo on 22nd October after his operations in the Yellow Sea, it seemed that the end of the war was in sight, and that before long the naval forces in Korea could be considerably reduced. Accordingly, he lost no time in obtaining Admiral Brind's approval for him to submit his proposals to Admiral Joy as regards his international forces. A small, representative United Nations force would probably be required in Korean/Japanese waters till after the Korean elections, and for this purpose he proposed to form a task group consisting of one cruiser, five destroyers, three frigates and a corvette under an officer of captain's rank, while he himself with his staff and the remaining British ships would move to Hong Kong as soon as the war situation permitted. The Commonwealth and Allied ships not included in this task group would be disposed as required by their respective Navy Boards and Admiralties. The base would be shifted from Sasebo to Kure, where there already existed an excellent organization under Australian authority; there the *Ladybird*, after closing down at Sasebo, would remain in reserve. These broad proposals were accepted by Admiral Joy and General MacArthur and, on 1st November, preliminary steps were taken to secure the concurrence of the Commonwealth Navy Boards. During the next fortnight details for putting these plans into effect were worked out.

At sea the usual patrols were maintained; little occurred to break their monotony. The number of floating mines sighted in the Yellow Sea diminished rapidly, the original launching areas having been overrun by U.N. forces. Minesweeping was confined to the clearance of ports through which the land forces could be supplied. Haeju, as already mentioned, was open to shipping by the end of October; at Chinnampo, which had been heavily mined with both contact and influence mines, a channel for L.S.T.s was swept by the Americans by 10th November, and H.M.S. *Constance* was stationed off the entrance to direct and control traffic. It was not until the 20th that the final clearance of the area was completed.

Meanwhile, there had been a check on shore. The U.N. advance at the beginning of November had become so rapid that some units had outrun supplies and lost contact with neighbouring units; disorganized North Korean troops, overrun in the advance, regrouped and closed in on supply lines. U.N. forces found themselves cut off and short of ammunition. Severe losses were suffered, especially by the R.o.K. 6th and 7th Divisions on the right of the 8th Army. And in the east the Marine Division and the 10th Corps, their time-table initially thrown out by the minefields off Wonsan, were still pushing to the north-west and north without being able to make contact with the 8th Army. On 2nd November, the Marines

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were heavily attacked by the Chinese Communist 124th Division; after five days' fighting, the Chinese withdrew, and the Marines continued their advance. But air reports of numerous small groups of Chinese and thousands of footprints in the snow to the north and north-west of the column, raised uncomfortable doubts lest the division was being encircled. At about the same time (3rd November), four divisions of Chinese Communist troops, backing up the resupplied North Koreans in the west, forced the U.N. forces to fall back to the line of the River Chongchon. There the front was stabilized; the U.N. air effort was stepped up, and aircraft from three American heavy carriers, two light carriers, and powerful land-based squadrons pounded the enemy in preparation for what was thought would be the final assault.

Notwithstanding these somewhat ominous signs, by mid-November it was deemed that the time had come to reduce the naval forces. Already a start had been made by the Americans, and, on 15th November, Admiral Joy authorized Rear-Admiral Andrewes to proceed with his plan; but Commonwealth and Allied ships, instead of returning home, were to be kept at short notice in Hong Kong or Japan, ready to return to Korea in an emergency. Accordingly, Admiral Andrewes having turned over the command of T.G. 95·1 to Captain Lloyd-Davies of H.M.S. *Ceylon*, sailed on 25th November in H.M.S. *Kenya* for Hong Kong. 'Our departure seemed well timed', wrote the Admiral, 'for it coincided with General MacArthur's optimistic announcement that the war would be over by Christmas.'¹

The disposition of the Commonwealth and Allied naval forces was then as follows: In Japanese/Korean waters, Task Group 95·1, consisting of H.M.S. *Ceylon*, seven destroyers, H.M.A.S.s *Bataan* and *Warramunga*, H.M.C.S.s *Cayuga*, *Sioux*, and *Athabaskan*, H.M.S. *Cossack*, H. Neth.M.S. *Evertsen*, and four frigates, H.M.S.s *Cardigan Bay*, *Morecambe Bay*, H.M.N.Z.S.s *Tutira* and *Rotoiti*.² The French Ship *La Grandière*,³ which was to have formed part of this force, had received orders from the French Admiralty, to proceed to Indo-China, in view of the serious situation which had arisen there.

At, or approaching, Hong Kong were H.M. Ships *Theseus*, *Kenya*, *Charity*, *Constance*, *Concord*, *Mounts Bay*, and *Whitesand Bay*.

H.M.S. *Jamaica* was refitting at Singapore on her way to the United Kingdom to pay off and recommission. A word should be said of her somewhat remarkable period of war service. She had been the first British warship to enter Korean waters, and the first to be in action, when enemy E-boats were sunk off Chumun-chin. She took part in the first bombardment of the war, and was the first U.N. ship to attack enemy territory north of the 38th parallel, when she bombarded Yangyang. She was also the first British ship to command a combined force of U.S. and H.M. ships, the first U.N. ship to suffer casualties, and, with H.M.S. *Cockade* in company, the first ship to sight and sink mines. She was the first U.N. ship to shoot down an enemy aircraft, and she took part at Inchon in the first large-scale amphibious operation. She finally left the station on 27th January 1951.

¹ F.O. 2i/c R.o.P. No. 24.

² H.M.N.Z.S. *Rotoiti* arrived at Sasebo 3rd November 1950 to take the place of H.M.N.Z.S. *Pukaki*.

³ 'I was sorry to lose *La Grandière*', wrote Admiral Andrewes, 'as she has been a useful member of the United Nations Escort Force, and has fitted in well; apart from this I have a high regard for her captain and officers, who have kept her ship's company at a good state of efficiency and keenness.' F.O. 2i/c R.o.P. No. 24.

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' You have set ', signalled Admiral Andrewes in farewell, ' a standard of enthusiasm and eagerness to tackle anything at any moment, which has left a real impression in my mind and on the station, and you did well in everything you took on Good-bye and the best of luck. Thank you for all you have done'¹

¹ F.O. 2i/c R.o.P. No. 30.

CHAPTER 5

Chinese Intervention

November 1950—January 1951

Section

- 38 Communist China intervenes.
- 39 Return of British Commonwealth naval forces to Korea.
- 40 Evacuation from Chinnampo.
- 41 Naval operations, west coast, December 1950.
- 42 Fighting on shore, eastern sector.
- 43 Operations of 41st Independent R.M. Commando.
- 44 Evacuations from Wonsan and Hungnam.
- 45 Chinese Communists resume offensive, January 1951.
- 46 Naval operations during Chinese offensive.

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AT the end of November 1950, just when General MacArthur expected to administer the *coup de grâce* to the North Korean Army, Communist China intervened in force and thereby confronted the United Nations with a new and much more formidable war than that which they had virtually won.

Though Chinese units had been identified fighting in support of the North Koreans as early as October, it was not clear that these were the forerunners of large-scale intervention. Throughout November, however, there were indications that something serious was brewing. Stiffening resistance in the north-west had forced the 8th Army on to the defensive on the River Chongchon; air reconnaissance reported an unending stream of very heavy traffic moving into Korea from Antung; in the east there had been several clashes between American Marines, moving from Hamhung towards the Chosin reservoir, and Chinese formations, which had, however, vanished among the mountains; prisoner-of-war reports stated that 24 Chinese divisions were being committed in Korea; and air attacks on U.N. forces were developing on an increasing scale from bases in Manchuria. These air attacks presented a knotty problem, the distance from the Yalu to the main line of contact being so short as to preclude effective interception, while the existing instructions to General MacArthur afforded the aircraft complete sanctuary as soon as they recrossed the Korean/Manchurian border.

By 6th November, General MacArthur was seriously alarmed, and ordered the destruction by air attack of the bridges over the Yalu,¹ starting with the important

¹ There were seventeen bridges crossing the river, six of them major ones. The most important two were the twin 3098-foot-long rail and highway bridges connecting Sinuiju and Antung. Other important bridges were located at Chongsonjin, Manpojin, Kanggu, and Hyesanjin.

rail and road bridges between Sinuiju and Antung. This was at first vetoed by President Truman, who feared that it might afford a pretext for all-out war with Communist China and possibly lead to a third world war; but it was later sanctioned, provided the bombing was limited to the Korean ends of the bridges, and flying over Manchurian territory was rigidly avoided. This of course left the countering of enemy air attacks in the same unsatisfactory condition and greatly enhanced the difficulty and risks of bombing the bridges; but to carry the war into Manchuria would involve political considerations of the highest importance, and would require the concurrence of the United Nations.

The bridges were attacked by naval aircraft from the *Philippine Sea*, *Valley Forge*, and *Leyte* operating off the east coast between the 9th and 21st November; 593 sorties were flown, and despite the difficulties resulting from the restrictions imposed for political reasons, succeeded in causing considerable damage, and to some extent in slowing up the enemy advance. By the end of November, the Yalu was beginning to freeze, and for the rest of the winter the Chinese could cross the river anywhere over the thick ice.

On 24th November, General MacArthur launched the 8th Army in 'a general offensive . . . to end the war'. The offensive ran into very superior forces, and was checked at the outset. Actually the Chinese, by moving at night, and by skilful infiltration, had achieved complete surprise. Three days later, on 27th November, their armies struck. By 4th December they had driven a huge wedge down the centre of the country, severing the 8th Army in the west from the 10th Corps in the east, and surrounding the Marine Division including the 41st Royal Marine Commando, which by then had reached the vicinity of the Chosin reservoir. See Figure 7.

Once again, in a matter of days, the fortunes of this extraordinary war had been dramatically reversed, this time in favour of the enemy;¹ but apart from the critical military situation in which the United Nations forces so unexpectedly found themselves, the Chinese intervention also had far-reaching political repercussions. Hitherto, the United Nations had displayed remarkable unanimity in their handling of the Korean affair, but the Chinese attack altered the whole political aspect. The Western Powers were strongly averse to taking any measures which might lead to the expansion of the limited war in Korea into an all-out war with Communist China; on the other hand it was unthinkable that they should abandon their South Korean allies to the tender mercies of the Communists. Rumours that the

¹ On 3rd December 1950, General MacArthur reported to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff: 'The 10th Corps is being withdrawn into the Hamhung area as rapidly as possible. The situation of the 8th Army becomes increasingly critical Already Chinese troops to the estimated strength of approximately 26 divisions are in line of battle, with an additional minimum of 200 000 to the enemy rear, and remnants of the North Korean Army . . . behind all the entire military potential of Communist China

'The terrain is of a nature to diminish the effectiveness of our air support in . . . interrupting the enemy supply system; it serves to aid the enemy in his dispersion tactics

'With the enemy concentration inland, the Navy potential is greatly diminished in effectiveness

'[The U.N. Command] has been in almost unending combat for five months and is mentally fatigued and physically battered

'The Chinese troops are fresh, completely organized, splendidly trained and equipped, and apparently in peak condition for actual operations. The general evaluation of the situation here must be viewed on the basis of an entirely new war against an entirely new power of great military strength and under entirely new conditions.' Harry S. Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope*, Volume II.

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


Figure 7. Chinese intervention, November 1950 - January 1951

Americans were contemplating the use of the atomic bomb added to the general concern lest events in Korea were the prelude to a third world war. In this crisis, Mr Attlee the British Prime Minister, visited Washington, and between the 4th and 8th December, exchanged views with President Truman on the world situation, with particular reference to Korea. Both statesmen were agreed on the basic issues, viz., the avoidance of general war and the determination to remain in Korea. A statement was issued outlining their general agreed policy, including the decision to increase the military capabilities of the United States and the United Kingdom as rapidly as possible, and to expand in the two countries the production of arms that could be used by the forces of all the free nations banded together in common defence. After almost continual but ineffective proceedings in the United Nations,¹ a cease-fire resolution was adopted in the General Assembly by 52 votes to 5 (Soviet bloc), with one abstention (Nationalist China) on 14th December 1950. This resolution requested the President of the United States 'to constitute a group of three persons including himself to determine the basis on which a satisfactory cease-fire in Korea can be arranged and to make recommendations to the General Assembly as soon as possible'. Not unnaturally, the Chinese rejected the proposals for a cease-fire, describing them as a United States trick to gain time for military consolidation.

Meanwhile, General MacArthur had to extricate his army as best he could, and once again he based his plans on sea power.

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As already mentioned, the United Nations naval forces operating in Korean waters had been reduced in mid-November, but with the start of the Chinese offensive on 27th November, it at once became apparent that the reduction had been premature. On 28th November, Vice-Admiral Joy warned Rear-Admiral Doyle that his Amphibious Force (T.F. 90) would probably be required to lift U.N. troops out of North Korea and redeploy them further south. Most of the ships of the Amphibious Force were in Japan for upkeep and replenishment; these were placed at short notice on 29th November, and the carrier *Boxer*, then on her way to America, was recalled.

As regards the British and Commonwealth forces, Captain Lloyd-Davies (C.T.G. 95·1) in the *Ceylon* was at Kure with the *Bataan*, *Eversten*, *Cossack*, *Rotoiti*, and *Cardigan Bay*, while off the west coast of Korea was Captain J. V. Brock (C.T.E. 95·12) in the *Cayuga*, with the *Athabaskan*, *Sioux*, *Warramunga*, *Tutira*, and *Morecambe Bay*. Captain Brock's destroyers were patrolling off Shimnato (39° 35' N., 124° 55' E.) as small enemy craft had been reported running supplies by night from the River Yalu to the south; the *Tutira* was stationed off the entrance to Chinnampo, and the *Morecambe Bay* at Haeju in charge of Japanese minesweepers.

On 30th November, Captain Lloyd-Davies in the *Ceylon* proceeded to Sasebo for conferences with Rear-Admiral Smith (C.T.F. 95); and in the course of the next three days the other ships at Kure followed to Sasebo and the west coast.

¹ Matters were complicated by the fact that the Chinese Communist Government, which had been recognized as the *de facto* Government by the United Kingdom, but not by the United States, was not a member of the United Nations.

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On the same day (30th), the ships of Admiral Doyle's Amphibious Force were ordered to Korea, and that evening Admiral Joy signalled requesting the return of Admiral Andrewes, with the *Theseus* and any other of H.M. ships available.

Admiral Andrewes had only arrived at Hong Kong in the *Kenya* on 28th November, but while still at sea, gloomy reports from Korea had begun to come in, and as the news did not improve he took certain precautions, such as ordering the *Theseus* to re-embark aircraft which she had landed at Kai Tak, and bringing the *Kenya* and destroyers to shorter notice, in anticipation of Admiral Joy's signal of recall, which reached him in the evening of the 30th November. 'It was naturally most disappointing', wrote Admiral Sir Patrick Brind, who was at Hong Kong at the time, 'for the Admiral and his force to have to cut short a very well earned period of rest, and return to face a rapidly deteriorating situation in Korea . . . [but] the Admiral, his staff and the ships tackled the new situation with good cheer and vigour which greatly pleased me; there was no sign of depression. The promptness with which H.M. Ships *Theseus*, *Kenya*, and *Constance* returned to the United Nations Command was much appreciated by Admiral Joy who specially remarked on it to me.'¹

On 1st December, Vice-Admiral Andrewes, who that day received his promotion, hoisted his flag in the *Theseus*, and with a small operational staff on board and the *Constance* in company, sailed at 1300 for the north, leaving the *Kenya* and *Concord* to follow with the remainder of the staff, heavy gear, office equipment, and so on. A strong, north-easterly gale delayed the *Theseus* in the Formosa Strait, and she did not reach Sasebo till about 1100 4th December, just after the *Kenya* and *Concord*, who, though they had left Hong Kong after her and taken the longer route east of Formosa, had made a much better passage, since the seas had not been so heavy as in the Formosa Strait. As they entered the swept channel they passed H.M.S. *Ceylon* on her way out to the Yellow Sea.

Admiral Andrewes lost no time in calling on Admiral Smith (C.T.F. 95) in U.S.S. *Dixie*, from whom he received a depressing picture of the situation ashore in Korea. Briefly the general situation at that time was as follows. As already mentioned the Chinese Communist armies had driven a wedge between the United States 8th Army in the west and the 10th Corps in the east. In the east the 1st Marine Division had been cut off by seven Chinese divisions near the Chosin reservoir, and was fighting its way south towards Hungnam to join up with the remainder of the 10th Corps. It was intended to withdraw these troops by sea from Hungnam and to land them again at Pusan. The evacuation of certain details from Wonsan was already in progress. The 8th Army was retreating southward, and Pyongyang was just about to fall into the hands of the enemy. Elements of the 8th Army were in danger of being cut off north of the Choppeki peninsula, and plans were being made for their evacuation from Chinnampo, covered by Captain Brock's T.E. 95.12 next day.

The Commander, 7th Fleet, Vice-Admiral Struble, had been placed in charge of all air and gun-fire support generally, while amphibious group commanders were in charge of air and gun-fire support at the evacuation centres themselves.² As before, the American naval forces were mainly concerned with the east coast,

¹ C.-in-C., F.E. Station to Secretary to the Admiralty, 19th January 1951, in M.0134 51.

² Rear-Admiral Doyle in U.S.S. *Mount McKinley* at Hungnam, Rear-Admiral Thackrey in U.S.S. *Eldorado* at Inchon, and Captain Kelly in U.S.S. *Bayfield* at Chinnampo.

and already all available carriers were operating in the Sea of Japan, supplying close air support on a hitherto unprecedented scale to the 1st Marine Division on its desperate 60-mile retreat to the sea.

Vice-Admiral Andrewes's Task Group 95·1 had been given responsibility for all west coast areas, excluding the evacuation ports themselves; units of the task group would be lent to the amphibious commanders at these ports as necessary, H.M.S. *Theseus* providing air support.

Admiral Andrewes remained at Sasebo only long enough for the *Theseus* to complete with fuel, and sailed in her the same afternoon with H.M. Ships *Concord* and *Cossack* and H. Neth. M.S. *Eversten* in company to support the operation at Chinnampo. At 1600, 4th December, he formally resumed the duties of Commander, Task Group 95·1, which he had handed over to Captain Lloyd-Davies nine days before. Thus, by the evening of 4th December, only four days after the receipt of Admiral Joy's signal recalling them to the theatre of war, the redeployment of the British and Commonwealth forces was complete; five destroyers and two frigates were covering the evacuation at Chinnampo, one cruiser and two frigates from Kure were on their way north up the Yellow Sea, as were one light carrier, one cruiser and one destroyer from Hong Kong, screened by two destroyers from Kure. The last destroyer from Hong Kong, the *Constance*, which had been delayed by weather, was just arriving at Sasebo.

40

The first task of T.G. 95·1 was to cover the evacuation of units of the U.S. 8th Army from Chinnampo. The plan was for H.M.S. *Ceylon* and destroyers to provide naval gun-fire support and to escort the transports out of the port, while aircraft from H.M.S. *Theseus* provided C.A.P., air spot, and A/S.P. over the area, armed reconnaissance to the north, and interdiction against the advancing enemy wherever possible. At the same time, a close blockade of the west coast of Korea was to be maintained to prevent any enemy reinforcement or supply by sea.

At Chinnampo, five U.S. transports had proceeded up river during daylight on 4th December. By nightfall, Captain J. V. Brock, C.T.E. 95·12, in H.M.C.S. *Cayuga* had collected the destroyers patrolling off the west coast at the entrance to the Chinnampo River, and his force then consisted of H.M.C. Ships *Cayuga*, *Sioux*, and *Athabaskan*, and H.M.A. Ships *Warramunga* and *Bataan*; in addition, the U.S. destroyer *Forrest B. Royal* was put under his command for the operation. Learning that the withdrawal programme was ahead of schedule, and that loading operations would be at their height at first light on 5th December, Captain Brock decided to risk the hazardous 30-mile passage up the river during darkness. The destroyers started just before midnight. H.M.C.S. *Sioux* had the misfortune to foul a mooring and withdrew to seaward with a buoy attached to her propeller; H.M.A.S. *Warramunga* grounded, but refloated; and also returned to seaward.¹ The remaining four destroyers made the passage successfully. 'This night passage', wrote Admiral Andrewes, 'was a bold stroke and very necessary in the circumstances: great credit is due to Captain Brock and the other commanding officers for its successful execution. It was achieved in darkness and in foul

¹ The *Sioux*'s propeller was cleared by divers from H.M.S. *Ceylon* on 6th December; the *Warramunga* suffered no damage.

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weather, and involved the long passage through shoal waters which had just been swept through the minefields in the approaches to Chinnampo.¹ As things turned out, gun-fire support was not necessary, and the *Ceylon*, which arrived early in the forenoon, did not go up river but remained off the entrance with the *Sioux* and *Warramunga*. Throughout 5th December, loading operations proceeded smoothly, the transports sailing down river as soon as completed, whence they were escorted as far south as 37° N. by frigates. By 1700 that afternoon, 1800 U.S. Army and Navy port personnel, and 5900 R.o.K. troops had been evacuated. Captain Brock remained up at Chinnampo with his four destroyers till the last transport had left, when, having carried out demolitions of military supplies, oil storage tanks, and dock and harbour installations, he proceeded down river and joined Captain Lloyd-Davies, who had taken over as C.T.E. 95·12, off the entrance. Throughout the afternoon, a C.A.P. from H.M.S. *Theseus*, which was operating between the Clifford and Techong islands, covered the ships engaged in the evacuation.

In the course of the next day, all forces and remaining fleet auxiliaries, U.S. transports, L.S.T.s, and so on, withdrew from the Chinnampo area to Inchon, where Admiral Andrewes in the *Theseus* with his destroyers also put in that evening. Meanwhile, Captain P. W. Brock of the *Kenya* had spent the day at Inchon, concerting gun-fire support arrangements with Rear-Admiral Thackrey, U.S.N., who was starting a slow-time evacuation of certain stores and personnel from Inchon the next day.

41

With the Chinnampo evacuation over, the duties of Admiral Andrewes's Task Group 95·1 were defined as follows:

- a. West coast blockade.
- b. Anti-aircraft defence of Inchon and naval gun-fire support.
- c. Air cover over the task group and armed reconnaissance north of the bomb-line.

To carry out these tasks, the group was divided into the following task elements:²

- T.E. 95·11. To operate west of Inchon. H.M.S.s *Theseus* (flag of C.T.G. 95·1) *Cossack*, *Constance*, *Concord*.
- T.E. 95·12. West coast blockade. H.M.S. *Ceylon* (C.T.E. 95·12), H.M.C.S.s *Cayuga*, *Sioux*, H.M.A.S. *Bataan*.
- T.E. 95·13. At Inchon; available for various duties as required. H.M.S.s *Cardigan Bay* (C.T.E. 95·13), *Morecambe Bay*, H.M.N.Z.S.s *Tutira*, *Rotoiti*.

¹ F.O. 2i/c R.o.P. No. 26. See Plan 6.

² Initial allocation of ships to elements; ships were interchangeable between the various elements as necessary. Task Elements 95·13 and 95·14 were available to be placed under the operational control of C.T.G. 95·1 as soon as the situation at Inchon became critical. H.M.S. *St Bride's Bay*, which had been refitting at Hong Kong, joined T.E. 95·13 on 15th December.

T.E. 95·14. At Inchon, primarily for A.A. defence. H.M.S. *Kenya* (C.T.E. 95·14), H.M.A.S. *Warramunga*, H. Neth. M.S. *Eversten*, H.M.C.S. *Athabaskan*.

For the remainder of the month of December 1950, T.G. 95·1, working from Inchon was engaged in covering the seaward flank of the 8th Army by air and surface blockade, and by armed air reconnaissance and strikes over north-west Korea. During this period there was little fighting on shore apart from patrol activity by North Korean forces which extended almost right across the 38th parallel, while the Chinese Communist 4th Field Army regrouped and deployed for a fresh offensive directed against Seoul.¹ Conditions in the Yellow Sea were considerably worse than those before the reduction of the Fleet. Korea was now in the grip of winter, and the intense cold, frequent gales, and short visibility increased the strain inherent in all operations. Though much time was spent at sea, few incidents occurred to break the monotony, and Admiral Andrewes, fearing lest alertness might suffer through sheer boredom, deemed it advisable to make the following signal² to his forces:

1. As China has intervened in the Korean War, it seems unlikely that she will limit her efforts to land operations, but will probably strike at naval forces by aircraft and submarine.
2. This has become more likely now that the front has moved south.
3. Any extension of the war could be helped by Russia with or without open intervention.
4. Commanding officers are to impress on all on board the individual responsibility that each man has to fight against boredom and over-confidence and keep ships in a high state of alertness.
5. This will be a hard task for everyone, but our strength and security depend on it.

This signal was repeated three days later by Admiral Joy to all task force and task group commanders in the theatre as ' a most timely message that is worthy of the close attention of all hands '.

As a further precaution against air attack, Admiral Andrewes made it his practice to keep whenever possible the cruiser on blockade patrol in company with H.M.S. *Theseus* by day, as her additional weight of armament would be invaluable, and she herself would be more comfortable under the umbrella of the carrier's combat air patrol.

All the American carriers being fully employed on the east coast, at first supporting the Marines during their fine fighting withdrawal to Hungnam, and later covering their evacuation and that of the 10th Corps, H.M.S. *Theseus* was the only carrier available for all flying duties on the west coast. This naturally threw a severe strain on her resources. In the eight days between 7th and 15th December when the weather permitted flying, she flew 332 sorties without accident or damage.

¹ The Communist policy of restricting movement by day to a minimum, combined with their slow-moving transport, made this build-up a lengthy process, and it was not until 31st December that they were ready to strike.

² 120913Z December 1950.

In addition to routine reconnaissance flights and C.A.P., these included offensive strikes in the Pyongyang–Chinnampo area on a variety of targets—road and rail bridges, rolling-stock, lorries, and troops. There was, however, not much enemy movement in daylight. The 11th December was a particularly successful day, when for the first time a moving train was sighted; *Furies* obtained eight rocket-hits on it, leaving it a shambles, while *Fireflies* excelled themselves by putting three railway bridges out of action, and blocking one end of a tunnel, all by dive-bombing. Many R.o.K. stragglers were lifted from the Changyan area by helicopter to L.S.T.s lying off shore. During one of these trips, the helicopter was attacked by MiG-15 fighters in an interval while its *Fury* escort was being relieved; fortunately no damage was done.

A signal from the First Lord (Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fraser of the North Cape) made on 15th December to H.M.S. *Theseus* showed that her good work was not overlooked at home and gave great satisfaction to all on board:

‘I was very interested to read in recent dispatches an account of your work and congratulate you on all you are doing.’

On 14th December Admiral Andrewes left the Inchon area in the *Theseus*, screened by the *Cossack*, *Constance*, and *Concord* (T.E. 95·11) for a flying visit to Sasebo, to replenish stores and to enable the Admiral to bring the two sections of his staff together for consultation. During the absence of the *Theseus* the necessary reconnaissance over Chinnampo was flown by the U.S. Air Force. Having completed with stores, the Admiral left Sasebo at 0700, 16th December in the *Theseus*, with the *Cossack*, *Consort*, and *Constance*, the *Concord*¹ remaining in port with condenser trouble. Very bad weather was encountered on the passage north, with winds of full gale force dead ahead, and frequent showers of rain, sleet, and snow; wind speeds of 55 knots, gusting up to 60 knots, were recorded over the deck, and speed through the water was below 10 knots for a considerable period.

T.E. 95·11 arrived back in its operating area to the westward of Inchon on 17th December; the wind was still blowing gale force, with heavy snow showers, and no flying was possible; but air reconnaissance next day showed that no great change had occurred in the *Theseus*'s absence—there was still no shipping to be seen and nothing seemed to be moving by road or rail on shore. Some vehicles, apparently stuck in the ice while trying to cross the River Chongchon, were suitably dealt with by *Furies*.

H.M.S. *Theseus* remained at sea in her operating area for the next eight days, except for a short visit to Inchon to refuel. Offensive air strikes were flown daily, vehicles, railway trucks, dumps, and troops whenever seen being attacked in the Pyongyang and Sariwon districts and considerable damage inflicted. On 24th December, increased enemy activity was noticed; casualties were inflicted on

¹ The British, Commonwealth, and Allied ships on the west coast were reorganized as follows on 16th December:

T.E. 95·11 (Air Support Element), *Theseus*, *Cossack*, *Consort*, *Constance*, *Concord*.

T.E. 95·12 (Surface Blockade Element), *Ceylon* (C.T.E.), *Bataan*, *Warramunga*.

T.E. 95·13 (Screening Element), *Cardigan Bay* (C.T.E.), *St Bride's Bay*, *Morecambe Bay*, *Rotoiti*.

T.E. 95·14 (Support Element), *Kenya* (C.T.E.), *Evertsen*, *Cayuga*, *Sioux*, *Athabaskan*.

H.M. Ships *Consort*, *Charity* and *St Bride's Bay* had recently arrived from Hong Kong; the *Charity* joined T.E. 95·11 on its arrival back in the Inchon area.

parties of troops moving along the main roads in the Sariwon area. One *Sea Fury* suffered an engine failure just after it had taken off that day, and ditched four miles ahead of the *Theseus*; the pilot, Lieutenant D. P. W. Kelly, was recovered unhurt by the *Sioux* after thirteen minutes in the icy water. Air attacks on enemy supplies and reinforcements continued on Christmas-Day, and daily surveillance of the airfields at Chinnampo, Ongjin, and Haeju was undertaken; no activity was observed on any of them.

The *Theseus* had been carrying out intensive flying operations practically the whole of December,¹ and it was becoming essential for the air crews to have a rest period; there was, too, an accumulation of items of maintenance for the aircraft, which could not be carried out at sea. For some time Admiral Andrewes had been making strenuous efforts to get a relief carrier or carriers from the 7th Fleet to take her place, but all were fully employed on the east coast. By 24th December the evacuation of the 10th Corps from Hungnam was completed, and on the 26th, the *Badoeng Strait*, wearing the flag of Rear-Admiral Ruble, and *Sicily* with six destroyers (T.G. 96·8) arrived off Inchon for duty in the Yellow Sea. After a final series of rocket attacks on large buildings and rail targets at Kaesong and Kumchon that forenoon, H.M.S. *Theseus* with the *Cossack*, *Consort*, *Charity*, and *Constance* in company shaped course for Sasebo.

'Since arriving in the operational area on 5th December', wrote Vice-Admiral Andrewes, 'H.M.S. *Theseus*'s aircraft had flown 630 accident-free sorties in 17 flying-days. This averaged more than one sortie per flying-day for each pilot and each aircraft, a fine and enviable achievement, brought about by a combination of skill and stamina on the part of the air crews and of hard work and keenness on the part of the air group's maintenance personnel.'

It is satisfactory to record that the Boyd Trophy² for 1950 was shortly afterwards awarded to the 17th Carrier Air Group in H.M.S. *Theseus*, and that at the new year, 1951, the Executive Officer and Commander (A) were promoted to captain, and the Air Group Commander, Air Group Engineer Officer, Lieutenant-Commander (Operations) and the Navigating Officer were all promoted to the rank of commander.

All this time the blockade patrol was kept up between Inchon and the Yalu Gulf by T.E. 95·12,³ the ships of the element periodically exchanging with those of T.E. 95·14, the Inchon Gun-fire Support Element. Captain Lloyd-Davies of the *Ceylon* controlled the blockade till 16th December and then Captain P. W. Brock of the *Kenya*. Also under their operational control was the R.o.K. (ex-U.S.) frigate P.F. 61, whose commanding officer proved most co-operative and efficient, and four R.o.K. patrol⁴ craft for work close inshore. Little occurred to break the monotony. On three occasions between 8th and 14th December, reports of a

¹ See Appendix H.

² The trophy is awarded annually to the individual or group of individuals who in the opinion of the Flag-Officer, Air (Home), have achieved the finest feat of aviation during the previous year.

³ Composition of T.E. 95·12, December 1950:

6th–10th: *Ceylon*, *Cayuga*, *Sioux*, *Bataan*.

10th–16th: *Ceylon*, *Warramunga*, *Bataan*, *Evertsen*.

16th–19th: *Ceylon*, *Warramunga*, *Bataan*, *Charity*.

19th–21st: *Kenya*, *Cayuga*, *Sioux*, *Athabaskan*.

21st–31st: *Kenya*, *Cayuga*, *Sioux*.

⁴ Nos 303, 304, 308, 703.

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mythical convoy alleged to be transporting elements of the Chinese 3rd Field Army from Shanghai to Korea necessitated wild-goose chases by different ships; when last heard of, the 'convoy' had been identified as a fishing fleet. Much hard work and steaming in bitterly cold weather 'frequently rough and on several days tempestuous'¹ was involved, but no enemy contacts occurred, and there were no incidents worthy of record.

The frigates, too, of T.E. 95·13 under Captain W. L. M. Brown of H.M.S. *Cardigan Bay* spent a busy if unexciting time carrying out anti-submarine patrol in the inshore approaches to Inchon, and providing escorts for R.F.A.s and other craft as necessary between Inchon and Sasebo. This element was placed under the operational control of Rear-Admiral Thackrey, U.S.N., at Inchon on 21st December, on the understanding that any frigates required for escort purposes would be made available to Admiral Andrewes.

On 24th December, intelligence reports indicated that Chinese Communist forces would launch a general offensive over the 38th parallel on Christmas-Day, and increased enemy activity was observed from the air; T.E. 95·14, then consisting of H.M.S. *Ceylon* (Captain Lloyd-Davies), H.M.A. Ships *Warramunga* and *Bataan*, and H. Neth. M.S. *Eversten*, accordingly moved to their bombardment berths near Inchon, under the operational control of Admiral Thackrey. The Chinese were not yet ready for their offensive and T.E. 95·14 remained standing by for a week. On 31st December, the U.S. 8-inch-gun cruiser *Rochester* arrived, and her commanding officer, Captain E. L. Woodyard, U.S.N., then took over command of the Gun-fire Support Element.

Meanwhile, the outloading of army stores at Inchon, which had started on 7th December, had continued without interruption. By 31st December, the eve of the Chinese offensive, 32 428 personnel, 1103 vehicles, and 57 741 tons of cargo had been evacuated and dispatched to the south.

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Concurrently with these activities on the west coast, a massive redeployment of the 10th Corps was being carried out by the American Amphibious Force on the east coast.

During November, General Almond's 10th Corps had attacked to the northward in four columns;² elements of the U.S. 7th Division reached Hyesanjin on the Manchurian border—the deepest penetration by U.N. forces into northern Korea of the war—while the two R.o.K. divisions ranged far up the east coast. The leading units of the 1st Marine Division, working to the north-west, reached Yudamni on 25th November with the intention of then striking west towards the road and rail junction of Kang-yi. This movement was actually started the next day, but on the 27th an attack opened on the Marines by two Chinese corps (six divisions), which had virtually surrounded them. This attack, coinciding with the Chinese offensive against the 8th Army in the west, left no doubt that a general withdrawal of the U.N. forces was necessary.

There followed a fighting retreat by the Marine division for which it would be

¹ F.O. 2i/c R.o.P. No. 2.

² The U.S. 3rd Division did not finish landing in Wonsan till 20th November.

hard to find a parallel. Under constant attack by very superior numbers, the column slowly fought its way down the narrow, tortuous, ice-covered, mountain road towards the sea. The weather was execrable, with frequent blinding snow-storms and temperatures about 25 degrees below zero, from which friend and foe alike suffered severely. But there were two factors in favour of the Marines which were exploited to the full and more than counterbalanced the numerical superiority of the enemy—the U.N. command of the sea and air. Heavily-laden U.S. Air Force C-119s dropped cargoes of ammunition, medical supplies, water, food, and petrol as required—on one occasion eight 2500-lb spans with which to replace a vital bridge blown up by the enemy; helicopters picked up the seriously wounded, who, with the sick and frost-bite cases, were subsequently evacuated from temporary air-strips constructed at Hagaru-ri and Koto-ri during the advance to the north. Close support by aircraft from U.S. Ships *Leyte*, *Philippine Sea*, and *Badoeng Strait*, and Marine flights working from the airfield at Yonpo was provided on an unprecedented scale, more than 200 aircraft being employed daily.¹

On 4th December, the head of the column reached Hagaru-ri; it took 22 hours to cover the 9½ miles on to Koto-ri. But the discipline, fighting spirit, and fire power of the Marines triumphed, and by midnight 11th/12th December all units of the division with its vehicles, tanks, guns, and over 100 prisoners had reached their assembly areas in the Hamhung–Hungnam district.

So heavily had the two Chinese corps suffered in the fighting that it was three months before they could again take the field. This considerably eased the impending evacuation from Hungnam, and furthermore deprived the Chinese of potential reinforcements from the north-east in their new-year offensive against the 8th Army.

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It was in these operations that the 41st Independent R.M. Commando first saw serious fighting. Since their arrival in Japan, their training, which included four successful raids in conjunction with U.S. naval forces on enemy communications on the east coast of Korea at the beginning of October, had continued. In mid-November, while the U.N. advance to the north was still in progress, they were ordered to join the U.S. Marines in the Chosin area. Arriving at Hungnam on 20th November, Lieutenant-Colonel Drysdale reported to H.Q., U.S. 1st Marine Division. The Commando had no arctic clothing, no transport, and no tentage.² Eventually it received certain equipment (but no arctic sleeping-bags), and in borrowed transport moved off to join the U.S. 7th Marine R.C.T. at Yudamni, where it was to act as reconnaissance on the left flank of the regiment in its north-westerly advance. It reached Koto-ri on 28th November, the day after the enemy had launched his counter-offensive which had cut the road in several places between there and Hagaru-ri and between Hagaru-ri and Yudamni; no less than 17 road-blocks had been established.

¹ For example, on 4th December there were 239 individual close-support sorties—128 from the fleet carriers, 34 from the escort carrier, and 77 from Yonpo.

² H.Q. 1st Marine Division immediately set about trying to equip the 41st Commando, but they themselves were also very short of essential stores.

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That night, Lieutenant-Colonel Drysdale was put in command of a composite force consisting of the 41st R.M. Commando, a company of U.S. Marines and a U.S. Army company, with the task of breaking out of Koto-ri, and fighting his way to Hagaru-ri, a distance of ten miles.

At first light, 29th November, the 41st Commando and the U.S. Marine company moved out and captured three enemy-held hills, the U.S. Army company keeping parallel with the main attack. The battalion was then joined by fourteen tanks, which led the attack until they were a mile south of Pusong-ni. They had been under machine-gun and mortar fire all the way, but at this stage very heavy opposition developed, and the tanks reported that they could not get through. Communications with the column, the air and divisional headquarters broke down, and it seemed prudent to withdraw, but just before dark a liaison officer brought a message that it was absolutely imperative that the battalion should get through at all costs. The order was passed to the tanks, and the column moved slowly forward, continually under fire, and reached Hagaru-ri that night, after fighting its way through three ambushes. Colonel Drysdale had started out with 900 men: he entered Hagaru-ri with fewer than 400. The 41st Commando lost most of its equipment and transport, and suffered 70 casualties out of nearly 200 men, including Colonel Drysdale, who was severely wounded in the arm, but continued to direct and command his force throughout their difficult operation. Subsequent reports showed that they had been opposed along the road by approximately three enemy regiments.

On 30th November, the unit was placed under the Commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion, U.S. 1st Marines, who were responsible for the perimeter defence of Hagaru-ri. That night the enemy attacked strongly. The village was under mortar fire, and infiltration by the enemy caused a critical situation. One troop of the 41st Commando, under Lieutenant Roberts, R.M., succeeded in stopping the infiltration and restored the position. The enemy withdrew at dawn, having suffered extremely heavy casualties; the Royal Marines suffered three wounded.

When the withdrawal from Hagaru-ri to the south began on 6th December, the Commando was attached to the 5th Marine R.C.T., which formed the rear-guard to Koto-ri. A battle continued throughout the night, with the column halted by heavy opposition; at daylight the enemy withdrew leaving over 600 dead behind them.

Towards the end of the following day (7th December), the R.M. Commando was cut off from the rest of the column. By sending one troop to destroy enemy snipers and machine-gunners who were harassing the column from high ground, they succeeded in rejoining the main body after dark, and reached Koto-ri. There they were joined by Captain Ovens, R.M., and eleven other ranks, who had been missing since the convoy battle of 29th November, and after hard fighting reached Koto-ri independently through the mountains.

The next day the break-out from Koto-ri started. During this operation, the 41st Commando reconnoitred enemy-held hills, climbing through two feet of snow in a blinding snow-storm; the night was spent in the open in 47 degrees of frost. Throughout 10th December, the column made slow and tortuous progress down the pass, under constant machine-gun and sniper fire; eventually they reached Majondong and were taken in lorries and open cattle-trucks to a tented camp at Hungnam. There they slept, twenty to a tent, in a sea of mud, but after their 23 miles march over the mountains on empty stomachs and without sleep for

72 hours, they had no complaints. During this period the unit suffered 98 casualties.¹

'As Commanding General of the 1st Marine Division', wrote General Oliver P. Smith to Lieutenant-Colonel Drysdale on 29th December 1950,

'I desire to take this opportunity to acknowledge the high qualities of leadership, heroism, devotion to duty and self-sacrifice displayed by the officers and men of the 41st Independent Commando of the Royal Marines, while serving with this division in Korea. I am familiar with the long and glorious history of the Royal Marines. This history records many outstanding feats of heroism, devotion to duty, and self-sacrifice by units and individuals alike. The performance of the 41st Commando during their drive from Hagaru-ri to the south will, in the perspective of history, take equal rank with the best exploits of the Royal Marines. I can give you no higher compliment than to state that your conduct and that of the officers and men under your command was worthy of the highest traditions of the Marines.'

44

Meanwhile, the outloading of the U.N. forces and material in the port area of Wonsan had commenced on 3rd December. Covering fire by the 8-inch-gun cruiser *St Paul* and two destroyers held the North Korean forces in the neighbourhood at such a distance from the U.N. perimeter that the troops were never seriously threatened. By 7th December the evacuation of 3834 military personnel, 1146 vehicles, 10 013 tons of cargo, and 7009 Korean civilian refugees had been successfully completed.

The evacuation of General Almond's main forces was carried out from Hungnam between 10th and 24th December. Hungnam possessed good port facilities, and was conveniently near to General Almond's headquarters at Hamhung, and also to Yonpo airfield. Rear-Admiral Doyle, in U.S.S. *Mount McKinley*—his Amphibious Force (T.F. 90) considerably augmented by ships taken up on time charter—assumed control of all naval activities on 10th December, and of all air support operations within a radius of 35 miles of Hungnam on the 15th. Once again, the value of the Amphibious Force was demonstrated, and the evacuation of over 100 000 military personnel with their impedimenta,² and nearly as many civilian refugees³ proceeded smoothly. The Marine division sailed for Pusan on 15th December, followed by the two R.o.K. divisions on the 17th, the U.S. 7th Division on the 21st, and finally the U.S. 3rd Division on the 24th.

During the operation, the Hungnam area was covered from the enemy by aircraft from no less than seven carriers. Rear-Admiral Ewen's T.F. 77—the fast carriers *Philippine Sea*, *Leyte*, *Valley Forge*, and *Princeton*—flew close air support and air

¹ Thirteen killed, 39 wounded, 27 missing, nineteen frost-bite, exposure and pneumonia cases.

² 105 000 U.S. and R.o.K. military personnel, 91 000 civilian refugees, 17 500 vehicles, 350 000 measurement tons of cargo, loaded in six assault transports, six assault cargo ships, twelve transports operated by Military Sea Transport Service, 76 time-charter ships, 81 L.S.T.s, eleven L.S.D.s.

³ The enormous number of refugees presented a problem. Many who wished to come had to be left behind through lack of accommodation. Ships were filled to capacity—for example, as many as 12 000 squeezed into one assault transport and 8400 into one L.S.T.

cover for forces inside the embarkation area during daylight hours. Outside the area, they attacked enemy supply lines, supported friendly ground operations, and provided air cover for the escort carriers and shipping to and from the embarkation area. They also contributed to 'heckling' missions by night in co-operation with the U.S. 5th Air Force. Rear-Admiral Ruble's T.G. 96·8, the escort carriers *Sicily*, *Badoeng Strait*, and *Bataan*, gave additional cover to the ground forces and shipping in the Hungnam port area.

Gun-fire support was provided by the battleship U.S.S. *Missouri*, two 8-inch-gun cruisers, *St Paul* and *Rochester*, seven destroyers¹ and three L.S.M.R.s,² under Rear-Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter, stationed so as to be able to deliver emergency support to the 10th Corps, and at the same time to provide protection in the event of enemy air attack. No naval gun-fire was required till 15th December; then 'deep' support fire was given at ranges up to 10 miles. As the 10th Corps' artillery was loaded and withdrawn, naval gun-fire took over observed firing and close support. Shore observers reported it very effective, and credited it with destroying considerable numbers of enemy troops.

For the final day of the withdrawal, 24th December, a concentrated naval gun-fire barrage was maintained in a strip approximately 2500 yards wide and 3000 yards from the beaches and harbour. Demolition crews ashore blew up everything of military value, and finally a bombardment of the port area itself was carried out, special attention being paid to the destruction of railroad cars and locomotives. By the time the last of the L.S.T.s and other evacuation craft were pulling away from the dock areas that evening, the whole waterfront seemed ablaze. U.S.S. *Mount McKinley*, with Admiral Doyle and General Almond on board, remained until all the troops had embarked. As she put to sea they saw through their binoculars Chinese Communist troops coming over the ridge behind Hungnam, only three or four miles away. They were greeted by gun-fire from the departing ships.

There was no attempt by the enemy at any time to interfere with the Hungnam evacuation from the air or from the sea. On shore, although the battering they had received from the Marine division had left the Chinese Communist forces in no condition to launch a large-scale offensive, attacks were made on the perimeter each night during the withdrawal, and ships were constantly called on for gun-fire, rockets, and star-shell illumination.³

That the evacuation from Hungnam was a brilliantly executed operation there can be no doubt. The time was short and the planning extremely complicated. It was the first occasion on which a U.S. amphibious force was called on to handle a large-scale evacuation, as opposed to an assault landing; both staff and organization fully stood up to the test. But it must be remembered that there was no opposition by aircraft, submarines, or ground forces equipped with artillery; had there been, there would probably have been losses. Admiral Joy summed up the operation as follows:⁴

'The Hungnam evacuation showed that a well-trained and well-led amphibious

¹ *Forrest B. Royal, Norris, Borrie, English, Lind, Hank, Massey.*

² Nos 401, 403, 404.

³ From 7th to 24th December the gun-fire support ships fired a grand total of 162 rounds of 16-inch; 2932 rounds of 8-inch; 18 637 rounds of 5-inch; 71 rounds of 3-inch; 185 rounds of 40-mm, and 1462 rockets.

⁴ *The Sea War in Korea*, Cagle and Manson.

force can carry out an amphibious operation in reverse as effectively as the conventional type. It again emphasizes the importance of having adequate amphibious forces in being and in a state of full combat readiness.'

45

The redeployment of the U.N. forces from North Korea was followed by a period of build-up of personnel, supplies, and equipment by both sides in order to resume the offensive.

By the last day of December 1950, the general situation was briefly as follows. In the south, the American 10th Corps was reorganizing in the Pusan-Masan area. In the north, the 8th Army was disposed along a line south of the River Imjin and north of the Han. Apart from patrol activity along almost the whole length of the 38th parallel by North Korean forces (who had made a remarkable recovery from their defeat in September), there had been no fighting since the 8th Army had eluded the original Chinese threat of encirclement.

An important change had just occurred in the U.N. Command on shore. General Walton Walker, the commander of the 8th Army was killed in a road accident near Seoul on 23rd December. He was succeeded by Lieutenant-General Mathew B. Ridgway. At the same time, the 10th Corps was placed under the control of General Ridgway, which thereby ended the peculiar set-up under which the eastern and western sectors were independent commands in the field (although of course under the general direction of General MacArthur in Tokyo).

The lull ceased in the afternoon of 31st December, when fighting flared up, starting in the west and spreading along the whole front. It was heaviest in the central section; by noon, 1st January 1951, the Chinese Communists had driven a wedge between the 2nd and 5th R.o.K. Divisions, which developed into a general breakthrough. The 8th Army carried out an orderly, but extremely rapid, withdrawal south of the River Han, and with the exception of the troops in the central sector, contact with the enemy was soon lost by all forward units. Seoul was abandoned and President Syngman Rhee and his Government once again retired to Pusan. The capital was occupied by the enemy on 3rd January, with but little fighting; Kimpo airfield and Inchon followed suit two days later, and the U.N. troops then stood on a new line running eastward south of Osan. By this time the U.S. 10th Corps had taken its place in the line in the Wonju area, where a strong attack was developing.

By 10th January the U.N. troops had fallen back to yet another line running from Pyongtaek in the west through Wonju towards Chumunchin on the east coast. On the western and eastern flanks there was only patrolling, but heavy fighting continued at Wonju, which changed hands more than once between 12th and 13th January; by the 14th the position was stabilized a few miles to the south of the town. Apart from some infiltration, some twelve or fifteen miles south-east and south-west of Wonju, this was as far as the Chinese Communist offensive carried them; any hopes they may have entertained of quickly driving the U.N. forces from the Korean peninsula came to an end.

On 15th January, a reconnaissance in force by U.S. troops in the Pyongtaek area initiated a movement which brought the U.N. forces once more across the 38th parallel by the end of March, a position approximately maintained for the remainder of the war.

When the Chinese offensive started on 31st December 1950, Vice-Admiral Andrewes was at Sasebo, where the C.-in-C., Admiral Sir Patrick Brind, who was shortly due to haul down his flag, paid him a farewell visit; the *Theseus*, with the *Cossack* and *Constance*, was at Kure for a well-earned recreation and maintenance period, her place in the Yellow Sea being taken by the U.S. carriers *Badoeng Strait* and *Sicily*. The usual blockade patrols were being carried out by T.E. 95·12 under Captain Brock of H.M.S. *Kenya*, and the frigates under Captain Brown of H.M.S. *Cardigan Bay* were on anti-submarine patrol in the approaches to Inchon, where the Gun-fire Support Element, U.S.S. *Rochester*, H.M.S. *Ceylon*, H.M.A. Ships *Warramunga* and *Bataan*, and H. Neth. M.S. *Evertsen* were standing by for eventualities.

During the first few days of the Chinese advance, the main naval interest on the west coast centred on Inchon, where the final stages of evacuation were in progress under the direction of Rear-Admiral Thackrey. By 4th January 1951, the situation was considered critical, and H.M.S. *Kenya* joined the Gun-fire Support Element, leaving H.M.S. *Charity* in charge of the surface blockade. Interdiction fire was provided for the army, who reported Inchon as completely evacuated by the morning of the 5th.¹ The lock-gates and various installations, which, as things turned out, were soon to be needed by the United Nations again, were demolished, and all ships except the three cruisers and the *Warramunga* were withdrawn to the outer approaches of the port, where they were screened and controlled by Captain Brown's frigates.² The *Rochester*, *Kenya*, *Ceylon*, and *Warramunga* remained about four miles west of Wolmi do, and during 6th January gave support fire to the west flank of the 8th Army. No further calls for fire were received, and on 9th January, the army line by then being 20 miles south of Inchon, the Gun-fire Support Element was dissolved. The *Rochester* and *Kenya* proceeded to Sasebo, the *Warramunga* to Kure for maintenance, and the *Ceylon* took over the blockade patrol.

At 0800, 7th January, Rear-Admiral Thackrey had turned over all ships in the Inchon area to Vice-Admiral Andrewes's operational control, and he himself left for Taechon in U.S.S. *Eldorado* next day. During the next 48 hours, ships were gradually withdrawn from the Inchon area, the United States ships proceeding mostly to the east coast. Among the last to leave were the frigates³ of T.E. 95·13, and the element was then dispersed, the American contingent proceeding to Kunsan and Sasebo and the remainder resuming their blockade and escort duties in the Yellow Sea. Once again the frigates had demonstrated their ability to operate for a considerable period at a distance from their base, and Admiral Andrewes expressed great satisfaction with the way in which they had carried out their 'prolonged and often very dull duties'.⁴

¹ A grand total of 68 913 personnel, 1404 vehicles, and 62 144 tons of cargo were lifted from Inchon to Taechon and Pusan.

² H.M. Ships *Cardigan Bay*, *St Bride's Bay*, *Morecambe Bay* and H.M.N.Z.S. *Rotoiti*. From 28th December, the element was reinforced by the U.S. frigates *Glendale*, *Bisbee* and *Gloucester*, at different times.

³ Except H.M.S. *Morecambe Bay* who had left on 3rd January for exercises off Sasebo.

⁴ F.O. 2i/c covering letter in M.0605/51.

The varied activities of the British and New Zealand frigates on this occasion are shown diagrammatically in Plan 8.

This was the last operational appearance of the Bay-class frigates for some months. H.M. Ships *Cardigan Bay* and *St Bride's Bay* finally left the west coast on 19th January, and after cruising and exercising independently in Japanese waters, they proceeded to Hong Kong early in February, where the *Morecambe Bay* had already arrived.¹

H.M.S. *Theseus*, flying Vice-Admiral Andrewes's flag, arrived in the operation area off the west coast on 7th January and carried out the duties of the Air Support Element² for the next ten days. With the enemy showing little or no activity along the coast, and many of the inlets and harbours frozen up, the air effort required to maintain adequate daily surveillance was not so great, and before leaving Sasebo, Admiral Andrewes had offered up to twenty sorties a day to the American 5th Air Force in support of land operations. Co-ordination was effected through the Joint Operations Centre at Taegu, and by the afternoon of 8th January, H.M.S. *Theseus's* aircraft were working in close support of the U.S. 25th Division on the left flank of the line to the southward of Osan. This was the first time close support had been given by F.A.A. aircraft during the war; the control was mainly by airborne controllers using Harvard-trainer-type aircraft, and this worked well, in spite of some congestion on the voice circuit in use.

Apart from these activities, regular coastal patrols covered the enemy-held coast at least once a day, and also kept an eye on the still-unused airfields at Haeju, Ongjin, and near Chinnampo. With friendly irregulars operating south of the Taedong estuary, and large numbers of refugees, together with rice to feed them, being evacuated to Choda and other islands, attack on shore targets and shipping had to be limited, and such as were made were confined to the Chinnampo area.

The distance aircraft had to cover between the operating area and their target area inland was considerable, so after a few days, Admiral Andrewes stationed what he aptly termed a 'bird-dog' south of the Inchon Gulf while flying was in progress. This duty was initiated by H.M.S. *Consort* on 14th January, and for the next month a destroyer or frigate was provided by C.T.E. 95·12 for the purpose.³

For some days, flying was much hampered by the weather. On 9th January it was too bad for any overland operations; on the 10th, only one C.A.S. flight, flying through low cloud and snow showers, reached the front line, and next day after the dawn reconnaissance had been launched, flying had to be suspended till the afternoon, when four C.A.S. Fireflies succeeded in inflicting about 200 casualties on the enemy by cannon-fire. Blizzard conditions prevailed on the 12th and 13th; with the flight-deck snow- and ice-bound, no flying was possible.

When the weather eased somewhat on the 14th, another difficulty arose. The catapult main reeving, which had been showing signs of stranding (after only about 880 shots) became unusable that forenoon. With a number of aircraft already airborne, it was possible to give the Furies an adequate free take-off run, but they had to be stripped of their long-range petrol tanks and could carry cannon armament only. The Fireflies were launched by RATOG and carried their

¹ H.M.S. *Morecambe Bay* left Sasebo 20th January, arrived Hong Kong 25th January, H.M.S. *Cardigan Bay* left Sasebo 31st January, arrived Hong Kong 3rd February. H.M.S. *St Bride's Bay* left Sasebo 10th February, arrived Hong Kong 13th February.

² H.M. Ships *Theseus*, *Cossack*, *Constance*, *Concord*.

³ The bird-dog was discontinued on 14th February 1951, as with the airfields of Suwon and Kimpo, and the port of Inchon again in friendly hands, with a harbour-entrance control vessel stationed in the approaches, it was no longer necessary.

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normal armament and petrol load. About 150 casualties were inflicted on the enemy by C.A.S. aircraft in the Suwon–Osan–Inchon area that day. On 15th January, it was doubtful whether flying could be started at all with a full deck park, but by using RATOG for the Fireflies, and by ingenious parking, the Furies were launched in spite of a low natural wind speed. A full day's flying ensued, a total of 58 sorties, the highest number so far achieved, being flown.¹ By this time U.N. land forces had started their reconnaissance in force through Osan and Suwon; as a result a considerable number of enemy troops were on the move, and the Fireflies and Furies made the most of their opportunity, inflicting about 350 casualties on them.

A similar programme was carried out next day, when a total of 60 sorties was flown; but enemy troops were not so much in evidence, and casualty figures were lower. Reconnaissance of the whole enemy-held coastline to 39° N. revealed no significant movement or activity.

Obviously it was beyond the capacity of a single carrier to operate permanently without periodical spells in harbour for rest and maintenance, and for some time, Admiral Andrewes had been pressing for additional air support on the west coast. Early in January, Admiral Struble felt able to detail the light carrier U.S.S. *Bataan* (Captain Neale, U.S.N.) with four screening destroyers² to alternate with H.M.S. *Theseus* as Task Element 95·11. The *Bataan*, carrying a U.S. Marine Corps air group equipped with thirty Corsairs, arrived at Sasebo on 10th January, and, after a short maintenance period, relieved the *Theseus* as C.T.E. 95·11 on the 16th. This welcome addition to Admiral Andrewes's force enabled him to work the carriers normally on an eighteen-day cycle,³ though naturally occasions occurred when the exigencies of war necessitated other arrangements.

The day-to-day blockading and escort activities produced nothing worthy of record. H.M.S. *Kenya* (Captain Brock) had relieved H.M.S. *Ceylon* as C.T.E. 95·12 on 12th January, and carried out these duties till the 24th. 'Though the period cannot be said to be inactive', remarked Captain Brock, and a glance at his report of proceedings confirms this, 'it was the least interesting month so far.' As with the arrival of U.S.S. *Bataan*, continuous air support would be available in the Yellow Sea, and, moreover, the prevailing winter weather would cut down any possible enemy sea traffic, Admiral Andrewes decided on 13th January to reduce the Surface Blockade Element to one cruiser and two small ships, one of which might be a frigate.

During the withdrawal of the army, when the future of the war could not be foreseen, Rear-Admiral Andrewes put forward a suggestion to hold a number of small islands off the coasts of Korea with R.o.K. Marine garrisons of 50 to 100 men. These would be useful as an anti-mining measure and also as advance bases for R.o.K. patrol craft. This far-sighted idea, which was adopted by Rear-Admiral Smith, C.T.F. 95, was to have many repercussions, as will be seen, and in time was to lead to the imposition of a heavy burden on the Commonwealth task group.⁴ The islands chosen on the west coast were Choda, controlling the approaches to

¹ Owing to the shortening of the sorties for lack of overload petrol in the Furies, and the need to keep about twelve aircraft airborne to clear the deck.

² U.S. Ships *Mackenzie*, *Taussig*, *Small*, *Hanson*.

³ Eight or nine days' flying and one replenishing at sea; one additional day each way on passage, leaving six or seven days in harbour for maintenance and rest.

⁴ See Section 77.

the River Taedong, whence the greatest mining menace existed, Pengyong do and Techong do, which with Choda controlled the only inshore route with reasonably deep water where the larger ships could get within gun range, and Tok Chok do controlling the approaches to Inchon.¹ The inshore route thus available covered the Hwanghae promontory and allowed the United Nations to poise a continuous threat of amphibious operations in the enemy's rear. The garrisons left Pusan on 20th January and established themselves in the islands. They were subsequently joined by large parties of 'young men'—recruits from the mainland for the R.o.K. Navy. Similar garrisons were later landed on certain islands off the east coast, notably in the approaches to Wonsan, which led to the remarkable 861-day 'siege' of that port.

On the east coast the naval aircraft of T.F. 77 were employed primarily on interdiction of all road and rail communications in the eastern part of Korea. This remained their principal role for the next two years and a half. They certainly caused considerable embarrassment to the Communists, but they failed in their ultimate object of isolating the enemy forces in the battle area from their supplies. The reasons for this failure will be discussed later. On occasions, as and when required, the effort was switched to close air support of the ground troops; other duties included spotting for naval gun-fire, armed reconnaissance and close air cover. Naval gun-fire at suitable targets on the coast was provided by cruisers, destroyers, and sometimes the battleship *Missouri*. Enemy minelaying, though abated during the winter, was continued from junks and sampans, and the much-augmented American minesweeping force was kept busy keeping channels and areas inshore clear, to enable bombardment to be carried out as required.

¹ Other islands further south would have been similarly retained had the withdrawal on land been continued.

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U.N. Advance to the 38th Parallel January–April 1951

Section

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As already mentioned, the new-year offensive of the Chinese had been checked by mid-January 1951. On 15th January, U.S. troops with tanks and strong air support moved out from positions around Pyongtaek and delivered a blow at Chinese forces, which had been subjected to very heavy air attacks the day before, building up in the Suwon/Inchon¹ area; by the evening the enemy were falling back on all roads leading to Seoul, and by nightfall, 16th, U.N. troops controlled Suwon and Inchon. To the east the U.S. Cavalry Division and R.o.K. 7th Division countered the enemy which had infiltrated into the Yangyang area.

There followed a comparatively quiet period. U.N. forces commenced to prepare a defence line in the Pyongtaek area; in the centre, after the fierce battles around Wonju, the enemy withdrew slightly to the north, leaving the city in a kind of no-man's land, while in the east there was little activity, with the R.o.K. Corps on the defensive north of Samchok.

The enemy were building up for another offensive, but were rudely interrupted by the U.N. forces, who adopted a policy of extremely aggressive patrolling. As a result, Chinese troops were continually driven to action in the open by day and suffered heavy casualties from air attack. The enemy was further embarrassed

¹ Not to be confused with Inchon.

by his lengthened supply lines and the onset of disease in his ranks; and by the end of January¹ the initiative had passed to General Ridgway.

The reconnaissance in force gained momentum, and by 6th February had developed into a limited offensive, with a slow, steady advance all along the front. The destruction of the Communist armies rather than territorial gains was the objective, but Inchon was recaptured on 10th February. After a heavy enemy attack between 12th and 15th February, which brought him to within three miles of Wonju, he withdrew on his reserves. Seoul was reoccupied by the United Nations on 15th March. During the latter part of the month, the U.N. forces were across the 38th parallel all along the line, with the left on the River Imjin, across which aggressive patrolling continued, and with the main strength of the Army working from the centre to the north-eastward towards the Chorwon-Kumwha-Hwachon triangle, where the Chinese had achieved a considerable build-up. Attempts by the enemy to flood the surrounding country from the Hwachon reservoir did not prevent the U.S. Cavalry Division from occupying the whole of the south bank of the reservoir by the beginning of April. On the right flank, the two R.o.K. corps having captured Chumunchin remained just south of the 38th parallel; they appeared to have only North Koreans opposite them, as did the R.o.K. 1st Division on the extreme left. Such briefly was the position just prior to the Chinese Army's spring offensive.

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Throughout this period the naval forces on the west coast, in addition to maintaining the blockade, were able to give considerable assistance to the left flank of the U.N. Army.

On 23rd January, when the reconnaissance in force towards the River Han was being planned, General Ridgway requested naval gun-fire support in the vicinity of Inchon, and U.S.S. *St Paul*, wearing the flag of Rear-Admiral Hillenkoetter, U.S.N., with the destroyers *Hank* and *Borrie* (T.E. 95·14) was placed under Vice-Admiral Andrewes's operational control for this purpose. T.E. 95·14 arrived off Inchon, after the approaches had been scanned for mines by aircraft from U.S.S. *Bataan* then on patrol, on 25th January, and at once started harassing and interdiction fire. At intervals they were reinforced by ships from the blockade patrol, then under Captain Lloyd-Davies of H.M.S. *Ceylon* who had relieved H.M.S. *Kenya* on 24th January. A spirited encounter between two of the patrol destroyers and a battery on Wolmi do took place on 26th January. Captain Lloyd-Davies had sent in H.M.C.S. *Cayuga* (Captain J. V. Brock) accompanied

¹ The fighting for the next five months can be conveniently divided into three phases: *End of January to mid-April*. Steady U.N. pressure driving the enemy slowly north until the line was pivoted on the Imjin and swinging north-eastward, with pressure on the Hwachon area.

Mid-April to mid-May. First Communist spring offensive in the left and left-centre, followed by U.N. withdrawal to the River Han line, and with all except the extreme right south of the 38th parallel.

Mid-May to June. Second Communist spring offensive in the right-centre, followed by U.N. counter-attack all along the front driving back to the original April positions, and beyond into the enemy's vital supply area in the Chorwon-Kumwha-Pyongyang triangle.

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by the newly arrived *Nootka* (Commander Fraser-Harris, R.C.N.)¹ to transfer a U.S. military liaison officer to the *St Paul*. As they were leaving harbour, the enemy opened fire on the American ships at anchor. The two Canadian destroyers immediately turned back and closing in finally to pom-pom range, silenced the battery. Their prompt action without awaiting orders was most favourably commented on by U.S.N. officers in the *St Paul*.

On 28th and 31st January H.M.S. *Ceylon* and H.M.C.S. *Cayuga* reinforced T.E. 95·14, bombarding enemy positions with air spotting from H.M.S. *Theseus*. At times the force came under enemy fire described as accurate, but no ship was hit. U.S. Ships *St Paul* and *Hank* proceeded to Sasebo on 31st January, but soon after they sailed, the 8th Army urgently requested the presence of ships at Inchon, both for gun-fire support of an attack it was putting in, and as a landing threat to the enemy's flank. Captain Lloyd-Davies accordingly concentrated his three ships at Inchon, and for the next three days supplied gun-fire support by day, and interdiction and harassing fire at night. The ships were kept in a waiting position about 16 000 yards from Wolmi do, moving up by day to about 7000 yards for bombardments. After dark, ships moved up again for harassing fire, always anchoring in a slightly different berth.²

U.S. Ships *St Paul* and *Hank* returned to Inchon on 2nd February, and after another night of harassing fire 'which I believe', remarked Captain Lloyd-Davies, 'is almost as harassing to the donor as to the recipient', H.M.S. *Ceylon* turned over the duties of blockade patrol to H.M.S. *Belfast* (Captain Sir Aubrey St Clair-Ford, Bt), which had arrived back in Korean waters on 31st January, after recommissioning in the United Kingdom. Apart from a short visit to Techong do to concert measures with R.o.K. P.C. 704 (Lieutenant-Commander Hyun)³ on the 4th February, and a day on patrol on the 7th, H.M.S. *Belfast* started her return to the war zone by reinforcing Rear-Admiral Hillenkoetter's force at Inchon. She provided harassing fire on the nights of 3rd and 5th February, and bombarded on the 4th and 6th, the blockade patrol being maintained by H.M.S. *Black Swan*, H.M.N.Z.S. *Tutira*, and H. Neth. M.S. *Evertsen*.

During most of this period, H.M.S. *Theseus* (Captain Bolt) with the destroyers *Cossack*, *Consort*, *Constance*, and *Comus* had formed T.E. 95·11, having relieved U.S.S. *Bataan* on 25th January. The patrol started with several days of fine and comparatively mild weather, and conditions for working the flight-deck were greatly improved. In the ensuing eight days of operations, 408 sorties were flown, 307 offensive and 101 defensive. Each day, close air support was provided for the U.S. 1st Corps, and the usual reconnaissances of coasts, airstrips, and roads were carried out. Two Sea Furies provided C.A.P. from dawn to dusk, and two spotting

¹ H.M.C.S. *Nootka* had arrived on 14th January to relieve H.M.C.S. *Sioux*, which then sailed for Esquimalt. This was the *Nootka*'s first patrol and proved an exciting one. Apart from the brush with the Wolmi do battery she sank a floating mine in the Inchon approaches, and rescued an airman from H.M.S. *Theseus* who had to 'ditch' his Sea Fury alongside of her.

² Captain Lloyd-Davies was strongly opposed to keeping ships anchored in the same berth by day and by night within sight and range of the enemy, *unless there was some specific reason for it*. He considered that it yielded the initiative to the enemy who could fix the ships' positions and thus be able to open an accurate fire at any time he had guns available to move up. He also thought it bad training for his own officers, who might come to regard it as a normal wartime risk. With these views, both the Commander-in-Chief and Vice-Admiral Andrewes fully concurred.

³ R.o.K. patrol craft Nos 704, 514, 309 were under Captain Ford's control.

aircraft for the bombarding ships at Inchon were provided as called for, the latter at the expense of C.A.P. rather than the close army support.

The flying operations were not without their casualties. On 26th January, Lieutenant A. C. Beavan was killed when his *Sea Fury* crashed into the sea while on C.A.P. A search of the area by H.M.S. *Comus* revealed only two small pieces of wreckage. Two days later Lieutenant P. L. Keighley-Peach was shot down in enemy-held territory; he was rescued by a U.S. helicopter—the second of H.M.S. *Theseus*'s pilots to be recovered from behind enemy lines by this admirable service. There were also two cases of pilots being forced to ditch *Sea Furies* owing to enemy action—Lieutenant-Commander M. P. Gordon-Smith, Air Group Commander, on 27th January, and Lieutenant J. M. Pinsent on 3rd February. Both these officers were rescued uninjured, the former by H.M.C.S. *Nootka* (the bird-dog), and the latter by U.S.S. *St Paul's* helicopter.

On 2nd February, there came to an end an unprecedented succession of consecutive accident-free deck landings when at the one thousand, four hundred and sixty-fourth, a *Sea Fury* made a heavy landing on a pitching deck in gusty weather and burst a tyre. It was found subsequently that the fuselage had been strained at the points of attachment to the undercarriage. A new record for H.M.S. *Theseus* was established next day, however, when 66 operational sorties were flown. This was specially creditable to the maintenance personnel, as No. 807 Squadron had by then lost four of its aircraft.

On 3rd February, U.S.S. *Bataan* took over the duties of C.T.E. 95·11, and H.M.S. *Theseus* with her destroyers left the area of operations, the carrier with the *Cossack* and *Constance* proceeding to Kure, and the *Consort* and *Comus* to Sasebo.

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By this time the reconnaissance in force had developed into a limited offensive, and in order to provide a diversion designed to draw some of the enemy troops from the front line, General Ridgway asked Admiral Joy to stage a feint landing on the Communist right flank. The obvious place at which to carry this out was Inchon, where the enemy had good reason to know what an amphibious assault could lead to. Accordingly, two forces from the Amphibious Force, then commanded by Rear-Admiral I. N. Kiland, U.S.N., who had relieved Admiral Doyle on 24th January—T.E. 90·02 under Captain Kelly, U.S.N., consisting of two assault cargo ships and an L.S.D., and T.G. 90·2 under Captain Wright, U.S.N., consisting of seven assault transports and an assault cargo ship—sailed respectively from Pusan and Yokosuka for Inchon. Rear-Admiral Hillenkoetter's bombardment force was already there, and to this was added the battleship *Missouri*. Further reinforcement, if required, could be drawn from the blockade patrol, and T.E. 95·11 would provide the necessary air component.

Shortly after midnight 6th/7th February, Vice-Admiral Andrewes, who was then at Sasebo, received orders to co-ordinate the feint-landing operations. He sailed that day in H.M.S. *Ceylon*, leaving Captain R. A. Villiers, who had succeeded Captain James as his Chief Staff Officer on 31st January, in charge at Sasebo, and with the *Consort*, proceeded to Inchon; on arrival there on 8th February he shifted his flag to H.M.S. *Belfast*, which had been called in from

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patrol. ' I was more than glad to hoist my flag once more in my real flagship ', remarked the Admiral. ' This was, I believe, the twenty-fourth occasion on which I have shifted my flag during the Korean War '.

Admiral Andrewes based his plan on the principle that the threat of a landing would be effective only while the amphibious forces were known to be in the offing ready to strike; should the landing craft approach too close to the shore, the enemy would immediately perceive that the threat was an empty one, and the deception would come to an end. He therefore decided to conduct the operation on the following broad lines:

On 8th February (D minus 2). Softening-up bombardment of likely landing beaches, supported by air strikes from T.E. 95·11 (U.S.S. *Bataan*). Arrival of first element of Amphibious Force in the afternoon, which was to anchor in the outer approaches in sight of the enemy.

On 9th February (D minus 1). Further softening-up bombardments and air attacks on increased scale; attacks on Wolmi do by 5th Air Force.

On 10th February (D-day). Final assembly of Amphibious Force with arrival of T.G. 90·2 about 1300, preceded by further softening-up on a still heavier scale culminating in air attacks from 1630 to 1700, and bombardment from 1700 to 1830 (H-hour). At H-hour, just before dark, transports to make ostentatious moves with their assault craft to simulate preparations for a night landing. In fact the assault craft would not approach the beaches, but would return to their ships in the dark and be hoisted. Gun-fire, smoke, and pyrotechnics were to be employed to seaward during the night to create a confused situation. A communications deception plan was included in the scheme. On conclusion, all amphibious ships were to withdraw from the area, only the gun-fire support ships remaining. If necessary the operation would be repeated on 11th February.

In the event the feint landing did not take place. The bombardments and air strikes were carried out on 8th and 9th February as planned; but in the meanwhile the advance of the 8th Army had gone so well that there was no point in continuing with the deception, and at the request of the army what remained of the planned operation was cancelled in the morning of the 10th. That afternoon, patrols of the U.S. 25th Division and R.o.K. Marines from Tok Chok do entered Inchon, while armoured forces reached Kimpo airfield and the River Han. The usual American efficiency was displayed in the quick reopening of the port, which would have to handle about 500 tons a day of army supplies; Rear-Admiral Thackrey (C.T.G. 90·1) left Yokosuka that very day to resume his interrupted duties as S.N.O., Inchon, and various port parties and construction battalions started on their way. With Inchon once again in the hands of the United Nations, the Amphibious Force ships left, the *Ceylon*, which had reinforced the bombarding forces, and the *Consort* proceeded to Sasebo to resume an interrupted maintenance period.

Admiral Andrewes remained at Inchon till 14th February, when he sailed for Sasebo in the *Belfast*, with the *Black Swan* in company. Before leaving he had an opportunity of meeting General Ridgway, who expressed great satisfaction with the naval operations by which his army's flanks were secured, and which compelled

the enemy to be ' always looking over his shoulder ' . It was afterwards estimated that these diversionary operations at Inchon immobilized two enemy divisions.

By this time the thaw was setting in, and a renewal of the enemy's minelaying campaign was to be expected. On 15th February, therefore, Admiral Andrewes called the attention of all his ships to this danger, and directed the commanders of the carrier groups to include in their reconnaissances possible assembly, launching, and laying areas.

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On 19th February there was a change in the command of the Blockade and Escort Force (T.F. 95). Acting on orders received from Washington, Admiral Joy directed Admiral Andrewes to take over the command of this task force from Admiral Smith and the latter to report to Admiral Andrewes for assignment as a task group commander. Since his promotion in December, Vice-Admiral Andrewes had of course been senior to Rear-Admiral Smith, and it was somewhat anomalous that he should be serving under the operational control of the latter. The organization was, however, working smoothly, and neither the British C.-in-C. nor Admiral Andrewes himself desired any change. To Admiral Andrewes, his new appointment came as a complete surprise; his first intimation of it was the arrival on board H.M.S. *Ladybird* of Admiral Smith to report to him for assignment, before he had received Admiral Joy's signal.¹


The change brought many problems in its train. It meant that Admiral Andrewes had to operate more than twice the number of the ships² for which he had been responsible hitherto, and it was questionable whether his staff, which was complemented for a much smaller command, would be able to stand up to the strain. However, he was aware that he was to be relieved at the beginning of April by Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff, who was junior to Admiral Smith, when the command would naturally revert to the American Admiral. With this in mind he set himself to produce as little change as possible for the short period that he would be in command, and after useful discussions with Admiral Smith and his Chief of Staff (Captain J. A. Farrell, U.S.N.) a solution was soon worked out.

Admiral Andrewes assumed responsibility for the over-all direction of operations on both coasts of Korea as C.T.F. 95, with under him the various task group commanders—west coast, east coast, minesweeping, and so on. They would all be nominally under his direct control, but it was agreed that Admiral Smith should be in immediate operational control of all task groups except the west coast (T.G. 95·1) of which Admiral Andrewes retained direct command. In effect, Admiral Smith who was under Admiral Andrewes in matters of policy, acted as his deputy as regards the United States and South Korean naval forces.³ These arrangements worked smoothly, owing, to a great extent, as Admiral Andrewes remarked, to the

¹ The signal ran—' Effective immediately. Vice-Admiral Andrewes, Royal Navy, relieve Rear-Admiral Allan E. Smith, U.S.N., as Commander, Task Force 95. Rear-Admiral Allan E. Smith, U.S.N., report to C.T.F. 95 for assignment as Task Group Commander. 190118Z February. '

² See Appendix F.

³ See Figure 8.



¹ Lent to T.E. 95.14.
² Disbanded 14th-15th March.
³ Lent to T.G. 95.2.
⁴ Left war zone for South China, January-February.

Figure 8. T.F. 95, composition and chain of command, March 1951

excellent co-operation that already existed between his own staff and Admiral Smith's staff in U.S.S. *Prairie*.¹

The biggest strain as the result of the new set-up came upon Admiral Andrewes's communications organization. During the first fourteen days, the cryptographic office distributed 3050 signals, and the main signal office 2030. A lot of signal traffic was taken up by very long and detailed opsums,² graded SECRET, which the U.S. Navy were accustomed to send out daily, and which Admiral Andrewes evidently thought could have been abbreviated with advantage. Nor were they always accurate—for example, on one occasion the *Theseus's* aircraft were credited with the destruction of eight enemy tanks, when in fact they had damaged five, and on the same day Thai frigates were reported operating off the west coast of Korea, when they were actually on patrol off Sasebo. These minor inaccuracies were spotlighted by the meticulous care with which a F.E.A.F. summary claimed that aircraft had shot a man (North Korean) in Korea and gave the lettered co-ordinates of his position; 'but maybe he was an important man', commented Admiral Andrewes.³

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It will be convenient here to consider briefly a problem which provided Admiral Andrewes and the blockade commanders with much food for thought, and which was emphasized by the Admiral's appointment as C.T.F. 95, namely the activities of various clandestine and guerrilla organizations operating on the west coast.⁴ These clandestine organizations began to appear very soon after the outbreak of war. They were considered so secret that they were unknown to anyone else or, indeed, to each other. Their activities lacked co-ordination, and some were controlled from outside the theatre of war. Being mostly centred on friendly islands, the performance of their missions necessitated breaking the blockade, at the risk of being delayed or destroyed; but they preferred to take a chance with no reliable form of identification or any notification of their movements. At times, they worked in co-operation with ships of the R.o.K. Navy, which thus got diverted from their primary (blockade and anti-mine) duties.

In addition, a number of para-military organizations operating craft of suspicious appearance manifested themselves. These were controlled variously by the United States Army, Navy, and Air Force.

With the assumption of duty as C.T.F. 95, it became essential for Admiral Andrewes to know what clandestine operations were in progress in the waters for which he was responsible, and he therefore requested information of all such activities taking place on either coast. The reply from Tokyo—'There are no clandestine operations taking place'—was not helpful. In this dilemma he adopted

¹ This close co-operation continued. The British daily staff conference was enlarged to include Admiral Smith's Chief of Staff and the senior officers of the American groups (particularly the Escort and Minesweeping Groups), and Admiral Andrewes's Chief Staff-Officer, Captain Villiers, usually accompanied by the S.O.(I), continued to attend Admiral Smith's daily briefings whenever possible, as had been the custom hitherto.

² Operation summaries.

³ F.O. 2i/c R.o.P. No. 27.

⁴ Similar problems occurred on the east coast, but owing to geographical conditions not so frequently.

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the policy of directing the C.T.E.s to seek out and try to co-operate directly with the various organizations operating in their areas.

There was, moreover, a healthy guerrilla organization controlled by U.S. Army officers operating from Pengyong do across to the Hwanghae promontory, and the R.o.K. Navy ran a raiding organization of its own. Eventually, the latter two worked together, and excellent co-operation grew up between the U.S. Army guerrilla organization and the British task group. Control of the movements of the para-military craft was also gradually improved by persuading them to notify all intended movements through Commander Luosey, U.S.N., the operational commander of the R.o.K. naval forces.

The R.o.K. naval forces, working under the control of the Blockade Element Commander, themselves presented a number of problems. They were woefully short of resources, ill paid by U.N. standards, and were expected to live partially off the land. Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff subsequently described them as 'brave as lions, and extremely keen and willing', but they suffered not a little from language difficulties and lack of communications. However, by direct and personal day-to-day contact with the blockading ships, by patient explanation of orders, and by the exchange of liaison officers, much good work was achieved.¹

But the agents of the clandestine organizations, which continued to rely on eluding the patrols, with varying fortunes, remained a problem throughout. This is a difficulty which has usually arisen in this type of operation. The ideal would be for one organization, preferably the navy, to be responsible for all water transport, in whatever type of craft is required. If, as in the Korean War, this cannot be achieved, there must be arrangements for *a.* the co-ordination of all clandestine and raiding operations to ensure that they do not conflict with one another, and *b.* the notification of the movements of craft to other interested authorities, a system of identification and the issue of recognizable passes to agents.

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As Admiral Andrewes's new appointment included responsibility for the operations on the east coast, which remained almost exclusively American, it will be convenient to glance at the situation there as he found it on taking over as C.T.F. 95.

The carrier force, T.F. 77, which was operating in the Sea of Japan, carrying out the duties already mentioned,² was of course entirely independent of his command, being part of Admiral Struble's 7th Fleet.

The blockade forces had just initiated operations at Wonsan, which came to be known as the siege of Wonsan, and continued for the remainder of the war.

Wonsan, the principal seaport of North Korea, with a population estimated at 100 000, has a large harbour, well protected from storms, and with good holding ground. The seaport boasted excellent facilities and, unlike other ports to the

¹ 'The R.o.K. Navy has, considering all things, been remarkably successful, and I think note should be taken of this for here is a native Korean navy manned and administered by the Korean Government, trained by the United States Navy, being operated by the British Navy, and often assisted by the Commonwealth Navies. In future types of war the potential value of these "native" forces cannot be over estimated' F.O. 2i/c R.o.P. No. 35.

² See p. 113.

north, was ice-free in winter. The city lay astride the main road and rail communications from the north-east to the front line, and it was also the terminus of the only east-west railroad in North Korea. A map of the harbour is shown in Figure 9.




Figure 9. Wonsan harbour

Originally, the intention had been to seize some of the islands which lay in the harbour, and to hold them till U.N. forces had fought their way north again, in furtherance of Admiral Smith's policy which had already been started on the west coast. But it was quickly recognized that solid advantages would accrue from holding the harbour and besieging the city from the sea. Thereby, the enemy would have to divert large numbers of troops to guard against an ever-present threat of invasion; the United Nations, on the other hand, by keeping the harbour swept of mines, would be able to invade at any time it suited them to do so; and the important road and rail communications would be continually open to naval gun-fire.

The operation started on 16th February, three days before Admiral Andrewes took over as C.T.F. 95, when two destroyers, U.S.S.s *Wallace L. Lind* and *Ozboorn* bombarded the harbour's military installations. Shore batteries retaliated, and on the 18th, the *Ozboorn* was slightly damaged, but from then on, two or three destroyers were always kept in the harbour, pounding the Wonsan targets with

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harassing and interdiction fire. On 19th February, H.M.S. *Belfast* and H.M.A.S. *Warramunga* arrived to reinforce the American destroyers. Their contribution was disappointing, as the spotting aircraft which had been requested from T.F. 77 were available for only just over an hour out of the 8½ hours spent in the bombardment area.¹ However, they obtained hits on road and rail junctions, buildings housing troops, and shore batteries, one of which the *Warramunga* partially destroyed² before returning to Sasebo that evening.

On 24th February, the island of Sin do, only 4000 yards from Kalma Gak, was occupied and garrisoned by R.o.K. Marines, and thereafter provided a good observation post for naval gun-fire and scrutiny of train traffic in the city. Before the end of March, six other islands³ were seized and put to various purposes, and a daily minesweeping service was organized to cope with the mines the enemy constantly laid at night from the innumerable fishing sampans at their disposal.

In due course, similar operations on a smaller scale were initiated at Songjin (140 miles north-east of Wonsan), and daily bombardments of road and rail facilities and other suitable targets at these two ports, and at suitable places between them, not omitting enemy front-line positions further south, were carried out. A total of two cruisers⁴ and eighteen destroyers or frigates were continually employed on these operations.

H.M.A.S. *Warramunga* returned to the east coast on 21st February and remained there till 5th March, carrying out a series of successful interdiction bombardments in the vicinity of Kangnung (about 120 miles south of Wonsan).

From this time onwards it became customary as a matter of policy to lend one destroyer or frigate from the 'international' naval forces of T.G. 95·1 for duty on the east coast.⁵ Operations on the west coast were, as a rule, less spectacular than those on the east coast, and therefore less interesting to the ships' companies. The constant bombardments and more frequent mentions in the press benefited morale; and the interchange of ships between the task groups was good for inter-Allied relations.

The ships took their part in the 'siege' of Wonsan, and at Songjin and other places as required. They usually anchored with ships on their cables in bombarding berths 8000 to 10 000 yards from the shore. Their tasks fell under three main headings, viz., covering certain sections of road and rail, and firing as soon as any movement was seen or reported from the air; night interdiction on given targets previously registered for the ship's guns in daylight by aircraft, at a rate laid down in the fire plan; and counter-battery fire. During March and April 1951, these duties were performed at different times by H. Neth. M.S. *Evertsen* and by H.M. Ships *Black Swan*, *Alacrity*, *Concord*, and *Comus*.

¹ Admiral Andrewes remarked that this was an inherent difficulty due to the command set-up whereby the operations of T.F.95 and T.F.77 (under Commander, 7th Fleet) were not closely integrated. On this occasion, too, the operations of the aircraft were considerably curtailed by the weather.

² The *Belfast* fired 127 rounds of 6-inch H.E. and 27 rounds of 4-inch; the *Warramunga*, 80 rounds of 4·7-inch H.E.

³ Yo do, Mo do, Sa do, Tae do, Ung do, and Hwangto do. The latter proved the best spotting and observation post.

⁴ At this time U.S.S.s *St Paul* and *Manchester*.

⁵ The converse was also intended to apply, and whenever possible a U.S. ship was attached to T.E. 95·12 on the west coast.

All this bombardment threw a heavy strain on the ammunition supply. Interdiction on quite a modest rate, say eight rounds per hour for twelve hours of darkness, with one or two direct bombardments by day could very soon consume 200 rounds, while counter-battery fire called for an expenditure of 100 rounds in a few minutes. With an ammunition pipeline 10 000 miles long, and so many different types of ammunition required, it posed a difficult problem. Occasionally a small quantity was sent up in a U.S. ammunition supply ship, but as the ships were not at that time fitted for ammunitioning under way, this was seldom resorted to.

Meanwhile, the 41st Independent R.M. Commando had remained at Tokyo since the costly retreat from Hagaru-ri in December 1950. Colonel Drysdale was anxious for some active employment to be found for them, and on 7th April a raid on the east coast was carried out by 250 Commandos who landed from U.S.S. *Fort Marion* (L.S.D.) eight miles south of Songjin and demolished a section of the main coastal railway. They were accompanied by a fire-control party from U.S.S. *St Paul* (flag, Rear-Admiral Hillenkoetter, U.S.N.), which, with two destroyers¹ provided support and covering fire. No serious resistance was encountered, and no casualties were sustained. In this they were fortunate, since, following the United States policy derived from the Pacific campaigns of 1943-45, the area had been heavily bombed by aircraft from T.F. 77 for the previous three days, and the enemy must have been aware that something was brewing.

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To return to the west coast, the normal blockade patrols were maintained, all possible help being given to the army as required.

H.M.S. *Theseus*, with the *Comus* and the Canadian destroyers *Cayuga*, *Athabaskan*, and *Nootka*, formed T.E. 95·11 between 12th and 23rd February. The weather was as bad on this occasion as it had been good on her previous patrol. Flying had to be prematurely abandoned on three out of the nine days, twice owing to the wind gusting in excess of 50 knots over the flight-deck, and once owing to very low cloud with visibility down to a mile. This resulted in fewer sorties being flown than on the previous patrol—380, of which 265 were offensive and 115 defensive, as opposed to 408. As before, C.A.P. and A/S patrols were maintained over the element from dawn to dusk, and the usual reconnaissances were flown. Priority was again given to close air support for the U.N. land forces.

A sad accident occurred on 14th February, when the front gun of a *Firefly* fired as the aircraft was arrested in landing on², fatally wounding Petty Officer Airman J. F. Wigley, who was working in the forward deck park; he was buried at sea with full naval honours next day.

U.S.S. *Bataan* relieved H.M.S. *Theseus* on 23rd February, and the *Theseus* returned to Sasebo.

During this period, H.M.S. *Ceylon* carried out her last patrol as C.T.E. 95·12 before refitting at Hong Kong. Captain Lloyd-Davies was impressed with the advantages that might accrue from raids and forays by the R.o.K. guerrillas from

¹ U.S. Ships *Wallace L. Lind* and *Massey*.

² This was the third occurrence that day of a *Firefly*'s front guns firing when the aircraft was arrested.

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Pengyong do, supported by T.E. 95·12 and the R.o.K. patrol craft. The whole coast from Inchon to Chinnampo was very lightly held by the enemy, and had many good beaches and landing places. He held several meetings with the R.o.K. patrol craft and some of the guerrilla officers at Techong do; one raid was actually planned, but had to be abandoned owing to an unexpected, strong south-westerly gale. Captain Lloyd-Davies also organized a guerrilla bombardment team, and started their instruction in our bombardment procedure and in the operation of a Type 68 W/T set.

Meanwhile, after the abortive Chinese thrust down the central front had been brought to a standstill, General Ridgway had at once started a counter-attack all along the front from Seoul to Pagnim-ni. The enemy was known to be nervous of possible landings behind his flanks, and already the operations at Wonsan were helping in this way. To embarrass him further, on 25th February the 8th Army asked for a feint landing to be made on the west coast, south of the Taedong estuary.

Captain Sir Aubrey St Clair-Ford in the *Belfast*, who had relieved Captain Lloyd-Davies as C.T.E. 95·12 on 23rd February was put in charge of this diversion, which took place between 27th February and 3rd March. The forces allocated were as follows:

BOMBARDING ELEMENT. H.M. Ships *Belfast*, *Cossack*, *Constance*, H.M.A.S *Bataan*, U.S.S. *Hank*.

MINESWEEPING ELEMENT. U.S. ships *Carmick* (D.M.S.), *Incredible*, *Merganser*, *Mocking Bird*, H.M.S. *Alacrity*, R.o.K. 501, 506.

AMPHIBIOUS ELEMENT. U.S.S. *Bayfield* (assault transport).

CARRIER ELEMENT. U.S.S. *Bataan*, with destroyers *Massey*, *Forrest B. Royal* and *Zellars*.

R.O.K. CRAFT ON PATROL. No. 62 (frigate) and S/M chasers Nos 303, 307 and 313.

Between 27th February and 1st March, aircraft from U.S.S. *Bataan* showed increased activity in the Chinnampo area, while surface craft made their presence in the vicinity known. Heavy weather prevented most of the American minesweepers arriving in time, but an improvised sweep was carried out by the *Carmick* and *Alacrity*, assisted by the R.o.K. motor-minesweepers 501 and 506 in the approach route to Chinnampo from the south (route 'Cigarette') on 1st March. Next day, bombardments on likely landing beaches were carried out, low C.A.P. being provided by U.S.S. *Bataan*, while the Far East Air Force kept high-speed jet fighters at 15 000 feet. On 3rd March, after intensified bombardments and air strikes against the beaches, the Amphibious Element entered Cigarette at 1700, and proceeded along it till dark, when they withdrew to the south; further bombardment was carried out by the *Belfast*, *Cossack*, and *Constance* on the 4th.¹ The army subsequently stated that this operation caused the enemy to move a division into the area.

¹ Between 2nd and 4th March, H.M.S. *Belfast* fired 410 rounds of 6-inch and 217 of 4-inch, plus 24 star-shell; H.M.S. *Cossack*, 530 rounds of 4·5-inch, and H.M.S. *Constance*, 522 rounds of 4·5-inch.

Meanwhile, U.S. Ships *St Paul* and *Hank* had been providing gun-fire support at Inchon ever since 23rd January, but as the U.N. forces advanced to the River Han, targets became scarce. T.E. 95·14 was therefore dissolved, the *Hank* being withdrawn to Sasebo on 5th March and the *St Paul*¹ on the 12th. H.M.S. *Kenya* (Captain P. W. Brock), which on completion of a three-week self-refit at Hong Kong, had relieved H.M.S. *Belfast* as C.T.E. 95·12 on 3rd March, was ordered to take over gun-fire support duties, should they be required.

Captain Brock, in addition to the maintenance of the blockade, had been engaged in keeping up the appearance of the landing threat in the Chinnampo-Choppeki area. To heighten this illusion, H.M. Ships *Kenya* and *Consort*, with the *Alacrity* on 5th March, and the *Hart* on the 7th, bombarded assorted targets² from berths near Choda island, air spotting being provided by H.M.S. *Theseus*. Like Captain Lloyd-Davies, Captain Brock admired the offensive spirit³ of the R.o.K. Navy and guerrillas, and thought that with proper training, planning, and logistics it could be exploited to produce important results against the enemy on the west coast; but guidance was necessary to ensure that it was kept in the right direction and not diverted into a private war.

Before the departure of U.S.S. *St Paul* from Inchon on 12th March, H.M.S. *Kenya* proceeded there to take over the gun-fire support duties. The position was that, in order to strengthen the U.N. offensive further to the east, the west flank was held by only one R.o.K. division, which was facing superior North Korean forces supported by a number of Chinese across the River Han. In the Kimpo peninsula there were only R.o.K. dispersed patrols. Thus, although the enemy in his present positions was beyond 6-inch-gun range, should he attack in force, in which case the plan was to withdraw and to form a perimeter defence around Inchon, naval gun-fire would probably be urgently required at short notice. Captain Sir Aubrey St Clair-Ford, who arrived in H.M.S. *Belfast* to relieve the *Kenya* next day (13th March), subsequently arranged with U.S. Army officers that while this situation lasted, the cruiser would remain within seven hours' steaming of Inchon during her operations.

In H.M.S. *Belfast* arrived Vice-Admiral the Honourable Sir Guy Russell who had succeeded Admiral Sir Patrick Brind as C.-in-C., Far East Station, on 7th February, and who had reached Sasebo on 10th March on a visit to the war zone and Japan. After meeting Rear-Admiral Thackrey, U.S.N., at Inchon, the C.-in-C. proceeded to sea in H.M.S. *Cockade*, whence he transferred that afternoon by jackstay to H.M.S. *Theseus* to witness flying operations and for return passage to Sasebo.

H.M.S. *Theseus*, with the destroyers *Comus*, *Cayuga*, *Nootka*, and *Athabaskan*, had been on patrol since 4th March. The weather was very variable, ranging from flat calm to rough with strong northerly winds, which hampered flying; on one day fog prevented it altogether. In the course of the patrol, 339 sorties were flown, of which 226 were offensive and 113 defensive. The usual duties were carried out.

¹ U.S.S. *St Paul*'s last day at Inchon was tragically marred by the loss of her motor whale boat in the harbour, when three officers and six enlisted men lost their lives.

² H.M.S. *Kenya* fired 169 rounds of 6-inch and 80 of 4-inch; H.M.S. *Consort*, 145 rounds of 4·5-inch; H.M.S. *Alacrity*, 35 rounds of 4-inch; and H.M.S. *Hart*, 61 rounds of 4-inch.

³ For example, the C.O. of P.F. 62 asked permission of Admiral Thackrey to bombard a place north of Haeju, informing him that he had been ordered to do so. After the operation, he admitted that he issued the 'orders' to himself.

These included bombardment spotting and C.A.P. for H.M.S. *Kenya*, close air support for the army, mainly in the Wonju area, reconnaissances and attacks against enemy communications. Considerable success attended the latter efforts, several road and rail bridges being severely damaged by the destruction of one or more spans. But enemy flak, both light and medium, was becoming more dangerous. On 12th March, Lieutenant D. L. James was fortunate to reach Suwon airfield when his Firefly had been severely hit, and on the 13th a Firefly was shot down after attacking a railway bridge near Sariwon. The state of the wreckage showed that its crew, Lieutenant G. H. Cooles, R.N., and Flight-Lieutenant D. W. Gray, R.A.F., must have been killed instantly.

It was shortly after this unfortunate occurrence that the C.-in-C. boarded H.M.S. *Theseus*, which shaped course for Sasebo that evening, after being relieved by U.S.S. *Bataan* which carried out similar duties for the next ten days.

There was not much change in the military situation ashore from mid-March to mid-April. The U.N. forces continued their advance north, and at the beginning of April they were beyond the 38th parallel in several places. But there were signs that the enemy was bringing into line fresh formations, and at the same time was building up for a new offensive.

The naval forces continued the same duties on both east and west coasts. H.M.S. *Theseus*, with the *Consort*, *Huron*,¹ *Nootka*, and *Athabaskan* formed T.E. 95·11 from 22nd March to 2nd April. Short visibility prevented flying on the 25th, and on the 28th the force was fuelling; apart from that, the usual operations were carried out, 253 offensive and 132 defensive sorties being flown in the course of the patrol—a total of 385. Enemy ground opposition continued to increase, and a number of aircraft sustained minor damage. A Sea Fury was badly hit on 24th March by a 0·5-inch armour-piercing bullet in the main petrol tank. The self-sealing properties were ineffective, and Lieutenant-Commander Gordon-Smith was nearly overcome by petrol fumes, but he succeeded in landing safely at Suwon. Lieutenant-Commander G. R. Coy's Firefly, too, was severely damaged by a 40-mm explosive shell; he managed, however, to land on board.

H.M.S. *Theseus*'s escorting destroyers usually had a dull time, with much steaming and constant vigilance, but little excitement. On one occasion during this patrol, the *Huron* attacked a possible submarine contact with a squid; a bale of straw blown to the surface indicated that it was an old wreck. Fuelling operations produced a healthy rivalry between the destroyers which resulted in some remarkable times 'from first line to start pumping'. H.M.C.S. *Nootka*, having achieved two minutes twelve seconds, was subsequently beaten by H.M.C.S. *Athabaskan* with one minute forty-five seconds. Rapidity in fuelling was of considerable importance for reducing the 'time away from screen', especially when, as not infrequently happened, there were less than four destroyers available for this duty.²

¹ H.M.C.S. *Huron* had arrived at Sasebo on 15th March to relieve H.M.C.S. *Cayuga* which sailed for Canada the next day.

² After the war had been in progress for about a year, a method was evolved whereby two hoses could be taken in from the tanker, thereby raising the destroyer refuelling rates from 190 to about 300 tons an hour. This method had been used in the British Pacific Fleet in World War II, and had been embodied in a major report of Pacific Fleet war experience; but no copy of this report was available on the China Station. 'It is to be hoped that a similar fate may not occur to such experience as we have been able to gain and pass on', wrote Admiral Scott-Moncrieff. Report of Experience in Korean Operations, January-June 1961, Part III, Section 4.

H.M.S. *Theseus* arrived back at Sasebo on 2nd April. Helicopters had proved their worth over and over again in the Korean War, and arrangements had been made by the Commander, 7th Fleet, for U.S.S. *Phillippine Sea* to lend one to the *Theseus* for the few weeks that remained before the arrival of H.M.S. *Glory* to relieve her on the station. The helicopter with its crew was transferred on 3rd April, and, as will be seen, rendered valuable service.

H.M. Ships *Belfast* and *Kenya* alternated as C.T.E. 95·12 till the end of March, when both cruisers being required in connexion with Admiral Andrewes's departure from the station H.M.S. *Black Swan* (Captain G. A. F. Norfolk) took over these duties. The usual blockade was maintained, but little worthy of mention occurred. Occasional bombardments were carried out—for example, H.M. Ships *Belfast*, *Cossack*, and *Cockade* bombarded beaches where new trenches were being dug on 16th March from route Cigarette and H.M.S. *Black Swan* fired 136 rounds at two gun-positions in the approaches to Haeju on 6th April. Air spotting was provided by U.S.S. *Bataan* on both occasions; there was no enemy reaction.

On 7th April H.M.S. *Cockade* (Commander J. T. Kimpton) while on duty as bird-dog in the Yalu Gulf received orders to try to recover the crew of a crashed U.S. bomber. This entailed proceeding inshore among shoals in thick weather, whence she directed the operations of a U.S. amphibian, which recovered one survivor, but there was no trace of the remainder. In the course of this mission, H.M.S. *Cockade* rescued from a junk Lieutenant D. S. Thomas, U.S.A.F., who had been shot down in January, and since then been concealed by friendly Koreans.

Mention should be made of a prolonged and thorough minesweeping operation in the waters around Pengyong do carried out between 15th March and 7th April by the R.o.K. motor-minesweepers 502 and 503, under the supervision of H.M.N.Z.S. *Rotoiti* (Lieutenant-Commander B. E. Turner, R.N.Z.N.) for the first four days, and then of H.M.N.Z.S. *Tutira* (Lieutenant-Commander P. J. H. Hoare, R.N.). Considerable difficulties had to be overcome owing to conflicting and unpredictable currents, and to the fact that no danlaying facilities were available. Lieutenant-Commander Hoare was much struck by the zeal and enthusiasm of the R.o.K. minesweepers, in spite of being long overdue for maintenance and very short of foodstuffs. 'They proved competent seamen and pleasant companions.'¹ This concluded H.M.N.Z.S. *Tutira*'s spell of duty in Korean waters, and after a short refit at Kure she sailed from Sasebo on 4th May for passage to New Zealand, her place being taken by H.M.N.Z.S. *Hawea*, (Lieutenant-Commander F. N. F. Johnson, R.N.Z.N.) who had arrived on 26th April.

During this period, arrangements were initiated for putting naval co-operation with the guerrilla activities in the Chinnampo-Haeju area on a more satisfactory basis. The first move was made by Captain Sir Aubrey St Clair-Ford, who, acting under instructions from Admiral Andrewes², established contact with the American Army officers³ concerned with these operations, which soon ripened into cordial relations. Fostered by successive commanders of T.E. 95·12, these gradually produced a close liaison much to the mutual benefit of the blockade forces and the Americans.

¹ H.M.N.Z.S. *Tutira*, R.o.P. in M.01177/51.

² See Section 51.

³ Colonel McGee of the 8th Army, Colonel Thompson of 1st Corps, Major Burke (Colonel McGee's representative) with headquarters on Pengyong do.

All this time Vice-Admiral Sir William Andrewes¹ had been controlling Task Force 95 from Sasebo. His time on the F.E. Station was drawing to its close, and between 22nd and 27th March he visited Yokosuka in H.M.S. *Belfast*, and took leave of Vice-Admiral Joy and General MacArthur in Tokyo. Admiral Andrewes left Sasebo for Hong Kong in the *Belfast* on 4th April, leaving Captain P. W. Brock of H.M.S. *Kenya* as C.T.G. 95.1 until the arrival of his successor; and Rear-Admiral A. E. Smith, U.S.N., reassumed command of T.F. 95. At the same time Rear-Admiral Smith came under the control of the Commander, 7th Fleet, Vice-Admiral H. M. Martin, who had just succeeded Admiral Struble (28th March), instead of being under COMNAVFE, Admiral Joy, as heretofore. This simplified co-operation with the G.O.C. 8th Army, who now had only one naval authority to deal with; it also tended towards better co-ordination of the activities of the carrier force with those of the blockading forces.

Vice-Admiral Sir William Andrewes hauled down his flag as Second-in-Command, Far East Station, on 10th April at Hong Kong, and was succeeded by Rear-Admiral A. Scott-Moncrieff, who sailed in H.M.S. *Belfast* for Sasebo the next day. 'Vice-Admiral Andrewes has done a magnificent job on the Far East Station', wrote the C-in-C., '... I feel very confident that Vice-Admiral Andrewes will fill any future appointment Their Lordships may select with credit to himself and to the great benefit of the Royal Navy.'

On the same day as Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff hoisted his flag there came a change in the supreme command of the U.N. forces. It is beyond the scope of this book to discuss the circumstances of the relief of General MacArthur.² Suffice it to say that during the months which had elapsed since the Wake Island meeting in October 1950 there had been increasing divergencies of opinion between the U.S. Home authorities and the Supreme Commander as to the strategy to be pursued in the Far East. Nor did General MacArthur hide his views from the public. Eventually, he put himself in such a position *vis-à-vis* the Government that, under the United States Constitution, President Truman had no alternative but to relieve him; and on 11th April 1951 he was succeeded by General Ridgway as Supreme Commander, who in turn was succeeded by General James Van Fleet as commander of the 8th Army.

By this time, it was apparent that the Communist preparations for another major offensive were almost complete. For many weeks, reconnaissance aircraft had reported very heavy southbound traffic in enemy rear areas. New enemy units were identified in ever greater numbers within supporting distance of the front. It was estimated that over 70 divisions were south of the Yalu.

In fact the blow fell just a week after General Van Fleet had taken up his new command.

¹ Admiral Andrewes had been awarded the K.B.E. at the new year for his services in Korea. On the 15th March he received a dispensation from H.M. the King to assume the style of Knight without waiting to receive the accolade.

² The matter is discussed in some detail from the President's point of view in *Years of Trial and Hope*, Volume II, Harry S. Truman.

Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff arrived at Sasebo in H.M.S. *Belfast* on 14th April 1951 to take over the command of T.G. 95·1 from Captain Brock of H.M.S. *Kenya*. The situation as regards his forces was somewhat abnormal at the time. The heavy carriers of T.F. 77 with the rest of the 7th Fleet were operating off Formosa as a result of indications that Red China might be contemplating an assault there, and since 8th April U.S.S. *Bataan* and H.M.S. *Theseus*¹ had replaced them in the Sea of Japan. This, therefore, deprived the west coast of offensive air operations, but by flying across Korea, a daily air reconnaissance of the Choppeki area was maintained. Also on the east coast were H.M. Ships *Constance* and *Alacrity*, engaged on interdiction bombardment at Wonsan in company with various U.S. ships. H.M.N.Z.S. *Rotoiti* was employed as tanker escort on either coast as required.

On the west coast, too, the ordinary surface-blockade routine was somewhat disorganized, owing to a special operation which involved most of T.E. 95·12. This operation, though not successful, is worth describing in some detail as illustrating the difficulties produced by slow communications, scanty intelligence, lack of information of the activities of various friendly forces, difference of language, and a somewhat cumbersome chain of command.

On 10th April, a MiG-15 aircraft had been reported as shot down over Sinmi do at the northern end of the Yalu Gulf (39° 53' N., 124° 52' E.). This the 5th Air Force was most anxious to recover; and at 0010, 11th April, Rear-Admiral Smith ordered Captain Brock of H.M.S. *Kenya* (C.T.G. 95·1) to form a temporary task element (95·15) from ships of the west coast blockading forces and R.o.K. patrols, and to take charge of search operations.

The *Kenya* had arrived at Sasebo the previous afternoon after a few days on the west coast to allow the Fleet Royal Marine Officer to visit the American intelligence organization on Pengyong do and Choda island; she sailed at 0200, 11th April, and proceeded at 27 knots, ordering the *Warramunga* (Captain O. H. Becher, R.A.N.) who had just relieved the *Black Swan* as C.T.E. 95·12, to start the R.o.K. ships moving north. The information available was very vague and the situation far from clear; what was clear was that the operation would be attended by risks of more sorts than one. Sinmi do was entirely surrounded by mud-banks, which at low water joined it to the mainland; only to the east was there a narrow channel about a mile wide with a minimum depth of seven or eight fathoms.² The island lay within 40 miles of the enemy air base at Antung. There had been no time for previous planning, and the whole operation was conducted on an *ad hoc* basis, with Captain Brock suffering from a general lack of information and a considerable chain of command passing orders down the line to him.³

Arrangements were made for the 5th Air Force to provide air cover and search planes, and a helicopter and L.S.T. 822 to act as its base were also made available; a salvage tug, U.S.S. *Bolster*, was added as a precaution.

¹ See Section 56.

² Rear-Admiral Smith's operation order included an injunction to 'take needed precautions to avoid grounding'.

³ COMNAVFE, Commander 7th Fleet, 5th Air Force, C.T.F.95 and the various interested task group authorities were all involved.

H.M.S. *Kenya* arrived off Sinmi do at 1015, 12th April. Thereafter, a series of vexatious delays occurred. The *Nootka* and *Comus* from T.E. 95·12 had already arrived, but the R.o.K. frigate, P.F. 62, after informing them that the island was in enemy hands, had sailed to the southward. There was no sign of the other R.o.K. craft, but the *Warramunga* signalled that she was rounding them up.¹ The day was enlivened by a very heavy air attack by the U.S.A.F. on the Yalu bridges; two B-29s were lost. Search by the *Nootka*, *Warramunga* and *Amethyst* only resulted in the recovery of one body by the latter.

The R.o.K. ships did not arrive till 0730, 13th April; by that time the weather had deteriorated and they had to shelter north of Tae Wha do, south-west of the operational area. L.S.T. 822 arrived as helicopter base that evening; there had been some delay owing to an omission to inform Captain Brock that she had been assigned to his force. She had been loaded with a deck cargo of 500 drums of aviation spirit. In view of the danger of air attack, Captain Brock reluctantly ordered all but the minimum to be thrown overboard. As they floated off, P.F. 62 could not resist the temptation to salvage all she could for her own purposes, regardless of the risk.

Meanwhile, search by C.A.P. and amphibian aircraft had so far revealed no trace of the MiG, nor did interrogation of junks and islanders produce aught but the vaguest rumours. The language difficulty was always present, few of the Korean 'interpreters' being proficient in anything but their mother tongue. Further search by aircraft and surface craft on subsequent days proved equally fruitless; but seventeen R.o.K. paratroops with four North Korean prisoners were rescued from Chari do (an islet west of the north point of Sinmi do) by R.o.K. motor-launch 308 on 14th April. It then transpired that twenty paratroops had been dropped unbriefed and without signalling appliances on Sinmi do on the 10th. They had retired to Chari do after beating off an attack by 50 North Koreans who had crossed the mud-flats from the mainland. This was the first Captain Brock knew of their presence. Similarly, a sampan was met with next day containing armed Koreans who eventually proved to be a clandestine party working under the American intelligence team on Choda island; their appearance too, which had nothing to do with the search for the MiG, came as a surprise.

By this time, the risk of keeping so many ships operating for so long in this exposed position appeared considerable, and the appearance of four Yaks, which, however, made no attack, just after the C.A.P. had withdrawn owing to engine trouble, caused Captain Brock to put to sea to the southward with the *Kenya*, *Comus*, and P.F. 62 in the evening of the 15th. R.o.K. Y.M.S. 512 ran aground east of Sinmi do, but refloated with the rising tide. Early next morning instructions arrived from Admiral Smith to abandon the search, and all ships were ordered to the southward. P.F. 62, however, which had returned to Sinmi do after dark, in the hope of picking up some last minute intelligence, delayed her departure, and was attacked by four Yaks. She shot down one and hit another, but was herself damaged by cannon-fire and a near miss by a 100-lb bomb. H.M. Ships *Kenya* and *Amethyst*, and the tug *Bolster* returned to stand by her, but after a little temporary assistance, she was able to proceed to Pusan under her own power. T.E. 95·15 was then dissolved; H.M.S. *Kenya* returned to Sasebo, *en route* for a short

¹ They were proving elusive as the operation unfortunately coincided with their relief period.

maintenance refit at Kure, and the ships of T.E. 95·12 resumed their normal patrol duties.

Commenting on the operation, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff considered that the Commanding Officer, H.M.S. *Kenya*, carried out his task with energy and determination; and both he and Admiral Smith were satisfied that had the MiG been there, his forces would have found it.

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As already mentioned, during the absence of the fleet carriers with the 7th Fleet, their place was taken by the light carriers U.S.S. *Bataan* and H.M.S. *Theseus*. This was the first occasion on which the British carrier had worked with another deck since H.M.S. *Triumph* left the 7th Fleet in August 1950. The teaming-up into one unit of these two highly efficient and friendly rivals resulted in very effective air operations.¹ It was also the first occasion on which a joint Commonwealth/U.S. destroyer screen operated together.

Preliminary conferences were held at Sasebo to discuss the working of the two carriers in company, and liaison officers were exchanged to assist in operational and tactical problems. The great disparity in their speeds (U.S.S. *Bataan* 32 knots, and H.M.S. *Theseus* 23 knots) was of less importance than might have been expected, as both ships were operating aircraft of approximately similar characteristics. It was agreed that all sorties would be by catapult, ships turning into the wind together. In the event, no difficulties were experienced in operating in company. Both carriers took turns as guide of the fleet, and once U.S.S. *Bataan* became accustomed to the slow acceleration of the *Theseus*, station-keeping was found to be quite easy.

The two carriers with their screen, H.M.S. *Consort*, H.M.A.S. *Bataan*, H.M.C. Ships *Athabaskan* and *Huron*, and U.S. Ships *English* and *Sperry*, left Sasebo in the morning of 8th April; they retained the designation of T.E. 95·11, Captain Edgar Neale, U.S.N., in U.S.S. *Bataan* being the element commander. Flying operations were carried out from 9th to 15th April inclusive. These included a daily reconnaissance across Korea of the Choppeki area, and on the east coast strikes on road and rail bridges, rolling-stock, marshalling yards, supply dumps, and warehouses at various places, armed reconnaissance as required, and bombardment spotting in the Wonsan and Songjin areas. Only very few sorties could be flown on 11th April owing to bad weather; apart from this, flying took place every day. H.M.S. *Theseus* replenished on 13th April, but flew 29 sorties that afternoon; U.S.S. *Bataan* replenished next day. In all, H.M.S. *Theseus* flew 276 sorties and U.S.S. *Bataan* 244.

There were no deck-landing accidents in H.M.S. *Theseus*,² but aircraft casualties were the highest experienced. Five Sea Furies and one Firefly were lost or badly

¹ The competition between the two carriers produced a general speeding-up of flying operations. H.M.S. *Theseus* with one catapult was usually able to launch quicker than U.S.S. *Bataan* with two, and catapulting intervals for Furies dropped to 40-42 seconds. The U.S. Marine Reserve Air Group could not quite compete with the landing rate of the more experienced pilots of the 17th Air Group, but they much improved by the end of the week.

² Captain Bolt remarked that this was much to the credit of the pilots, as on four days there was a heavy north-easterly swell; swell is not experienced on the west coast, and they were unused to it.

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damaged, and one pilot was killed. Tuesday 10th April was a black day. It started with an attack in error by U.S. Marine Corsairs from Kimpo on two Furies, which inflicted very severe damage on one of them flown by Lieutenant Leece, who however managed to land on board safely, though the inter-spar petrol tank was set on fire and burnt out. At about the same time a Fury was shot down by flak and totally destroyed, its pilot, Pilot III R. H. Johnson, being killed. Later in the day, another Fury was badly damaged by flak and force-landed at Kangnung airfield; the pilot, Lieutenant H. G. Julian, suffered minor injuries and shock. No flying could be carried out after 0730 on the 11th owing to the weather, but on 12th April a Firefly piloted by Commissioned Pilot F. D. Bailey was damaged by flak and landed in the sea 40 miles from the carriers. The observer was rescued by U.S.S. *Bataan*'s helicopter, and Mr Bailey by the U.S. helicopter loaned to H.M.S. *Theseus*. This helicopter acted as plane guard for every flying operation. Two more Furies were shot down by flak behind the enemy lines before the operations concluded; one piloted by Lieutenant J. S. Humphreys who was injured on 13th April, and the other, piloted by Lieutenant I. L. Bowman on the 14th. Both these officers were gallantly rescued by U.S.S. *Manchester*'s helicopter, despite intense light flak in their vicinity.

The light carriers' flying operations on the east coast were a conspicuous success. Considerable damage was inflicted on the enemy by their combined efforts, and the operation of the two ships in company had gone very smoothly. But Captain Bolt struck a warning note in his report. 'There were many times', he remarked, 'when I wondered what would have happened if a few well-handled U-boats had been in the vicinity. Three destroyers on a closed concentric circular screen, screening two carriers steaming on a steady course at 12 knots was the situation on more than one occasion when replenishment was being carried out by members of the screen.'¹

Task Element 95·11's operations on the east coast came to an end at 1630, 15th April, when U.S.S. *Bataan* with U.S.S. *English* and H.M.A.S. *Bataan* proceeded to Sasebo, leaving H.M.S. *Theseus* as C.T.E. 95·11, who with the *Consort*, *Huron*, and *Athabaskan*, set course for her old haunts on the west coast. H.M.A.S. *Bataan* picked up Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff at Sasebo, and met them next afternoon, when the Admiral transferred by jackstay to the *Theseus*, in which he spent the next few days.

Flying operations started as soon as the *Theseus* was within effective range of targets next morning, and continued throughout 17th and 18th April. On these two days a total of 94 sorties were flown, though No. 809 Squadron was by then reduced to eighteen Furies. Apart from C.A.P. and A/S patrols, the usual armed reconnaissances of enemy-held coasts, airfields, and roads were carried out, and attacks were made on various rail and road bridges, junks in Chinnampo estuary, and other suitable targets. No close air support was required by the army.

On 18th April, a Sea Fury, piloted by Lieutenant T. R. S. Hamilton, landed in the sea about 60 miles from the *Theseus*. He was rescued practically unconscious after 55 minutes in water of about 42° F. by the helicopter, but made a good recovery in 24 hours. This was the fifth rescue effected by helicopter since the ship sailed on 8th April. Apart from the practical value of these aircraft, their effect on the morale of air crews was described by Captain Bolt as outstanding. This was

¹ H.M.S. *Theseus* R.o.P. in M.01367/51.

the last day's flying carried out by H.M.S. *Theseus* before leaving the station, and that evening the *Consort* was detached to meet H.M.S. *Glory*, then on her way to relieve her, in the Formosa Channel. The weather on 19th April—low cloud, short visibility, heavy rain, and a pessimistic forecast—prevented flying over the land, and T.E. 95·11 withdrew to Sasebo. On arrival, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff transferred to H.M.S. *Ladybird*.

Since her arrival in the theatre of war seven months before, H.M.S. *Theseus* had flown 3446 operational sorties in 86 operational flying-days.¹ The main credit for this fine record was ascribed by Captain Bolt to the pilots for their high and consistent standard of flying, and to the deck-landing control officers for their excellent work. Great attention was paid to the avoidance of deck-landing, handling, and taxi-ing accidents; at the end of the last operational period the sequence of accident-free landings stood at 939, approaching four figures for the second time in six months. Admiral Scott-Moncrieff wrote—'I was particularly pleased to be able to watch the last two days' flying in this very efficient carrier It is fair to say that the operations of H.M.S. *Theseus* have been an inspiration to the U.S. carriers out here, and it is notable that for the first few days after the return of the Task Force 77 carriers to their own parish they were provoked into flying over 200 sorties a day for the first time . . . a considerable increase on their normal operational outputs There is no doubt that great credit is due to Captain Bolt, his officers and ship's company for a fine effort, ably performed.'²

H.M.S. *Theseus* sailed from Sasebo for the United Kingdom on 25th April 1951. The U.S. Navy was generous in its recognition of her achievements, her departure being marked by congratulatory signals from the C.-in-C., U.S. Pacific Fleet (Admiral Radford), Commander, Naval Forces, Far East (Vice-Admiral Joy), the Commander, 7th Fleet (Vice-Admiral Martin), and the Commander, Task Force 95 (Rear-Admiral Smith), who all paid high tribute to her performance in the theatre of war. 'There is little doubt', wrote Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff, 'that the efficiency and skill of our "Naval Air" has been an eye-opener to the United States Navy'; and the C.-in-C., Vice-Admiral Sir Guy Russell, considered that H.M.S. *Theseus* had 'set an exceptionally high standard of operational flying . . . in Korean waters'.

Two days previously, H.M.S. *Glory* (Captain K. S. Colquhoun) had arrived there to relieve her. In H.M.S. *Glory* was embarked No. 14 Carrier Air Group under Lieutenant-Commander S. J. Hall, consisting of No. 804 Squadron, 21 Sea Furies XI, (Lieutenant-Commander J. S. Bailey) and No. 812 Squadron, 12 Fireflies V, (Lieutenant-Commander F. A. Swanton). She also carried a helicopter.

Like the *Theseus*, H.M.S. *Glory* had carried out intensive flying training on her way out, and was ready to embark on operational duties without delay. As it happened, her arrival coincided with the start of the Chinese spring offensive.

¹ No operational flying took place in November 1950, since during that month the North Koreans had been defeated, and the Chinese had not yet come in.

² F.O. 2i/c F.E.S. covering letter to H.M.S. *Theseus* R.o.P. in M.01367/51. Admiral Scott-Moncrieff added, as a matter of interest, that during a recent period the two C.V.L.s, alternating in nine-day cycles and operating from Sasebo (one day's steaming from the operational area) produced very near 50 per cent more sorties per pilot and per plane than the Essex-class carriers in Task Force 77, with a twenty-day-out and ten-day-in cycle operating from Yokosuka (two days' steaming from the operational area).

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Defeat of Chinese Spring Offensive, 1951

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AT 2000, Sunday 22nd April, the long-heralded Chinese spring offensive commenced. For weeks past, prisoners of war, captured documents, aerial reconnaissance, and other intelligence sources had all pointed to its imminence. Indeed, the Chinese made no secret of the fact that it was planned to drive the Americans right out of Korea. At worst they hoped to gain so much ground as to have a strong bargaining counter should truce negotiations follow General MacArthur's dismissal.

Actually the offensive proved a somewhat damp squib, and after ten days' bitter fighting, which brought them negligible territorial gains, they had outrun their logistic support and were forced to pause while they brought up supplies for another attempt.

The U.N. front line when the offensive was launched was 116 miles long, running from the River Imjin in the west along the Hwachon salient in the centre to the mountains in the east. It had been expected that the attack would come in the centre, and the U.N. forces were mainly disposed to meet this threat; in the event, it was directed at the Allied left and left-centre. See Figure 10.

The offensive started with a heavy bombardment in the Imjin area, followed by all-out assaults in the 1st Corps sector across the River Imjin, and in the 9th Corps sector west of Hwachon. In each sector an R.o.K. division collapsed. In the west this resulted in the British 29th Brigade being surrounded. The 1st Bn the Gloucestershire Regiment was cut off and, after putting up a magnificent fight, was virtually annihilated;¹ the remainder broke out with considerable losses.

¹ H.M. the King awarded the Victoria Cross to Lieutenant-Colonel J. P. Carne commanding the Gloucesters for his conduct on this occasion.

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


Figure 10. Chinese spring offensive, 1951

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But the enemy advance was checked and his time-table dislocated. In the 9th Corps sector some 30 000 Chinese poured through the gap the R.o.K.s had yielded; the British 27th Brigade, then in reserve, and the U.S. 5th Cavalry Regiment were sent in to plug the line, and succeeded in holding the enemy near Kapyong.

By the end of the month the 8th Army line had fallen back in good order to the vicinity of the 38th parallel, with the left flank on the River Han and before Seoul. There the offensive was halted, and the enemy, who had suffered enormous casualties, withdrew out of range of the massive U.N. artillery resources which had been concentrated on this line. It was clear that the enemy still had many divisions which had not been committed, and a second phase of the attack was anticipated. There followed two weeks of aggressive patrolling in the no-man's land between the two armies, with the U.N. forces very much in control while awaiting the next phase. Though some movement of enemy forces to the eastward was noticed, it was still expected that the main push would start in the west-centre and be directed on Seoul.

The offensive was resumed on 16th May. This time the blow fell on the U.N. right-centre, between Hwachon and Inje, in the R.o.K. 3rd Corps sector. Again the R.o.K.s collapsed. By grim fighting the 10th Corps (U.S. Marines and U.S. 2nd Division) held on, and the U.S. 3rd Division from 1st Corps Reserve, moving rapidly across, held the enemy drive on Wonju. After four days, General Van Fleet ordered an advance by the 1st and 9th Corps to knock the enemy off balance. The latter completely failed to exploit his initial advantage in the east, and soon the U.N. armies were advancing all along the line, with a large number of Chinese and North Korean soldiers in danger of being cut off by a drive diagonally to the coast by the U.S. Marines and 2nd Division. They managed to extricate themselves from this, but suffered many thousands of casualties, including for the first time very large numbers of Chinese prisoners of war.

By the end of May the United Nations were back almost to the original April positions north of the 38th parallel, with the left flank on the Imjin, and the advance was proceeding slowly and steadily in the centre with the line again oriented north-eastwards.

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The principal effect of the Chinese offensive on naval operations was to cause Task Force 77 temporarily to discontinue the interdiction attacks on enemy supplies and lines of communication and to concentrate on giving close air support to the army.

On the west coast the Gun-fire Support Element, T.E. 95·14, was reconstituted at Inchon, and placed under Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff's operational control; it consisted of U.S.S. *Toledo* and a frigate or destroyer from the blockade force. Gun-fire was not required till 28th April, when U.S.S. *Toledo*, assisted by H.M.S. *Concord*, silenced an enemy battery; thereafter she carried out a few bombardments before the enemy was checked on the River Han line and withdrew out of range.¹

As a precautionary measure, Rear-Admiral Thackrey (C.T.G. 90·1) in U.S.S. *Eldorado* was sent from Japan to Inchon to co-ordinate the very considerable

¹ U.S.S. *Toledo* remained at Inchon till 25th May, when T.E. 95·14 was dissolved and she proceeded to the east coast. By that time the second phase of the Chinese offensive had failed, and U.N. troops were back on the Imjin line.

increase of supplies required by the army. This was the fourth time Admiral Thackrey had taken charge at Inchon during the various redeployments, and he again became responsible for the inner defence of the port, for which purpose Admiral Scott-Moncrieff transferred to his operational control the R.o.K. vessels employed in this area.

Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff arrived at Inchon in H.M.S. *Amethyst* on 25th April, where he transferred his flag to H.M.S. *Belfast*, then on patrol. At this time, U.S.S. *Montrose*, which had arrived two days before with the King's Own Scottish Borderers (the first element of the British 28th Brigade), had just embarked the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders for passage to Hong Kong. During her departure, H.M.S. *Belfast* manned and cheered ship in honour of this gallant battalion, which with the Middlesex Regiment had been in Korea since September 1950. 'When the Scots saw H.M.S. *Belfast*'s piper on *B* turret, recorded Admiral Scott-Moncrieff, 'the cheering might have been heard on the Han River.'

The following morning the Admiral sailed in H.M.S. *Belfast*, and after meeting H.M.N.Z.S. *Rotoiti*, which was engaged with the R.o.K. Y.M.S.s 512 and 515 in sweeping an extension of the previously-cleared area off Techong,¹ proceeded to Pengyong do for a conference with the Americans and R.o.K. officers there. While the *Belfast* was at anchor, A/S protection was provided by H.M.S. *Black Swan*.

It had been expected that the Chinese offensive would be accompanied by air intervention on a major scale. Actually the only enemy air activity of naval interest occurred on 22nd April, when four Yaks attacked two Corsairs from U.S.S. *Bataan* at the entrance to the Chinnampo estuary, where they were covering the rescue of a downed pilot. Three of the Yaks were shot down and the fourth heavily damaged;² the Corsairs returned safely, as did the rescued pilot. In the expectation of air attack, however, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff had given instructions that during daylight the cruiser of T.E. 95·12, when away from Inchon, should keep under the protective screen and C.A.P. of T.E. 95·11; should her blockade operations render this impossible, arrangements were to be made with C.T.E. 95·11 for a special C.A.P. to be provided for the cruiser. Accordingly, on 27th April, H.M.S. *Belfast* joined H.M.S. *Glory*, which had arrived that morning to take over the duties of C.T.E. 95·11 on her first patrol. The start of her war service was inauspicious; low cloud and foggy weather prevented all flying till late in the afternoon of the 28th, when 15 sorties were got off. Then the weather again clamped down, and a Sea Fury on C.A.P. piloted by Lieutenant E. P. L. Stevenson disappeared into thick cloud at 900 feet; it was never seen again. Thereafter, her flying operations followed the usual lines, subject to the weather which varied from thick fog to perfect flying conditions. No enemy aircraft were encountered, but there was a steady increase in light flak. One aircraft was lost on 2nd May, when a Sea Fury force-landed in a stream north of the bomb-line. The pilot, Lieutenant (E) P. Barlow was promptly rescued by helicopter, and his Sea Fury was strafed and set on fire.

Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff was anxious to make personal contact with the commander of the 7th Fleet, Vice-Admiral Martin, who was then operating in

¹ Two mines were cut that day and subsequently detonated by gun-fire.

² It is believed to have been one recovered by R.o.K. J.M.L. 309 on the north side of the Taedong estuary some days later.

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the Sea of Japan, so on the arrival of H.M.S. *Kenya* at Inchon on the 29th, he returned to Sasebo in H.M.S. *Belfast en route* for the east coast, leaving Captain T. E. Podger, who had succeeded Captain P. W. Brock in command of the *Kenya*,¹ as C.T.E. 95·12.

The battle on shore had reached a critical stage at this time, and Admiral Smith proposed that U.S.S. *Bataan* should reinforce H.M.S. *Glory* for a few days, in order to give additional close air support to the army. U.S.S. *Bataan*, which had returned to Sasebo on 27th April, had just sent off her pilots on five days' rehabilitation leave, the first this group had had for many months; there was some delay in retrieving them, and it was not until 2nd May that the two carriers could start operating together, with Captain Neale, U.S.N., in tactical command. Their operations were, to a large extent, marred by bad weather, which impeded flying except on two days, on each of which about 90 sorties were flown. By that time the enemy main offensive had been blunted and close air support was no longer urgent. H.M.S. *Glory* returned to Sasebo on 6th May for quick replenishment, returning to relieve U.S.S. *Bataan* on patrol on the 11th.

Little occurred during this period apart from the ordinary routine of patrolling. Steps were taken to intensify the patrol of the approaches to the River Yalu, and a new patrol was instituted off the mouth of the River Hanchon. On 3rd May, H.M.S. *Kenya* fired 81 rounds of 6-inch from a position NE. of Pengyong do at gun positions; fires were started and many hits were obtained in the target area. Two days later, the R.o.K. J.M.S.² 306 struck a mine close to the eastward of Sok to, off the entrance to Chinnampo, and subsequently sank. H.M.S. *Amethyst* gave medical assistance to the wounded, and the *Kenya* took up a position to the westward of Choda island to support her in case of attack.

Meanwhile Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff in H.M.S. *Belfast* had joined Task Force 77, which then consisted of three carriers, the *Philippine Sea* (flag Vice-Admiral Martin), *Princeton* (flag, C.T.F. 77, Rear-Admiral R. A. Ofstie), and *Boxer*,³ the heavy cruiser *Helena* (flag, Rear-Admiral R. E. Libby) and fourteen destroyers, at a rendezvous in the Sea of Japan on 3rd May. The first phase of the Chinese offensive had petered out the day before, and flying operations, which up till then had been mainly concerned with close air support for the army, had just been shifted again to interdiction of the enemy's build-up and supply lines further north.

Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff transferred by helicopter to U.S.S. *Philippine Sea* where he was cordially received and had a very satisfactory interview with Admiral Martin. The two Admirals found themselves in full agreement in their general views. Admiral Scott-Moncrieff, who, like Captain Bolt,⁴ had formed the opinion that the Americans underestimated the potentialities of the submarine danger, was glad to learn from Admiral Martin of his intention to step up the anti-submarine training of his forces. It was also decided that, in view of the possible development of the air threat in the coming months, major units should operate by day under a combat air patrol whenever possible.

¹ 23rd April 1951.

² Japanese-built sweeper, slightly smaller than the American motor-minesweeper.

³ U.S.S. *Boxer* with four destroyers had joined to relieve U.S.S. *Philippine Sea* with her destroyers, but Admiral Martin decided to operate all three carriers for a day or so before letting the latter go.

⁴ See page 134.

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Admiral Martin considered the scale of the bombarding operations on the east coast excessive, and had decided to allocate to T.F. 95 only such destroyers and frigates¹ as he could spare after making provision for T.F. 77's screen, and a planned maintenance and training programme. This would mean, in effect, only sufficient ships to keep Wonsan and, if possible, Songjin open, and to prevent the enemy from denying them to the United Nations by mining or other activities. The cruisers of the 7th Fleet would be sent in periodically for short periods to fit in with C.T.F. 77's normal interdiction policy programme.

A change was made in the command organization of the west coast in order to meet Admiral Martin's desire to have a single senior officer with whom he could deal in emergencies in the absence of Admiral Scott-Moncrieff; the senior captain on that coast was therefore appointed 'Officer in Tactical Command'. This was normally the commander of the carrier force (C.T.E. 95·11), as both these officers were senior to the other captains; but the Commander, T.E. 95·12, still remained responsible for the conduct of his normal blockade and escort duties.

Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff left T.F. 77 that afternoon, on conclusion of his talks with Admiral Martin, and returned to Sasebo. Two changes in the ships under his command took place about this time. H. Neth. M.S. *Van Galen* (Commander A. M. Valkenberg, R. NETH. N.) arrived at Sasebo on 1st May in place of H. Neth. M.S. *Evertsen*,² and on the same day, H.M.C.S. *Sioux* (Commander P. D. Taylor, R.C.N.) returned after four months' absence to relieve H.M.C.S. *Athabaskan*, which sailed for Canada on 3rd May.

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Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff remained at Sasebo from 3rd to 14th May. There he found many matters to occupy his attention. As he had expected, Admiral Martin's decision to reduce the number of 7th Fleet destroyers allocated to T.F. 95 resulted in pressure from Admiral Smith (C.T.F. 95) for additional Commonwealth ships for service on the east coast. Provided the situation on the west coast permitted, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff was quite ready to comply, subject to the requirements of his maintenance and training programme. It was also arranged between the two Admirals at this time that each would provide two destroyers continuously as a screen for the west coast carrier force (T.E. 95·11). Apart from ensuring an adequate A/S screen, this arrangement had the advantage of exercising the destroyers of the various nationalities in working together. In pursuance of his policy to increase anti-submarine precautions, Admiral Martin directed that all replenishment ships proceeding to and from the operating areas should be escorted.³ A small force of U.S. frigates under C.T.G. 95·5 was detailed for this purpose, but it could only meet the requirements of the east coast, and Admiral Scott-Moncrieff had to make separate provision for escorting such ships on the west coast. Admiral Scott-Moncrieff welcomed this recognition of the submarine threat,

¹ These ships were changed approximately every 28 days.

² H. Neth. M.S. *Evertsen* had left Sasebo on 15th April for Hong Kong (where the two Dutch destroyers met) on her way home.

³ Shipping, other than special cargo or troopships, between Pusan and Japanese ports, and shipping belonging to the amphibious forces, which had their own armament, was excluded owing to insufficient escorts being available.

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but he remarked that it was merely a token arrangement, and that if a real threat were to develop, it would be necessary to drop some of T.F. 95's many other commitments in order to meet it, and a much more economical plan for co-ordinating the sailing of ships in company would have to be adopted.

With the coming of spring, a growth of fishing activity from Korea and the movement of junks from Shantung on the same quest increased the danger of mining and the infiltration of agents. This presented a knotty problem. The limits of the blockade had never been clearly defined and questions of international law were involved. Neutral merchant shipping, which presumably included 'neutral' Chinese junks, had a perfect right to be there; unless contraband or mines, war material clearly bound for Korea, was found there was little that could be done, beyond, in the case of fishing boats, driving them out of the operational area. Admiral Smith's view had always been that if anything was encountered in this area that was liable to interfere with operations it could be sunk at sight, but though the exercise of the right of visit and search, and driving these slow-moving craft out of the area undoubtedly hindered operations, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff was reluctant to take such drastic measures. After consideration, he issued the following instructions to his ships:

- a. Chinese and North Korean junks found east of longitude 124° E.: crews to be taken to Inchon for disposal by the U.S. 2nd Logistic Command. Vessels to be sunk, unless a port is near enough for them to be handed over to U.S. or shore authority without delaying the operations of the intercepting ship.
- b. South Korean junks outside authorized area to be shepherded back, assisted if necessary by a few near misses. Should they become unmanageable, assistance to be called for from other vessels on patrol
- c. Any alleged South Korean junks, other than Chinese fishermen, unable to explain their presence satisfactorily, to be taken in and handed over to R.o.K. authorities for interrogation.

To add to the difficulties of the blockading ships, friendly agents from the various secret organizations already referred to continued to operate in the area without notification and with negligible means of identification. H.M.S. *Amethyst*, for example, arrested certain individuals in one of these craft who professed to be members of one such organization, and were turned over to Major Burke (Leopard) for interrogation and proof of their bona fides.

Reports, too, of infiltration across the Yalu Gulf, and of sampans carrying supplies across the estuary of the River Chongchon to Hanchon had been received recently. As far as possible, the probable tracks of these were covered by radar across the mud-flats by night and by aircraft by day; it is believed that very few, if any, got by.

The mining offensive, which, with the North Korean coasts back in Communist hands following the Chinese intervention and the gradual break up of the ice, had been intensified, was also causing the Admiral anxiety, particularly as regards the Chopekki-Choda route Cigarette. So far, it had been confined to defensive mining in the approaches to enemy ports, but there was always the possibility of mines being transported overland and laid by sampans in this well-known route. He had alerted the Leopard organization in Pengyong do and the R.o.K. Navy

to the danger, but he was very anxious to check-sweep the channel and asked Admiral Smith if two American motor-minesweepers could be made available to keep it regularly swept. The U.S. minesweeping forces¹ had been considerably strengthened, but they were much in demand on the east coast, where they were mainly employed in keeping clear channels and areas whence the bombarding forces could operate,² and Admiral Smith was unable to comply with this request till the middle of May, when he informed Admiral Scott-Moncrieff that minesweepers would be available between 15th and 22nd May.

Admiral Scott-Moncrieff had intended to visit Tokyo to meet the Supreme Commander (General Ridgway) and Admiral Joy about then, but as all the indications from the land front pointed to the second phase of the Chinese offensive coinciding with this period, it occurred to him that a feint landing in conjunction with the minesweeping might play a very useful part in relieving pressure on the army. With this proposal Admiral Smith readily agreed, and, the approval of Admirals Joy and Martin having been obtained, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff decided to postpone his visit to Tokyo and to proceed to the west coast to conduct the operations himself.

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Many demonstrations on both coasts had been staged during the last few months but all had been of short duration, which had scarcely left the enemy, with his slow communications, time to react.³ The American demonstrations, too, had been marked by what Admiral Scott-Moncrieff described as the 'blatant' nature of the minesweeping and the preliminary bombardments, and he felt that more might be achieved if some finesse were used on this occasion. His plan in the first place provided for the spreading of vague and nebulous rumours, through the Leopard organization, of an impending landing. During the first few days of the minesweeping, gun-fire and air support was to be limited to what was really necessary to neutralize any opposition the sweepers might encounter. After the Cigarette route had been swept, he intended to sweep an anchorage to the south-east of Choda island, and thence two lanes to the selected beaches, some five miles distant, covered by bombardment. The operation would culminate with a final pre-landing bombardment and air demonstration, accompanied—provided he was assured of no opposition—by an actual landing by Royal Marines from H.M. Ships *Kenya* and *Ceylon*.⁴ At a meeting held in H.M.S. *Glory*, then on patrol, at which Major Burke was present, it was confirmed that very little opposition

¹ T.G. 95·6 (the Minesweeping Group) at this time consisted of U.S.S. *Comstock*, L.S.T. 799 (occasionally an additional L.S.T. and helicopter), two destroyer-minesweepers, two fleet minesweepers, sixteen auxiliary motor-minesweepers. There was also one 'guinea-pig' ship, *Soei Maru*.

² Early in the year 1951, 186 mines were swept at Hungnam, and in preparation for the siege of Wonsan, 325 mines were swept. U.S.S. *Partridge* (A.M.S.) was mined and sunk south-east of Wonsan on 2nd February in the course of these operations.

³ A possible exception to this was the one carried out early in March in the Cigarette area by Sir Aubrey St Clair-Ford (see p. 126). On this occasion, verisimilitude for a last-minute cancellation was fortuitously provided by the arrival of drift-ice from the Taedong estuary on the morning the simulated landing was to take place.

⁴ In the event the landing was carried out by Royal Marines from H.M.S. *Ceylon* only H.M.S. *Kenya* being required for bombarding duties at Inchon.

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was to be expected, the only enemy being a few reported guns and occasional patrols, housed in villages.

The operation was planned to commence at dawn, 16th May. The forces on the west coast at this time were:

T.E. 95·11. H.M.S. *Glory* (Captain Colquhoun), U.S. Ships *Perkins*, *Agerholm*, H.M.A.S. *Bataan*, H.M.C.S. *Huron*.

T.E. 95·12. H.M. Ships *Ceylon* (Captain Thring), *Concord*, H.M.C. Ships *Nootka*, *Sioux*, H. Neth. M.S. *Van Galen*, H.M.N.Z.S. *Hawea* (which was escorting R.F.A. *Wave Premier*) together with the usual R.o.K. patrol craft.

T.E. 95·14. U.S.S. *Toledo* (Captain Hunter Wood Jr, U.S.N.) at Inchon as Gun-fire Support Element.

To these were added for the minesweeping/landing demonstration:

T.E. 95·13. Frigate Escort Element, U.S. Ships *Glendale* (Captain L. Williamson, U.S.N., C.T.G. 95·5 embarked), *Everett*, H. Thai M.S. *Bangpakong*¹ and the Colombian frigate *Almirante Padilla*.

T.E. 95·16. U.S. L.S.T. 799 (Captain R. C. Williams, U.S.N., C.T.G. 95·6, embarked), H.Q. of minesweeping forces, carrying a helicopter and mine-sweeping base stores, U.S.S. *Comstock*, L.S.D. carrying L.C.V.P.s for the Minesweeping Group,² light buoys, etc., U.S. minesweepers, *Curlew*, *Gull*, *Mocking Bird*, R.o.K. Y.M.S.s 501, 515.

Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff left Sasebo in H.M.S. *Kenya* on 14th May, and next day joined his forces which, with the exception of H.M.C.S. *Nootka* and H.M.N.Z.S. *Hawea*, on patrol off Inchon, had concentrated at an anchorage off the Techong islands. Short visibility delayed the start of the sweeping on 16th May, but later good progress was made, and the operation proceeded smoothly according to plan; in addition, an outside anchorage area south of Choppeki Point (Chansong Got) was swept for moored mines by the R.o.K. sweepers. The helicopter searched at low water for moored mines and tested for acoustic mines by dropping hand grenades. The cruisers patrolled to seaward of the shoal which runs parallel to the coast outside the route, and carried out bombardments against two gun positions reported in the Mongumpo area, with air spotting provided by H.M.S. *Glory*, who also maintained a combat air patrol of Sea Furies over the Cigarette area daily throughout the operations. H.M.S. *Concord* was attached to T.E. 95·16 to provide close gun support for the minesweepers, and the frigates carried out A/S patrols to seaward of the general area. For the next four days the sweeping was continued without incident.

During 17th May it became clear that the enemy's land offensive had started, and Admiral Scott-Moncrieff decided to proceed to Inchon to confer with Admiral Thackrey and the 1st Corps headquarters, leaving Captain Thring of the *Ceylon*

¹ The *Bangpakong* failed to join owing to defects. The Thai *Bangpakong* and *Praesae* had arrived at Sasebo on 10th November 1950. They were not assigned to Admiral Andrewes's force, and therefore have not been previously mentioned.

² Additional L.C.V.P.s in which to land the Royal Marines were carried in U.S.S. *Comstock* for this operation.

in charge in the Cigarette area. At Inchon it seemed prudent to reinforce the Gun-fire Support Element (T.E. 95·14) for a few days. H.M.S. *Kenya* and H.M.S. *Constance*, which was on passage to relieve the *Concord*, therefore joined U.S.S. *Toledo* at anchor off Inchon. H.M.S. *Amethyst*, which had just relieved H.M.C.S. *Nootka* on patrol outside the harbour, was ordered to join Captain Thring's force and H.M.S. *Concord* to join H.M.S. *Glory* (due for relief on 19th May) and with H.M.C.S. *Huron* to escort her to Sasebo.

At 1st Corps headquarters, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff met General Van Fleet, the commander of the 8th Army, General Milburn and other American officers. He also met Brigadier Brodie, the commander of the (British) 29th Brigade, which was then holding the Kimpo peninsula, and Major-General Cassells, Commander-designate of the Commonwealth Division which was being formed. The Admiral was much impressed by the morale and general bearing of all the British troops he saw.

As things turned out, no enemy troops came within gun range of the ships. This gave an opportunity for as full a programme of exchange visits with elements of the 29th Brigade as the military situation permitted. H.M.S. *Kenya*'s concert party gave two performances ashore (one to the 29th Brigade and one to about 600 American troops) which were much appreciated. Bombardment drills and communications exercises, too, were carried out; with the additional ships in T.E. 95·14, these left much to be desired, and after staff meetings on the subject agreement was reached between Admirals Scott-Moncrieff and Thackrey and the O.C. 45th Field Regiment, Royal Artillery, that a proper link-up for bombardment and continuity of control was necessary, and arrangements were made for additional spotters and adequate communications. All these contacts between the military and H.M.S. *Kenya* and *Constance* were of great value.

The enemy offensive never seriously threatened the western U.N. flank, and on 20th May, General Van Fleet launched the 1st Corps on a limited offensive which at once made progress to the north. In these circumstances, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff's presence at Inchon, where Admiral Thackrey was fully in control of the situation, became unnecessary; he therefore transferred his flag to H.M.S. *Ceylon*, which had just finished the demonstration in the Choda area,¹ and sailed for Sasebo on 21st May, leaving Captain Podger of H.M.S. *Kenya* as C.T.E. 95·12. By 24th May, the army had advanced to the Imjin line, and Admiral Thackrey felt he could dispense with the bombarding ships. T.F. 95·14 was accordingly once again dissolved, and U.S.S. *Toledo* returned to the east coast, while H.M. Ships *Kenya* and *Constance* proceeded on what proved to be an uneventful patrol.

Meanwhile, in the Cigarette area the minesweeping had been carried out according to plan. Throughout the operation (except the last day), aircraft from H.M.S. *Glory* provided continuous C.A.P. by day, air spotting and reconnaissance, in addition to attacking targets in the area. Variable weather handicapped air operations on 13th, 15th, and 16th May, but in spite of this the *Glory* managed to intensify the rate of her operations, and in her last three days she flew a total of 155 sorties. There was an increase of flak in the inland areas, and a Sea Fury was hit and came down in the sea on 15th May. The pilot, Lieutenant J. A. Winterbottom, was picked up by a friendly Korean in his sampan and taken ashore, whence he was later evacuated by the American helicopter from L.S.T. 799. Three days later

¹ See p. 146.

(18th), a Firefly piloted by Lieutenant R. Williams was hit by rifle-fire and forced to ditch in about three feet of water some 70 miles north of the *Glory*. The crew was promptly assisted by two South Koreans in a fishing sampan; they were subsequently picked up by H.M.S. *Glory*'s helicopter. Lieutenant Williams was unhurt, but his observer, Aircrewman I K. L. J. Sims was wounded.

The minesweeping programme was completed by 20th May. Admiral Scott-Moncrieff had modified his orders as to gun-fire, and various targets were bombarded on the 18th and 19th. A rehearsal of the landing was carried out on the south-east corner of Choda on the 19th. Next afternoon all ships took up firing positions off the channel, which had been swept by L.C.V.P.s, into the two selected beaches—Naenjong (38° 31·6' N., 125° 00·7' E.) and Sidong (38° 29·2' N., 125° 00·7' E.). At 1630 (H minus 30 minutes), the covering bombardment started. The frigate force, consisting of six ships¹ of five nationalities (British, Canadian, Colombian, United States, and New Zealand) under Captain Williams, U.S.N., and the three American minesweepers² provided neutralizing fire over the beach area, while H.M.S. *Ceylon* covered all roads and approaches to the beaches with aircraft spotting.

The landing was carried out by two platoons of Royal Marines plus a demolition and medical party from H.M.S. *Ceylon* under Captain Burge, R.M. They embarked from U.S.S. *Comstock* (where they were regaled with a glamorous film, large steaks and ice-cream) in three of her L.C.V.P.s, which were accompanied inshore by nine other L.C.V.P.s to give the impression of a large-scale landing. The beach had been mined, but Korean guides from Choda island led the troops through gaps without trouble.

No opposition of any kind was encountered; the Marines penetrated about a mile and a half inland, fired two deserted villages, and after two hours and a half ashore returned to the beach and re-embarked without incident. It was clear that the defenders of that part of the coast, whose morale was known to be very weak, had taken the precaution of retiring to the hills in good time to avoid any possible contact with the assault. Nevertheless, the landing provided a first-class exercise from the training point of view for all concerned.

Air cover and support for the landing was provided by Corsairs from U.S.S. *Bataan*, which had relieved H.M.S. *Glory* the night before. The U.S. Marine Corps pilots were, of course, in their element, and co-operation was smooth and efficient. In addition to covering the naval force all day, they provided continuous air spot and road reconnaissance behind the beaches from H minus one (1600) till dusk, and also carried out an air strike at H plus one. One aircraft was hit by light flak from a position inland. The aircraft returned safely, and the position was suitably dealt with. Commenting on the whole operation, Captain Thring observed—'The remarkable feature of the operation was that with an average of fourteen ships of six different nations³ taking part . . . everything went according to plan on a carefully-timed programme; and no-one shot one of his own side and there were no collisions, even when sailing in the dark.' This happy state of

¹ H.M.S. *Amethyst*, U.S.S.s *Glendale*, *Everett*, H.M.C.S. *Sioux*, H.M.N.Z.S. *Hawea*, Colombian *Almirante Padilla*. Captain Williams allowed the *Amethyst* to control the frigate bombardment, her fire-control arrangements being better for indirect fire.

² U.S.S.s *Gull*, *Curlew*, *Mocking Bird*.

³ Canada, Colombia, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, United Kingdom, United States.

affairs was very largely due, in the opinion of Captain Thring, to the excellent co-operation of the three American captains taking part—Captain Williams, C.T.E. 95·16, Captain Williamson, C.T.E. 95·13, and Captain E. T. Goyette, commanding officer of U.S.S. *Comstock*.

Admiral Scott-Moncrieff was sorry that 'this stirring demonstration had such a poor audience';¹ except for a few peasants on a distant hill-top, no human being had been seen, and for the moment it appeared that rather than drawing enemy troops and aircraft into the area, the operation had resulted in driving them away! But a week or so later, there was a marked increase in enemy activity, and it was apparent that he had decided to patrol this stretch of coast more seriously. Whatever effect, if any, this may have had on the general situation on shore, coupled with our excellent liaison with the Leopard organization, it afforded good opportunities to harass him from the sea.

During the latter part of May, the 8th Army was well across the 38th parallel and pressing steadily towards the enemy main supply area in the Chorwon-Kumwha-Pyonggang² triangle. The usual patrols were maintained on the west coast. T.E. 95·12³ under Captain Podger (*Kenya*) carried on with its anti-junk activities with considerable success, and a number of craft and prisoners were brought in. A clear understanding was arrived at, that unnotified intelligence missions whenever found would be arrested and turned over to Leopard for investigation. This did not prevent, however, unfortunate incidents occurring from the air.

On 30th May, the R.o.K. L.S.T. 8501 went hard and fast aground off Sochong to; H.M.N.Z.S. *Rotoiti* stood by her, and she was subsequently refloated by two U.S. salvage tugs.

U.S.S. *Bataan*⁴ carried out the duties of C.T.E. 95·11 during this period for the last time before her relief in T.F. 95 by U.S.S. *Sicily*. This final patrol was marred by no less than six days of fog, which prevented flying operations altogether. This was unfortunate, and gave the enemy some relief in the Taedong estuary and on the Hwanghae promontory, where at the end of the month a very definite increase in activity was noticed. U.S.S. *Bataan* remained on patrol till 3rd June, when she proceeded to Sasebo to turn over her duties in T.E. 95·11 to U.S.S. *Sicily*.

H.M.A.S. *Bataan*, too, left the theatre of operations about this time. 'Our oldest inhabitant'⁵ who has given very good service for the many months she has been here'⁶ sailed for Hong Kong and Australia on 24th May, her place being taken by H.M.A.S. *Murchison* (Lieutenant-Commander A. N. Dollard, R.A.N.).⁷

¹ F.O. 2i/c R.o.P. No. 37.

² Not to be confused with Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea.

³ H.M.S.s *Kenya* (relieved by *Ceylon*, 29th May), *Constance*, *Amethyst* (relieved by *Huron* and *Hawea* 27th May), *Comus* (relieved by *Black Swan*, 28th May) and *Alacrity*.

⁴ Screened by U.S. Ships *Rupertus* and *Fechteler*, H.M.A.S. *Warramunga*, H.Neth. M.S. *Van Galen*. U.S.S. *Tucker* relieved the *Fechteler*, which then took Rear-Admiral Smith, who had been visiting Inchon, back to Sasebo, on 28th May.

⁵ H.M.A.S. *Bataan* joined Rear-Admiral Andrewes's flag on 1st July 1950, and except for a short break at Hong Kong in February 1951, had been continually employed in the area of operations.

⁶ F.O. 2i/c R.o.P. No. 36.

⁷ H.M.A.S. *Murchison* arrived at Sasebo on 4th June 1951.

Meanwhile, on the east coast of Korea, operations had followed their normal pattern. The 'sieges' on Wonsan and Songjin continued, supplemented by bombardments as required, while T.F. 77's aircraft maintained their efforts at interdiction. The practice of reinforcing the Americans by ships of the 'International' Force was continued, and one or two of Admiral Scott-Moncrieff's destroyers or frigates were usually operating off this coast.

H.M.S. *Comus* spent from 8th to 13th May at Wonsan where, with two U.S. destroyers¹ and a frigate,² she took her part in day and night bombardments. These were much hampered by short visibility and intermittent fog, and as there was virtually no spotting, Lieutenant-Commander Hennessy doubted whether road transport was seriously impeded, though rail transport was probably stopped.

H.M.S. *Black Swan* had an interesting spell operating in the Songjin area with T.E. 95·22, which normally consisted of three U.S. destroyers and frigates, between 8th and 21st May. As Captain Norfolk was senior as a captain to Commodore A. J. Hill, U.S.N., the commander of T.E. 95·22, he was ordered to take over command of the element³ on arrival. T.E. 95·22 was responsible for continuous surveillance of the approaches to, and swept area⁴ off, Songjin, a nightly patrol between Songjin and Changjin, 80 miles to the northward, and the bombardment of military targets and lines of communication in these areas. As at Wonsan, fog and short visibility prevailed for a large part of the time.

From previous experience on the east coast, Captain Norfolk had come to the conclusion that a proportion of the ammunition fired by small ships was wastefully expended. He therefore regulated the expenditure in accordance with such factors as the visibility and weather conditions, air spotting and reconnaissance, type of target, irregularity of fire in order to trap working parties, and requirements for harassing effect as well as interdiction. In the event, the *Black Swan*'s total expenditure for eleven firing days (daylight only) was 369 rounds of 4-inch and 200 rounds of 40-mm, not a large total by contemporary standards, but all rounds being worth-while shots. Similar regulation was applied to the American ships, though in view of the destroyers' greater fire-power and superior control arrangements, a measure of discretion was left to their commanding officers.

Regular replenishment of the element was carried out by the U.S. oiler *Kaskaskia*, and ammunition ships *Oberon* and *Titania*. It was while ammunitioning alongside the latter that the following classic exchange was overheard between an enlisted man in the *Titania* and a fore-castle leading hand of the *Black Swan*:

Enlisted man: 'How's the second largest navy in the world?'

Leading hand: 'Not so bad. How's the second best?'

H.M.C.S. *Nootka* relieved H.M.S. *Black Swan*, which had then been at sea 60 days out of the last 68, on 21st May, and having turned over the command of T.E. 95·22 to the commanding officer of U.S.S. *Tucker*, Captain Norfolk proceeded to Kure for maintenance refit.

¹ U.S. Ships *Floyd B. Parker* and *John R. Craig*.

² U.S.S. *Tacoma*.

³ The following U.S. ships at one time or another served in T.E. 95·22 under Captain Norfolk's command: destroyers *Bausell*, *Stickell*, *Tucker*, *Thompson* (minesweeper); frigates *Hoquiam*, *Gallup*, *Burlington*, *Sausalito*.

⁴ Roughly a rectangle of 5 by 17 miles running parallel to the coast.

DEFEAT OF CHINESE SPRING OFFENSIVE, 1951

Four days previously, the Chinese offensive had been launched, and in response to calls for support in the Kansong, Kosong, and Wonsan areas from the 8th Army, the battleship U.S.S. *New Jersey*, making her first appearance in the operational area, and U.S.S. *Manchester* carried out several coastal bombardments, proceeding into Wonsan harbour on 21st May. Coincident with the launching of the offensive, there had been increased activity by the shore batteries at Wonsan, and profiting by the absence of the destroyers, which with the exception of U.S.S. *Brinkley Bass* proceeded to sea on the 20th to screen in the heavy ships, they succeeded in damaging her with splinters from a near miss. There was a further recrudescence of fire between the 25th and 28th May, while U.S.S. *Manchester* was paying a farewell visit prior to her departure for the United States; to this she retaliated, and two L.S.M.R.s expended some 5000 rockets in two days on the batteries at Kalma Gak and Hodo Pando with satisfactory results. Several attempts to eject the R.o.K. Marines from the occupied islands in the anchorage were repulsed without difficulty, some prisoners being taken.

H.M.C.S. *Nootka*, after relieving H.M.S. *Black Swan*, remained with the Songjin force till 31st May. Proceedings were enlivened by novel forms of teasing the enemy throughout by her commanding officer, Commander Fraser-Harris, R.C.N., and by Commander J. B. Gay, U.S.N., of U.S.S. *Stickell*, who had taken over as C.T.E. 95·22.

For example, on 23rd May the *Nootka* landed a party in position 40° 31·5' N., 120° 7·6' E. in order to ascertain whether the railway there was still in use and if it was guarded. This was primarily an exploratory venture; if no opposition was encountered, a bridge and two tunnels in the vicinity were to be blown up, but no landing was to be attempted against opposition. Shrouded in fog, the party consisting of three officers and fourteen ratings (all volunteers) under Lieutenant A. H. M. Slater, R.C.N., accompanied by Lieutenant Ou, R.o.K.N., and a war correspondent¹ proceeded inshore in a motor-boat and fourteen-foot dinghy, conned by radar and radio from the ship. As the boats beached, they were greeted by a furious, but fortunately ineffective, burst of small-arms fire; they had found out what they wanted to know, and promptly withdrew into the fog, in accordance with their orders. Shortly after the boats were hoisted, the fog cleared, and H.M.C.S. *Nootka* bombarded the area, destroying or damaging a pill-box with W/T mast spotted by the landing-party while ashore, a look-out post on a nearby hill, and the railway bridge.

On 26th May, H.M.C.S. *Nootka* carried out a smart bit of work, subsequently highly commended by C.T.F. 95,² in clearing a channel 300 yards wide from the swept area to within 2000 yards of the beach at Songjin. Asdic mine detection, Squid countermining, and both motor-cutters, under the command of Sub-Lieutenants G. M. Rycroft and K. R. B. Cadogan-Rawlinson, R.N., directed by radio from the ship, were made use of. When the channel was cleared, the *Nootka* moved in, and engaged all visible targets for 45 minutes supported by U.S.S. *Stickell*, which joined in the bombardment. The *Nootka* fired 70 rounds of 4-inch and 256 rounds

¹ Mr Jock Carroll of the *Montreal Standard*, then embarked in H.M.C.S. *Nootka*.

² Rear-Admiral George Dyer, U.S.N., who by that time had succeeded Rear-Admiral Smith, noted 'with pleasure the imagination and daring efforts successfully executed by officers and personnel' of H.M.C.S. *Nootka*, and particularly commended Commander Fraser-Harris and the two sub-lieutenants for their ingenuity.

of 40-mm, and scored many direct hits on a railway bridge, which was rendered unusable, a viaduct, the railway, freight-cars, and villages.

After fuelling at Wonsan, H.M.C.S. *Nootka* proceeded to the 'bomb-line' in latitude 38° 15' N. on 31st May, where she patrolled to seaward screening the U.S. cruisers *Manchester* and later *Los Angeles*¹ while they carried out bombardments, until relieved by H.M.C.S. *Sioux* on 3rd June.

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By the end of May 1951, the Chinese offensive had been definitely defeated; more than 10 000 Chinese surrendered as prisoners of war during the last week of that month, and the U.N. Army was pressing on to the north-east towards the enemy's vital supply area. The naval forces on both coasts settled down again to their normal routine activities, and Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff, who had remained at Sasebo since his return from Inchon, felt able to pay some visits, which the war situation had previously prevented him from making.

On 30th May, he proceeded in H.M.S. *Unicorn*, escorted by the Colombian frigate *Almirante Padilla* and H.M.N.Z.S. *Rotoiti*, to Pusan to attend a memorial service at the U.N. cemetery. Representatives from H.M.A.S. *Warramunga*, H.M.C.S. *Nootka*, and H. Neth. M.S. *Van Galen* were present; unfortunately, very bad weather prevented the attendance of General Ridgway and several senior commanders, but the ceremony was nevertheless impressive. While at Pusan, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff met President Syngman Rhee, Admiral Sohn, C.-in-C. of the R.o.K. Navy, and Commander Luosey, U.S.N., its operational commander. He returned to Sasebo next day, where Vice-Admiral Martin arrived on 1st June in U.S.S. *New Jersey* to meet Vice-Admiral Joy and Admiral Radford, C.-in-C. of the Pacific Fleet, who was visiting the war zone. All British, Commonwealth, and Allied commanding officers present in harbour met the American admirals at a luncheon arranged by Rear-Admiral Smith.

On 6th June, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff sailed from Sasebo in H.M.S. *Unicorn* to carry out his postponed visit to Japanese ports, arriving at Yokosuka on the 8th. There he met Vice-Admiral Kiland, U.S.N., commander of the Amphibious Force, and Rear-Admiral McManus, U.S.N. (C.T.G. 96.1, Fleet Activities, Japan). The latter gave an interesting dinner party, which included among the guests Mr Yoshida, the Japanese Prime Minister, six American and four very senior Japanese admirals, one of whom was Admiral Nomura. All the Japanese admirals deplored their nation's part in World War II; each in turn made a point of telling Admiral Scott-Moncrieff how happy the Japanese Navy had been in the old days, when such a close bond existed between it and the Royal Navy.

While at Yokosuka, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff visited the 41st R.M. Commando, with which he was much impressed, at Camp McGill. The Commando had then been for two months without active service, and Colonel Drysdale was finding it difficult to keep his men on the top of their form. This matter the Admiral took up with Admiral Joy at Tokyo, and arrangements were made to explore the possibilities of the Royal Marines being employed in raids on the east coast under the direction of C.T.F. 95. Admiral Scott-Moncrieff had a very satisfactory discussion

¹ U.S.S. *Los Angeles* relieved U.S.S. *Manchester* in the evening of 31st May.

with Admiral Joy on a wide range of subjects, the most important of which—apart from the future of the Royal Marine Commando—was the simplification of the communication requirements of ships on the west coast. Before leaving Tokyo, he called on the Supreme Commander, General Ridgway, and also met Lieutenant-General Sir H. Robertson, C.-in-C. British Occupation Forces, Heads of Commonwealth missions, and various senior officers.

On his return to Yokosuka, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff discussed A/S training with Rear-Admiral McManus, who was responsible for basic training and Rear-Admiral Cruise, (COMCARDIV 15 in the carrier *Bairoko*) who arranged the tactical training of the U.S. forces, with a view to Commonwealth destroyers taking part. The readiness of the U.S. Navy to accord these facilities was most encouraging. He also gave a farewell party to Rear-Admiral A. E. Smith, who had arrived in U.S.S. *Prairie* on 11th June prior to meeting his relief as C.T.F. 95, Rear-Admiral G. C. Dyer, U.S.N., who was due on the 18th.

From Yokosuka, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff proceeded to Kure, the base of the Australian Occupation Force under Brigadier J. C. Rawlinson. The Admiral was much impressed by the arrangements made by the N.O.i/c, Commander C. J. Stephenson, R.A.N. The question was then in his mind of shifting the main base from Sasebo to Kure where, except for being further from the war area, the facilities were better.

Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff arrived back at Sasebo on 17th June. Owing to the material reduction in the communication problems in the Blockade Element on the west coast, the continual presence of a cruiser there was no longer necessary, and he decided to offer the cruisers for employment on the east coast, a proposal which he knew would be very welcome to C.T.F. 95. H.M.S. *Kenya* had then been almost continually in the operational area for nine months, and the Admiral felt she should have a short rest and change before taking up these new duties. He himself wished to visit Hong Kong to discuss local defence measures with Commodore Brownfield before the latter's departure for the United Kingdom early in July, so after spending a few days at sea in H.M.S. *Glory*, he sailed from Sasebo in H.M.S. *Kenya* on 26th June, arriving at Hong Kong on the 29th; in his absence Captain Colquhoun of the *Glory* acted as C.T.G. 95·1, while operations and administration were controlled by the Chief Staff Officer, Captain Villiers.

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Meanwhile, the advance of the United Nations Army had continued steadily. By the middle of June they had broken into the Chorwon-Kumwha-Pyongyang supply area, and the enemy was in full retreat to the northward. In the opinion of General Van Fleet, the war could then have been won outright. He planned to supplement the shore offensive with amphibious landings, leap-frogging up the east coast. 'With those landings the Chinese couldn't have met it. They're not flexible enough. The Chinese armies had no conception of fast moves; they had no communication system; they had no logistical support So in June 1951 we had the Chinese whipped. They were definitely gone. They were in awful shape.'¹

¹ Communicated by General Van Fleet to the authors of *The Sea War in Korea*, p. 309.

But it was not to be. At this stage, political considerations imposed a check on military operations. From the entry of Communist China into the war, the policy of the United Nations had been to limit hostilities to the confines of Korea and, subject to the restoration of the Republic of Korea with a northern boundary approximately the same as before the North Korean aggression, they were ready to enter into armistice negotiations at any time. Proposals for a cease-fire on 11th January, when the Chinese offensive in the new year was in full swing, had been rejected by the Chinese Government within a week, and on 1st February, the U.N. General Assembly retaliated by naming China an aggressor. These matters remained during the fluctuating fortunes of the war during the next four months, but the defeat of the Chinese spring offensive seemed to offer a chance of an armistice, and on 1st June Mr Trygve Lie, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, announced that a cease-fire approximately along the 38th parallel would fulfil the purposes of the United Nations, viz., to repulse aggression against the Republic of Korea. A week later Mr Dean Acheson, the U.S. Secretary of State, made a similar statement.¹

On 23rd June 1951—the eve of the first anniversary of the North Korean invasion—Mr Malik, the Soviet representative on the U.N. Security Council, declared that the Russian Government believed that discussions should be started between the belligerents in Korea. Two days later the Peking newspaper the *People's Daily* asserted that the Chinese people endorsed Mr Malik's peace proposals. The measure of the Chinese Army's discomfiture in Korea may perhaps be gauged from this response to the United Nations announcement.

Little time was lost by the United Nations in acting on these suggestions, and on 29th June General Ridgway was directed to offer to meet the Communist C.-in-C. to discuss an armistice.

From the purely military point of view it will be seen that such negotiations were entirely in favour of the Chinese. Operations on shore developed into static warfare in the region of the 38th parallel, where, with the unlimited coolie labour at their disposal, they were able to construct formidable strong-points and entrenchments, and the disadvantages of their slow and primitive communications were to a large extent mitigated, while the United Nations, being denied a war of movement, were unable fully to exploit their superior logistics and above all the amphibious weapon, which hitherto had stood them in such good stead. The situation at the start of armistice talks is illustrated in Figure 11.

While these moves to end the war were taking place there was a change in the command of the naval blockade and escort forces. Rear-Admiral George C. Dyer, U.S.N., assumed command of T.F. 95 on 20th June 1951, in place of Rear-Admiral A. E. Smith, who returned to the United States. Admiral Smith had proved himself a fine fighting commander, with the United Nations aspect of his command very much at heart, and Admiral Scott-Moncrieff was sincerely sorry to see him depart.

Rear-Admiral Dyer, after a meeting with the Commander, 7th Fleet, Vice-Admiral Martin, and Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff at Sasebo on 26th June, at which the general situation was discussed, hoisted his flag in U.S.S. *Toledo* and

¹ President Truman has explained that for some time past a distinction had been made between the political aim—the eventual establishment of a unified, independent, democratic Korea—and the military aim of repelling the aggression and terminating hostilities under an armistice agreement.

DEFEAT OF CHINESE SPRING OFFENSIVE, 1951




Figure 11. Situation at start of armistice talks

carried out a tour of the operational area on both coasts of Korea, which lasted till 11th July, when he rejoined U.S.S. *Prairie* at Sasebo.

While these events were happening on shore and in the higher direction of the war, the naval forces of the United Nations were continuing their normal functions on each coast of Korea. As June drew to its close and rumours of impending armistice got about, somewhat paradoxically their activities were intensified; the necessity of negotiating from strength was fully appreciated, and constant reminders that there must be no easing up became the order of the day.

On the west coast, H.M.S. *Glory* took over from U.S.S. *Bataan* on 3rd June, and with H.M. Ships *Constance* and *Cockade*, and U.S. Ships *Hawkins* and *Fiske* as screen, continued operations till 11th June, when the discovery that her aviation petrol was heavily contaminated forced her to return to harbour.¹ The weather during this period on patrol was consistently fine with good visibility, and the aircraft were very successful in dealing with enemy movements across the Taedong estuary; that area soon again resumed its usual deserted aspect. There was a continued increase in light flak and small-arms fire, and a good deal of minor damage was suffered by H.M.S. *Glory*'s aircraft. Engine failure forced a *Sea Fury* to ditch off Choda island on 4th June; the pilot, Lieutenant P. A. L. Watson, was picked up uninjured by H.M.S. *Black Swan*. On 7th June, a *Firefly* damaged by enemy fire while on armed reconnaissance came down into the sea ahead of the ship; the pilot, S. W. E. Ford, Pilot III, failed to get out of the aircraft and was unfortunately lost. Another *Firefly*, piloted by Lieutenant R. E. Wilson, developed a coolant leak after being hit by the enemy, and ditched near Kirin do on 7th June. The pilot and his observer, Sub-Lieutenant L. R. Shepley were unhurt; they were rescued by a shore-based helicopter and taken to Pengyong do, whence H.M.S. *Glory*'s helicopter subsequently retrieved them. Two *Sea Furies* and a *Firefly* were also damaged in the course of the patrol through crashes when landing on.

U.S.S. *Sicily* replaced H.M.S. *Glory* in the operational area on 14th June. This, her first patrol, was not a happy one. She had on board a large number of defective and very old aircraft, and for the first few days bad weather curtailed flying operations. Also, owing to arrangements ordered and counter-ordered by the various U.S. commanders in the chain of command (without reference to Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff), she had no opportunity of meeting U.S.S. *Bataan*, and consequently had no briefing. The Fleet Aviation Officer, Commander E. S. Carver, R.N., boarded her before she sailed for the west coast, but on this patrol the air group was never able to get into its stride. By her second patrol (2nd–11th July), however, a few new aircraft had arrived, and her output and performance improved daily, despite the loss of no less than six aircraft. With but eighteen left, U.S.S. *Sicily* achieved the fine total of 45 sorties on one day, and over 36 on several others.

H.M.S. *Glory*, after making good defects at Kure, took over from U.S.S. *Sicily* on 23rd June, and remained on patrol till 2nd July. During the first couple of days, Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff, who had boarded her from H.M.S. *Cardigan*

¹ The contamination was caused by corrosion in the supply pipe from the tanks in R.F.A. *Wave Premier* to the forward supply position, a position which had not been used for many years. There was no truth in rumours of sabotage which appeared in the press.

Bay on her way to the west coast, was present to watch her flying operations. He was much impressed with the high standard reached so early in the commission¹ and with the fine spirit he found in her. While he was on board, the 1000th operational sortie was flown. The Admiral returned to Sasebo in H.M.S. *Alacrity* on 24th June.

Throughout this patrol, H.M.S. *Glory's* helicopter was out of action and was sorely missed, particularly as regards the effect on the screen of having one destroyer as plane guard most of the day, and in the daily distribution of flying programmes and operational summaries, without which the escorts could not be kept in the picture. The helicopter could have accomplished in a few minutes what a destroyer could not perform in under an hour, during which time both the mobility of the force and the effectiveness of the screen were impaired. In order to be as near as possible to a land-based helicopter, Captain Colquhoun shifted the area of his operations some 30 miles to the northward of the usual position.²

H.M.S. *Glory* had a very satisfactory period on patrol. The main air effort was devoted to armed reconnaissance, attacks on the principal routes, targets in the Taedong estuary and the Hwanghae promontory reported by the Leopard organization, and air spotting for increasingly frequent bombardments carried out by the Blockade Element. Some close air support was also provided for the ground troops, but for some unaccountable reason, the Joint Operational Centre directed this effort to the eastern end of the line, with which the pilots were completely unfamiliar, while that from T.F. 77 in the Sea of Japan was applied at the western end.³

The weather was fine throughout, and the *Glory* was keeping up a steady record of over 50 operational sorties a day when an accident occurred to the catapult and it was necessary to rely on RATOG on the last two days. Even so, she achieved the highest number for a patrol up to date (393) at an average of 49 per flying-day. Just on 100 tons of explosives were launched on the enemy, including 22 1000-lb bombs, 200 500-lb and nearly 1500 rocket projectiles in double tiers.

A good deal of minor damage was suffered from flak, and Suwon airfield was used frequently by damaged aircraft—all of which returned to the ship in due course—to effect repairs, and also for refuelling. Only two aircraft were lost—a Firefly, shot down in flames after releasing its bombs in the Chinnampo area, Lieutenant J. H. Sharp and Aircrewman I G.B. Wells losing their lives; and a Sea Fury which ditched just ahead of the ship, through the catapult strop becoming detached. The pilot was rescued by a destroyer.

Two cases of mistaken identity occurred during the patrol. On 25th June, four Sea Furies, though plainly marked, were attacked by four American F-80s; the Sea Furies took evasive action and were fortunate to escape without damage. Four days later, Sea Furies sank a friendly junk, causing five fatal casualties, two of which were highly trained intelligence agents belonging to an organization known as 'Salamander', of which Captain Colquhoun had not previously heard. The junk made no recognition signals in spite of a warning burst of fire ahead, and the

¹ H.M.S. *Glory* completed the first six months of the commission on 30th June; she had then steamed 28 817 miles during the period.

² Within a radius of fifteen miles from latitude 37° 15' N., longitude 124° 15' E.

³ Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff took this matter up with Admiral Martin, but this uneconomical practice continued throughout the period.

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pilots were in no way to blame for this unfortunate incident; indeed, so long as the various secret organizations insisted on working unknown to the task element commanders, such incidents were bound to occur from time to time.

The surface craft of the Blockade Element carried on their usual activities till 16th June, under Captain Thring (*Ceylon*), who had taken over as C.T.E. 95·12 from H.M.S. *Kerya* on 29th May, from 16th to 25th June, under Captain Norfolk (*Black Swan*), and from 26th June to 4th July under Captain Brown (*Cardigan Bay*)¹.

Anti-junk measures were continued vigorously, and a number of craft and prisoners were sent in; useful intelligence was obtained from some of the latter. At the request of the R.o.K. Government, some extension was made to the authorized fishing areas, partly in order to include certain banks where fish were normally found and partly to assist in feeding the large numbers of refugees in Choda and other islands, which, despite the removal of many of them to the mainland in R.o.K. L.S.T.s, was posing a difficult problem.

There was increased enemy activity in the areas opposite the Cigarette route, and on several occasions the patrolling ships came under machine-gun-fire, to which they retaliated with bombardments. As the month advanced a number of small raids were carried out by the Leopard organization with the support of C.T.E. 95·12. These were intended to culminate in a large-scale raid on the shore opposite to Sok to off the entrance to Chinnampo, but difficulties arose with the guerrillas, and this plan had to be abandoned. At the same time, various R.o.K. organizations laid on some raids in the vicinity of Haeju and Ongjin, without consultation with the Blockade Commander, though he heard of two of them by chance. H.M.S. *Alacrity* (Lieutenant-Commander Turner) supported one of these raids on 20th June, and H.M.S. *Morecambe Bay* (Commander Mackenzie) with R.o.K. frigate P.F. 62 supported another on the 27th. These raids were deprecated, however, as they diverted R.o.K. craft from their blockade duties, and steps were taken to put an end to these 'private' activities.²

During the last week of June and the first week of July, there was a considerable increase in the bombardment of military targets reported by the Leopard organization; some twenty targets were engaged within eight days up to 2nd July. This increased activity, though fortuitous, fitted in very well with the policy of exerting maximum pressure on the enemy in order to start the armistice negotiations from strength.

At the beginning of July, T.G. 95·1 was considerably embarrassed by a shortage of destroyers; H.M.C.S. *Sioux* broke down after a spell on the east coast and a succession of defects developed in H.M.A.S. *Murchison* and N. Heth. M.S. *Van Galen*, while H.M.C.S. *Nootka* was at Yokosuka, where she was being relieved by H.M.C.S. *Cayuga*. In these circumstances H.M.S. *Ceylon* (Captain Thring) returned to the west coast as C.T.E. 95·12 on 4th July, which then consisted of the frigates *Mounts Bay*, *Whitesand Bay*, and *Rotoiti*.

¹ The following ships were employed in T.E. 95·12 at different times in June and July: *Ceylon*, *Huron*, *Black Swan*, *Hawea*, *Alacrity*, *Nootka*, *Rotoiti*, *Cardigan Bay*, *Morecambe Bay*, *Constance*.

² The desirability of Colonel Burke of Leopard controlling all raiding operations in this area was pointed out by Captain Thring; but this was not practicable, because all his guerrillas were in fact anti-Communist North Koreans. Though ready to fight the Communists, they and the R.o.K. forces disliked each other almost as much, and would not co-operate. The most that could be hoped was that they would not actually fight each other.

On 9th July, Rear-Admiral Dyer arrived at Techong do in U.S.S. *Toledo*, with U.S.S. *Bradford* in company, in order to familiarize himself with conditions on the west coast. At Captain Thring's invitation, the Admiral hoisted his flag in H.M.S. *Ceylon* and proceeded in her up route Cigarette to Choda. Representatives of the Leopard organization had already been embarked, and a useful conference was held while on passage. Admiral Dyer's attitude was one of finding out how he could best help Admiral Scott-Moncrieff with his problems.

Admiral Dyer returned to U.S.S. *Toledo* late that evening and sailed for Sasebo.

A couple of days later, a smart little impromptu raid, which deserves mention, was carried out by H.M.N.Z.S. *Rotoiti* (Lieutenant-Commander Turner). During a refitting spell at Kure, Lieutenant-Commander Turner had taken advantage of the presence of R.M. Commandos to train an assault team of six able seamen in beach-landing tactics and technique. About noon, 11th July, the *Rotoiti* was passing Sogon-ni Point in the outer approach to Chinnampo, when a movement of khaki-clad figures was noticed at the top of the cliffs, a spot from which U.N. ships had frequently been fired on by machine-guns and small arms, to which they retaliated by bombardment. Naturally, as soon as their guns opened fire the enemy went to earth till the ships had moved on, as they were certain to do sooner or later. Here seemed to be a chance for the Commandos.

Under cover of bombardment, at a range of 2000 yards, they went ashore in the motor-boat under Lieutenant R. S. F. Webber, R.N. Landing unseen, the two Bren-gun teams quickly set up their guns to enfilade the position under attack, while the assault group—Able Seamen N. J. Scoles and E. J. Button—scaled the cliff, some 50 to 70 feet high. On arrival at the top they surprised three North Korean soldiers concealed in a foxhole. One attempted to throw a grenade, and was promptly shot dead. The other two surrendered without more ado, and were escorted down to the beach with their weapons, under fire from a Communist patrol which appeared, but which was kept at a distance by the accurate fire of the covering party. An orderly withdrawal was made under the protective fire of the ship's guns, and the motor-boat was hoisted exactly an hour after its departure from the ship. No casualties were sustained. 'The way in which the operation was laid on', wrote Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff, 'shows that the lessons and the traditions of Lord Nelson are by no means forgotten in the Royal New Zealand Navy.'

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On the east coast, too, the tempo of naval operations increased during June, and engagements with shore batteries off Songjin and Wonsan became frequent, but apart from U.S.S. *Walke*, which suffered severe damage and lost 26 of her crew when she struck a mine off Hungnam on 12th June, and U.S.S. *Thompson* which was hit by shore batteries off Songjin on the 14th, there were no serious casualties to U.N. forces.

During the month, H.M.C. Ships *Sioux* and *Huron* and H.M. Ships *Whitesand Bay* and *Morecambe Bay* operated with the Americans at different times.¹ H.M.S. *Ceylon*, too, with Captain Villiers and Colonel Drysdale on board, spent three days

¹ 3rd-19th June, *Sioux*; 19th-26th June, *Whitesand Bay*; 26th June-7th July, *Huron*; 7th-23rd July, *Morecambe Bay*.

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at Wonsan and one at Songjin, investigating the possibilities of employment for 41st R.M. Commando.

H.M.C.S. *Sioux* (Commander P. D. Taylor, R.C.N.) joined T.E. 95·28 then operating under Rear-Admiral Arleigh Burke, U.S.N., in U.S.S. *Los Angeles*, off Kosang (50 miles SE. of Wonsan) in support of the R.o.K. 1st Division which held a strip of coast in this vicinity, on 3rd June. The R.o.K. division lacked artillery, and could only maintain its position with the help of naval gun-fire. From then until the end of her spell on the east coast on the 19th, her main armament was almost constantly in action. By day, bombardments with air spot were carried out, or targets of opportunity engaged; by night, harassing or interdiction fire as called for by shore fire-control party was supplied. In these night bombardments, the H.D.W.S. radar (Sperry) proved its value in blind control; both the R.o.K. brigadier and the American Army Liaison Officer in control of the spotting teams commented on the speed and accuracy with which the *Sioux* found targets as compared with the U.S. ships, whose radar was not so well adapted. It was also found most useful for estimating initial ranges in daylight bombardments on a coast whose indefinite features made visual fixing difficult.

On two occasions (14th and 17th June) H.M.C.S. *Sioux* reinforced T.E. 95·21, the bombardment force in Wonsan harbour. There the enemy had placed batteries of 76-mm guns equidistantly around the harbour on Umi do, a small island at the southern end of the bay, Kalma Gak, and Hodo Pando, which periodically engaged the ships. When this happened, avoiding action being restricted by minefields and islands, all ships steamed clockwise round the bay on a varying circle about a mile in diameter at speeds of from 15 to 25 knots, firing everything they had in counter-battery fire. This was appropriately known as Operation War Dance. On her first visit the *Sioux* found things comparatively quiet, but on 17th June she carried out War Dance with the U.S. destroyers *Bass* and *Evans* for half an hour, and the next day for over an hour. The presence of this occasion of the Thailand corvette *Bangpakong* and the U.S. frigate *Gloucester*, which left harbour when the action commenced, complicated matters, and each ship in turn narrowly missed collision with the latter. After about an hour, aircraft from T.F. 77 arrived and joined in with rocket and cannon-fire, and shortly afterwards the enemy ceased fire. All ships were straddled, and shrapnel from four near misses landed on board the *Sioux*. During the action, she expended 264 rounds of 4·7-inch, and at the end she had only 48 rounds left, six of which were practice. The ships' gun-fire was accurate, but the enemy guns were mainly situated in caves, thus presenting only a pinpoint target, and its effect on them was hard to estimate.

There was another heavy action on 19th June, in which To do island where most of the R.o.K. Marine garrison was taken under fire as well as the destroyers. The North Korean battery on Umi do was silenced for the time being by aircraft from T.F. 77. Thereafter, some of the batteries opened fire every few days.

This was in fact the beginning of a much more aggressive policy at Wonsan on the part of the enemy, and operations there entered on a new phase, in which the main gunnery effort of the U.N. ships gradually changed from its offensive role of interrupting the important enemy communications, which ran through the city, to the defensive role of counter-battery fire in order to enable them to maintain their control of the harbour.

H.M.C.S. *Sioux* had rejoined T.E. 95·28 after the action on 18th June, and next day, having been relieved by H.M.S. *Whitesand Bay*, she proceeded to

Sasebo and Hong Kong to make good a boiler-room defect which had developed. H.M.S. *Whitesand Bay* (Commander Rowell), after a couple of days at Wonsan, spent her period on the east coast with T.E. 95·22 in the Songjin and Changjin area. Bombardments of enemy positions, and occasionally troops, were carried out, as well as anti-junk and anti-submarine sweeps. Nothing of particular note occurred; the only anxiety was whether the ammunition would be sufficient to complete the assigned tasks, U.S.S. *Oberon*, in which replenishment was expected, being delayed. The arrival of H.M.S. *Ceylon* at Songjin on 23rd June solved this problem.

H.M.C.S. *Huron* (Commander Madgwick, R.C.N.) replaced the *Whitesand Bay* in T.E. 95·22 on 26th June, and remained working in the Songjin-Changjin area till relieved by H.M.S. *Morecambe Bay* on 7th July. For three days, between the departure of U.S.S. *Stickell* and the arrival of U.S.S. *Naifeh*, Commander Madgwick was commander of T.E. 95·22 (then consisting of the *Huron* and the *Almirante Padilla*). During this time, U.S.S. *Toledo*, wearing the flag of Rear-Admiral Dyer who had assumed command of T.F. 95 the week before, and U.S.S. *Bradford* arrived at Songjin and were given targets for the duration of their stay.

The usual sweeps and bombardments were carried out. On 5th July H.M.C.S. *Huron* was fired on by a 75-mm gun in the Songjin area; no damage was done, and the gun was quickly silenced by close-range weapons. A small sampan, manned by four North Koreans escaping from the Communists, was intercepted on 6th July. They had been conscripted with most of the local population (male and female) to work in labour gangs. They slept in tunnels by day, where also any trains in the neighbourhood lay up, and by night worked hard repairing the damage to the railway inflicted by the ships the previous day. Some useful information on the effect of night bombardments was obtained from them. Opening fire with star-shell and waiting for the burst before firing the remainder of the armament gave ample time for the repair parties to take cover. What really bothered them when working was an air burst; a 4-inch high-explosive bursting on impact did little damage to personnel, unless they were unlucky enough to be within a few yards of it.

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Meanwhile, preparations for truce negotiations had been going forward. In compliance with instructions from Washington, General Ridgway on 30th June broadcast the following message to the C.-in-C. of the Communist forces in Korea:

‘As Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command I have been instructed to communicate to you the following:

‘I am informed that you may wish a meeting to discuss an armistice providing for the cessation of hostilities and all acts of armed force in Korea, with adequate guarantees for the maintenance of such armistice.

‘Upon receipt of word from you that such a meeting is desired, I shall be prepared to name my representative’

General Ridgway went on to suggest that the meetings should be held on board the Danish hospital ship *Jutlandia*, which would be anchored in Wonsan harbour for the purpose. General Kum Il-sung, the North Korean Prime Minister and C.-in-C. wasted no time in accepting the proposal for talks, but he rejected the

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Jutlandia as a meeting place, and insisted that they should take place at Kaesong, situated on the 38th parallel some 35 miles north of Inchon. To this the United Nations agreed on 3rd July.

The Communists had won the first trick. Their propaganda would now be able to represent the United Nations as coming to them to sue for peace, a not unimportant consideration in view of the importance attached to 'face' throughout the Far East, and one which nothing was left undone to foster.

By 4th July, a general lull in the fighting on shore had set in all along the front, and on the 6th a preliminary meeting of liaison officers took place, at which details were arranged for the first meeting of the delegates.

CHAPTER 8

Opening of Truce Talks

Section

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- 72 Naval operations, east coast, July–September.
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- 74 Visit of C.-in-C., F.E. Station, and operations, October 1951.

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ON 11th July 1951 there took place the first meeting of the main truce delegations at Kaesong. General Ridgway was represented by Vice-Admiral Joy and Rear-Admiral Arleigh Burke. The Communist delegation consisted of three North Koreans (General Nam Il, Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, North Korean Army, Major-Generals Lee Sang-jo, and Chang Pyong-san) and two Chinese (Lieutenant-General Tung Hua, Deputy Commander of Chinese forces in Korea, and Major-General Hsieh Fang).

The arrival of the U.N. delegates at Kaesong was not propitious. Chinese troops under arms were much in evidence, and Communist reporters and photographers abounded, whereas U.N. press representatives were excluded from the area. The American admirals were obliged to wait an hour for the Communist delegation, probably a deliberate slight, as North Korean time was an hour slow on that being kept by the United Nations. In short, the Communists contrived that General Ridgway's delegates should appear as representatives of a defeated enemy summoned to their conqueror's territory to accept dictated terms.

It took five days to straighten out these matters—to establish the neutrality of the conference zone, to substitute military police for armed troops in the area, and to secure the admission of members of the U.N. press—and it was not till 15th July that the first meeting to discuss the agenda took place.

From the first it was clear that the Communists intended nothing but obstruction and procrastination, and that no early settlement could be looked for; few, however, can have anticipated that two years twelve days would elapse before an armistice

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was signed.¹ An agreed agenda was adopted on 29th July, but the first item on it, the military demarcation line, was not settled for four months.

During these negotiations crisis followed crisis. Past experience in other conferences with Communists had clearly shown that attempts to placate them and to take conciliatory measures were merely taken by them as a sign of weakness. Power and strength were terms the Communists understood, and they were not influenced by much else. Consequently, General Ridgway decided early that the only way to obtain equitable terms for an armistice was to choose a sound, vigorous course of action and state it forcibly; and while care was taken to ensure that the U.N. demands were reasonable, it was on these lines that the delegates conducted the negotiations.

It will be convenient here to anticipate the course of the talks for the rest of the year. The Communists were patient and were not averse to wasting time, apparently expecting that the Americans would eventually give in on important points for the sake of agreement. In this they were disappointed and there were frequent adjournments as the summer and autumn advanced. At the beginning of October, after a long break, the conference was resumed at Panmunjon, six miles east of Kaesong. Military pressure was then pushing the Communists back and eventually, after another long suspension of talks, the current battle-line was accepted on 27th November as the line of demarcation.

On 18th December 1951, prisoner-of-war lists were exchanged by the delegates. Naturally, the United Nations was anxious to recover its prisoners, who were known to be abominably treated, and it was hoped that this matter could be settled reasonably quickly. But it proved the knottiest point of all to solve, as will be seen, and was under discussion practically right up to the signing of the armistice more than eighteen months later. The difficulty arose from the Communist insistence that *all* the prisoners in the hands of the United Nations should be returned, regardless of their personal desires. This was the last thing many of them wished to happen to them, and the United Nations were equally determined, for reasons of common humanity, that none should be compelled to fall into the hands of the Communists again against their wishes.

With the beginning of the truce talks, the war entered on a new phase, all military

¹ In retrospect, it may seem that the United Nations was premature in consenting to truce talks at this stage, but it must be remembered that the political leaders had to regard the world-wide situation, and that at the time, armed intervention in Korea by Soviet Russia was assessed as a very real possibility. It now appears that Russia had no such intention, and indeed in 1951 was in no condition to become involved in a third world war. What the Russians undoubtedly aimed at, once the United Nations had committed themselves to military measures in Korea, was to keep as many U.N. forces (especially American and British) as possible tied down there as long as possible in order to impede the formation of forces wherewith to support the recently-born NATO. With the Chinese armies in Korea seriously compromised in June 1951 (and, if General Van Fleet's view is correct, in serious danger of expulsion from the peninsula) then protracted armistice negotiations would seem the best method of achieving this object. At the same time such negotiations would provide the Chinese Communists with a breathing space in which to retrieve their position and shaken prestige in North Korea. Hence Mr Malik's 'peace proposals', and their ready acceptance by the Peking Government.

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operations in each sphere of activity being coloured by the progress, or lack of progress, in the negotiations.

Hitherto, on shore, throughout its varying fortunes, it had been a war of movement, with pauses only for one side or the other to regroup its forces and make preparations for the next offensive. Now, although pressure was kept up on the main 8th Army front, and a small amount of progress was made at times, the battle to all intents and purposes became static. Minor adjustments to improve defensive positions were made, and a series of small but vicious offensives were carried out by both sides in October and November with this end in view. With the agreement on 27th November 1951 on a buffer-zone line, the fighting on the main front died away and was not resumed for the rest of the year.

The employment of the U.N. air forces, too, underwent a change, when in August, 1951, the 5th Air Force commenced a co-ordinated plan for the interdiction of all road and rail communications and the neutralization of airfields in North Korea,¹ at the expense of direct support to the ground troops. At about the same time, however, the enemy reacted sharply in the air. The MiG-15 had proved superior to any other fighter in the theatre of war, and he assembled large numbers of these aircraft on the Manchurian border, besides making strenuous efforts to recondition the airfields in North Korea. In the air battles which ensued, though the losses were not spectacular on either side, the attrition rate in the 5th Air Force was high, and it soon became apparent that day raiding by heavy bombers was no longer a paying proposition.

At sea, the operations on both coasts followed generally the underlying pattern of the previous six months, but at a higher intensity. With the hopes of an early armistice, an extra effort and display of force was called for by the United Nations Command; as the negotiations dragged on, it was found necessary, for prestige and other reasons, to keep the pressure up. This resulted in an increasing build up of static and largely defensive commitments—e.g., the siege of Wonsan, ‘and in fact’, remarked Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff, ‘the positions were to some extent reversed, in that where the naval forces had set out to contain enemy ground forces, they themselves were in the end contained’.²

On the west coast, the Carrier Element (T.E. 95·11) continued to operate in the southern part of the Yellow Sea, while the Blockade Element (T.E. 95·12) consisting usually of a cruiser and four or five destroyers or frigates further north, patrolled mainly between the Han and the Taedong estuaries. Night patrols, and at times day patrols, also proceeded north into the Yalu Gulf in support of the islands there, from some of which intelligence and sea-air rescue organizations were working. In the middle of July an interesting problem was posed to the Blockade Element in the recovery of a MiG-15 which had been shot down and lay in very shallow water about a hundred miles behind the enemy lines. The successful performance of this task, to which great importance was attached by the American high command, deserves recording in some detail.

¹ Hitherto, the interdiction of roads and communications had only been studied carefully in the heavy carriers of Task Force 77, which had been working for some months on the communications network, but their efforts had been confined to north-east Korea only.

² Report of Experience in Korean Operations, July 1951—June 1952, Part I, Historical Survey, para. 16.

Reports of a MiG jet fighter shot down in 39° 26' N., 125° 22' E. had been received from the Joint Operations Centre on 9th July. This position was in very shallow water, and there seemed no prospect of one of H.M. ships being able to reach it, so, apart from requesting U.S.S. *Sicily* to search for it during the daily reconnaissance, no action was taken by C.T.E. 95·12—at that time Captain Thring (H.M.S. *Ceylon*). Short visibility prevailed during 10th July, but on the 11th air reconnaissance from H.M.S. *Glory*, who had relieved the *Sicily*, sighted the tail unit of an aircraft some thirteen miles to the southward and westward of the position originally reported, and two days later the remainder of the aircraft was sighted near by. The wreckage was just awash at low water; it lay some 40 miles to the northward of Choda, along a narrow channel flanked by sandbars and blocked at the southern end by a minefield. On receipt of this report, Admiral Joy directed that every effort was to be made to recover as much of the wreckage as possible.

The forces then on the west coast consisted of H.M.S. *Glory* screened by four destroyers (T.E. 95·11) and T.E. 95·12—H.M.S. *Cardigan Bay* (Captain W. L. M. Brown, C.T.E.) and H.M.N.Z.S. *Hawea*. Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff arrived in H.M.S. *Kenya* on 14th July, and transferred his flag to H.M.S. *Glory*, keeping the *Kenya* in company by day, while by night she reinforced the Blockade Element under Captain Brown.

Captain Brown, meanwhile, had evolved a salvage plan using the tidal range, seventeen feet at springs and eight feet at neaps, as the basis for the lift. He proposed that two shallow-draught junks should be towed to the area at the next spring tides, lashed to the MiG at low water, and towed clear at high water. Learning, however, at a meeting with representatives of the various U.S. special intelligence parties, of the existence at Inchon of a special L.C.M. fitted with a crane, he decided to substitute this for the junks, and got out the following plan:

H.M.S. *Glory*'s helicopter, led by aircraft, would buoy the position of the MiG on 18th July. R.o.K. J.M.L. 302, which was supposed (erroneously) to have local knowledge, would lead the L.C.M. there after dark that evening. H.M.S. *Cardigan Bay* would proceed to the area of operations on the 19th, to provide counter-battery fire and A.A. support. Aircraft from H.M.S. *Glory* would provide low C.A.P., and the 5th Air Force jet aircraft high C.A.P.

This plan was approved by Admiral Scott-Moncrieff, who arrived at Pengyong do in the *Kenya* on 17th July for a conference on the subject; and the next morning, the Admiral himself proceeded to Inchon to arrange about the L.C.M. It turned out that there was no such craft there, but a L.S.U. with a mobile crane was produced. This was shipped in the L.S.D. *Whetstone*, and arrived at Choda on 19th July, escorted by H.M.S. *Kenya*, which then proceeded to sea to the north-west to provide early radar warning of aircraft approaching from Manchuria during the salvage operations.

H.M.S. *Cardigan Bay* sailed from Choda at 1330, 19th, and, avoiding the minefield, successfully crossed the outer bar¹ at high water and anchored in the inner

¹ The way across the bar was found by sounding from the ship's motor-boat which was sent away fitted with a radar reflector and a portable R/T radio set (Type 615).

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channel for the night. L.S.U. 960 and J.M.L. 302 were to have joined her that evening, but owing to the former's running aground, and to the inability of the latter to navigate in the dark, did not do so till 0830, 20th. The passage to the vicinity of the MiG was uneventful, and the ships arrived at 1235. There they waited till near low water, which was at 1730. The weather was fine with good visibility, but no sign of any enemy movement or apparent interest in their presence could be detected from the ships.

At 1600, when the tide was nearly out and the channels and sandbanks exposed to view, the *Glory's* helicopter arrived and dropped two buoys with great accuracy to mark the tail section and the fuselage of the MiG. As soon as the buoys were laid, H.M.S. *Cardigan Bay's* motor-boat, with Lieutenant M. Ross in charge, led the L.S.U. up the channel. The positions of the sandbanks bore little resemblance to the chart of the area, and the water was yellow with disturbed mud; however, the C.A.P. Sea Furies could make out the passage and indicated it by flying along it at low altitude—an ingenious and most effective navigational aid. When about three quarters of a mile from the main part of the aircraft, the L.S.U. grounded with a still falling tide. The boats closed the aircraft. It was found that in addition to four large portions, which would require the crane to lift them, there was a very large number of small pieces scattered over an area of about 400 yards radius, mostly on sandbanks which dried at low water. All visible small parts were recovered and loaded into the L.S.U.'s shallow-draught boat, while the remainder of the salvage party attached slings to, and buoyed, the main sections. At 1930, the water had risen sufficiently for the L.S.U. to get inshore; by 2115, all except the cockpit and wing section, which broke away from its sling and slipped back into the water, had been recovered. The strong current with the rising tide frustrated diving operations to recover the wing section, and the party returned to H.M.S. *Cardigan Bay*, which had anchored for the night, as being less hazardous than remaining under way in those confined and swift-flowing waters. Early next morning, the boats were sent in at low water to prepare the wing section for lifting. This tide was extreme low-water springs, three feet lower than the previous day; other small portions of the wreck were found and collected. At 0730, the L.S.U. arrived on the scene, and the lift of the wing section was completed in ten minutes. The salvage party then returned to seaward.

Throughout the operation, no interference was attempted by the enemy. Some sporadic A.A. fire at the low C.A.P. revealed the position of a heavy battery, and after the salvage party had finally withdrawn from the beach, H.M.S. *Cardigan Bay* fired 72 rounds of H.E.D.A. at it, with good results.

The withdrawal south passed off without incident. Visibility shortened as they neared the end of the channel, and Captain Brown decided to lead the other ships to Choda, accepting the risk of crossing the minefield at high water. This was successfully negotiated, and the force arrived off Choda at 1700, 21st July. Next day, L.S.D. *Epping Forest* arrived, and escorted by H.M.N.Z.S. *Rotoiti*, returned with the L.S.U. to Inchon, where the MiG was handed over to the U.S. 5th Air Force.

'Your highly successful special operation', signalled the commander of the 7th Fleet, 'is deserving of our number one well done.'

Meanwhile, H.M.S. *Glory* had been carrying out the duties of C.T.E. 95·11 since 11th July. Weather curtailed flying activities on two or three days, but on the whole it was fair with good visibility. The *Glory* started with a success when,

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on her first day, Lieutenant W. R. Hart sighted the tail of the wrecked MiG, and a couple of days later Lieutenant D. A. McNaughton spotted the remainder of the aircraft.

Despite damage from enemy fire to a number of aircraft,¹ serviceability was maintained at a high standard and, in all, 418 sorties were flown; over 130 tons of explosives, including 24 1000-lb bombs, 206 500-lb, and 1320 rocket projectiles were launched at enemy store-dumps, military buildings, bridges, and transport. But the ever-increasing enemy opposition claimed four aircraft during the patrol. On 16th July, a Firefly, while carrying out a bombing attack north of Sariwon, crashed in enemy territory and burnt out, Lieutenant R. Williams and Sub-Lieutenant I. R. Shepley losing their lives. The following day, Lieutenant Hart was forced to ditch his Sea Fury south of Choppeki Point with engine trouble, probably due to flak; he was picked up unhurt almost immediately by the R.o.K. frigate P.F. 61; but there was another fatal casualty on 18th July when a Sea Fury piloted by Mr T. W. Sparke, Commissioned Pilot, was hit—again near Sariwon—and crashed in flames; and on the same day a Sea Fury, piloted by Lieutenant P. S. Davis, was hit by flak and forced to ditch off Choppeki Point. Lieutenant Davis was picked up after an hour and a half in the water by the *Glory's* helicopter.

H.M.S. *Glory* then moved some 70 miles north to an area centred on 38° 15' N., 124° 00' E. in order to enable constant air cover to be given to Captain Brown's force for the recovery of the MiG; and on the successful conclusion of this, proceeded to Kure, after relief by U.S.S. *Sicily* on 20th July. Her stay there was of short duration.

Two days after her arrival, an emergency arose² and she received orders to reinforce U.S.S. *Sicily*. Though at 24 hours' notice, she sailed only nine hours later, and joined the *Sicily* at 1845, 26th July. The two carriers then operated together, carrying out strikes against the area north of the Han estuary. Bad weather seriously curtailed flying, but they managed 101 sorties between them on the 28th. On 29th July, U.S.S. *Sicily* returned to Sasebo and H.M.S. *Glory* remained in the operating area as C.T.E. 95·11 till 4th August. Strikes, and many missions for ships bombarding in the Han estuary, were flown whenever the weather permitted. Owing to her hurried departure from Kure, the *Glory* was six aircraft short, but in spite of this, a total of 312 sorties were flown, and nearly 49 000 rounds of 20-mm, over 1000 rocket projectiles, and over 100 500-lb bombs were launched against enemy personnel and installations. There were no casualties to aircraft. The flying weather was the worst yet experienced by H.M.S. *Glory* in the Yellow Sea, low cloud and fog being intermittent and arriving with little warning; on 4th August, for example, two Sea Furies returning from C.A.P. over ships in the Han estuary had to wait 3¼ hours to land on in visibility of 400 yards and heavy rain from a sudden 'front'.

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The recovery of the MiG had scarcely been completed when there arose a new

¹ In addition to four aircraft lost, thirteen Furies and six Firefly were damaged by flak. One Firefly was damaged in landing.

² See Section 70

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commitment on the west coast, which though originally expected to last only a few days, actually continued for over four months, and involved a very great effort under most trying conditions.

The peace talks were hanging fire, but there was a prospect of agreeing an agenda, and the first item on it was the military demarcation line. It was considered important to emphasize that the area to the south of the 38th parallel in the Ongjin and Yonan vicinity, though actually held at the time by the Communists, was controlled by the United Nations. Accordingly, in the evening of 24th July, Admiral Joy acting in his capacity as senior delegate at the armistice conference, addressed a personal message to Rear-Admiral Dyer (C.T.F. 95), requesting a show of strength in the Han estuary, as close as possible to the neutral area around Kaesong.

Admiral Dyer at once ordered all activities on the west coast to be subordinated to the requirements of this demonstration. U.S.S. *Sicily*, then on patrol, was reinforced by H.M.S. *Glory*, and both carriers concentrated their air operations on this area, even to the exclusion of coastal reconnaissance.

All available frigates and the R.o.K. patrol vessels on the west coast were ordered to the Han estuary.

Captain Brown, C.T.E. 95·12, which consisted of H.M.S. *Cardigan Bay*, H.M.A.S. *Murchison*, H.M.N.Z. Ships *Rotoiti* and *Hawea*, R.o.K. P.F. 62 and the usual patrol craft, was at Inchon when he received these orders. He sailed at 0530, 25th July, and after meeting U.S.S. *Sicily* at sea to make arrangements with Captain Thach, U.S.N., for C.A.P., spotting and other air assistance, proceeded to a rendezvous off the Han estuary where the rest of the Blockade Element had already assembled. Because of the limited gun-power of the New Zealand frigates, he decided to leave the *Rotoiti* in the Cigarette area, and the *Hawea* in the outer approaches to the Han estuary (37° 33' N., 126° E.) as radar and crypto link, and with the secret publications of the other frigates on board, who retained only their dangerous-waters sets during the operation.

The approaches to the River Han are shallow, and include many islands surrounded by shifting mud-flats which dry at low water. No navigation marks existed and the tidal streams run at four to eight knots. The available charts bore little relation to the reality. From the pilotage point of view, the prospect was not alluring, and how near to the enemy-held north shore it would be possible to get was problematical. A number of targets¹, mostly of minor importance, for bombardment had been indicated by Rear-Admiral Dyer, but he had not mentioned the underlying (political) object of the operation. It was therefore difficult at first to assess the importance of these targets as opposed to the risks involved in negotiating the shallow channels to the estuary. Of these there were two. One, the narrow and rocky Songmo² Channel, with its eight-knot stream and other hazards, led to the nearest point to Kaesong, but it was questionable whether the frigates could get through at all; the other, further to the westward across mud and sand-banks, seemed to offer better prospects of getting within range of at any rate the southern part of the Yonan peninsula.

After weighing up the hazards, Captain Brown decided to attempt the western

¹ These targets were added to by the Joint Operations Centre and the Leopard organization. See Plan 3.

² On Admiralty charts Meioumu Channel.

channel, and accompanied by the *Murchison*, P.F. 62, and the patrol craft he proceeded at high water (2000) with J.M.L. 304¹ sounding ahead of the force. Progress was slow and faltering; the *Murchison* grounded, but came off, and P.F. 62 dropped out when darkness fell. However, after about three hours, the remainder reached a position north of Poromu to, where they anchored for the night, during which a number of bombardments at targets on the Yonan peninsula were carried out. The following morning it was found impracticable to proceed further up, and after a further bombardment, this time with air spotting, Captain Brown decided to withdraw and try the Songmo Channel, detaching the J.M.L.s to carry out a sweep along the northern channel on the right bank of the River Han.

Passage down the western channel was made at high tide, with the ships' boats sounding ahead. Difficulties soon arose after rounding Pi do. The charts proved even less accurate than had been supposed, and for about two hours all three ships floundered about in water which was seldom deeper than 2½ fathoms. H.M.S. *Cardigan Bay* grounded three times, and all ships might well have remained aground, with the risk of being neaped, but for the able assistance of aircraft from U.S.S. *Sicily*, who could make out the channel to some extent. Soon after 1400, all three ships were clear of the mud-banks and the force returned to the *Hawea*'s anchorage, where it was joined by H.M.S. *Morecambe Bay*.

At 1735, the four frigates (*Cardigan Bay*, *Morecambe Bay*, *Murchison*, P.F. 62 one J.M.L., and two Y.M.S.s started for the eastern channel on the rising tide. The charts of this area were found to be much more accurate, and all ships were anchored in deep water at the southern entrance to Songmo Channel by dusk. At dawn, 27th July, the ships' boats were sent up at low water to observe the hazards and buoy the channel. This was successfully done, and during the forenoon the frigates proceeded up uneventfully and passed into the Han estuary, anchoring in fairly deep water between the northern shores of Kyodong do and Kangwha do, a position which came to be known as the 'Fork'. Bombardment of the northern bank of the river was at once commenced, and later, when aircraft spotting became available, fire was lifted to targets further inland.

From this anchorage, all ships were in full view of the enemy shore, and frequent bombardments ensured that their presence could not be overlooked. Nearly all military targets in the area were within range, including those adjacent to the five-mile safety circle around Kaesong. J.M.L. patrols 'worked over' the immediate coastline to the north with close-range weapons. Apart from some sporadic small-arms fire at these, there was no enemy reaction.

To Captain Brown it seemed that the object of the operation had been adequately accomplished. See Plan 3. This, however, did not satisfy Admiral Dyer, and the ships were ordered to try to get further up. Actually, Captain Brown was already probing for channels with the ships' boats; but this was necessarily a slow business in the strong tideway.

On 29th July, H.M.S. *Mounts Bay* (Captain J. B. Frewen) arrived from the east coast to take over from Captain Brown,² who proceeded to Sasebo to report personally on the situation to Rear-Admirals Scott-Moncrieff and Dyer. It was by this time apparent that these operations might go on indefinitely, and Admiral

¹ An officer from H.M.N.Z.S. *Hawea* was embarked in the J.M.L.

² This was Captain Brown's last service in H.M.S. *Cardigan Bay* before his relief by Captain H. C. B. Coleridge.

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Scott-Moncrieff, who, from the first was doubtful of their military value and was very conscious of the hazards the ships were running, feared lest they might develop into a 'prestige' commitment (similar to that at Wonsan) and thus immobilize a number of ships permanently. Admiral Dyer, however, was determined to continue, and was unwilling to submit alternative suggestions to higher authority, or to reduce the number of frigates in the estuary. He agreed, however, to a limit of 50 rounds of ammunition a day per ship being set for bombardment, which was in fact a necessity, as only 1000 rounds of 4-inch were available till the arrival of H.M.S. *Warrior* on 7th August.

In these early days, an episode occurred which is worth recording as emphasizing the importance of full inter-Service co-operation. On 4th August, a bomb from an aircraft, which appeared momentarily through the 300-foot cloud-base, fell near H.M.S. *Mounts Bay*, and on the 7th the frigates engaged a jet aircraft that made two passes out of low cloud.

A similar incident occurred two days later. It then transpired that the aircraft belonged to the U.S. 5th Air Force, which was apparently unaware of the frigate operations in the estuary; the frigates were equally unaware that one of the fixed air routes to Kimpo airfield crossed the area in which they were operating. Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff, who paid a brief visit in H.M.C.S. *Huron* to the estuary on 11th August, remarked that these incidents could 'but reflect upon the [American] inter-Service co-ordination and briefing'.¹

Between the 16th and 24th August, the somewhat erratic movements of a typhoon known as 'Marge' compelled the withdrawal of all ships from the Han. On 24th August, H.M.S. *Mounts Bay* returned and at once started a steady economical bombardment of enemy troop locations near the coast. She was joined within a few days by the *Morecambe Bay*, *St Bride's Bay*, and *Haweia*. From then until the end of November, some of H.M. ships², usually two or three frigates, were continuously in the estuary. Much ammunition was daily expended at targets usually of dubious value, without provoking the enemy into making any reply till seven weeks had elapsed from the start of the operations.

Meanwhile, steady progress was being made in the survey of the channels between the mud-flats. This was mainly done by the navigating officers of the frigates, working in the South Korean J.M.L.s.³ It was a laborious task. The water was a thick brown colour, with many swirls that might equally be due to rocks or to cross-currents. Aerial photographs were of little help, and even at low water it was difficult to gauge the best channels. Lack of surveying and buoyage resources much retarded the work at first, but after the typhoon had passed on its way, U.S. tug *Abnaki* arrived with buoys, and U.S.S. *Weiss* with a surveying team, and by mid-September channels had been found and buoyed which enabled ships to steam at high water within a mile of the north shore of the estuary for a distance of about ten miles (see Figure 12); but the approach of neap tides brought changes

¹ F.O. 2i/c R.o.P. No. 39. As the threat of enemy air attack in this sector was negligible at the time, he ordered the ships not to open fire unless an aircraft was positively identified as hostile, while the matter was being straightened out.

² The following Commonwealth ships were employed at one time or another in these operations. H.M. Ships *Cardigan Bay*, *Mounts Bay*, *Morecambe Bay*, *St Bride's Bay*, *Whitesand Bay*, *Amethyst*, *Black Swan*, *Comus*; H.M.A.S. *Murchison*; H.M.N.Z. Ships *Haweia*, *Rotoiti*, *Taupo*.

³ The tidal streams were too strong for ships' boats to be used.

in the configuration of the banks and channels, which resulted in occasional groundings.

The discovery of the channel along the north shore enabled the ships' guns to reach targets seven or eight miles inland, and full advantage was taken of this; but such bombardments were limited to a comparatively short period before and after high water, a fact of which the enemy was of course perfectly aware. On 21st September, Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff paid a second visit to the area, and took a complete run over the channels¹ in H.M.S. *Amethyst* (Commander P. E. Fanshawe).

Three days earlier, the enemy had made his first attempt at interference, when J.M.L. 302, while surveying near the north bank on 18th September, was fired on and hit by a 40-mm, or field-gun shell. No serious damage was suffered, and the gun position was bombarded by the *Amethyst* and *Murchison*. After this display of temper, the enemy reverted to his previous passivity, but on 28th September he reacted sharply. It so chanced that on this day Rear-Admiral Dyer was visiting the Han estuary for the first time. Accompanied by Captain Norfolk, the Surface Blockade Commander at the time, he embarked in H.M.A.S. *Murchison* (Lieutenant-Commander A. N. Dollard, R.A.N.) for a trip among the mud-flats. When about five cables from the mouth of the River Yesong the *Murchison* came under heavy fire from a number of concealed guns and mortars, from three villages on the north shore at a range of about 2000 yards. She immediately returned the fire. At the end of her beat she had to stop, turn on her anchor, and run the gauntlet on her return journey, when she was again engaged. H.M.A.S. *Murchison* succeeded in knocking out one gun; though herself hit four times, the damage was negligible, and there was only one slight casualty. Admiral Dyer was much impressed with the admirable way in which Lieutenant-Commander Dollard handled his ship and with the bearing of his men in action, and subsequently sent him a very appreciative letter.

On 30th September H.M.A.S. *Murchison*, again patrolling in the same area ('Sickle') came under even heavier fire; she was holed in several places, luckily without serious damage, and suffered three casualties, one of them severely wounded.

The enemy on this occasion included a platoon of riflemen hidden in paddy-fields. The heaviest fire came from new positions covering the western end of 'Sickle' and 'Piccadilly' channels. H.M.A.S. *Murchison*'s fire temporarily silenced the opposition, but it was virtually impossible to deal with all the guns.² Admiral Scott-Moncrieff considered it very fortunate that she received no damage impairing her steering or manoeuvring, which could only have resulted in the stranding and probable loss of the ship.

As already mentioned, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff had never seen eye to eye with Admiral Dyer either as to the value or method of execution of these frigate operations, and after this, he decided to restrict their movements in the estuary to the southern channel ('Lambeth') when it was necessary to bombard Yonan

¹ By the time the frigates were finally withdrawn from the Han, some 85 000 soundings had been taken, and 33 buoys had been laid in channels covering about 26 miles.

² These were assessed as follows: Two or three 75-mm guns, two 50-mm anti-tank guns, three or four mortars and three or four 11-mm machine-guns. Of these batteries, one 75-mm, two mortars and two machine-guns were probably destroyed.

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


Figure 12. Han estuary : channels and patrols. August - November 1951

from 'Knife-edge'; bombardment of the north shore further east was to be carried out from 'Fork' anchorage. With these instructions, Admiral Dyer, after his recent experience in H.M.A.S. *Murchison*, concurred; but he declined to sanction any reduction in the number of frigates employed in the Han.¹

This enemy opposition was of course not unexpected. It was only surprising that it had not occurred before. But as Admiral Scott-Moncrieff had foreseen, it brought the question of prestige to the fore and could not be allowed to pass unchallenged.

An operation known as 'Retribution' was therefore laid on, which had as its object the razing of the villages and destruction of all cover on the strip of coast west of the River Yesong.

Operation Retribution started on 3rd October. H.M.S. *Black Swan* (Captain Norfolk) made a feint up Piccadilly to induce the guns to reveal themselves; this was synchronized with air attacks on villages and gun emplacements north of Sickie by aircraft from U.S.S. *Rendova*, using H.E. bombs, napalm bombs, rockets, and cannon.

Villages were left burning, and then H.M.S. *Black Swan* bombarded various targets (with air spot) till dark, continuing harassing fire throughout the night. Heavier air strikes and bombardments by the *Black Swan* and *Rotoiti* were carried out during the next two days; much damage was done, but enemy guns continued to fire ranging shots into Sickie daily from various positions. The treatment was continued for some days, but even using napalm it was surprising how small an area could be devastated.

On 7th October the C.-in-C., Far Eastern Fleet, Vice-Admiral the Hon. Sir Guy Russell, paid a brief visit to the estuary, where H.M.S. *St Bride's Bay* (Commander W. G. C. Elder) had just relieved the *Black Swan* as senior officer. Accompanied by Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff he embarked in H.M.N.Z.S. *Rotoiti* (Lieutenant-Commander Turner) and proceeded by 'Lambeth' channel—navigationally the most hazardous—to 'Knife-edge', where a short bombardment was carried out. This was the *Rotoiti's* last operational day before sailing for New Zealand; her relief, H.M.N.Z.S. *Taupo* (Lieutenant-Commander K. A. Cradock-Hartopp, R.N.) arrived in the theatre of war on 10th October, and at once took her place in the Han.

¹ Admiral Scott-Moncrieff's views at this time were as follows:

'The latest professed aim of the operations was, to quote Commander Task Force 95, "to demonstrate naval control of northern River Han estuary approaches". It has been repeatedly pointed out to Commander Task Force 95 that the frigates in the Han were doing no such thing, but were only in the northern channel by kind permission of the Communists; that the effect of this type of demonstration on the oriental negotiators . . . was of very doubtful value; and that in any case the same effect could be achieved by . . . one ship . . . permanently stationed at Fork, with occasional appearances by a large number of ships for a day or so; or, if the army attached such great importance to the gun-fire and noise, by positioning a number of guns on the friendly-held islands of Kangwha do and Kyodong do.

The . . . first occasion on which the enemy showed any serious resentment of our presence . . . has left no doubt who in fact does control the northern River Han estuary approaches . . . Even though to some extent, by having persisted in the original operation too long, the United Nations Command may now lose some prestige due to our inability to use these channels, I am quite certain that the loss of prestige would be infinitely more serious if one of our frigates was piled up on a mud-bank for a whole tide or longer, and within close range of the enemy's guns.'

F.O. 2i/c. Covering letter to frigates' reports, in M.0 2799/51.

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As time went on, new enemy batteries were installed, and the frigates were ordered to remain in Fork anchorage altogether. From there, bombardments with air spot, supplemented by air strikes, were carried out for 'demonstration' purposes at least twice daily, including one to influence the peace talks at 1015, the time at which the negotiators when in conference were expected to assemble. Gun-fire support, too, was given to friendly guerrillas from Kangwha do, who made several raids on the north shore, covered by the J.M.L.s. In mid-October, H.M.S. *Amethyst* developed a new bombardment technique, which gave satisfactory results. This consisted of landing a rear observing party operating from the top of a high hill on Kangwha do while H.M.N.Z.S. *Taupo* did similarly on Kyodong do.

On 29th October, for the first time a destroyer—H.M.S. *Comus* (Commander C. E. Pollock)—entered the Han. An unexpected complication arose as she experienced much more difficulty than the frigates in the strong tidal streams in Fork. Even with two anchors down and constantly steaming to them she dragged periodically at alarming speed across the estuary.¹ An anchorage comparatively clear of the tideway was found for her just north of Songmo do ('Spoon'), and she then did invaluable execution with her heavier armament, firing over a hill with the frigate in the forward anchorage acting as spotter. She remained in the estuary for nine days.

The 31st October was the hundredth day since the start of the operations in July. In this period, 235 ship-days had been spent in the estuary by twelve of H.M. ships, and 15 370 rounds of 4-inch ammunition had been expended on the enemy.

They had made 74 passages of the entrance channel, and steamed about 2100 miles, in the course of which there had been fourteen groundings, fortunately none of them serious; 26 miles of channels had been surveyed and buoyed.

For reasons of prestige, occasional sorties were made from Fork when air cover from T.E. 95·11 was available. For example, H.M.S. *Amethyst* bombarded Yonan from Knife-edge on 30th October, and H.M.S. *Black Swan* fired at coastal targets and gun positions from 'Cutlass' on 3rd November. On each occasion, H.M.S. *Comus* stood by to give covering fire from Fork. But such sorties were exceptional, and with the ships confined to Fork, the frigates were no longer acting as even mobile batteries; they were in fact contained in the Han, with the initiative largely in enemy hands, and Admiral Scott-Moncrieff became increasingly anxious to withdraw them.

By this time, negotiations over the cease-fire line were at last making progress, and on 10th November Admiral Dyer sanctioned the reduction of the force to one frigate and one J.M.L. H.M.A.S. *Murchison* and H.M.S. *Whitesand Bay*, who had recently returned from a long refit, were then in the estuary. The latter sailed to join T.E. 95·12, and the *Murchison*, who had been a 'founder member' of the force in July, and had spent considerably more time in the estuary than any other ship, remained alone till 16th November, when the *Whitesand Bay* returned to take her place. The *Whitesand Bay* in turn was relieved by H.M.S. *Mounts Bay*

¹ The only explanation put forward for this unexpected phenomenon was that the fierce tide scoured away all the mud from under the anchor and cable until they were left lying on bare rock. The frigates no doubt were helped by their hull form, though they were liable to drag near spring tides.

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on 23rd November, and on the 30th, the demarcation of the cease-fire line having at last been settled, the operations were brought to a close.

' Whatever the value of these operations as a contribution to the peace talks ', wrote Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff,

' there is no doubt that they have maintained the prestige of the Commonwealth Navies, and the determination and resolution with which they were carried through, especially by commanding officers and navigating officers, often under unpleasant, and always under trying conditions, has been in accordance with the best traditions of the Service .'¹

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During the frigate operations in the Han estuary just described, the normal blockade and patrol activities covering the Cigarette route, the Yalu Gulf, and the Haeju areas had been carried on by Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff's depleted forces,² while the carriers of T.E. 95·11 concentrated their offensive efforts mainly on the Han estuary, and in the Taedong and northern Hwanghae areas.

There were also periodical operations designed to influence the armistice talks. For example, at the start of the River Han demonstration in July, a complementary operation 25 miles to the westward, in the Haeju estuary, was ordered by Admiral Dyer. U.S.S. *Los Angeles*, which chanced to be at Inchon at the time, was sent there accompanied by a couple of minesweepers.³ This operation was not a success. While the minesweeping was in progress, she was able to reach only ' very small and rather worthless ' targets on the Chongyong Myon peninsula, which was subsequently discovered to be entirely friendly. Confusion was caused by her transference to Admiral Scott-Moncrieff's operational control, after she had received a large number of preliminary orders from Admiral Dyer. ' The command system was at its worst ', wrote Admiral Scott-Moncrieff, ' but I could do no more than be extremely sorry for the commanding officer'⁴

On 29th July H.M.S. *Ceylon* (Captain Thring) arrived from the east coast to take over the duties of C.T.E. 95·12, which included the Han estuary operations, and she relieved U.S.S. *Los Angeles* at Haeju. The *Ceylon* found the same difficulties as to worth-while targets, but by this time four American A.M.S.s⁵ had been made available, and Admiral Scott-Moncrieff ordered them to sweep as far up the main channel to Haeju as they could get. This was done under the direction of Captain Williams, U.S.N., who arrived in U.S.S. *Colonial* (L.S.D.). ' As usual ', remarked the Admiral, ' the enthusiasm and teamwork of these minesweepers was admirable.' And by 4th August, channels had been swept to positions from which

¹ F.O. 2i/c. Covering letter to final frigate R.o.P.s, in M.0628/52.

² In addition to the absence of the frigates in the Han, H.M. Ships *Cossack*, *Consort*, *Charity* and *Cockade* were taking part in U.S. hunter-killer A/S exercises off Okinawa, between 18th and 30th July.

³ U.S. Ships *Kite*, *Redhead*.

⁴ F.O. 2i/c R.o.P. No. 39.

⁵ U.S. Ships *Kite*, *Redhead*, *Osprey*, *Chatterer*.

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Haeju city itself and the railway line could be brought under gun-fire.¹ H.M.A.S. *Warramunga* (Captain Becher) proceeded to the area on 1st August. On this, her last operational visit to the west coast before sailing for Australia,² she delivered some 'admirable bombardments, highly reported on by the air spotters'; and H.M.C.S. *Cayuga* (Commander J. Plomer, R.C.N.) did the same a few days later.

In the Choda area there were indications that the enemy was meditating operations against Sok to in the southern approach to Chinnampo. There was a troop concentration on the mainland to the southward of the island, and two 120-mm guns periodically opened fire on it from the Amgak peninsula, five miles to the eastward. These afforded targets for the Cigarette patrol, a duty carried out by H. Neth. M.S. *Van Galen*, H.M.A.S. *Warramunga*, H.M.C.S. *Cayuga*, and H.M.S. *Consort* at different times; H.M.S. *Kenya* which had relieved the *Ceylon* on 7th August bombarded the guns on Amgak peninsula on 12th August, and, according to the air spotter from U.S.S. *Sicily*, knocked out the emplacement.

Between 16th and 24th August 1951, the naval operations were interrupted by typhoon 'Marge'. Warning of its approach was given by the Commander, 7th Fleet, during the afternoon of the 16th, and all commanders were authorized to remove ships from confined waters in the war area. The frigates were at once withdrawn from the Han, and later T.E. 95·12 and T.E. 95·11 proceeded to the southward.

Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff had left Sasebo that day with the intention of spending a few days at sea on board H.M.S. *Glory*. He met her on 17th August north of the Makau Islands, and having transferred his flag to her, concentrated the ships of the two task elements³ and moved to the latitude of Quelpart Island in order to get sea room. There he cruised waiting to see what the typhoon would do. Reports as to its probable course were contradictory; but it was clear that it had slowed up, and for the next 30 hours the weather in the Yellow Sea remained perfect. 'I had visions of the enemy seizing his opportunities', wrote Admiral Scott-Moncrieff, 'laying mines in the Cigarette route and the Han estuary; of landing on Sok to; and a number of possibilities . . .' But he felt it essential to keep full sea room, especially as the *Glory's* deck park of aircraft was a source of anxiety.

By the forenoon of 19th August, the fuel of some of the escorts was running low, and the *Cardigan Bay*, *Morecambe Bay*, *Murchison*, and *Cayuga* were detached to shelter in the Inchon area, while the *Glory*, *Ceylon*, *Kenya*, *Charity*, and *Concord* steered to the southward. That evening, the weather started to deteriorate and next day it was blowing force 10 with a heavy confused sea and a 30-foot swell.

¹ Channels were swept as far as 37° 48·5' N., 125° 47·7' E. (fifteen miles from Haeju) in the eastern channel for the cruiser, and to 37° 51·3' N. (beyond which obstructions were found) in the main channel for destroyers (twelve miles from Haeju).

² H.M.A.S. *Warramunga* left the war area on 15th August 1951. Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff remarked: 'She has been a tower of strength and done an incredible amount of steaming with no troubles at all. I cannot speak too highly of Captain D. H. Becher and his men . . .' F.O. 2i/c R.o.P. No. 40. Her place was taken by H.M.A.S. *Anzac* (Commander J. Plunkett-Cole, R.A.N.).

³ H.M. Ships *Glory*, *Ceylon*, *Kenya*, *Charity*, *Concord*, *Morecambe Bay*, and H.M.C.S. *Cayuga*. H.M.S. *Cardigan Bay* and H.M.A.S. *Murchison*, being due for relief, were detached to Kure; but further reports of the typhoon indicated that it would reach there just as they were arriving, and they rejoined the flag next morning.

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The ships stood up to it well; the aircraft on the *Glory's* flight-deck were unharmed, and the only damage was to the cruisers' whalers, each of them losing her starboard seaboat turned in at the davits. The force put into Buckner Bay, Okinawa, on 21st August, and the destroyers completed with fuel. Admiral Scott-Moncrieff left for Sasebo in the *Kenya* that afternoon, leaving the other ships there till next morning, by which time it was hoped that 'Marge', then menacing the China coast in the vicinity of the Saddle Islands, would be clear. Conditions on the 22nd, however, had not improved, the typhoon having turned north across the Shantung promontory and later twisted further to the eastward; it eventually passed south of Inchon and across Korea on the 23rd.

By the evening of 22nd August it was plain that there could be no operations before the 24th, the day on which U.S.S. *Sicily* was due to relieve H.M.S. *Glory*, so the latter was ordered direct from Okinawa to Kure, escorted by the *Charity* and *Concord*. While on passage, the *Concord* lost a man overboard; despite the rough weather, she recovered him in nine minutes, using a whaler—a fine feat of seamanship on the part of her commanding officer, Lieutenant-Commander McLaughlan.

Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff shifted his flag to H.M.S. *Ladybird* on arrival at Sasebo on 22nd August, and on the 25th H.M.S. *Kenya* left the war area to refit and recommission at Singapore. One of the veterans of the war, she had then steamed over 63 000 miles and had fired 3386 6-inch and nearly 1000 4-inch projectiles; she had also rescued ten airmen from the sea. On the same day, operations on the west coast recommenced, the task element and units being composed as follows:

T.E. 95·11. U.S.S. *Sicily*, H.M.A.S. *Anzac*, H.M.C.S. *Cayuga*, U.S. Ships *Perkins*, *Kidd*.

T.U. 95·12·1. H.M. Ships *Ceylon* (Captain Thring), *Charity*, H.M.N.Z.S. *Rotoiti*.

T.U. 95·12·2. (Han estuary) H.M. Ships *Mounts Bay*, *Morecambe Bay*, H.M.N.Z.S. *Hawea*.

No time was lost in resuming the activities so rudely interrupted, T.U. 95·12·2 working in the Han estuary as already described, and the element and other unit in the Yellow Sea. U.S.S. *Sicily* experienced good weather conditions and put up a high rate of offensive sorties till relieved by H.M.S. *Glory* on 31st August. In spite of scarcity of targets the main effort was still required to be put into the Han area, but strikes were also laid on in the Amgak region, and spotting aircraft were provided wherever requested.

Captain Thring first took T.U. 95·12·1 to the Ping Yang inlet and Cigarette area. It will be remembered that before the intrusion of the typhoon, there had been threats to Sok to from the Amgak peninsula and Wolsa-ri. These positions were subjected to bombardments by the *Ceylon* and *Charity* throughout 25th August. Much of the intelligence of enemy intentions and troop concentrations had of late proved entirely unreliable, so a small raid was laid on that night with the object of capturing prisoners to obtain corroboration. While H.M.S. *Ceylon* continued bombardments, a party consisting of three Royal Marines from the *Ceylon* and three A.B.s from the *Rotoiti* under Lieutenant J. A. Hunter, R.M., with a

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beach defence party of seven Royal Marines and four A.B.s under Lieutenant R. S. F. Webber, R.N., was landed at Sogon-ni, covered by H.M.S. *Charity*. After proceeding half a mile inland the raiding party surprised an enemy strong-point. A fight ensued, and the enemy were silenced by a well-directed grenade, but not before one able seaman had been killed. By this time, the neighbourhood was thoroughly alerted, and, in accordance with previous orders, the party withdrew.

The following morning, the *Ceylon*, *Charity*, and *Rotoiti*, after some further bombardment of Amgak, blasted the strong-point at Sogon-ni with gun-fire while proceeding south to Pengyong do for a meeting with Lieutenant-Colonel Ergott, U.S.A., who had relieved Lieutenant-Colonel Burke as head of the Leopard organization. From there, H.M.S. *Charity* proceeded north to patrol off the Yalu, while H.M.S. *Ceylon* looked in at Haeju, where, on 27th August, she bombarded the few enemy positions known to exist in the Chongyong Myon peninsula.

The possibility that the enemy had taken advantage of the absence of U.N. patrols during typhoon 'Marge' to lay mines could not be overlooked, and check-sweeping operations in the vicinity of Taedong, Choda, and Sok to were undertaken by R.o.K. minesweepers, working under the direction of H.M.N.Z.S. *Rotoiti* (Lieutenant-Commander Turner), who 'set about this with his usual vigour'.¹ These operations were extended to the Chinnampo approaches and further north as time went on.

A somewhat unfortunate raid was carried out early on 30th August. Its object was to round up a number of enemy troops reported by Leopard to be in Chonidong (38° 11' 10'' N., 124° 46' 50'' E.) near Mongumpo. No serious opposition was expected, but the raid was on a larger scale than heretofore, the landing party consisting of two platoons of Royal Marines and one of stoker-mechanics from H.M.S. *Ceylon*. The assault party, H.Q. and one Marine platoon, under Captain H. E. Kelsey-Burge, R.M., was to be followed ashore by the two remaining platoons, if the beach-head was established.

H.M. Ships *Ceylon* and *Concord*, and H.M.N.Z.S. *Rotoiti* approached in darkness to positions between one and two miles from the beach, and as soon as it was light enough for daylight spotting, delivered a heavy twelve-minute bombardment, while the assault party, accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Ergott, U.S.A., himself, proceeded inshore in an L.C.V.P. previously embarked at Sasebo. The bombardment was then lifted inshore and the party landed. As they deployed across the beach, an accurate and heavy mortar and small-arms fire opened from the flanks. The fire was returned, and covering bombardment was renewed while the party withdrew and re-embarked, but fifteen casualties, one of them serious, were suffered. Except for the coolness of Captain Burge and all concerned, including the L.C.V.P. crew, the losses would have been heavier. A heavy bombardment was continued after they left the shore, and the enemy must have sustained a large number of casualties. The next day, aircraft from U.S.S. *Sicily* attacked a canvas-covered position and supply dumps a short distance inland with satisfactory results. There could be no doubt that information of the intended raid had leaked out, and Admiral Scott-Moncrieff ordered such activities to be discontinued in future, unless C.T.E. 95·12 could be certain he was not being double-crossed.

H.M.S. *Ceylon*, with the casualties on board, proceeded to the southward and turned over the duties of C.T.E. 95·12 to H.M.S. *Belfast* (Captain Sir Aubrey

¹ F.O. 2i/c R.o.P. No. 40.

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St Clair-Ford) off Quelpart Island. The *Belfast*, in which the Chief Staff Officer, Captain Villiers, was embarked, had just returned from a long refit, so Captain St Clair-Ford first visited Inchon, Pengyong do, Choda etc., including the Han estuary, in order to get into the picture. The bombardments in the Amgak, Sogon-ni, and Mongumpo areas were continued on 3rd, 4th, and 5th September by her or H.M.C.S. *Cayuga*, who had relieved H.M.N.Z.S. *Rotoiti* in the Cigarette area. H.M.S. *Belfast* was relieved as C.T.E. 95·12 by H.M.S. *Cossack* (Captain V. C. Begg) on 10th September.

H.M.S. *Glory*, meanwhile, had been on patrol since 1st September. The weather was consistently fine, with good visibility. Catapult trouble impeded the flying programme on two or three days, but an average of over 50 sorties a day was maintained, and on 9th September a total of 84 sorties (66 offensive; eighteen defensive) was achieved.¹ The main air effort was directed on the Han, but the Chinnampo and Chongchon estuaries also received attention; many junks and sampans were destroyed, and a number of roads and bridges in Hwanghae were damaged. Spotting aircraft were provided for the bombardments, and during the last few days, close air support was afforded to the recently-formed British Commonwealth Division. Enemy light flak and small-arms fire had not abated, but, apart from a Firefly which was lost, only minor damage was sustained and there were no casualties to personnel. The Firefly was hit in the oil system by flak while carrying out a dive-bombing attack on 9th September; the pilot, Lieutenant Morris, succeeded in landing on mud-flats south-east of Haeju in enemy territory. The ship's helicopter rescued the crew, and the Firefly was then set on fire and destroyed. Two aircraft were damaged while making emergency landings on Pengyong do on 2nd September; they were left stranded on the island, but were salvaged some weeks later.²

U.S.S. *Sicily* took over from the *Glory* on 10th September and continued carrying out similar operations till the 16th. This was the *Sicily's* last patrol on the west coast before her relief by U.S.S. *Rendova*.

H.M.S. *Glory's* time in the war area, too, was drawing to a close, H.M.A.S. *Sydney* being on her way to take her place. Between 16th and 20th September she was employed on the east coast,³ returning to the west coast on the 21st. Her air operations were mainly concentrated on the Taedong area, and useful support was provided for a guerrilla raid on the Amgak peninsula. H.M.S. *Belfast*, flying Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff's flag, joined T.E. 95·11 on 22nd September, and the Admiral boarded H.M.S. *Glory* to witness 'the flying operations by this most efficient carrier'.⁴ Trouble was again experienced with the catapult, which somewhat reduced the number of sorties flown; and as the result of a RATOG failure, a Firefly crashed just ahead of the ship. Acting Sub-Lieutenant R. G. A. Davey, the observer, lost his life, but the pilot, Mr J. P. Hack, was rescued by the helicopter, as was the Air Group Commander, Lieutenant-Commander S. J. Hall, when his Sea Fury was hit by flak and forced to ditch north of Chopekki Point on 24th September.

¹ The final event consisted of nineteen aircraft and when they were launched every aircraft carried was airborne. Serviceability throughout the day was 100 per cent.

² See p. 179.

³ See Section 72.

⁴ F.O. 2i/c R.o.P. No. 41.

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U.S.S. *Rendova* (Captain E. Fickling, U.S.N.) sailed from Sasebo for her first patrol on the west coast on 25th September escorted by H.M.C. Ships *Athabaskan* and *Sioux*, in the latter of which was embarked Rear-Admiral W. B. Creery, R.C.N., CANFLAGPAC, who was visiting the Canadian ships in the war area. The *Rendova* carried a new air group equipped with new aircraft, and did not experience the difficulties that beset the *Sicily* on her first patrol. She at once put up a high rate of performance, averaging a steady 38 sorties a day. Rear-Admiral Creery transferred to H.M.C.S. *Athabaskan* on the 26th, and joined T.E. 95·12 for a short period in order to see something of its work, after which he proceeded to Kure in H.M.S. *Charity*.

Meanwhile, the operations of the surface blockade forces continued without a pause. The ships were worked very hard. In addition to bombardments and blockade patrols, escorts for fleet auxiliaries and important shipping had to be fitted in, and screening destroyers to be provided for the carriers of T.E. 95·11—a commitment aggravated by the not infrequently sudden withdrawal of one or both American destroyers by Admiral Dyer for other duties; and the River Han demonstration was a constant drain on the frigates.

Between 15th and 24th September, Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff visited the various centres of activity in H.M.S. *Belfast*. There had been an increase in the patrol activities in the north, between the entrances to the Rivers Yalu and Chongchon, partly owing to reports of coastal traffic, and partly to support the various clandestine organizations based on several of the islands in that neighbourhood. Admiral Scott-Moncrieff took the opportunity to visit this area on 17th September, accompanied by H.M.S. *Cossack*, who had previously ascertained that a cruiser could negotiate the narrow channel east of Sinmi do as far north as 39° 32' N. From this position, H.M.S. *Belfast* carried out a night bombardment of the main railway line in the vicinity of Kwaksan, and the *Cossack* was detached to bombard a gun position on the Chorusan peninsula. Fire was opened on the two ships while passing Sinmi do, but was speedily silenced. This was the first time enemy positions had been attacked by ships' gun-fire so far north on the west coast. Next day, H.M.S. *Belfast* carried out a number of short bombardments in the Haeju area, on her way to Inchon, where Admiral Scott-Moncrieff remained a couple of days and met a number of local authorities, including Major-General Cassells at the 1st Commonwealth Divisional Headquarters at Choksang. The Admiral visited the Han estuary in H.M.A.S. *Murchison* on 21st September,¹ and rejoining H.M.S. *Belfast* proceeded north that night to Sinmi do, and again bombarded the Kwaksan railway installations, withdrawing before daylight to join H.M.S. *Glory*, and eventually returning to Sasebo on the 24th.

Meanwhile, on 20th September, Leopard had reported that about 200 Chinese Communists had ejected friendly forces from the island of Wolto (39° 42' N., 124° 35' E.), west of the Chorusan peninsula. H.M.S. *Cossack* proceeded at once to the position and bombarded the island and positions on the adjacent mainland.

On 22nd September, the two aircraft from H.M.S. *Glory*² that had been stranded on Pengyong do were salvaged. An L.S.U., borrowed from the Commander, Fleet Activities, at Inchon, arrived at the island escorted by H.M.S. *St Bride's Bay* on the 20th. There she dried out and landed a mobile crane. Both aircraft were

¹ See Section 70.

² See p. 178.

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successfully embarked next day, and transferred to H.M.S. *Unicorn* (Captain J. Y. Thompson), who arrived on the 22nd, escorted by H.M. Ships *Cossack* and *Comus*. This date chanced to be the anniversary of the *Unicorn's* departure from the United Kingdom; to celebrate the event, as well as the visit to the operational area after many months of hard and monotonous ferry work, she then proceeded north across the 38th parallel and carried out a couple of short, sharp bombardments against positions on Chopekki Point, thereby becoming the first aircraft-carrier to carry out a direct bombardment in the war. On the conclusion of this operation, H.M.S. *Black Swan* (Captain Norfolk) took over as C.T.E. 95·12, and the *Cossack* and *Sioux* (from T.E. 95·11) escorted the *Unicorn* back to Sasebo.

On 24th September, H.M.S. *Comus* supported a raid by Leopard's guerrillas on the Amgak peninsula. The landing was made soon after midnight, using their own boats; the party returned at 0600, bringing with them nine prisoners, including a North Korean colonel accompanied by his concubine. The former expressed himself as 'fed up' with the war. By this time, the main body of Communist troops had been alerted by the raid, and H.M.S. *Comus's* gun-fire, and strikes by aircraft from H.M.S. *Glory* were effectively brought into play.

Another guerrilla raid in the Pungchon area (south-east of Choda) on 29th September was supported by H.M.S. *Comus* and U.S.S. *Taussig*; the latter was Admiral Dyer's escort during his visit and was lent by him for the purpose. Much to the visitors' disappointment, there was no opposition and consequently no call for fire.

That evening, Captain Norfolk received an urgent call from Leopard for support against enemy forces threatening the islands of Yuk to and Mahap to (Taedong Bay). These islands are only about ten miles from Pengyong do, Leopard's headquarters, about whose security, alarm had been felt for some time. H.M. Ships *Black Swan* and *Comus* both proceeded to the vicinity and carried out bombardments against the reported troop concentrations and gun positions; and one or other of them remained in the vicinity for the next two days, by which time the anxiety had died down.

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On the east coast meanwhile, operations continued on the usual pattern during the first months of the armistice wrangles, but, as elsewhere, at an increased tempo. The aircraft of T.F. 77 were almost entirely confined to attempts to cut the enemy communications from the north. These efforts were supplemented at intervals by bombardments at suitable places by the battleship and cruisers of the 7th Fleet.

Rear-Admiral Dyer's destroyers and frigates of T.F. 95 were virtually reduced to the defensive role of keeping Songjin and Wonsan, especially the latter, open for the use of U.N. forces.

The policy of employing one or two Commonwealth ships on the east coast continued, except when the increased demands on the west coast rendered this impossible. H.M.S. *Morecambe Bay* (Commander J. Farnol) was there between 8th and 23rd July. The coastal rail route had been reopened, as the aircraft had been diverted to targets further inland, and the *Morecambe Bay* succeeded in

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picking off a number of trains in the Songjin area, a performance which elicited a congratulatory signal from the Commander, 7th Fleet, on her prowess.

Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff visited Wonsan in H.M.S. *Kenya* between 24th and 26th July. The enemy had much to gain from the bargaining point of view at the armistice talks if he could drive the ships out and recapture some of the islands, and he speedily took advantage of the breathing space on shore to reinforce the troops and defences there. By mid-July there were more than 40 gun positions in the vicinity and over 20 000 troops were reported to be in Hodo Pando peninsula alone. At the time of the *Kenya's* visit, in addition to the usual destroyers and cruiser, two L.S.M.R.s had been at Wonsan for over three weeks; the latter had fired more than 10 000 rockets in twenty days. Whenever the shore batteries opened fire, Operation War Dance was carried out. Admiral Scott-Moncrieff remarked that this must have been very stimulating to the enemy, and likened it to 'stirring up a wasp's nest with a stick from a safe distance, and then waiting till it settles down before prodding it again'.¹ The navigational dangers of this manoeuvre with more than two ships present struck him as being greater than those from the enemy gun-fire.

After a couple of days, H.M.S. *Kenya* returned to Sasebo, and H.M.S. *Ceylon* took her place. The *Ceylon* was not long at Wonsan, as she was required to relieve U.S.S. *Los Angeles* at Haeju on 29th July, but her visit was not without its excitements. While taking part in a War Dance she was narrowly missed both by Allied destroyers and enemy gun-fire. Owing to the preoccupation of the T.F. 77 aircraft with interdiction, air spotting was seldom available for bombardments, but on the one day when it was available, H.M.S. *Ceylon* acquitted herself so well that the Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, subsequently asked for the details of her fire-control equipment, the spotter having reported it as the best shooting he had ever seen.

Between the 10th and 25th August, Rear-Admiral Dyer paid a visit to the east coast with his flag in U.S.S. *Toledo*, escorted by H. Neth. M.S. *Van Galen* (Commander Valkenberg). The *Van Galen* got in a number of bombardments at various places and earned high praise for her efficiency, and in particular for her anticipation of requirements when manoeuvring. 'I know that this is fully deserved', wrote Admiral Scott-Moncrieff, 'and I cannot but feel that this is the fruit of British training, but this matter of initiative by junior officers never fails to surprise the U.S. Navy.'²

With this additional destroyer commitment and the all-out effort of the frigates in the Han in full swing, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff was unable to spare the usual ship for duty on the east coast till 17th August, when H.M.S. *Consort* (Commander Carr) joined the Wonsan element, and remained there, except for occasional patrols, until relieved by H.M.S. *Cossack* (Captain Begg) on 24th August. Save for a few War Dances, the *Consort* had no particular excitements; but the *Cossack* was promptly straddled by a shore battery while entering harbour to take over, in the channel between Yo do and Ung do. She therefore found herself involved in a War Dance even before she had received the local orders, and was in some doubt at first which way she should go round. It subsequently transpired that the enemy had at last got a battery on Hodo Pando registered on this focal point,

¹ F.O. 2i/c R.o.P. No. 39.

² F.O. 2i/c R.o.P. No. 40.

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and thereafter it was necessary to have one of the destroyers carrying out neutralizing fire every time a new ship entered harbour.

After 48 hours at Wonsan, Captain Begg was sent north to take charge of the Songjin element as C.T.E. 95·22. He remained there until relieved by H.M.S. *Charity* (Lieutenant-Commander Worth) on 3rd September. During this time H.M.S. *Cossack* supervised the establishment of a R.o.K. Marine garrison on the island of Yang do, fifteen miles to the north of Songjin, whence some covert activities had been conducted. The usual harassing bombardments were carried out day and night; both the *Consort* and the *Cossack* obtained the services of spotting aircraft from T.F. 77 on a number of occasions.

During H.M.S. *Charity's* patrol, the enemy made a sudden determined effort to use the railway with a shuttle service between Tanchon and Songjin. For many weeks this line had been believed to be dead, but soon after her arrival it became apparent that the enemy was using it, thanks to their technique of erecting temporary bridges by night and removing them by day.¹ The *Charity* carried out some very successful bombardments, for which she was able to get air support and air spot. She herself came under fire on 10th September, but by the 13th the railway traffic was again at a standstill.

Meanwhile, reports from the U.S. airmen at Wonsan stated that the enemy was building up large defences again in the town itself and close to the harbour, whence previously they had withdrawn out of ships' gun range. During his visit there Rear-Admiral Dyer decided that a co-ordinated attack by carrier aircraft, cruisers, destroyers and L.S.M.R.s on these installations would pay a good dividend. The operation was approved by Vice-Admiral Martin who, however, was not prepared to divert the aircraft of T.F. 77 from their interdiction activities for the purpose.

Accordingly, a force was formed known as T.G. 95·9, of which Admiral Dyer himself took command, consisting of U.S. Ships *Toledo* (flag) and *Craig*, H.M.S. *Glory* (then at Kure), and three Commonwealth destroyers; on arrival at Wonsan it was joined by three U.S. destroyers—the *Parks*, *Orleck*, and *Moore*—and three L.S.M.R.s. T.G. 95·9 arrived off Wonsan early on the 18th September. H.M.S. *Glory*, screened by H.M.C. Ships *Sioux* and *Cayuga* and H.M.S. *Concord* operated to seaward, while the destroyers and L.S.M.R.s entered the harbour. U.S.S. *Toledo* stood by in the outer anchorage to provide anti-flak fire with her 5-inch guns.

H.M.S. *Glory* flew 68 sorties² on 18th September, made up of three strikes of sixteen each, plus bombardment spotting and C.A.P. sorties; anti-submarine patrols for the Carrier Element were flown by U.S.N. Mariners. In spite of some low cloud over the target area, good results were obtained, though as it was necessary to clear the area for bombardment immediately after attacking, the assessment of damage was very difficult.

On the second day (19th), flying operations were hampered, firstly by bad weather, and later by a catapult defect, so only 21 sorties were laid on before T.G. 95·9 was dissolved that evening, and H.M.S. *Glory* returned to the west

¹ This clever technique had been frequently reported, and on this occasion it was actually seen.

² Impressed by H.M.S. *Glory's* fine performance of 84 sorties on 9th September Admiral Dyer had hoped for 84 sorties on each day of the Wonsan attack. It was explained to him that she could not keep this up for two days in succession, and he then accepted a target of 66 each day—i.e., two per aeroplane per day.

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coast, calling at Sasebo. From what was seen it appeared very doubtful that the reported activities in Wonsan were actually taking place. The whole city seemed to be dead. Very little flak was encountered, and U.S.S. *Toledo* remained in the outer area the whole time. Some slight opposition from Kalma Gak was met by the destroyers, U.S.S. *Craig* being fired on. The attacks by the L.S.M.R.s were described as most impressive.

H.M.A.S. *Anzac* (Commander Plunkett-Cole, R.A.N.) took over from H.M.S. *Charity* as C.T.E. 95·22 on 13th September and remained in the Songjin area till the 26th. The *Anzac* had an interesting spell of duty which included patrols to Changjin, support of the garrison at Yang do, landing intelligence teams, and some 'train-hunting'. On the 19th, she recovered a downed pilot, Lieutenant P. M. Fant, U.S.N., belonging to U.S.S. *Boxer*, from the sea off Changjin. Oddly enough he turned out to be an old acquaintance of one of the *Anzac's* officers, Lieutenant-Commander Buchanan, whose radio operator he had been eight years before during World War II at Fort Lauderdale, Florida.

H.M.S. *Belfast* (Captain Sir Aubrey St Clair-Ford) spent five days on the east coast between 26th and 30th September, as Admiral Dyer, who was visiting the west coast in U.S.S. *Toledo* at the time, asked for a cruiser to take her place. Bombardments were carried out at Wonsan, Tanchon and Songjin, and on the night of 28th September, she covered a small raid by a troop belonging to the 41st R.M. Commando, some account of whose fortunes will now be given.

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After many weeks of comparative inactivity at Camp McGill, the 41st R.M. Commando came under the command of C.T.F. 95, Rear-Admiral Dyer, for duties on the east coast during the period under review. It will be remembered that during his visit to Tokyo in June, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff had suggested to Admiral Joy that the Commando might find a fruitful field for its activities on the east coast.¹ As a preliminary, Captain Villiers, who had been involved in planning operations of the Special Boat Section and Aegean raiders forces during World War II,² and Colonel Drysdale visited Wonsan and Songjin in H.M.S. *Ceylon* to investigate the possibilities of employing the Commando in a similar manner there.

As on the west coast, there was a large number of individualistic clandestine intelligence organizations, most of which had gravitated to Wonsan, where they had their headquarters on various islands, principally Yo do. The plan eventually put forward by Admiral Scott-Moncrieff included co-ordination with these organizations and with C.T.G. 95·2, the naval commander at Wonsan. This would confer the advantage of using common intelligence, and would also be of great benefit to the morale and training of the R.o.K. Marine island garrison, which at the time was somewhat shaken. Admiral Scott-Moncrieff's recommendations for the employment of the R.M. Commando were based on its mobility. He visualized the mounting of a number of small raids at various places between the bomb-line and Changjin, and hoped, by exploiting surprise, to occupy large numbers of

¹ See Section 62.

² See Naval Staff History, Battle Summary No. 36, *Aegean Operations, 1943*.

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enemy troops, to force the enemy, in fact, to garrison the whole coast—a distance of some 350 miles.

Vice-Admiral Martin accepted the plan, but with reservations; it was clear to Admiral Scott-Moncrieff that the U.S. Navy was not really happy about employing the Commando in this manner and did not like the idea of leaving any latitude to the men on the spot. The Commando came under the operational control¹ of Admiral Dyer, but special clearance for each operation had to be obtained right up the chain of command to COMNAVFE (Admiral Joy); and the area of operations was limited to the immediate vicinity of Wonsan. There, a U.S.M.C. colonel was placed in over-all command of the R.M. Commando and the garrison, but not of the clandestine units.

One troop (C) of the Commando arrived at Wonsan on 14th July—three days after the start of the armistice talks—and moved into Yo do. The enemy threat of invasion to the islands off Wonsan was at this time being taken very seriously by the Americans, and the activities of the troop were at first limited to attacks on sampans in that area, which in Admiral Dyer's view were the priority target. Under no circumstances would he entertain any proposals for alternative operations outside the Wonsan area, such as had been visualized by Admiral Scott-Moncrieff. A second troop (B) arrived on 11th August, but, like the first, was merely used to strengthen the garrison of the Wonsan islands. This, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff felt, was a thoroughly unsatisfactory role for these highly specialized troops, and before a month had elapsed, he strongly recommended that 'the earliest possible opportunity should be taken to withdraw these troops from the theatre where they have been almost entirely wasted'.² The Admiralty, however, decided to leave them where they were for the time being; and throughout August and September two troops were maintained in Yo do and Mo do. Small-scale activities were constantly carried out. A number of reconnaissances on the southern end of Hodo Pando revealed defences far sparser and weaker than assessed by local intelligence reports; on Yomi do, on the other hand, much greater activity was found than expected. In the course of these operations a few casualties were incurred; one officer and one O.R. were killed in action during a beach survey patrol, and five Royal Marines were lost in a L.C.V.P. which broke down in bad weather. The shore fire-control party did much good work in spotting from Hwangto do and other islands. The islands came frequently under enemy fire, but no attempt at invasion materialized.

It was not until the end of September that the Commando was allowed to operate outside the Wonsan area. On the night of the 28th/29th, two simultaneous small raids were carried out from U.S.S. *Wantuck*, covered by H.M.S. *Belfast*, near Chaho (latitude 40° 10' N., longitude 128° 32' E.), some 50 miles SW. of Songjin on the railway track. The enemy was on the alert, and the raid was only partially successful. Covering fire from the *Belfast* inflicted a number of casualties on the enemy. A similar raid in the same vicinity was attempted, again from U.S.S. *Wantuck*, on the night of 4th/5th October; but the enemy spotted the canoeists before they could land and the raid was called off. It was estimated at this time

¹ Administrative control was exercised by C.T.G. 95.1, Captain Villiers, at Sasebo, where arrangements were made to accommodate the rest of the Commando. These arrived from Yokosuka on 31st August.

² F.O. 2i/c R.o.P. No. 39.

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that the enemy had a guard for every 100 yards of track; and while still convinced that raids such as these were the correct employment for the Commando, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff conceded that the enemy's knowledge that it was at Wonsan ready to raid had almost as much effect as the raids themselves.

Throughout October and November their activities were confined to the Wonsan area; but U.S.S. *Horace Bass* became available at the end of November, and two raids were carried out from her in the Tanchon area on 2nd and 3rd December. But the time of the Commando in the Far East was now drawing to a close, and early in December orders were issued to turn over their garrison duties to R.o.K. Marines and to return to Sasebo for release from the theatre of war. Before leaving, some successful attacks were made on junks in the inner harbour at Wonsan, and the west side of Hodo Pando.

Remarking on the Commando's activities, Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff subsequently wrote:

'Although not tactically employed as effectively as they should have been most of the time . . . there is little doubt that the presence of these troops and their employment on raiding activities was well known to the enemy from almost before they arrived in the Wonsan area. Shortly after this, the vigilance and defence all up and down the east coast improved. It can thus be said that their employment in containing the enemy in increasing numbers was profitable, and once again showed the value of raiding and potential raiding to contain troops out of all proportion to the raiding troops involved, provided they are properly trained and efficient, transportation is available, and their operations are co-ordinated with the main operational plans, both naval and military.'¹

The main body of the Commando reached Sasebo on Christmas Eve. On arrival there, signals, warmly expressing high appreciation of their achievements, were received by Lieutenant-Colonel F. N. Grant, who had succeeded Lieutenant-Colonel Drysdale in October, from Admirals Joy, Martin, and Dyer; and in 1957, the Commando was awarded the United States Presidential Citation for its services with the 1st Division U.S. Marine Corps seven years earlier.²

The 41st Independent Royal Marine Commando finally departed from the war area in the *Empire Orwell* on 21st January 1952.

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The beginning of October 1951, was marked by a visit to the war area by the C.-in-C., Far East Station, Vice-Admiral the Hon. Sir Guy Russell. The Admiral arrived at Kure in H.M.S. *Alert* on 29th September, where he was met by Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff flying his flag in H.M.S. *Unicorn*. Besides her were present H.M.S. *Glory*, about to depart for Australia, H.M.A.S. *Sydney* (Captain D. H. Harries, R.A.N.) who was taking over from her, and nine smaller craft,

¹ F.O. 2i/c R.o.P. No. 45.

² The Commando was disbanded in February 1952, but was re-formed in 1960. The Presidential Citation was handed to the officer commanding the reborn unit by the Commandant-General, Royal Marines, at a ceremony in September of that year.

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auxiliaries, etc.¹ Embarked in H.M.A.S. *Sydney* was No. 21 and part of No. 20 Carrier Air Group under Lieutenant-Commander M. F. Fell, consisting of two squadrons of Sea Furies, No. 805 (Lieutenant-Commander W. G. Bowles, R.A.N.)² and No. 808 (Lieutenant-Commander J. L. Appleby), and one of Fireflies, No. 817 (Lieutenant-Commander R. B. Lunberg). A U.S. helicopter and crew were loaned to her on arrival.

Admiral Russell took the opportunity to visit H.M.S. *Glory* to wish her farewell and to congratulate Captain Colquhoun, his officers and ship's company on her fine war record. Since her arrival in April she had flown 2892 sorties.³ Lieutenant P. G. Young, who had transferred from H.M.S. *Theseus*, flew his 100th sortie on his last mission. Throughout most of her operational period, the servicing and maintenance units under Lieutenant-Commander (E) I. F. Pearson maintained a 90 per cent serviceability record, and this rose to 100 per cent before the end. Ammunition expended reached the figures of 1544 bombs,⁴ 9242 rockets, and 595 000 rounds of cannon-shell. Accompanied by H.M.A.S. *Anzac*, she sailed on 30th September for a well-earned refit and rest at Sydney.

After visiting the ships at Kure the C.-in-C. proceeded with the Rear-Admiral in the *Alert* to Sasebo, where he visited the ships in harbour⁵ and the 41st R.M. Commando camp, and exchanged calls with Rear-Admiral Dyer, who then sailed in U.S.S. *Toledo* for Yokosuka. H.M.A.S. *Murchison*, fresh from her action in the Han estuary, arrived at Sasebo on 4th October.

The C.-in-C. embarked in H.M.S. *Belfast* wearing Admiral Scott-Moncrieff's flag on 5th October, and proceeded to the west coast with H.M.S. *Ceylon* (newly arrived from Hong Kong) and H.M.S. *Concord* in company. The *Ceylon* took over as C.T.E. 95·12, while the *Belfast* went to Inchon, where the C.-in-C. met various U.S. officers, and with Admiral Scott-Moncrieff visited General Cassels at the Commonwealth Divisional Headquarters. A limited offensive, of which the Commonwealth Division was the spearhead, had started three days previously (3rd October) in the U.N. 1st Corps sector. It lasted about five days, during which time all the objectives (except one in the U.S. Cavalry Division sector) were attained, and many of the enemy's potential winter positions were overrun. While there, the two Admirals were taken to the front line, where they came under fire from enemy tanks and had to take shelter under a convenient Centurion tank.

While at Inchon, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff received orders from Admiral Dyer to carry out a co-ordinated air and surface strike against Kojo on the east coast on 10th and 11th October, using the *Belfast*, *Sydney*, and destroyers. This interfered somewhat with Sir Guy Russell's programme, but he visited the Han estuary in H.M.N.Z.S. *Rotoiti*, and afterwards the Chopekki area in H.M.S. *Belfast* on 7th October.

H.M.A.S. *Sydney* was then carrying out her first patrol on the west coast. Another Australian newcomer, H.M.A.S. *Tobruk* (Commander R. I. Peek, R.A.N.)

¹ H.M. Ships *Cossack*, *Concord*, *Amethyst*, *Charity*, H.M.A. Ships *Anzac*, *Tobruk*, H.M.C.S. *Cayuga*, R.F.A. *Brown Ranger*, H.M. Hospital Ship *Maine*.

² Carrier Air Group No. 20.

³ Average daily sorties for air crew, No. 804 Squadron, 74, No. 812 Squadron, 70.

⁴ 1450 500-lb, 94 1000-lb.

⁵ H.M. Ships *Belfast*, *Ladybird*, *St Bride's Bay*, *Comus*, R.F.A.s *Fort Charlotte*, *Fort Rosalie*, *Wave Premier*.

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who had taken the place of the *Anzac*, formed part of her screen. The first operational sortie, led by Lieutenant-Commander Fell, had been flown on 5th October, thereby conferring on H.M.A.S. *Sydney* the distinction of being the first Dominion carrier to send her aircraft into action. She flew 47 sorties on the usual missions on each of the first two days and 29 on 7th September up to 1400,¹ when she refuelled from R.F.A. *Wave Premier*, and then shaped course to the south to join H.M.S. *Belfast* for the passage to the east coast.

Admiral Scott-Moncrieff had received no previous intimation of this operation, nor did the signal indicate its object or scale. Later he gathered that the opportunity had been taken to combine the business of striking the enemy with the pleasure of providing Sir Guy Russell with a spectacle of action on the more exciting east coast—‘a courtly gesture of modern hospitality’.² Further intelligence signalled during the passage round included a target list of 35 guns of 120 mm and above in the immediate vicinity of Kojo.

The force arrived off Kojo at 0630, 10th October. It was organized in two task elements, viz., T.E. 95·91—H.M. Ships *Belfast* and *Concord*, U.S.S. *Colohan*, and T.E. 95·92—H.M.A.S. *Sydney*, H.M.S. *Comus*, H.M.C.S. *Cayuga*, U.S.S. *Shields*.

For the next 36 hours combined strikes and bombardments with spotting from H.M.A.S. *Sydney*'s aircraft were carried out. There were six events scheduled, but a heavy north-easterly swell got up in the afternoon and the last had to be cancelled owing to the difficulty of landing aircraft.

At noon, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff was informed by U.S.S. *Colohan* that his operations were interfering with the activities of a guerrilla organization known as Kirkman—the equivalent of Leopard on the west coast. The Admiral was not unnaturally surprised to find that Kirkman had not been informed of the intended operation. Later, Major Coke, U.S.A., of the organization arrived on board the *Belfast* and stated that the targets being engaged were out of date; he detailed fresh ones, which were immediately dealt with. Major Coke remained on board and got into direct touch with his agents, using a wireless set he had brought with him; the agents then indicated targets and passed spotting corrections, and the *Belfast* carried out two successful shoots against troops, causing many casualties.

During the night, U.S.S. *Colohan* was detached to give close support to the R.o.K. 1st Corps at the bomb-line. H.M.C.S. *Cayuga* patrolled the bombardment area as a precaution against minelaying sampans³ and also carried out a night area bombardment with the help of a 5th Air Force spotting aircraft, while the remainder of T.G. 95·9 stood out to seaward.

On 11th October, U.S.S. *New Jersey*, wearing the flag of Vice-Admiral Martin, and U.S.S. *Hanson* joined T.E. 95·91, and took part in the day's bombardments. The targets were mainly troop positions reported by Major Coke who was still on board, and kept up to date by the agents ashore. As on the previous day, the

¹ H.M.A.S. *Sydney* had not previously operated a helicopter—‘The quiet and efficient way in which Lieutenant O'Mara, U.S.N., and his crew go about their S.A.R. duties and perform their many invaluable miscellaneous missions has been fully appreciated’, wrote Captain Harries.

² F.O. 2i/c R.o.P. No. 42.

³ A few days before (7th October) U.S.S. *Small* had been mined and seriously damaged off Hungnam. She eventually reached Kure for temporary repairs, but her bow fell off on the way.

shoots were spotted by H.M.A.S. *Sydney's* aircraft, who reported that the *New Jersey's* and *Belfast's* shooting was very accurate; both the *New Jersey* and Admiral Martin commended the air spotting of the *Sydney's* aircraft. On this day H.M.A.S. *Sydney* equalled H.M.S. *Glory's* record of 89 sorties, finishing up with an attack by sixteen Furies on at least 2000 enemy troops who were caught digging in on the hills covering the beaches. At a conservative estimate, 200 were killed. Three of the *Sydney's* aircraft sustained minor flak damage in the course of the operations.

While this was going on, the niceties of naval etiquette had been duly observed. The Commander, 7th Fleet called on the C.-in-C. in the *Belfast* by helicopter in the forenoon; Admiral Russell accompanied him back in the helicopter to return the call, and with Admiral Scott-Moncrieff stayed to luncheon on board the *New Jersey*. The Admirals received an unexpected salute when, at the request of an oncoming air-strike, H.M.S. *Belfast* opened fire on three flak positions simultaneously, just as their helicopter took off from her.

The operation ended at 1700, 11th October. As the ships withdrew, a heavy explosion was seen in the target area; an ammunition dump had been exploded by one of the many fires left burning in the vicinity.¹ T.G. 95.9 was dissolved, and the Commonwealth ships steered for Sasebo, where the *Belfast* and *Sydney* arrived on the 12th, the destroyers being detached for various duties. Admiral Russell remained at Sasebo for the next three days.

Another typhoon, known as 'Ruth', was on its way. The harbour at Sasebo was rather crowded, so as a precaution Admiral Scott-Moncrieff ordered the Commonwealth ships to sea in the forenoon of the 14th, where they remained hove-to till the storm had passed; most ships sustained superficial damage, and the *Sydney* lost one aircraft overboard and had four damaged in the deck park. The Japanese *Kongo Maru* with 500 passengers on board went ashore on Ukushima;² A.P.A. *George Clymer* took off the passengers, while H.M.C.S. *Sioux* stood by. The typhoon struck Sasebo with full force that night. H.M.S. *Ladybird*, with her shallow draught, yawed violently, and was menaced at various times by U.S. Ships *Bryce Canyon* and *Gloucester*, who had parted their bridles, and a gigantic crane which broke adrift. Altogether, three ships dragged, and five parted their bridles, but there was no major disaster, thanks to fine work by tugs.

Sir Guy Russell left for Tokyo by air on 16th October, landing at Itazuke to meet Admiral Radford, C.-in-C., Pacific Fleet, who had intended to visit Sasebo the day before, but had been prevented from doing so by the typhoon.

Meanwhile, on the west coast the usual air and blockade activities had continued, so far as other calls on Admiral Scott-Moncrieff's forces permitted. U.S.S. *Rendova* had started her second patrol on 9th October. She flew 50 sorties that day—a record at the time for a U.S. escort carrier—and followed this up with a daily average of 45, paying special attention to the Han in continuation of the 'retribution' policy.³

H.M.A.S. *Sydney* (Captain Harries) relieved her on 18th October and remained on patrol till the 28th. She maintained the fine standard she had set in her first

¹ Ammunition expenditure for the two days operations was 184 16-inch, 529 6-inch, 284 5-inch, 309 4.5-inch, 315 4-inch, 88 500-lb bombs, 648 3-inch rockets (60 lb head) and 23 335 20-mm Hispano.

² About 30 miles west of Sasebo.

³ See Section 70.

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patrol. The weather impeded flying on two days, and no flying was carried out on 22nd October, when the element was refuelling; but 474 offensive sorties were flown. The Fireflies concentrated mainly on railway bridges and tunnels with considerable success, while the Sea Furies attacked coastal shipping and troop concentrations reported by Leopard. Two strikes a day were laid on in the River Han area, and a large amount of bombardment spotting was carried out. But the most popular task was close air support for the Commonwealth Division, and particularly, of course, for the Royal Australian Regiment, though it was on this duty that the heaviest flak was encountered.

Trafalgar-Day was celebrated by a very successful attack on junks in the Yalu Gulf, in response to an urgent call from Leopard, who reported a junk-borne invasion of the island of Tae Wha do. Heavy damage was inflicted on junks drawn up on the mainland coast, and six were sunk under way. Unfortunately, despite prior assurance by Leopard that no friendly junks were in the area, two of the latter belonged to one of the clandestine organizations. As Admiral Scott-Moncrieff had frequently pointed out, with the loose control exercised over such friendly craft, the chances of such occurrences were high, but the organizations concerned considered this acceptable, whatever might be thought by the actual victims.

On 23rd October, the U.S. 5th Air Force had a bad day, four B-29s being shot down in a strike against northern airfields. Two of them landed north of Choda; aircraft from H.M.A.S. *Sydney* helped in the search for survivors, some of whom were picked up by a U.S. Air Force amphibian and by H.M.A.S. *Murchison*.

In the course of the patrol, three of the *Sydney's* aircraft were shot down and 28 damaged by flak. Fortunately there were no casualties to personnel. A Sea Fury piloted by Lieutenant C. M. Wheatley, R.A.N., was hit by flak and ditched off Chinnampo on 25th October. The pilot was rescued unhurt and subsequently reached Kimpo. On the same day another Sea Fury was badly hit; its pilot, Lieutenant-Commander J. L. Appleby succeeded in landing on Kimpo airfield. A third Sea Fury was hit on the 26th and crash-landed on a mud-flat in the Han estuary. Sub-Lieutenant N. W. Knappstein, R.A.N., the pilot, was speedily rescued by a boat from H.M.S. *Amethyst*, which also salvaged remnants of the aircraft. That afternoon, five Fireflies attacking tunnels ten miles south of Sariwon, ran into intense light flak; one of them was shot down. The pilot, Sub-Lieutenant N. D. MacWilliam, R.A.N., made a skilful crash-landing in a field three miles to the westward of the target in enemy territory; neither he nor his observer, Observer 1st Class J. Hancox, R.A.N., was injured, but their situation was far from pleasant. This gave rise to a remarkable rescue operation, which must be told in some detail.

It was extremely doubtful whether the *Sydney's* helicopter could reach them and get clear of enemy territory before nightfall; but Captain Harries decided to make the attempt—a decision 'received with enthusiasm'¹ by the American crew, Aviation Device Chief A. K. Babbit, U.S.N., and Aviation Mechanician's Mate C. C. Gooding, U.S.N. This welcome news was conveyed to Sub-Lieutenant MacWilliam by Lieutenant-Commander Fell; in flying low over him to tell him that the helicopter was on its way, his aircraft was hit by flak, but he succeeded in reaching Kimpo. Furies gave cover over the scene of the crash, and were joined by R.A.A.F. Meteors of No. 77 Squadron. On the ground, the two airmen

¹ H.M.A.S. *Sydney*, R.o.P. 17th-28th October 1951 in M.02868/1951.

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helped them to keep the encircling enemy at a distance with bursts from their Owen sub-machine-gun. At 1715, the Meteors had to leave; the Sea Furies, too, had been ordered to leave at that time, being at the limit of their endurance, but the pilots, Lieutenants J. H. G. Cavanagh and J. R. N. Salthouse, R.A.N., decided to hold on a few minutes longer. Ten minutes later the helicopter, which had been making a good 20 knots more than its accepted maximum, touched down. As it landed, Gooding jumped out and shot two of the enemy who had crept to within fifteen yards. An hour later, the helicopter, with its escort of Sea Furies, landed with the last of daylight at Kimpo airfield, an achievement beyond anyone's expectation. 'Apart from the fine performance of the helicopter's crew', wrote Captain Harries, 'the whole rescue organization worked with copybook exactitude, and it is felt that the ship's guardian angel had a very hardworking and successful day.'¹

Captain Harries had evidently gone into the question of rescue very carefully, and was responsible for the introduction of a novel rescue aid. This consisted of fluorescent panels carried by all air crew. They speedily proved their value; already on two occasions when aircraft had crashed in enemy territory the rescuing aircraft had seen the panels long before they sighted the crews. Admiral Scott-Moncrieff lost no time in recommending the general adoption of this device to the commander of the 7th Fleet and to Admiral Dyer, and gave great credit to H.M.A.S. *Sydney* for the introduction of the idea.

The surface patrols, though hampered by shortage of ships, had continued throughout October, mainly off Hwanghae and in the Yalu Gulf, with greater emphasis on the latter.

H.M.S. *Cossack* (Captain Begg) took over as C.T.E. 95·12 on 1st October, and for some days, apart from the ships in the Han estuary, was the only ship in the element. She bombarded in the Choda area on the 3rd, and patrolled in the Haeju-Hwanghae-Inchon area. H.M.S. *Amethyst*, who had just started a spell on the east coast, was recalled, and joined T.E. 95·12 on the 4th, in time to support the withdrawal of some guerrillas who had got themselves encircled in the Pungchon area. H.M.S. *Ceylon* (Captain Thring) arrived on the 6th and, took over command of the element; she bombarded Haeju on the 9th. H.M.S. *Alert* (Commander R. de L. Brooke) was lent by the C.-in-C. to help out, and spent a few days in the Cigarette area, where she carried out some bombardments before leaving on 11th October to join the C.-in-C.

Most of the islands in the Yalu Gulf at this time were in friendly hands, but the largest of them, Sinmi do, was held by the Communists. It was believed to be held by only a small garrison and for some time its capture by guerrillas had been under consideration. The attempt was launched on 9th October. Sinmi do is eight miles long and four miles wide, with a ridge of hills 900 feet high running north and south down the middle line. Most of the villages lie on the western side. Covered by H.M.S. *Cossack*, 800 guerrillas landed on the eastern side on 9th October, with the object of capturing the high ground and then attacking the town of Nae Dong from landward. At first all went well. The party secured a beach-head and advanced to the hills. There they met stiff resistance, and the support given by H.M.S. *Cossack* was invaluable. The *Cossack* remained till

¹ H.M.A.S. *Sydney*, R.o.P. 17th-28th October 1951 in M.02868/1951.

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daylight, 12th, when success seemed assured, and she left for Sasebo;¹ but the enemy had landed reinforcements over the mud-flats during the night, and on the arrival of H.M.S. *Ceylon* that evening to continue the support, she found the guerrillas withdrawing. H.M.S. *Ceylon* covered the withdrawal successfully during the night of 12th/13th October, and also carried out a heavy bombardment of the rail communications at Sonchon on the mainland.

The decision to withdraw was rather a relief to Admiral Scott-Moncrieff. The feasibility of reinforcement over the mud-flats had always been appreciated, and for this reason, in his view, any attempt to hold the island permanently would have resulted in its becoming more of a liability than an advantage. As things were, a successful raid had been carried out, in which enemy troops had been killed, and more disabled; but it was no doubt something of a disappointment for the guerrillas. After this operation, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff decided that the risk of mining by sampans in the narrow channels round Sinmi do was no longer acceptable, and ships were forbidden to enter these waters. A resurgence of activity by MiGs from Antung, too, took place about this time, and orders were issued restricting the cruisers' daylight operations to the southward of Choda.

On 19th October, numbers of junks were reported in the Chorusan area, and the *Belfast* patrolled there that night, returning south at daylight; she again visited the neighbourhood on the night of the 21st, after H.M.A.S. *Sydney*'s aircraft had carried out their strikes against the junks.

H.M.S. *Ceylon* relieved H.M.S. *Belfast* as C.T.E. 95·12 on 23rd October, and during the following week a ship patrolled the Yalu islands nightly. On 25th, enemy single-engined aircraft bombed Tae Wha do, the southernmost island. H.M.C.S. *Cayuga* (Commander J. Plomer, R.C.N.) was sent to investigate. She embarked a number of casualties, including a doctor and his wife, and took them to Pengyong do, returning to Tae Wha do the following night with stores and personnel. On both occasions bombardments of enemy-held positions were carried out.

On 28th October H.M.C.S. *Cayuga* carried out bombardments in the Chang San Got area during the day; and on the 30th she came under heavy fire while sending a boat to the assistance of a friendly junk being fired at from the Amgak peninsula, near Sok to. The *Cayuga* had to slip her cable and make a rapid stern-board out of 'Hookah'² to get clear. H.M.S. *Ceylon* bombarded the Amgak batteries next day, and they were also attacked from the air, but without response: nevertheless when no ships or aircraft were present, they continued to fire on Sok to and passing junks.

Another instance of the delays imposed by the cumbersome U.S. chain of command occurred on 30th October. H.M.N.Z.S. *Taupo*, on passage from the River Han and H.M.N.Z.S. *Hawea* were diverted to hunt a submarine reported by U.S. reconnaissance aircraft. H.M.S. *Black Swan*, also on passage from the Han, was in the vicinity of the reported submarine and carried out an expanding box-search without making contact. The *Taupo* and *Hawea* arrived on the scene nine hours after the first contact, by which time the search had been abandoned,

¹ H.M.S. *Cossack*, who had spent longer in the operational area than any other destroyer in the flotilla, sailed for Hong Kong on 17th October, prior to refit and recommissioning, her place being taken by H.M.S. *Cockade*.

² See Plan 6.

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and the reported course and speed of the contact did not reach H.M.S. *Ladybird* till three days after the event. As a result of this episode, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff made certain recommendations for improving the communications and control of such operations, which were accepted by Admiral Dyer and forwarded to higher authority.¹

Owing to the number of commitments elsewhere, no Commonwealth ship was available for duty on the east coast during the greater part of October. Mine clearance off Hungnam was completed and a check sweep of the whole coast, which continued into November, was undertaken. The usual interdiction activities by aircraft of T.F. 77 were continued, and the separate static elements at Wonsan, Songjin and the bomb-line continued their operations; to these commitments was added Hungnam in the course of the month.

H.M.S. *Concord* (Lieutenant-Commander McLaughlan) worked on the east coast from 21st October to 1st November, first at Hungnam and than at Songjin. At Hungnam she came under heavy and accurate fire at times, being successively straddled at 15 000 yards range and near missed at 12 000. She left for Hong Kong on 3rd November after a busy three months in the war area, her place there being taken by H.M.S. *Constance* (Commander A. V. Lyle).

¹ These recommendations were however, turned down, because of the insistence on passing orders strictly down the chain of command.

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Beginning of Stalemate

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THE close of 1951 saw some progress in the armistice talks, which, as already mentioned, had been resumed after long adjournments at Panmunjon in October.

Since the beginning of the negotiations, the Communists had been strengthening their defence lines and building up their forces and supplies; by the end of the year it was estimated by General Headquarters that they could launch a general offensive using approximately 40 infantry, three armoured and one mechanized divisions, with support from an airborne force of about one regiment. The duration of such an offensive, however, would be limited to between five and ten days on account of supply difficulties, and the U.N. Command was confident of being able to check it.

On 4th November there was a heavy enemy attack of divisional strength, supported by 22 tanks, on the 1st Commonwealth Division, in the sector held by the King's Own Scottish Borderers, who made an orderly withdrawal of about 1000 yards. The enemy was unable to exploit his success with his tanks and a counter-attack by the K.O.S.B.s and Leicesters regained some of the ground; by 12th November the situation was again fairly static. This was followed by probing attacks by both sides.

Then there came a sudden break in the deadlock in the cease-fire negotiations, culminating in an agreement at the end of November on the cease-fire line and buffer zone to be respected, if the remaining points for an armistice could be resolved in the next 30 days—i.e., by 27th December.

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The progress in the armistice negotiations did not by any means ease the strain on Admiral Scott-Moncrieff's forces. Although in mid-November, approval for the reduction of the number of frigates in the Han estuary was obtained, and their withdrawal altogether at the end of the month, new calls soon made them-

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selves felt. Towards the end of October a tendency had been noticed to infiltrate Chinese troops into the Hwanghae area and into the northern islands in the Yalu Gulf, and the defence of the latter grew to be a heavy commitment. There was also a stronger reaction and more accurately controlled fire from the shore batteries.

Throughout the month of November, U.S.S. *Rendova* and H.M.A.S. *Sydney* alternated as C.T.E. 95·11. Both carriers achieved a very high output of sorties, and had considerable success in keeping the railroads cut. Close air support to the U.N. troops was continued.

On 3rd November, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff left Sasebo in H.M.S. *Belfast* (Captain Sir Aubrey St Clair-Ford) to pay them a visit. Next day, he embarked in U.S.S. *Rendova*, leaving the *Belfast* to take over from H.M.S. *Ceylon* as C.T.E. 95·12. Captain Fickling, U.S.N., and his officers gave the Admiral a most cordial welcome, and a thoroughly interesting and enjoyable day. Though only eighteen aircraft were available, a fine total of 60 sorties was flown on such varied tasks as air-spot support for H.M.A.S. *Murchison*, destruction of supply craft in inland waterways, close air support for the 1st Corps, and strikes in the Han estuary. Admiral Scott-Moncrieff was invited to address the pilots and, after watching the flying, was left with no doubt that No. 212 Squadron, U.S. Marine Corps, was a very fine unit. This squadron had adopted the unofficial name of Devilcats, and the Admiral was much gratified when, just before his departure in near darkness by jackstay to the *Belfast*, he was created an honorary Devilcat and presented with a leather jacket emblazoned with their insignia.

H.M.A.S. *Sydney* relieved U.S.S. *Rendova* on patrol on 5th November, and Admiral Scott-Moncrieff hoisted his flag in her and spent a couple of days on board. On this day the *Sydney* sustained her first casualty in Lieutenant K. E. Clarkson, R.A.N., who was killed when his aircraft failed to pull out of a dive, while attacking enemy transport. On 6th November the weather was poor, with low cloud and rain, but a full flying programme was carried out. Two special operations were laid on. At dawn, one flight co-operated with H.M.S. *Belfast* and H.M.C.S. *Athabaskan* in the hope of drawing the fire of the Amgak guns. In spite of the tempting bait of the *Athabaskan* stopped well within range, while the *Belfast* remained hidden behind Sok to (with her shore fire-control party ready on its crest) and the air strike was orbiting fifteen to twenty miles away, the guns steadfastly declined to open fire. The Communists evidently smelt a rat.

Later in the day, eight Furies carried out an effective attack against junks and small craft around the Chorusan peninsula and along the northern side of the island of Ka do, which had just been occupied by the enemy. The Communists retaliated that afternoon with an attack by eleven four-engined bombers on Tae Wha do; following this arrived reports from Leopard that the island was being invaded. Captain St Clair-Ford (C.T.E. 95·12) at once ordered H.M.C.S. *Athabaskan* (Commander D. G. King, R.C.N.) who was in the neighbourhood, to support the guerrillas in Tae Wha do and proceeded there himself in H.M.S. *Belfast*. Failure of the normal radio station since the air attack in the afternoon complicated the *Athabaskan's* task, but during the night it was ascertained that there had been no invasion, though Tan do a few miles to the north-east had been occupied by the enemy. There was not time to embark the air-raid casualties before daylight, and at that time the *Belfast* and *Athabaskan* withdrew to the southward. The next night H.M.C.S. *Athabaskan* supported by H.M.C.S. *Cayuga* returned to the island and evacuated 47 casualties to Pengyong do. The

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Commander, 7th Fleet (Vice-Admiral Martin), complimented both the *Belfast* and the *Athabaskan* on their ' prompt and effective action ', referring particularly to the ' initiative and aggressiveness ' shown and the ' prudence and excellent judgment ' in their daylight withdrawal. ' I concur ', wrote Admiral Scott-Moncrieff, ' but I should not have expected anything less.'¹

From then on, at the request of the 8th Army, increasing attention was paid to Tae Wha do;² but Admiral Martin was careful to impress on the army that no guarantee for its security could be given by the naval forces alone.

Admiral Scott-Moncrieff left H.M.A.S. *Sydney* on 7th November and returned to Sasebo in H.M.S. *Comus*. H.M.A.S. *Sydney* remained on patrol till 13th November, when she was relieved by U.S.S. *Rendova* and returned to Sasebo. As the air crew gained in experience the percentage of aircraft hit by flak showed a considerable drop, only sixteen aircraft being damaged, and there were no further losses during the patrol, during which 401 sorties were flown. On 12th November, in very bad weather, the *Sydney* flew her one thousandth operational sortie in the 18½ days' flying since her arrival in Korean waters.

On 13th November, U.S.S. *New Jersey* wearing the flag of Vice-Admiral Martin, who, accompanied by Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff, was visiting the west coast for the first time, joined T.E. 95·11. The two Admirals boarded H.M.A.S. *Sydney* by helicopter and watched flying operations during the forenoon; before leaving, Admiral Martin addressed some of the pilots. U.S.S. *New Jersey* and her escort, U.S.S. *Shields*, then bombarded a village reported to be occupied by enemy troops in the Changyan area (Hwanghae), with air spot by H.M.A.S. *Sydney*. During the bombardment the *New Jersey* fired her 3000th round of 16-inch, in the Korean War. After a meeting with Captain Sir Aubrey St Clair-Ford (C.T.E. 95·12) and the new commanding officer of Leopard off Pengyong do, the *New Jersey* and *Shields* patrolled in the Yellow Sea during the night. Next day they closed U.S.S. *Rendova*, who had just relieved H.M.A.S. *Sydney*. Admiral Martin and Admiral Scott-Moncrieff visited her and watched the flying for an hour or so; the latter then transferred to H.M.S. *Belfast*, who had been relieved by H.M.S. *Ceylon*, for passage to Sasebo, while Admiral Martin proceeded to Yokosuka with the two American ships.

By this time winter had set in; the weather was very cold and snow had made its first appearance. Strong gales restricted flying on most days. On 16th November, the 5th Air Force requested that the west coast carrier should assume responsibility for harassing the route Sariwon-Sinmak-Kumchon, and this was undertaken, so far as normal blockade tasks permitted.

In the blockade further north the main interest was centred on the north end of Cigarette route and the islands in the Gulf of Yalu. H.M.S. *Comus*, H.M.C. Ships *Cayuga* and *Athabaskan*, and U.S.S. *Edmonds* all carried out bombardments of enemy held islands at different times during their nightly visits. H.M.S. *Whitesand Bay* carried out a large number of firings in the Cigarette route on 15th November; H.M.S. *Ceylon* supported a raid in the Haeju area on the 16th, and bombarded troop positions, and H.M.N.Z.S. *Hawea* supported guerrillas in the Choda area on the 19th. New batteries threatening Choda were reported at Wolsa-ri (four 76-mm guns) and at Mongumpo; the former was bombarded by H.M.S. *Comus* on the 23rd, and raided by guerrillas, covered

¹ F.O. 2i/c R.o.P. No. 43.

² See Section 77.

by H.M.C.S. *Cayuga* on the 24th. Both batteries were bombarded by H.M.S. *Ceylon* on the 27th.

On the east coast the usual activities continued. H. Neth. M.S. *Van Galen* relieved H.M.S. *Concord* there on 1st November, and she in turn was relieved by H.M.A.S. *Tobruk* (Commander Peek) who remained operating in the Songjin area till 19th November. Frequent bombardments of railways, tunnels, marshalling yards, bridges, and factories in various places along the coast were carried out. Unfortunately, air spotting was seldom available.

On 20th and 21st November another co-ordinated air and surface strike (known as Operation Athenaeum), similar to the operation against Kojo in October, was carried out against Hungnam by Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff's forces. The shore batteries at Hungnam had been markedly aggressive, at considerable ranges, against the minesweepers and destroyer patrols of late, and opposition was expected.

The force was organized as C.T.G. 95·8 under Admiral Scott-Moncrieff, flying his flag in H.M.S. *Belfast*, and consisted of three elements, viz., T.E. 95·81, H.M.S. *Belfast*, H.M.A.S. *Tobruk* (already on the east coast), H. Neth. M.S. *Van Galen*; T.E. 95·82, H.M.A.S. *Sydney*, H.M.S. *Constance*, H.M.C.S. *Sioux*, U.S.S. *Hyman*; and T.E. 95·83, three U.S. L.S.M.R.s, Nos 401, 403, 404.

All elements arrived in their planned positions off Hungnam at 0745,¹ 20th November. The weather was clear, with visibility to seaward ten miles, and a slight haze, which soon dissipated, over the land; the sea was calm, and there was a light easterly breeze. The air plan was similar to that employed at Kojo. Five events were planned for each day, and this programme was adhered to, with co-ordinated flak-suppression shoots before each strike, and spotting aircraft remaining behind to observe the ships' gun-fire on pre-arranged targets.² The ships had been allotted patrol lines and bombarded under way at about ten knots. Only meagre and inaccurate flak was experienced, and to Admiral Scott-Moncrieff's surprise, no enemy batteries opened fire on the ships. He could only surmise that the enemy were expecting an invasion and were reserving their fire till the landing-craft appeared. This supposition was strengthened later by the illumination of the beaches by floodlighting and occasional star-shells fired by the enemy throughout the night. After the last event had been completed (about 1600), the ships withdrew to seaward, till at 1930 the three L.S.M.R.s, covered by the *Van Galen* and *Tobruk*, with the *Belfast* in support, went in to their firing positions. At 2030 the L.S.M.R.s opened fire simultaneously, and continued firing for 35 minutes. Again there was no reply from the enemy, and the force withdrew unmolested for the night, the L.S.M.R.s being detached to the operational control of C.T.G. 95·2 at Wonsan. H.M.A.S. *Tobruk* remained inshore for the night to ensure against minelaying.

The next day (21st), a similar programme was carried out, except for the L.S.M.R. attack. During the two days, H.M.A.S. *Sydney* flew 113 sorties (78 Furies and 35 Fireflies), 75 strike and 38 C.A.P. over carrier and bombarding elements. Air spot was provided by two aircraft detached from each strike after it was over. Communications were very good and there was no case of any strike leader, C.A.P.,

¹ Zone minus 9, (I).

² There was no direct intelligence from guerrillas ashore as at Kojo, but target lists were provided by the commanders of the Wonsan Blockade Element and T.F. 77, and many most excellently annotated oblique and vertical photographs by C.T.F. 77 and the Commander, 7th Fleet. With these aids there was little difficulty in identifying the pre-arranged targets.

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or air-spot aircraft failing to establish good communication with C.T.G. 95·8. On both days, U.S. Mariner aircraft provided A/S patrol.

Admiral Scott-Moncrieff remarked that the material damage caused by the 200 tons of bombs, rockets, and shells seemed very slight, and only a few fires and secondary explosions were started, but the numerous smokeless factory chimneys and gutted buildings testified that the city was of little use to the enemy. On completion of the last air strike, H.M.C.S. *Sioux* and U.S.S. *Hyman* were detached to join C.T.G. 95·2 (Wonsan), and the remainder withdrew to the southward, H.M.A.S. *Sydney*, H.M.S. *Constance* and H. Neth. M.S. *Van Galen* proceeding to the west coast, H.M.S. *Belfast* to Yokosuka and H.M.A.S. *Tobruk* to Kure.

H.M.S. *Belfast* remained at Yokosuka for five days. There, Captain A.C.A.C. Duckworth took over command of the *Belfast* from Captain Sir Aubrey St Clair-Ford, who returned to the United Kingdom. 'He will be missed from amongst the distinguished company of Commanders, Task Element', wrote Admiral Scott-Moncrieff, 'who have kept the west coast blockade so tight, and at the same time exploited every opportunity of harassing the enemy, and diverting his attention from the main front with ingenuity and initiative.'

While at Yokosuka, Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff had a number of useful interviews there and at Tokyo with various officials. He visited Vice-Admiral Martin, who had just shifted his flag to the newly-arrived U.S.S. *Wisconsin*, and gave him some account of Operation Athenaeum, stressing the need to conserve effort with H.M. ships, especially the destroyers and frigates, in order to meet present commitments, and more particularly with regard to the future. Admiral Martin was sympathetic and authorized him to take up the question of reducing the tempo of operations with Admiral Dyer direct. During a visit to Tokyo, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff met the new C.-in-C., British Commonwealth Occupation Forces, Lieutenant-General W. Bridgeford, with whom he discussed, among other things, the future of Kure. Admiral Joy was away, in connexion with his unenviable task at Panmunjon, but his Chief of Staff, Rear-Admiral Ofstie, and Deputy Chief of Staff, Rear-Admiral Ragan, had talks with Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff on a number of matters, including the future of the 41st R.M. Commando and the removal of his own headquarters to Hong Kong in the event of an armistice.

The Vice-President of the United States, Senator Alben Barkley, was visiting Tokyo at the time, and on 27th November he honoured H.M.S. *Belfast* with a call; he was received with full honours. H.M.S. *Belfast* sailed from Yokosuka on 28th November, and arrived at Sasebo on the 30th.

Meanwhile, H.M.A.S. *Sydney* had arrived back on the west coast after Operation Athenaeum on 23rd November. This patrol was chiefly notable for the appalling weather, which virtually put a stop to flying except for the last two days. On rounding the SW. tip of Korea in the evening of the 22nd, heavy head seas were met and speed had to be reduced to eleven knots; northerly winds up to force eight prevailed all the next day. On 24th November sleet, snow, and short visibility prevented flying till 1000, after which 31 sorties were flown. On the 25th, strong winds from the west, with rising sea and swell, seriously interfered with fuelling; by the evening it was blowing force ten from the north-west, with gusts force twelve, and the *Sydney* and screen were hove to twenty miles north of Makau; on the 26th only seven sorties were got off in a temporary lull. On 27th and 28th November the weather was better, and 110 sorties were flown on these two days.

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Targets in the Chinnampo, Sariwon, and Han areas were attacked; and close air support was provided for the army on occasions. Only two aircraft were damaged by flak and there were no casualties to personnel.

November 1951 closed on the west coast with emphasis of the operations shifting more and more to the defence of the U.N.-occupied islands in the Yellow Sea. This subject will be discussed in the following section.

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It will have been noticed that since September the defence of the islands in the Yellow Sea had been making steadily increasing demands on the Commonwealth naval forces. In October, the enemy, realizing their value as bargaining counters, went over to the offensive against them in earnest, until by December the defence of such as remained in U.N. hands became a priority task. Some consideration of this problem will not be out of place at this stage.

It had its genesis in the retreat of the U.N. forces before the Chinese offensive in January 1951. The U.N. Command had at that time decided to abandon such islands as lay north of the front line, but Rear-Admiral Andrewes had pointed out the importance of retaining Choda, the Techong islands, and Pengyong do, and, should the retreat continue, islands further to the south, in order to guard against enemy minelaying. This policy was adopted by Rear-Admiral Smith (then C.T.F. 95), and small R.o.K. Marine garrisons were placed in a number of them. At that time, the army and the air force were not interested.

When the U.N. forces started to advance, however, the value of the islands was soon appreciated, and before long a large number of clandestine and covert organizations, together with certain regular air force elements began to appear up and down the coast.¹ During the summer of 1951 these organizations extended their activities further and further north, until by September they were operating from Tae Wha do and beyond, and most of them had bases in one or another of the islands in the Yalu Gulf. It was after the guerrilla raid on Sinmi do that the enemy took the offensive, and by the beginning of November, friendlies were operating only from Tae Wha do and Unmi do, a small island 25 miles to the eastward. Throughout that month there were periodical reports from Leopard of threats to Tae Wha do from concentrations of enemy troops and junks in the neighbourhood. Admiral Scott-Moncrieff, while accepting no responsibility for its security, agreed to send a ship to the area each night to discourage attack and to lend moral support to the garrison, which consisted of some 1200 guerrillas. It should be noted that it was no part of the policy of the parent organization (EUSAK G3, Misc.) that the

¹ These organizations consisted of three main types, viz., *a.* The regular Service organizations, such as the air force shore-air-naval parties on Techong and Tok Chok, and the sea-air-rescue parties and radar stations later installed in Choda and Pengyong do. *b.* Guerrilla organizations, of which the principal was Leopard controlled by G3, EUSAK, Miscellaneous Division, which actually had little to do with the 8th Army. *c.* Intelligence organizations: Salamander, FEAF TAG, C.I.A., and so on, whose personnel, names, and initial letters were constantly changing, and of whose activities, despite many attempts at co-operation, the Commonwealth naval forces had but scant knowledge. From the point of view of Admiral Scott-Moncrieff and his blockade commanders it was a most unsatisfactory situation.

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guerrillas should resist an attack; on the contrary they had a well-prepared evacuation plan, which they rehearsed daily, and publicly, so that the enemy was quite familiar with it.

Towards the end of November, Leopard began to feel happier again about Tae Wha do, and agreed that the frequency of the nightly visits of the ships might be reduced. On the night of 28th November his guerrillas raided the neighbouring island of Ka do and captured some prisoners. From them they learned that an attack on Tae Wha do was in fact imminent; but this information was not passed to Admiral Scott-Moncrieff till after it had taken place. Actually, the island had become a critical issue in the armistice negotiations, but this again was not known till a warning signal¹ from Admiral Joy arrived some hours after the attack. However, for one reason or another the nightly visits had been maintained; H.M.A.S. *Murchison* was there on 28th and 29th November and H.M.S. *Cockade* on the night of 30th November/1st December. That night the enemy struck.

The attack was well planned and was executed under cover of guns from Ka do and the Chorusan peninsula by junks and up to 50 collapsible rubber boats. These small boats were deployed unobserved round the north-east and north-west coasts of this diamond-shaped island, and about 500 men were put ashore, followed by another 500 from junks; complete surprise was achieved. H.M.S. *Cockade* (Commander J. T. Kimpton) was to the south-eastward of the island when the alarm was raised. She immediately made for the scene of the attack, but was only able to close within gun range of some supporting junks across the shoals before she herself came under an accurate fire from Ka do and received a hit on Y gun, which killed one rating. She sank two or three of the enemy craft, including one of the few remaining North Korean motor-launches; but communication with the shore radio was confused and soon lost altogether, and she was thus unable to bring down supporting fire for the friendly forces. Actually the latter, as soon as they recovered from their surprise, had taken to their boats² and got away.

H.M.S. *Cockade* withdrew in order to get to the southward before daylight, and joined H.M.S. *Ceylon*, who had left Pengyong do at the first report and was closing the area at high speed. Next morning H.M.C.S. *Athabaskan* (Commander D. G. King, R.C.N.) closed the island under C.A.P. to see if any further assistance could be rendered to survivors. Several fires were burning but there was no sign of fighting. She herself came under fire before she left.

The loss of Tae Wha do naturally focused attention on the defence of the other islands. Unmi do was very exposed and of little importance, so it was decided to concentrate on the defence of Sok to and Choda and to a lesser extent on Pengyong do. The efficiency of the enemy and the potentialities of the collapsible boats in the bitter weather at this season had been underestimated. It was now realized that they could get across the short distance to Sok to or Choda on the ebb tide, even without the use of outboard motors; and reports continued to

¹ COMNAVFE 300700Z 30th November, i.e., 1600, 30th November: zone minus 9.

² At the start of the attack some of the enemy craft made straight for the position where Leopard's special intelligence boat and one or two others were collected in readiness for such a contingency, and lobbed grenades into them. Lieutenant Allen, U.S.A., who was in charge of the guerrillas, however, escaped in another boat. By an unfortunate mischance a British Army officer, Captain Adams-Acton, Sub-Lieutenant Langford, R.N.V.R., and Naval Airman Penman had gone ashore the night before to get press photographs, and they fell into the hands of the enemy.

CHAPTER 9

come in of the installation of new batteries on the Wolsa-ri peninsula, which presented a threat to either of the islands as well as to the patrolling ships and minesweepers. It therefore became necessary to concentrate ships at night in this vicinity.

Captain Thring of H.M.S. *Ceylon*, then C.T.E. 95·12, instituted Operation Smoking Concert, in which the available ships were stationed on various beats in the swept channels 'Cheroot' and 'Hooka', and later 'Tobacco Road'¹ to cover the north and south approaches to Sok to and the channel across to Choda. Because of enemy mining, the radar-controlled batteries at Amgak and Wolsa-ri, and the navigational hazards, it was not considered prudent to place a major warship to the eastward of Sok to—the direction from which attack was most probable. Captain Frewen, H.M.S. *Mounts Bay*, took over as C.T.E. 95·12 on 1st December, and continued these arrangements with minor alterations. The arrival of H.M.S. *Constance* to relieve H.M.A.S. *Murchison* on 4th December with a large quantity of star-shell and rocket flares on board for ships to illuminate the Sok to approaches was an important contribution to the security of the island at this stage.

On 2nd December, Rear-Admiral Dyer received directions that the defence of these islands² was to be given the highest priority, above even blockade and escort tasks. On one point he, Admiral Martin and Admiral Scott-Moncrieff were firmly agreed: their defence as a naval commitment could not be guaranteed. This was duly represented up the long chain of command, resulting in inevitable delay. Admiral Scott-Moncrieff had arranged to pay a visit to Hong Kong to discuss various matters with officials in the colony at this time and he sailed in H.M.S. *Belfast* on 2nd December, expecting to be away about three weeks. It thus fell to his Chief Staff Officer, Captain Villiers, who remained at Sasebo, to implement the measures for the safety of the islands. It was a knotty problem. The 8th Army had no garrison troops available, and was pressing for naval support. Responsibility for the policy of the irregular organizations rested with the C.-in-C., Tokyo, but he had no combatant forces other than guerrillas for the task. A suggestion that R.o.K. Marines should be used was frowned on by Admiral Martin, because of its implication of naval responsibility.

By 6th December there appeared to be a possibility of the Royal Navy's being made a cat's-paw for United States inter-Service disagreement. Captain Villiers accordingly represented personally to Admiral Dyer that while we would do everything in our power to preserve the islands, it must be made clear that it could not be done alone by the Commonwealth naval forces, and this should go on record. Admiral Dyer referred the matter to Admiral Martin, who ordered him to proceed himself to the west coast and report on the position.

The problem bristled with difficulties. In the first place it was almost impossible to reconcile the army and navy directives. The only military forces were under the command of Leopard, and their orders, as at Tae Wha do, were to evacuate in case of attack. The other intelligence organizations, such as Salamander, and the air force units, of course, had similar instructions. Eventually, an organization known as Covert Clandestine and Related Activities, Korea (CCRAK) was set up,

¹ See Plan 6.

² And in addition Techong, Yong Pyong do (south of Haeju), and Tok Chok (outer approached to Inchon); all these islands contained air force units. See Figure 13.

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


Figure 13. Korea, west coast, latitudes 37° to 40°N, 'strategic' islands

and a number of officers arrived, who arranged some sort of defence scheme. In addition to other short-comings there were no beach mines or barbed wire available, and the guerrillas in Sok to were short of ammunition; as a stopgap, a quantity of ammunition was provided by U.S.S. *Rendova*, and transported to the island in destroyers. R.o.K. Marines, as they completed their training, were to form the garrisons, and the first batch of these arrived on 21st December. Inshore patrols, too, presented a difficulty. Ships' boats were unsuitable in the strong tideways, and the few R.o.K. patrol craft proved entirely unreliable. An extension of the swept areas too, was necessary. And then there was the problem of refugees. There were thousands of these unfortunate people in the islands, besides the normal populations; they were an embarrassment to the defence, and the removal of all useless mouths was desired. In any case, in the event of an armistice, they would

have to be removed to a place of safety; but the Commonwealth forces had no shipping for this purpose.

These and other questions confronted Rear-Admiral Dyer when he arrived off Choda in U.S.S. *Manchester*, escorted by U.S.S. *Erben*, on 10th December. On the same day, all the west coast problems were complicated by a high-level decision that in effect would temporarily reverse the duties of T.E. 95·11 and the 5th Air Force. Air cover for the troop convoys involved in the exchange of two U.S. divisions then in progress, and while the ships were in the Yellow Sea, was now to be provided by T.E. 95·11 instead of the 5th Air Force as heretofore. The latter, in the meantime, would be responsible for T.E. 95·11's strike, spotting, and army support tasks.¹

Rear-Admiral Dyer visited all the principal islands and then left on the 14th for consultation with Vice-Admiral Martin, who arrived at Sasebo in U.S.S. *Wisconsin* on the 16th. This gave Captain Villiers an opportunity to clarify many things with the Vice-Admiral and his staff, who showed him many back signals that had passed behind the scenes. Much frustration and misunderstanding would have been avoided if these could have been passed to him or to Admiral Scott-Moncrieff as they were made 'for information'. As a result of these conversations and Admiral Dyer's recommendations, various steps were taken to ease the situation off the Taedong estuary in the course of the next week or so. It was arranged that in the absence of T.E. 95·11 on convoy duty the 5th Air Force would carry out any air tasks required by C.T.E. 95·12, on application through the J.O.C., Korea. The 5th Air Force also undertook to provide last-light reconnaissance, to drop flares in the area, and to send two napalm-carrying aircraft each evening to set fire to cover and trees around Wolsa-ri.

U.S.S. *Horace Bass* (A.P.D.)² had already arrived on 8th December, carrying L.C.V.P.s and L.C.P.R.s for use as patrol craft; these were manned and armed by H.M.S. *Ceylon*, who relieved H.M.S. *Mounts Bay* as C.T.E. 95·12 on the 9th. These patrol boats had many adventures and were singularly alone on their patrols; more often than not they were fired on by friendly forces ashore. U.S.S. *Comstock* carrying small boat sweepers (L.C.V.P.s) accompanied by the minesweepers *Merganser* and *Chatterer* arrived on the 15th, and after some delay started extending the swept areas. On 19th December two L.S.M.R.s (Nos 401 and 404) reinforced the defence craft, and three L.S.T.s started lifting refugees. Between then and 23rd December 2340 were moved.³ On the same day, the C-in-C., Far East, placed the responsibility for the defence of the islands on the U.N. naval forces and 'indigenous' forces under the Commander, CCRAK.

Meanwhile, though no attack had developed on any of the main islands, there had been plenty of activity of one kind and another. On the night of 15th/16th December, the enemy attacked Chong Yang do and Ung do, two islets four miles south-east of Sok to. These islets were useful to the United Nations as landing places for shore fire-control parties; in the hands of the enemy they covered the

¹ This suggestion originated with Admiral Joy, and though Admiral Martin asked for the views of Admiral Dyer and Admiral Scott-Moncrieff, he accepted the arrangement before they reached him. Admiral Scott-Moncrieff regarded the change as a mistake and could see no reason for it. The 5th Air Force pilots were unfamiliar with the terrain over which they would be operating, whereas the pilots of T.E. 95·11 knew it only too well.

² U.S.S. *Horace Bass* was replaced by L.S.T. 602 on 21st December.

³ These L.S.T.s ran a ferry service between the islands and Mokpo, which continued for some time.

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southern approach to Sok to. They were connected with the shore at low water, and it was not practicable to hold them continuously; in fact the enemy controlled them at low water and the United Nations at high. In the course of the next couple of days there was sharp fighting and they changed hands more than once. H.M. Ships *Ceylon*, *Constance*, and *Alacrity*, H.M.C.S. *Sioux*, and U.S.S. *Comstock* provided supporting fire for the defence. The Amgak battery joined in, and was promptly silenced by the *Ceylon*, but not before the *Constance* had been hit by a 105-mm shell that burst on impact and blew a hole about two feet in diameter in the ship's side, damaging the asdic instruments board. H.M.C.S. *Sioux* did considerable execution among the enemy troops crossing the mud-flats. Unfortunately, H.M.A.S. *Sydney* was unable to supply air support owing to the troop convoy commitment in the southern Yellow Sea. The 5th Air Force C.A.P. had no knowledge of spotting procedure. By the morning of 17th December all enemy resistance had ceased on both Chong Yang do and Ung do; thereafter, they were subjected to frequent periodical bombardment and air attack. That night, there was an alarm at Yuk to (north-east of Pengyong do, close inshore); H. Neth. M.S. *Van Galen* bombarded the island. She also captured three junks, which, however, proved to be friendly.

New batteries on the neighbouring coasts continued to be reported and occasionally opened fire on the ships; they were invariably quickly silenced. H.M. Ships *Ceylon* and *Alacrity*, H.M.A.S. *Tobruk*, and U.S. Ships *Manchester* and *Eversole* all engaged them and Amgak at different times.

Throughout the operations round Choda and Sok to, anxiety was caused by considerable night air activity of aircraft that, from the general conditions of the war, had to be assumed friendly. But they might not have been; in fact on one occasion bombs were dropped (one of which damaged Salamander's house) by two aircraft which had been tracked in over Choda. It was a difficult situation, arising largely from lack of inter-Service co-ordination. On another occasion a twin-engined monoplane circled Sok to showing the wrong I.F.F. signal. It took nearly 24 hours to elicit a reply from J.O.C., Korea, that no friendly aircraft was actually assigned to the area, but that 5th Air Force night-interdiction routes passed close by and it might well be one of them. By that time C.T.E. 95·12 had established that this particular aircraft had in fact dropped medical supplies to the garrison.

On 18th December, Rear-Admiral Dyer arrived back in U.S.S. *Manchester* after his talks with Vice-Admiral Martin, and took over as O.T.C., West Coast, till Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff's return. The latter regretted that this should have been considered necessary, as he was perfectly satisfied with the handling of the situation by his Chief Staff Officer and C.T.E. 95·12, but it certainly resulted in a greater appreciation of the requirements of the situation, and a readier response to British requests on the part of the Americans.

Such, briefly, was the situation as regards the defence of the islands which greeted Admiral Scott-Moncrieff when he arrived back off Choda from Hong Kong in H.M.S. *Belfast* on 23rd December. He lost no time in taking over as O.T.C., West Coast, from Admiral Dyer, and assumed the title of C.T.E. 95·19, leaving operational control in H.M.S. *Ladybird* with Captain Villiers, because of the usual communication shortage. Captain Duckworth (*Belfast*) assumed the duties of C.T.E. 95·12 from Captain Frewen (*Mounts Bay*), who then became C.T.U. 95·12·1, in charge of the local defence of the Sok to-Choda area.

Commenting on the situation as he found it, and on occurrences mentioned in the foregoing pages, Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff was outspoken in his criticism of certain aspects of the United States system of command, and the conduct of operations.

‘ The operations of the past three weeks ’, he wrote, ‘ bring out all the weaknesses in the American command system The lack of any joint Service planning; the lack of a combined H.Q. in Korea; the inability to work direct with other organizations and commands, except right up and down through the chain of command; the rigid command and lack of confidence in the man on the spot. The need to “ go on record ” resulting in long and sometimes confusing directions; the insistence on being told every detail immediately anything happens; the appallingly overcrowded signal communications, causing further delays, and aggravated in the present case by the unwieldy chain of command and the objection to any signal on any policy matter being made for “ info ” up and down the chain

‘ A further weakness is the lack of intelligence available to me under present conditions when the local organizations who normally keep me supplied with operational intelligence . . . are bottled up [in the islands]. Although there has been an improvement recently in passing on by Commander, Task Force 95, of certain TOP SECRET information, the source or reliability is never stated, and except in verbal discussions, no qualifying information is every passed on, so I am in no position to assess the strength or reality of the threat at this moment

‘ In the meantime . . . some sixteen (including R.o.K.) ships of value well over £10 000 000 are tied up in yet another of these static tasks, in a vulnerable position, as a result of a threatened attack which may be launched by a few junks and a large number of small collapsible boats, and is only credible having regard to the characteristics of a resourceful and fanatical enemy. This loss of naval mobility, which has been such a feature of this war, is the price that has to be paid for the insufficiency of regular soldiers to carry out static garrison duties. More particularly, it is directly the result of failure to evaluate and agree the basic military requirements on a joint Service basis, and less directly it is the result of the uncoordinated activities of the “ funny parties ” and the irregular forces A study of recent naval operations in the light of the established “ principles of war ” is most revealing.’¹

Admiral Scott-Moncrieff was further concerned when in the course of taking over from Admiral Dyer the latter intimated that he thought the Commander, 7th Fleet, would now require an admiral continuously on the west coast, and in any case a cruiser must be there permanently. Admiral Scott-Moncrieff replied that he himself could not remain out permanently as he had his other duties as Flag-Officer, 2nd in Command, F.E. Fleet, to perform; and in his view it was wrong for the cruiser with the T.E. commander on board to remain static in the Sok to-Choda area. The matter cropped up again later, when H.M.S. *Belfast* was due to return to Sasebo on 7th January 1952. Admiral Scott-Moncrieff then asked Admiral Dyer to request approval from Admiral Martin to dispense with ‘ Duty Admiral, Sok to ’, informing him that the situation was well in hand and that

¹ F.O. 2i/c R.o.P. No. 45.

he reposed every confidence in his cruiser captains; and with this, to his relief, Admiral Martin concurred.

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Meanwhile, the usual blockade patrols and carrier operations had been carried out on the west coast throughout December, so far as the defence of the islands and other priority commitments permitted. These involved modification to the accustomed arrangements in several directions, especially as regards the destroyers. For example, one of the Canadian destroyers was assigned to the Sok to area whenever possible, on account of the great value for detecting small boats and the like of the H.D.W.S. radar fitted in these ships, and one of the carrier's screen patrolled off Pengyong do each night, rejoining the carrier by day.

Captain Frewen, H.M.S. *Mounts Bay*, carried out the duties of C.T.E. 95·12 between 2nd and 9th December and again between the 19th and 23rd, Captain Thring, H.M.S. *Ceylon*, between the 9th and 19th December, and Captain Duckworth, H.M.S. *Belfast*, for the remainder of the month. During the period H.M. Ships *Cockade*, *Comus*, *Constance*, *Whitesand Bay*, *St Bride's Bay*, and *Alacrity*, H.M.C. Ships *Athabaskan*, *Sioux*, and *Cayuga*, H.M.A.S.s *Tobruk*, and *Murchison*, H.M.N.Z.S. *Taupo*, H.Neth.M.S. *Van Galen* and U.S. Ships *Manchester*, *Edmonds*, *Munro*, *Eversole*, *Porterfield*, *Fletcher*, *Comstock*, and *Horace Bass* formed part of T.E. 95·12 at different times.

U.S.S. *Rendova* carried out her last patrol as C.T.E. 95·11 up to 6th December, when she was relieved by H.M.A.S. *Sydney*. Admiral Scott-Moncrieff remarked that during her 2½ months on the west coast she had put up a remarkably fine performance with her Devilcats, and he was glad that this fine squadron transferred to her successor, U.S.S. *Badoeng Strait* (Captain R. L. Johnson, U.S.N.).

H.M.A.S. *Sydney* (Captain Harries) remained at sea till 18th December. The main emphasis of the patrol lay in the support of C.T.E. 95·12 in the anti-invasion operations in the Choda-Sok to area, including constant combat air patrol over the target (TARCAP) in daylight over the ships in this vicinity, in addition to the usual strikes against enemy communications and targets indicated by *Leopard*. For the first five days, fine, clear weather was experienced at sea, though ground fog ashore occasionally hampered the attacks; thereafter the weather deteriorated.

Flying began at 0730, 7th December, the day being 'rich in results', but marred by the loss of Sub-Lieutenant R. P. Sinclair, R.A.N., whose *Sea Fury* was hit by flak north-west of Chinnampo and caught fire. Sub-Lieutenant Sinclair baled out, but hit the tail plane as he jumped and was killed. His body was recovered by helicopter, and was committed to the deep with full naval honours in latitude 37° 30' N., longitude 124° 30' E. Four other aircraft were hit that day, one, piloted by Sub-Lieutenant A. J. B. Smith, R.N., who was unhurt, being forced to land on Pengyong do. A *Firefly* was damaged by flak next day and landed on a small beach at Techong do, whence the crew was rescued by a helicopter from Pengyong do. On 13th December bad weather set in, but a full day's flying was carried out. The *Sydney's* helicopter was damaged, and remained out of action for the rest of the patrol, but the helicopter from Pengyong do (known as *Pedro Fox*) performed notable service in its place, retrieving the pilots of two shot-down *Sea Furies*, one west of Pyonggang and the other off Ongjin. High winds, rough seas, and snow showers prevented all flying on the next two days, and in the evening of

the 15th, H.M.A.S. *Sydney* proceeded to the vicinity of the Makau Islands to cover a troop convoy to Inchon. This, of course, stopped further efforts to assist C.T.E. 95·12, and, as the convoy was very late owing to the weather, took up the remainder of the patrol. A total of 383 sorties had been flown; 25 cases of flak damage resulted in a total loss of five aircraft. It is satisfactory to note that subsequent reports from Leopard indicated that more damage was done to the enemy than had been estimated at the time. H.M.A.S. *Sydney* turned over to U.S.S. *Badoeng Strait* on 18th December and proceeded to Kure.

About the middle of December, the replacement of the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division by the 45th Division from Hokkaido commenced. This meant that Admiral Dyer had to provide escort for all personnel ships plying between Inchon and Japan, and threw a further strain on the destroyers and frigates, necessitating frequent changes in the two task elements; and, as already mentioned, T.E. 95·11 was given responsibility for providing air cover in the Yellow Sea.

Admiral Scott-Moncrieff's arrival back from Hong Kong on 23rd December coincided with reports of an enemy build-up in the Haeju area, which drew attention to the island of Yong Pyong do lying off the approaches; H.M.N.Z.S. *Taupo* was sent to patrol in the vicinity. On Christmas Eve, H.M.S. *Belfast* bombarded the Amgak batteries; shore observation was provided by a distinguished team, consisting of Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff, the Fleet Gunnery Officer, and the Staff Communications Officer. Christmas-Day was a miserable day, snowing and blowing hard. Ships remained at their station or patrolling locally; most of them postponed their Christmas celebrations till their next return to harbour.¹ For the next few days, operations assumed a set pattern—daylight bombardments and harassing fire against suspected battery positions in the Amgak and Wolsa-ri areas, and harassing fire and star-shell illumination by night. Admiral Scott-Moncrieff availed himself of the opportunity to visit the various islands and discuss their problems with the officers in command ashore.²

Meanwhile, there had been a revival of interest in the Han estuary. It will be remembered that the agreement as to the cease-fire line had been subject to the settlement of other armistice points within 30 days—i.e., by 27th December. It soon became clear that there was no chance of such a settlement, and as the 30 days drew to their close the possibility of a Communist attack in force had to be envisaged. The army, always sensitive about its left flank, wanted a ship stationed in the Han to cover it. The naval authorities were averse to tying down a ship there permanently, but agreed to occasional visits by frigates on passage. H.M.S. *Mounts Bay* carried out a number of bombardments from Fork anchorage on 18th December, and on the 19th, H.M.S. *Whitesand Bay* arrived for a 36-hour visit. It was found that the mud-banks to the north of Fork had shifted considerably.

On 23rd December, just after Admiral Scott-Moncrieff's return, the defence of Kyodong do and Kangwha do in the estuary was added to the 'highest priority'

¹ Admiral Scott-Moncrieff had, however, been able to arrange for a surprising number of ships, considering the operational situation, to spend Christmas in harbour: H.M.A. Ships *Sydney* and *Tobruk* at Kure, H.M. Ships *Alacrity* and *Constance*, H.M.C.S. *Sioux*, H.M.N.Z.S. *Harwea* and H. Neth. M.S. *Van Galen* at Sasebo, while H.M. Ships *Ceylon*, *Cardigan Bay*, *Morecambe Bay*, *Amethyst*, *Cossack*, *Comus* and *Concord*, and H.M.A.S. *Murchison* were fortunate enough to be at Hong Kong.

² Lieutenant Baudette (later relieved by Captain Pattison) in *Sok to*, Lieutenant Penny, U.S.N., at Choda, Major McKeen (*Leopard*) at Pengyong do and Captain O'Connell (Air Force Intelligence) at Yong Pyong do.

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tasks. Defence commanders were appointed, but no troops other than guerrillas were made available, and they had very little ammunition. In these circumstances, H.M.S. *St Bride's Bay* was sent to the Han for a few days on 23rd December. Nothing abnormal occurred on the 27th when the dead-line date in the armistice negotiations passed, and she was withdrawn on the 28th and proceeded to Hong Kong.

On the night of 27th/28th December an attempt was made by guerrillas from Sok to recapture Ung do. After air strikes and a softening-up bombardment, they approached the island in three junks, supported by R.o.K. J.M.L. 302 and H.M.C.S. *Cayuga* (Commander Plomer). They were greeted by heavy fire from some fifteen machine-guns and mortars. One junk was sunk, one retired, and one landed its men on the neighbouring islet Chong Yang do, but they had to withdraw in the early hours of the 28th, having lost nine killed or missing, with twelve wounded. H.M.C.S. *Cayuga* fired 427 rounds in their support during the night. It was clear that the defence was alert¹ and well dug in, and also that such an operation was quite beyond the capacity of guerrillas in junks.

While this was going on in the Ping Yang inlet, the enemy attacked and captured Sosuap to, a small island in the Haeju estuary ten miles north of Yong Pyong do. H.M.N.Z.S. *Taupe* (Lieutenant-Commander Cradock-Hartopp) bombarded the island, and the next day U.S.S. *Badoeng Strait's* aircraft carried out strikes on it and nearby junks, inflicting heavy casualties estimated at 300 of the enemy and 700 civilians killed, among them a number of Leopard's agents. H.M.S. *Whitesand Bay* (Commander Rowell) was sent to take charge in the area, and friendly forces reoccupied Sosuap to that night; its importance lay in its convenience to the enemy as a stepping-stone towards Yong Pyong do. Admiral Scott-Moncrieff himself visited Yong Pyong do in H.M.S. *Belfast* on 28th December, and discussed the action at Sosuap to with the Air Defence Commander, Lieutenant O'Connell and Lieutenant-Commander Cradock-Hartopp, whose action he entirely endorsed. But the incident, with its unfortunate consequences for Leopard's agents, raised the question of policy in the event of the attacks on other small inshore islands that had to be anticipated. It was agreed between Admiral Scott-Moncrieff and Leopard that no great effort would be made to hold them, except, of course, in the case of the 'vital' islands and those covering their approaches, and air and gunnery counter-attacks would not be made till after Leopard's assurance had been received that they would not interfere with his people. Both the Admiral and Leopard were agreed that it was far preferable for the guerrillas and intelligence agents to lie low on such occasions and await future opportunities.

In the Sok to-Choda area, daily, harassing bombardments were carried out, and at night Operation Smoking Concert continued. This was enlivened in the evening of the 28th by a machine-gun attack on U.S.S. *Eversole* by an aircraft from about 1500 feet. This subsequently proved to have been the work of a 'friendly'; fortunately, no damage or casualties were caused.

So the year 1951 drew to a close. On new-year's eve, H.M.S. *Belfast* carried out a deliberate bombardment of the Amgak batteries (which had not opened fire since being silenced by H.M.A.S. *Tobruk* on 21st December) from 'Tobacco Road',

¹ Admiral Scott-Moncrieff remarked that it might have been better to have avoided the preliminary bombardments and relied on achieving surprise; but this softening-up was always an essential preliminary in American doctrine.

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the Fleet Navigating Officer, Commander J. A. Meares, with an observation party approaching by boat to within 3000 yards as 'bait'. The enemy refused to be drawn, however, and the exact position of the guns could not be spotted; two holes in the hillside which might have concealed them were accurately engaged.

CHAPTER 10

Stalemate in 1952

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By 1st January 1952, stagnation had set in and the war had assumed the over-all pattern that continued throughout the year. The armistice discussions on the exchange of prisoners of war dragged on without any appreciable progress being made. Serious riots at the prisoner-of-war camps in the island of Koje (south-west of Pusan), engineered by Communist agents who had allowed themselves to be captured, occurred at intervals between February and June, and further bedevilled the issue. Feelings were exacerbated, too, when on 22nd February the Communists accused the United Nations of using germ warfare.¹ On 4th April, the armistice talks were postponed indefinitely. An attempt to resume them was made in December by a United Nations resolution based on proposals put forward by India, but this was turned down by the Communists, and it was not in fact till March 1953 that any further progress was made.

An important political event took place when on 28th April 1952 the Japanese peace treaty with the United States and the British Commonwealth came into force. In the following months this raised various administrative problems affecting the Commonwealth naval forces based in Japan for the prosecution of the war in Korea, the solution of which called for much thought and diplomatic action. Hitherto, base facilities in Japan had been available by virtue of the rights of individual nations as occupying powers; with the ratification of the treaty, the

¹ There was, of course, not a shadow of truth in this allegation, but there were plenty of the home-grown variety of germs in Korea. An American resolution on 3rd July for an International Red Cross investigation was vetoed by Russia.

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United States, who had also negotiated a security pact and an accompanying administrative agreement, was the only nation whose forces had any legal standing in the country. At Sasebo, the Royal Navies had always been virtually rent-free subtenants of the United States, and the position did not greatly change, but the loss of control of the cruiser dock at Kure, which with many of the port facilities had been run by the Royal Australian Navy, was a serious handicap. Many other relatively minor but none the less important problems, such as the legal jurisdiction of the Japanese over British Commonwealth officers and ratings on shore, and the liability for payment of customs duties, also called for solution.

On shore, the war remained largely static throughout the year, with the front line approximately the same as at the commencement of the armistice talks. At first, the fighting was limited to patrol activities, but in July the United Nations decided to hit the enemy harder. Bitter and stubborn fighting broke out in the Chorwon area; by the end of September this had extended along almost the whole front and culminated in November and December in some of the hardest fighting of the war. The enemy had taken full advantage of the static warfare to overhaul his forces and to construct a very complex system of trenches and tunnels throughout his front. A great increase in his artillery and armour, moreover, gave him a numerical gun superiority over the U.N. forces, and by the end of October the ratio of U.N. to Communist losses had risen from 1:3 plus to 1:2, the R.o.K. divisions being the chief sufferers. There was, however, little significant change in the front line.

In the air, strenuous attempts at interdiction continued, the 5th Air Force dealing with the western part and the carrier-borne aircraft of T.F. 77 with the eastern part of North Korea. Great damage was inflicted on the enemy's roads, bridges, railway lines, and rolling-stock, but the effort did not succeed in its purpose and with the advent of static warfare the Communist armies never suffered from a shortage of ammunition and supplies. The reasons for this failure will be discussed later.¹ Meanwhile, the enemy was making steady attempts to recondition the airfields in North Korea, starting on those north of the River Chongchon, with a view to moving his air effort forward till he would be in a position to support the main battle. An increased willingness by enemy pilots to engage U.N. fighter-bombers at lower altitudes than before was noticed, coupled with great aggressiveness.

In June 1952, there was a change in the U.N. air policy. Hitherto, partly for political reasons and partly on humanitarian grounds, there had been a ban on attacking the hydro-electric power plants in North Korea. Now, after two years of warfare and with armistice talks in abeyance owing to the intransigence of the Communists, it was decided to lift the ban, and from 23rd June onwards a series of heavy attacks on the thirteen most important installations was carried out at intervals, and eventually extended almost to the Russian border. Later in the year (October), when it became clear that interdiction was not being achieved, a new system of bombing areas behind the enemy front lines initiated by Vice-Admiral Clark, U.S.N. (then commander of the 7th Fleet), was undertaken by aircraft of T.F. 77, with the object of destroying such store dumps as were not underground.

At sea, the general conduct of operations remained as hitherto. On the west

¹ See Section 102.

coast a carrier element consisting of either the Commonwealth light fleet carrier or a United States C.V.E., screened by four destroyers, operated in the southern Yellow Sea, relieving each other every nine or ten days. The Blockade Element, consisting usually of a cruiser and four or five destroyers or frigates operated further north, mainly between the Rivers Taedong and Han. On the east coast, T.F. 77—normally two heavy carriers, one or two 8-inch-gun cruisers, and sometimes a battleship, with destroyers—concentrated its efforts on the interdiction programme. The cruisers and battleship were detached at frequent intervals to visit established bombardment stations in turn, such as Kojo, Wonsan, Hungnam, Songjin, and so on, to deal with the coastal tracks. As regards T.F. 95, one task element was permanently stationed at the bomb-line to give gun-fire support to the troops to the northward, the 'sieges' of Wonsan and Songjin were maintained, and the whole coast was patrolled to guard against minelaying.

These commitments, and especially the defence of the 'vital' islands on the west coast, tended more and more to restrict the mobility of the naval forces. As time went on the volume and accuracy of shore-battery fire steadily increased, and many ships were hit, though in almost every case with surprisingly little damage and but few casualties.

Several changes in the naval command took place in the course of the year. On 3rd March, Vice-Admiral R. P. Briscoe succeeded Vice-Admiral Martin as Commander, 7th Fleet; Admiral Briscoe relieved Admiral Joy as COMNAVFE on 20th May, when Vice-Admiral J. J. Clark took over the 7th Fleet. Rear-Admiral Dyer was succeeded as C.T.F. 95 by Rear-Admiral J. E. Gingrich on 31st May, and Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff was relieved by Rear-Admiral E. G. Clifford on 23rd September.

General Mark Clark succeeded General Ridgway as Supreme C.-in-C., U.N. Forces, on 7th May, on the latter being appointed to command the NATO forces in Europe.

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On the west coast, the beginning of January 1952 saw the resources of the Blockade and Escort Force, 'which might more properly now be called the Naval Defence Element',¹ almost exclusively concentrated in the Sok to-Choda area. The aircraft of the Carrier Element (T.E. 95·11), too, were primarily employed in providing TARCAP and air strikes in support of the island defences; their operations will be described later.²

H.M.S. *Belfast* (Captain Duckworth), flying the flag of Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff, was C.T.E. 96·12 which was reinforced by an American destroyer, U.S.S. *Eversole*, later (7th January) relieved by U.S.S. *Taussig*.³ The forces at his disposal on new-year's day were as follows:

¹ F.O. 2i/c R.o.P. No. 47.

² See Section 83.

³ 'The usefulness of these fine ships with their excellent gunnery and radar equipment was to some extent offset by their reluctance to enter close waters However, it is only right that the Americans should begin to realize the navigational hazards that our ships have had to accept continuously on the west coast during this war.' F.O. 2i/c R.o.P. No. 46.

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IN THE SOK TO-CHODA AREA (T.U. 95·12·1): H.M.S. *Mounts Bay* (C.T.U.), H.M.C.S. *Cayuga*, U.S.S. *Eversole*, two L.S.M.R.s (Nos. 401 404), L.S.T. 602 carrying four L.C.P.s, known as Swanny Force, the armed rescue tug *Abnaki*; T.G. 95·7, the R.o.K. Group, P.C. 701, three A.M.C.s and two Y.M.S.s¹; and T.G. 95·6, the U.S. Minesweeping Group, U.S.S. *Epping Forest* (L.S.D.) H.Q. ship and tender with minesweeping boats embarked, and U.S. Ships *Merganser* and *Chatterer* under the temporary command of Commander J. F. Rowe, U.S.N., in the absence of Captain Williams, who, to Admiral Scott-Moncrieff's great regret, had been discharged to Yokosuka hospital seriously ill.

IN THE HAEJU AREA: H.M.N.Z.S. *Taupo*.

On 1st January, H.M.N.Z.S. *Hawea* relieved the *Taupo*, and H.M.A.S. *Tobruk* the *Cayuga*; the latter paid a visit that night to the Yalu Gulf and fired 70 rounds at Tae Wha do, before proceeding to Kure to meet Mr Brooke Claxton, the Canadian Defence Minister. Next day, H.M.S. *Alacrity* (Commander Luard) took over as C.T.U. 95·12·1, and H.M.S. *Mounts Bay* proceeded to the Han estuary for a few days.

In the Sok to-Choda area the ships took up their Smoking Concert stations every night, withdrawing and moving around during daylight so as not to present too obvious targets. As a result of the activities at the end of December, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff came to the conclusion that this area was over-insured, and that some of the forces there could with advantage be employed elsewhere. Admiral Dyer agreed to some reduction in the north to reinforce the south, but insisted on a minimum of one cruiser and three destroyers or frigates in the Sok to area at night. By this time the minesweeping was sufficiently advanced for the whole eastern coast of Sok to to be covered by ships' guns and the L.S.M.R.s, so Admiral Scott-Moncrieff decided that the Swanny Force patrol could be dispensed with. They had done good service in the early stages, when there was no other means of covering the eastern approaches to the island, but the steadily worsening winter weather conditions were very arduous and there were few nights when the L.C.P.s²

¹ For some time past these R.o.K. vessels had been a source of some worry to the task group commanders. Apart from their maintenance problems and language difficulties, there had been in some cases a definite unwillingness to co-operate and take part in full-time operations. A.M.C. 302 had put up a 'most admirable performance' at the attack on Ung do on 27th-28th December, but some of the others had been 'more trouble than they were worth'. The reason for this falling-off was not understood till April 1952, when Admiral Scott-Moncrieff visited Pusan. It then transpired that all their best officers had been withdrawn to key or training jobs in a long-term training scheme and reorganization of the Naval Academy and base at Pusan—an enterprise with which the Admiral was much impressed.

To get over the difficulties on the west coast, Commander Min, R.o.K.N., in P.C. 702 was appointed to take charge of all the R.o.K. ships on 4th January. Commander Min proved an excellent officer, and immediately things began to improve.

² The L.C.P.s of Swanny Force had at first been commanded by Lieutenant G. A. Swanston, R.N., and manned by crews from H.M.S. *Ceylon* and U.S.S. *Horace Bass*. On the departure of the *Ceylon* they were manned by personnel from U.S.S. *Manchester* for a short time, and then by a number of R.M. Commandos lately arrived from the United Kingdom, which were brought up in H.M.S. *Belfast*: and later by Royal Marines from the cruiser in T.E. 95·12. From the end of February 1952, the ship's company of the L.S.T. acting as parent ship provided the crews for the L.C.P.s.

could be used effectively. The Admiral therefore moved them to the Haeju area, where the climate was not so severe.

On 4th January Admiral Scott-Moncrieff visited the Han area in H.M.S. *Belfast*¹ in order to discuss matters there with Captain Frewen (*Mounts Bay*) and Major Maus, U.S.A., commanding 'Wolf-pack', an organization based on Kangwha do which was responsible for guerrilla operations in the Haeju area and to the eastward, similar to, but separate from, Leopard in Pengyong do. There he found the situation far from satisfactory. There was a considerable build-up opposite Kangwha do, and the island frequently came under fire from the north bank of the Han, east of the River Yesong. This was adjacent to the neutralized area around Kaesong and Panmunjon, and attacks on this area were prohibited, except air strikes under ground or Mosquito control. However, these gun positions were pinpointed, and Admiral Scott-Moncrieff ordered the *Mounts Bay* and *Hawea* to bombard them forthwith. This he followed up with air strikes from H.M.A.S. *Sydney*, in which he spent the next day carefully briefing the pilots himself. These measures had the desired effect, and there was no more enemy fire for some weeks; but though J.O.C., Korea, and 1st Corps raised no objection, Admiral Dyer did not feel able to lift the restriction. As a result of his visit, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff decided to keep a ship in the Han area more or less permanently, mainly to provide liaison with Wolf-pack and the U.S. 1st Corps; H.M.N.Z.S. *Hawea* remained there till 11th January, when she left to refit before returning to New Zealand on the arrival of H.M.N.Z.S. *Rotoiti*, and H.M.S. *Whitesand Bay* took her place between the 16th and 22nd January.

H.M.S. *Belfast*, who had taken the opportunity of subjecting targets in the Haeju area to harassing fire the night after leaving Songmo Sudo, returned to the Sok to-Choda area with Admiral Scott-Moncrieff on board in the evening of 5th January.

That day, the Amgak batteries, which had not fired since H.M.A.S. *Tobruk* had engaged them on 21st December, had suddenly opened fire on the mine-sweepers. H.M.S. *Alacrity* and H. Neth. M.S. *Van Galen* promptly silenced them and aircraft attacked them with rockets and napalm; but that did not prevent them from repeating the offence on the 6th, when they were engaged by H.M. Ships *Belfast* and *Alacrity* and again silenced.

On this day (6th January), an important decision was promulgated from Supreme Headquarters; the full responsibility for the defence of all the important islands off the coasts of Korea was transferred to the navy. This developed through the chain of command upon Rear-Admiral Dyer as C.T.F. 95, and, as far as the islands on the west coast were concerned, on Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff. The measures taken to cope with this responsibility, which included the land defences and logistic support of the garrisons, will be described later.

On 7th January H.M.S. *Ceylon* (Captain Thring), recently returned from a well-earned rest at Hong Kong, took over as C.T.E. 95·12, and H.M.S. *Belfast* with Admiral Scott-Moncrieff on board proceeded to Sasebo. Captain Thring exercised command of the element in H.M.S. *Ceylon* independently of any of the static elements, which were visited in turn at night. The *Ceylon* was usually based

¹ The Admiral transferred from the *Belfast* to the *Hawea* at the entrance to Songmo Sudo (37° 37' N., 126° 18' E.) for passage to Fork anchorage. This was the furthest point yet reached by a cruiser. See Plan 3.

centrally on Pengyong do or Techong do, whence she could support either end of the area.

At about this time the islands inshore of Pengyong do off the Ongjin peninsula began to give anxiety.

H.M.C.S. *Cayuga* had been covering the evacuation of refugees from various islands in company with R.o.K. P.C. 702, when on 10th January she came under fire from shore batteries in the vicinity of Changnin do, and again on the 13th near Kirin do.

These attacks lent colour to intelligence reports of impending assaults on Yuk to and Wollae do. While it was never the intention to attempt to hold these inshore islands,¹ it was desirable to deny them to the enemy as possible jumping-off points for an attack on Pengyong do.

L.S.M.R. 404 and the tug *Abnaki* were sent from Sok to reinforce the *Cayuga*, and one of the destroyers of the carrier force patrolled nightly off Yuk to. On 15th January H.M.S. *Ceylon* bombarded suspected positions of shore batteries on the mainland opposite Kirin do; L.S.M.R. 401 engaged junks and rubber boats reported off Changnin do on the 18th, and H.M.S. *Constance*, who had relieved H.M.C.S. *Cayuga*, bombarded Kumsuri, north of Yuk to, on the 20th. Air strikes from H.M.A.S. *Sydney* supplemented these efforts. After this there was a lull, but on the night of 2nd/3rd February Yuk to was occupied by the enemy. L.S.M.R. 401 (Commander Budd, U.S.N.), commander of the newly-constituted T.U. 95·12·2² engaged boats approaching the island and guns firing from the mainland, and it was thought the attack had been repelled; but it transpired that the friendly guerrillas, with whom communication had failed early, had at once evacuated the island. The enemy remained there only a few days, and the guerrillas returned on 5th February.

Two days later, Mahap to was attacked; H.M.A.S. *Warramunga* provided supporting fire; but the attack failed. Then enemy activity in the area died away for a time.

While the main effort of T.E. 95·12 was concentrated on the defence of the islands, occasional night visits were paid to the Yalu Gulf, when a ship was available, in order to keep the enemy on the *qui vive*; H.M.S. *Constance* carried out a sweep in these waters on 12th January, in an abortive attempt to capture some junks, and again on the 23rd, when she bombarded Ka do.

Between the 13th and 18th January Rear-Admiral Dyer visited the islands on the west coast in U.S.S. *Rochester*, escorted by U.S.S. *Collett*. While at Sok to he took the opportunity to carry out a bombardment of the Amgak batteries by the *Rochester*, with continuous, specially briefed air spot from U.S.S. *Badoeng Strait*, then C.T.E. 95·11. The guns were so well concealed, however, that unless they opened fire there was little the aircraft could do. On this occasion the enemy refused to be drawn, and though a number of bombardments was carried out, their success was very problematical.

By now the sweeping operations off Sok to had been completed and, on 18th January, the minesweepers of T.G. 95·6 transferred to the Haeju area, where a similar programme was commenced. U.S.S. *Epping Forest* had departed on 11th January; until the arrival of her relief, U.S.S. *Catamount* (L.S.D.), on the 22nd,

¹ Wollae do, Yuk to, Mahap to, Kirin do, Changnin do: see Plan 7.

² See Section 83.

the minesweepers which now numbered five were looked after by the Swanny Force L.S.T.¹

Meanwhile, the new arrangements for the defence of the islands consequent on the navy's assuming sole responsibility were taking shape. A new task element, consisting of the island garrisons—T.E. 95·15—was formed under the command of Colonel W. K. Davenport, U.S.M.C., and U.S. Marine officers of the rank of major were appointed in command of each of the vital islands, the Leopard officers reverting to their intelligence and guerrilla duties. Liaison with the naval forces was provided by the appointment of a Commonwealth Naval Liaison Officer with Colonel Davenport; this duty was first carried out by Lieutenant G. A. Swanston of H.M.S. *Ceylon* and later by Lieutenant D. R. Saxon, R.C.N.

Reinforcements of R.o.K. Marines and much needed defence equipment began to arrive in R.o.K. L.S.T.s on 22nd January, and by the end of the month the situation was stabilized.

On 21st January, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff, accompanied by his Chief Staff Officer, Captain Villiers, left Sasebo in H.M.S. *Belfast* for a short visit to the west coast in order to meet Colonel Davenport and to examine the dispositions on the spot. On arrival at Techong do on the 22nd, H.M.S. *Belfast* took over as C.T.E. 95·12 from H.M.S. *Ceylon*, and a conference with Colonel Davenport was held that afternoon. The next day Rear-Admiral J. W. M. Eaton, Flag-Officer Commanding, Australian Fleet, who was visiting the theatre of operations and had been spending some days at sea in H.M.A.S. *Sydney*, arrived from Sok to in H.M.A.S. *Tobruk*. After meeting Admiral Scott-Moncrieff, who then left for Haeju, Admiral Eaton witnessed a few harassing bombardments at targets in the Ongjin peninsula from H.M.A.S. *Murchison* on 23rd January, and took passage to Sasebo, *en route* for Australia, in H.M.A.S. *Sydney* on the 25th.

Admiral Scott-Moncrieff had intended to return to Sasebo with him in the *Sydney*, but there were indications that simultaneous attacks might be brewing in both the Sok to and Pengyong do areas, and, on receipt of a signal from Admiral Dyer expressing anxiety, he decided to remain in the *Belfast* to see what would happen.

H.M.S. *Belfast*, meanwhile, had proceeded to Sok to on the 24th January, where a conference was held with C.T.U. 95·12·1, Captain Coleridge (H.M.S. *Cardigan Bay*). Later a gale sprang up, and the weather became bitterly cold with intermittent snow squalls. The R.o.K. L.S.T. 803, which had brought up the first lift of reinforcements, parted her cable off a lee shore on Sok to and drove aground, where she became a total loss; fortunately no life was lost.

Apart from a trip to Techong do, where Captain Villiers transferred to H.M.C.S. *Sioux* for passage to Sasebo, H.M.S. *Belfast* remained in the Choda area for the next few nights. Intelligence reports forecast an attack on Ilo do, a small island close inshore north of Wolsa-ri held by friendly guerrillas, or possibly on Choda, and special vigilance in defence stations was exercised each night. Hitherto, except on one occasion off Changnin do, the rockets carried by the L.S.M.R.s had been conserved for use against a serious attempt at invasion, but Admiral Scott-Moncrieff now decided that small quantities might be used nightly, and suspected gun positions and build-up on Wolsa-ri were attacked by L.S.M.R. 401 at intervals. Enemy batteries became more active than of late; H.M.S. *Constance* was fired on

¹ U.S. Ships *Merganser, Chatterer, Swallow, Condor, Curlew*.

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from Wolsa-ri and hit by splinters on 26th January. Two days later U.S.S. *Fletcher* and the tug *Apache* came under fire from guns of about 5-inch calibre in the vicinity of Chedong Dong. H.M.S. *Belfast* proceeded to their support, and the battery was silenced; but on 30th January a battery in the same position fired on H.M.C.S. *Sioux*, which had relieved H.M.S. *Constance* in T.U. 95·12·1. Nightly activity with the enemy firing on Ho do from Wolsa-ri, and ships and the L.S.M.R. replying, continued for the rest of the month. On the night of 31st January, junks approaching Ho do from the eastward were driven off by A.M.S. 309 and H.M.C.S. *Sioux*, who, with H.M.S. *Concord*, silenced a battery supporting them.

So far the winter had been unusually mild, but by the end of January ice was forming rapidly, hampering the operations of ships round Sok to and preventing inshore boat patrols. On the other hand, as it was not thick enough to cross on foot to Ho do it made any seaborne invasion much more difficult for the enemy, and Admiral Scott-Moncrieff decided to visit the other areas. H.M.S. *Belfast* therefore spent the last two days of January in the Haeju and Han areas.

In the Haeju estuary, minesweeping of an extension to the northward (channel 'Tango'), to enable destroyers to get within range of Haeju, was in progress. This gave rise to enemy landings on some of the small islands to the northward of Yong Pyong do, from whence they could bring fire to bear on the minesweepers. To guard against this, the patrol boats of Swanny Force visited the islands by night, and when any signs of enemy occupation were noted, they were bombarded by H.M.S. *Cockade*. Having satisfied himself as to these arrangements, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff proceeded to the Han approaches on 31st January, where he transferred to H.M.A.S. *Murchison* (Lieutenant-Commander Dollard) and went up to Fork anchorage. There he conferred with Wolf-pack representatives. A regular battle had been going on for the last ten days between enemy guns on the north bank and Kangwha do. Admiral Scott-Moncrieff had again on 27th January sought permission to attack these guns by air, but Admiral Dyer would take no action. Some U.S. amphibious tractors, however, had been sent to Kangwha do to counter their fire to some extent and H.M.A.S. *Murchison* lent some assistance. But no shore fire-control parties to assist in spotting the ships' gun-fire could be made available by either the U.S. Army or Navy.

In these circumstances, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff decided not to station a frigate there permanently, but he arranged for nightly A.M.C. patrols in the Knife area to investigate all approaching craft. Large numbers of friendly clandestine craft were operating in the area at this time, and their identification posed a major problem. The authorized recognition signals were unsuitable because of the inevitable proximity of the shore; moreover, they were not directional and did not change frequently enough. H.M.S. *Whitesand Bay* and H.M.A.S. *Murchison*, with Wolf-pack's assistance, had introduced a single-letter code changing daily, but Admiral Dyer would not agree to the use of this officially, because it did not comply with what was laid down in a new recognition manual issued by the C.-in-C., Far East. This manual was entirely based on proposals made by the British during the past twelve months and Admiral Scott-Moncrieff felt that the C.-in-C. might well be open to further suggestion, but he could not get it up to him through the chain of command. So he authorized it locally, an arrangement to which Admiral Dyer did not demur.

It was dark by the time Admiral Scott-Moncrieff left Fork anchorage, but this did not perturb Lieutenant-Commander Dollard, who brought the *Murchison*

down the Meioumu Channel ' against a seven-knot current, using bearings of the tops of hills, most of which he had to memorize. A first-class job.'¹ This was H.M.A.S. *Murchison's* 60th day in the Han, and her last; after transferring the Admiral back to H.M.S. *Belfast*, she sailed for Sasebo *en route* to Australia. While on passage she had the misfortune to ram and sink an unlit fishing junk off Flower Island (south coast of Korea).

H.M.S. *Belfast* carried out some bombardments on 1st February with air spotting in the Mahap to area, where there was a concentration of troops and some camouflaged junks, and after spending the night off Choda, turned over the duties of C.T.E. 95·12 to H.M.S. *Ceylon* at Techong do on 2nd February, and then sailed for Kure, calling at Sasebo to transfer Admiral Scott-Moncrieff's flag to H.M.S. *Ladybird*.

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Meanwhile, throughout January, the carrier force (T.E. 95·11) had been mainly employed in supporting the islands' defence forces, though periodically this had to be discontinued owing to the carrier's being too far to the south providing air cover for the troop convoys in the Yellow Sea, which, it will be remembered, had been accorded priority over all other duties. Attempts to get the arrival and departures of these convoys timed so that both requirements could be met achieved no success; on these occasions air support for the islands was provided by the 5th Air Force, but this was not altogether satisfactory owing to difficulties in communications.²

H.M.A.S. *Sydney* (Captain Harries) had taken over as C.T.E. 95·11 from U.S.S. *Badoeng Strait* on 28th December. Her operations consisted principally in providing TARCAP and air strikes in support of the island defence, especially against gun and mortar positions and suspected boat concentrations in the Sok to-Choda area. Clever camouflage and deceptive measures by the enemy, however, rendered detection of gun positions or invasion preparations extremely difficult. A small proportion of the air effort was put into interdiction of the main communications in Hwanghae, and C.A.P. and routine reconnaissance was maintained.

H.M.A.S. *Sydney* carried out a full day's flying on 29th December. The next day was spent in providing air cover for a couple of convoys to the southward, but 54 operational sorties were flown on the 31st, though the weather left much to be desired. A very successful attack on a diversionary railway bridge and other Leopard targets was carried out by Fireflies.

The new year started badly, with a breakdown of the catapult. This, combined with an emergency landing by a damaged Firefly, considerably delayed operations, but a special effort was made in the afternoon and a total of 51 sorties was achieved. The island of Yongho do in the Sunito anchorage, seven miles north of Fankochi Point, had been invaded early that morning; four Furies dealt faithfully with targets there reported by Leopard and successfully covered the evacuation of about 90 of his guerrillas.

¹ F.O. 2i/c R.o.P. No. 47.

² An improvement was later effected in these by the appointment of a liaison officer (Lieutenant-Commander House) to the Joint Operations Centre, Korea.

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On 2nd January, while operating just on the edge of thick cloud and in very uncomfortable weather conditions, a Sea Fury on C.A.P., piloted by Sub-Lieutenant R. J. Coleman, R.A.N., got separated from his leader and was lost. An immediate air and surface search by Fireflies and U.S.S. *Hanson*¹ was ordered and continued for the rest of the day, but visibility was short, and though a wide area was covered, no trace of the pilot or wreckage was sighted.

The next day, air and surface cover was required for a convoy of two L.S.T.s making for Inchon; by sending the C.A.P. rather further from the ship than usual, a full day's flying was made possible, but the offensive sorties were necessarily curtailed. On this day Sub-Lieutenant N. D. Macmillan, R.A.N., carried out the 2000th operational landing on the carrier.

On 4th January, T.E. 95·11 refuelled, and, on the 5th, as already mentioned, Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff embarked in H.M.A.S. *Sydney*, and personally briefed the pilots for a strike against the guns near the River Yesong in the Han area. One pilot, Lieutenant P. Goldrick, R.A.N., was wounded by flak, but he managed to return to the ship and landed on successfully.

During the last two days of the patrol, bad weather was encountered with low cloud, snow squalls, and short visibility, and little flying was possible. Many of the Australian ship's company had never before seen snow in any quantity, but they made good use of it in a traditional snow-fight as the ship left the area on 7th January, after relief by U.S.S. *Badoeng Strait*. A total of 362 sorties had been flown during the patrol, an average of 50·3 sorties a day (including one on convoy protection), and 73 440 rounds of 20-mm cannon ammunition, 1197 rockets, 144 500-lb and ten 1000-lb bombs had been expended on the enemy. Eleven aircraft were damaged in action.

U.S.S. *Badoeng Strait*, screened by H.M.S. *Charity*, H. Neth. M.S. *Van Galen*, and U.S.S. *Hanson* remained on patrol till 16th January. Like H.M.A.S. *Sydney*, her operations were mainly in support of the Choda-Sok to area, to which were added attacks on a reported build-up against Yuk to. U.S.S. *Badoeng Strait* also made a speciality of cutting roads and tracks into Chinnampo from the northward. There was considerable flak round the main target areas, and she lost three aircraft; in two cases the pilots were not recovered.

H.M.A.S. *Sydney*, screened by H.M.C.S. *Sioux* and U.S.S. *Radford*, took over from U.S.S. *Badoeng Strait* in the evening of 16th January. This was the *Sydney*'s last operational period before her return to Australia. It was largely marred by bad weather and uncertainty as to convoy requirements, the liaison between T.F. 90 and T.F. 95 in this respect being indifferent. So far as the weather permitted the usual air operations were carried out. In response to a suggestion in a prisoner-of-war interrogation report, some effort was devoted to the destruction of railway water-towers. It was thought that these would take about a month to restore, whereas it was known from experience that the enemy could usually make good a rail cut in 24 hours or so.

Flying operations began at 0750, 17th January, in fine, clear weather. That forenoon the Flag-Officer Commanding, Australian Fleet, Rear-Admiral Eaton, arrived in H.M.A.S. *Tobruk* and joined the *Sydney* to witness the flying for a few days, the *Tobruk* joining the A/S screen. Flying continued throughout most of

¹ U.S.S. *Hanson* with H.M. Ships *Constance* and *Cockade*, and H.M.C.S. *Sioux*, formed H.M.A.S. *Sydney*'s A/S screen.

the day, but the weather deteriorated and heavy snow compelled the cancellation of the last event. Normal operations were carried out on the next two days. On 20th January the weather was fine and clear at sea, but targets were obscured by fog. That afternoon Admiral Eaton left the ship for a visit to the islands in H.M.A.S. *Tobruk*, whose place in T.E. 95·11 was taken by H.M.S. *Constance*; and H.M.A.S. *Sydney* then proceeded to the southward to cover a convoy. On 21st January the weather was very changeable and seriously interfered with flying; the next day the force refuelled, and a full day's flying was carried out on the 23rd. Rear-Admiral Eaton rejoined the *Sydney* on 24th January. Flying operations were carried out during the forenoon; then the weather forced their abandonment. That night was spent practically hove-to in a very rough sea, with wind force nine. The gale continued throughout the 25th, and in the evening the *Sydney* left the area for Sasebo, on relief by U.S.S. *Badoeng Strait*.

During the period, which included one day on convoy escort and the greater part of two days on which the weather prohibited flying, 293 sorties were flown; no aircraft was lost, but ten suffered damage in action.

Since her arrival on the station, H.M.A.S. *Sydney* had spent a total of 64 days in the operational area, not including time on passage from Kure or Sasebo. Of these days, 9·5 were occupied in replenishment or on passage between the east and west coasts of Korea, and 11·7 full flying-days were lost through bad weather, leaving a total of 42·8 full flying-days, during which 2366 sorties were flown—an average daily sortie rate of 55·2. Admiral Scott-Moncrieff described the performance of H.M.A.S. *Sydney* and her air group as 'quite excellent'; she sailed from Sasebo on 27th January with H.M.A.S. *Tobruk* for Hong Kong and her home waters. There she was to form part of the royal escort for the projected visit of H.R.H. Princess Elizabeth and the Duke of Edinburgh to Australia in February. But that was not to be.

For on 6th February 1952, the postponement of the Royal visit *sine die* was compelled by an event which shocked and saddened the Commonwealth and its friends throughout the world—the sudden death of His Majesty King George VI.

In the war zone, the news was received with deep regret. The accession of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II was marked by the firing of 21-gun royal salutes by H.M. Ships *Ceylon* and *Charity* at her enemies in their respective areas and by H.M.S. *Belfast*, who was at Kure.

King George VI had taken a keen interest in the doings of his Commonwealth forces in Korea, and six months previously (25th July 1951) had authorized the issue of a medal in recognition of their achievements. Memorial services for His late Majesty were held on Friday, 15th February—the day of the funeral—in all of H.M. ships, and minute guns were fired by H.M.S. *Belfast* in Kure and H.M.S. *Unicorn* in Sasebo. A memorial service in the latter was attended by Rear-Admiral Dyer and other senior U.S. naval officers. Messages of sympathy were received by Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff from all our allies, including each of the R.o.K. Navy ships on patrol, and also by voice radio from guerrillas in the islands behind the enemy lines.

'There is no doubt', wrote the Admiral, 'the event has made a profound impression.'¹

¹ F.O. 2i/c R.o.P. No. 48.

By the end of January 1952 it had become clear that the defence of the islands was a permanent, high-priority commitment, and Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff issued new directives to his forces with the object of giving effect to the defence measures and at the same time breaking away so far as possible from the static warfare they threatened to impose on his ships. Each of the defensive task units was given an area to be patrolled during the day and a wider area of responsibility.¹

Task Element 95·12 was organized into four task units, viz.,

T.U. 95·12·1. *Sok to-Choda Unit*. Patrol area, code name Cigarette, from Sok to to Choppeki Point.

T.U. 95·12·2. *Pengyong do Unit*. Patrol area, code name Worthington, from Choppeki to approximately meridian 125° 15' E., including Wollae do, Yuk to and Kirin do.

T.U. 95·12·3. *Han Unit*. Patrol area, code name Guinness, Han estuary, but frigates not to proceed beyond Fork anchorage.

T.U. 95·12·4. *Haeju Unit*. Patrol area, code name Brickwood, from Worthington area to the eastward.

Ships were to be assigned to the task units by C.T.E. 95·12, who himself (in the cruiser) would not be assigned to any particular unit, but would be available to reinforce anywhere necessary.

Subject to a minimum of three destroyers or frigates, one A.T.F., one L.S.M.R. being at invasion stations at night or in short visibility at Sok to-Choda, and one destroyer and the L.S.T. with Swanny Force at Yong Pyong do, the areas were to be patrolled actively with the following aims:

- a. To discourage offensive operations by the enemy by display of activity in the widest possible area.
- b. To support T.E. 95·15 and guerrilla activity.
- c. To prevent enemy minelaying.
- d. To prevent movement of enemy junks in areas not covered by anti-invasion stations.
- e. To control movements of clandestine craft.
- f. To control refugees and capture unauthorized craft.
- g. The Han Unit to provide link with Wolf-pack and to supply gun-fire support if required.

The R.o.K. light craft were to patrol inshore in route Cigarette when not required for check-sweeping; the latter was to be carried out only if an area had not been patrolled adequately to ensure safety.

Admiral Scott-Moncrieff followed up these directions with new directives for

¹ C.T.G. 95·1 signal 206015Z January; copy in F.O. 2i/c R.o.P. No. 47, Appendix I.

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bombardment policy¹ and the deployment of the air effort of T.E. 95·11.² As regards bombardment, all ships were to be prepared to engage opportunity targets with direct fire, including counter-battery fire against active gun positions. Directions for obtaining air spotting from T.E. 95·11 and 5th Air Force were laid down. Unobserved fire was to be used sparingly; ships were reminded that effective use could be made of ships' observers landed on suitable friendly islands, and that in certain circumstances guerrillas could be of use. Commanding officers were authorized to use ammunition as necessary to achieve the object of any shoot.

The duties of the Carrier Element (T.E. 95·11) were laid down as follows:

a. TARCAP, Choda-Sok to area. Provide two aircraft for day TARCAP, relieving on station or with minimum practicable interval. Acting under direction of air control ship, tasks in order of priority:

- (1) Strike enemy artillery active against our forces.
- (2) Give cover against attack by enemy piston aircraft.
- (3) Keep coastal area Amgak to SAGR-ri under regular surveillance.

b. Air spot for planned bombardment of pre-arranged targets.

- (1) One pair of aircraft daily as requested by C.T.U. 95·12·1.
- (2) One pair daily if requested by C.T.E. 95·12 or other C.T.U.

These two defensive requirements would absorb up to two-thirds of the available effort. Other tasks in order of priority were defined as:

a. Strikes requested by C.T.E. 95·12 or C.T.U.s.

b. Armed reconnaissance of coastal area, including enemy-held islands, from the Han to Chinnampo. Primary task: detection and destruction of enemy personnel, artillery, craft, and equipment threatening invasion of friendly islands.

c. Armed reconnaissance and interdiction of supply routes in Chinnampo, Hwanghae, and the River Han area, and close air support.

d. Strikes on other targets.

When day C.A.P. over troop convoys in the Yellow Sea was required, arrangements were to be made with the 5th Air Force to take over TARCAP in the Sok to-Choda area, and the remaining activities were to be modified or suspended as necessary. O.T.C., West Coast, was authorized to revise this deployment of air effort at his discretion to meet changing situations.

Owing to these requirements for the defence of the islands, and to the necessity to provide destroyers to screen the convoys employed on the large-scale troop movements from Hokkaido to Inchon³, there was an acute shortage of destroyers and frigates at this time. This made itself felt chiefly on the east coast. Furthermore, the United States had recently transferred a number of patrol frigates to the South Koreans and Thailanders, after which they practically never ran. Actually,

¹ C.T.G. 95·1 signal 030925Z February; copy in F.O. 2i/c R.o.P. No. 47, Appendix I.

² C.T.G. 95·1 signal 040551Z February; copy in F.O. 2i/c R.o.P. No. 47, Appendix I.

³ See p. 206.

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even the Americans experienced difficulty in keeping this class of frigate running. As a conspicuous exception, mention should be made of the Colombian frigate *Almirante Padilla* (Lieutenant-Commander Reyes). 'This little ship', wrote Admiral Scott-Moncrieff on 9th January,

'which is the same class as the other ex-American frigates . . . has now been serving out here for nine months and as far as I can see she has seldom stopped running. She has been at sea for 52 out of the last 60 days. I am delighted to hear that the Americans are now transferring another frigate, U.S.S. *Bisbee*,¹ to them. This frigate will relieve the *Almirante Padilla* who will return to Colombia in March. Lieutenant-Commander Reyes, who was trained by British naval officers in the original Colombian destroyers, and is intensely proud of this, has done a fine job . . . his men are full of fighting spirit; so much so that . . . he is leaving 50 per cent of his crew to provide the commissioning nucleus for the *Bisbee*, and in fact he had 80 per cent volunteers for this. He is sailing his own ship back to Colombia with only half a ship's company. . . . The Colombians have certainly deserved well of the United Nations.'²

At about this time a regrettable incident occurred which was, nevertheless, to facilitate the exercise of the blockade and patrol operations. A clandestine craft with some U.S. Army officers on board was engaged and sunk by a U.S. destroyer on the east coast. As a result of this, authority was given to take positive action to prevent such 'accidents' occurring on either coast of Korea in future. Both Admiral Andrewes and Admiral Scott-Moncrieff had frequently urged that the movements of these clandestine craft should be notified in time to promulgate them to the ships operating in the area, and also that proper means of identification should be carried.³ As already mentioned, a Far East Command recognition manual, giving four different types of recognition, had been issued recently, but the naval commanders still lacked authority to make all the various organizations concerned notify the intended movements of their craft. Now, at last, authority was given to enforce the co-operation of the various local authorities in this respect, and it became possible, at any rate in theory, to inform ships and aircraft on blockade and defence patrols of craft likely to be met with in their areas, and so to avoid a recurrence of the unfortunate incidents of the past.

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Some mention should be made here of another commitment on the west coast, which was much to the fore at this time—the evacuation of refugees from the various islands. This has been mentioned before, and considerable numbers had already been lifted to Mokpo.⁴ At the beginning of January, three L.S.T.s belonging to T.F. 90 were employed on this duty. Supported by H.M.C.S. *Cayuga* and R.o.K. P.C. 702, they virtually completed the evacuation of the islands in the Pengyong do and Ongjin area by 14th January; but a steady trickle by junk and sampan from the mainland to the islands continued. One L.S.T. was then withdrawn,

¹ The *Bisbee* was renamed *Capitan Tomo* by the Colombians.

² F.O. 2i/c R.o.P. No. 46.

³ See Section 53.

⁴ See Section 77.

and another on 28th January. By that time 25 000 refugees had been lifted; but there were many more to come and the withdrawal of the enemy from Sunwi do, Changnin do, and other islands at the beginning of February resulted in an influx of some 17 000 with many wounded. A further complication was introduced by the discovery of 50 typhus cases—not isolated—in Yong Pyong do. An L.S.I.(L)¹ with an epidemiological research unit on board, was sent to the west coast to survey this situation.

In these circumstances, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff asked for at least two more L.S.T.s to be allocated. Many of the refugees were averse to going so far as Mokpo; these he encouraged to move in their own junks to suitable islands not so far south. At this time, it must be remembered, it seemed quite probable that a cease-fire agreement would be reached in a few weeks. This would certainly involve giving up some of the islands held by the United Nations (though it was not certain precisely which), and for their evacuation these L.S.T.s would be invaluable. Admiral Dyer, however, was doubtful whether they would be available for this purpose, as in the event of an armistice they would almost certainly be required for the transfer of prisoners of war.

Admiral Scott-Moncrieff had discussed this question with Admiral Martin, who visited Sasebo in U.S.S. *Wisconsin* on 17th January. Admiral Martin confirmed that all L.S.T.s would probably be needed for the prisoners of war, but he wished planning to be commenced as soon as possible, though it could only be on an *ad hoc* basis. In addition to the guerrillas, their families, cattle, and belongings, and any of the inhabitants and refugees who wished to evacuate, there were heavy electronic equipment and installations at Pengyong do and Yong Pyong do, and some highly specialized equipment at Choda, which would have to be removed within five days in event of these islands being given up. The prospect of coping with this problem without the use of craft which could beach, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff described as 'horrifying'.² Admiral Martin again visited Sasebo on 31st January, and further discussed the subject with Admiral Dyer and Captain Villiers, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff being then at sea. It was still not known whether Pengyong do would be given up. It seemed likely that the Swanny Force L.S.T. would be available, and possibly one R.o.K. L.S.T., but it was clear that all available warships would have to be used, and planning for the embarkation and the security of the islands while this was in progress was initiated between C.T.E. 95·12 and C.T.E. 95·15, two officers of Admiral Scott-Moncrieff's staff being sent to examine the problem on the spot, and to make an estimate of the lift and arrangements required.

As things turned out, the problem was not so imminent as it appeared to be, and eighteen months were to elapse before the situation arose.

Meanwhile, the evacuation of civilians from the main islands as a defence measure continued, and was practically completed by the middle of March. The constant trickle of civilians from the mainland to the smaller islands continued, but they usually evacuated themselves by junk. On 29th February the C.-in-C., U.N. Command, directed that mass evacuations were to cease, the camps then being full; evacuation was to be limited to those who had in some way aided the

¹ L.S.I.(L) 1091 was actually no more than an L.C.I.(L). The term *ship* was used by the U.S. authorities to denote that she was manned by the navy, all landing-craft being manned and run by the U.S. Army or Marine Corps.

² F.O. 2i/c R.o.P. No. 47.

United Nations, and might therefore be subject to reprisals. These were to be carefully screened. At this time there were 455 natives and one cow all ready, and willing, to be evacuated from Sok to. As this was likely to be the last party from that island, a special case was made for them and they were lifted to Kunsan without any formality.¹

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Early in February 1952, Admiral Dyer and Admiral Scott-Moncrieff were agreed that the important islands were reasonably secure against any attempt at invasion. Admiral Scott-Moncrieff then wished to utilize the R.o.K. Marine garrisons offensively for raiding, but the Commander, Covert Clandestine and Related Activities (CCRAK), was opposed to this, as he feared it would stir up enemy activity and possibly bring retribution to the small islands from which his intelligence teams were working, and it was not till some months later that his objections were overcome.

For the rest of the year, naval operations on the west coast continued on the lines laid down in Admiral Scott-Moncrieff's directives. The work was un spectacular, but arduous in the extreme, especially for the destroyers and frigates, entailing constant patrolling, enforcement of the blockade, intricate navigation in all varieties of weather, and frequent bombardment. In addition, there were escort duties, and three or four destroyers were continually employed in screening the Carrier Element,² whose operations will be described later.³

A typical day's work might start with a destroyer on night patrol steaming to bombard a reported enemy troop position near the coast at first light. As the ship nosed her way through shoal waters in the darkness, the hands would be piped to action stations and the guns made ready. When light enough for spotting aircraft to see the fall of shot, fire would be opened and continued till the target had been well covered or destroyed. The forenoon might be spent in directing and supporting minesweeping operations; then perhaps a rendezvous with another ship to collect mail, provisions, or personnel, usually transferred by jackstay. In the afternoon a shore battery might be engaged, with fire directed by the ship's fire-control party previously landed by boat. This might be followed by a visit to a friendly island to land stores and equipment for the garrison. At dusk the limits of prohibited night-fishing areas would be scrutinized, and friendly fishing craft ordered away. Nightfall would find her once again on patrol. In the course of the night there would be radar contacts to be closed and investigated; searchlight or star-shell might reveal a friendly coaster supplying refugees on an off-lying island, but any vessel not surely identified would necessitate boarding. So it went

¹ It is of some interest to note the length of time for this 'special case' to be referred up and down the chain of command. C.T.E. 95·12's first signal made to Admiral Scott-Moncrieff was timed 1142Z, 1st March; the final signal reporting that the evacuation had taken place, 0710Z, 11th March. In the meantime the local garrison had bought the cow, which had rewarded their enterprise by giving birth to a calf.

² The carrier screen was supposed to consist of four destroyers (two Commonwealth or Dutch and two American), but not infrequently had to be reduced to three.

³ See Section 86.

on, day in and day out, with all the discomforts of great heat in summer and intense cold in winter thrown in for good measure.

H.M.S. *Belfast* (Captain Duckworth) and H.M.S. *Ceylon* (Captain Thring) continued to alternate as C.T.E. 95·12, but their time on the station was drawing to a close, and they both left before the end of the year—the *Ceylon* in July and the *Belfast* in September—their places being taken by H.M.S. *Newcastle* (Captain W. H. F. C. Rutherford) and H.M.S. *Birmingham* (Captain J. D. Luce).

Of the four areas defined in Admiral Scott-Moncrieff's directive, the Choda-Sok to area made the greatest numerical demands on his forces. Though the enemy made no serious attempt against either of these important islands, exchanges of gun-fire were frequent, and at first this was the most active area. During the early summer months the centre of interest shifted to the Haeju and Pengyong do areas. There the enemy adopted the policy of periodically occupying the small inshore islands off the south and west coasts of the Ongjin peninsula. They only remained in them for a day or so, and then returned to the mainland. Any friendly guerrillas who might be based in these islands evacuated as soon as the enemy was seen approaching, returning after they had left. A small trickle of refugees resulted from each such exchange. From July onwards a series of raids by the U.N. island garrisons and guerrillas was carried out.

In the Han area, operations by Commonwealth ships virtually ceased in February. On St Valentine's Day H.M.N.Z.S. *Rotoiti* (Lieutenant-Commander G. O. Graham) carried out a bombardment at the request of Wolf-pack. Returning to the area on 22nd February, she came under very heavy fire in Fork anchorage from three batteries sited each side of the River Yesong. After being straddled five times she slipped her cable and managed to withdraw undamaged behind Kyodong do. On this, Admiral Scott-Moncrieff sought permission through Admiral Dyer to attack these batteries from the air, but this could not be obtained; he therefore decided not to send a frigate to the Han till these restrictions were withdrawn, and informed Admiral Dyer accordingly. In any case the sandbanks of the river had by this time shifted to such an extent that navigation above Fork would not be possible without a complete new survey. One or two R.o.K. A.M.C.s continued to patrol these waters.

During the first quarter of 1952, as already mentioned, the Choda-Sok to area was the scene of the main activities. Enemy batteries usually opened fire whenever U.N. aircraft were not overhead,¹ and the ships in the area retaliated. On 14th February H.M.A.S. *Bataan* (Commander Bracegirdle) was straddled and hit in the commanding officer's cabin; apart from damage to his apparel, little harm was done. Three days later a special air strike supported by gun-fire from H.M. Ships *Ceylon* and *Cardigan Bay* (Captain Coleridge), and H.M.C.S. *Nootka* (Commander Steele), was laid on against Wolsa-ri battery; this, however, did not prevent this battery from firing about 80 rounds at H.M.S. *Mounts Bay* (Captain Frewen) and U.S.S. L.S.I.(L) 1091 while at anchor at 'Old Gold'² off Sok to on the 23rd, after TARCAP from U.S.S. *Bairoko* had left. Though both ships were straddled, no damage was sustained, but as a result ships were forbidden to anchor within range of enemy guns in daylight.

¹ It was noticeable that the enemy seldom opened fire till the departure of TARCAP before dark, or if for any reason it was not present.

² See Plan 6.

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A good deal of fog in the latter part of March hampered both sides, but on the 17th, U.S. Ships *Gull* and *Mocking Bird*, while sweeping north of Sok to, came under intense fire from Amgak and positions on the north bank. Again, no damage was suffered, and the guns were silenced by H.M.S. *Charity* (Commander Henley). The small island of Ho do, south of Sok to, which had been garrisoned by a platoon of R.o.K. Marines, fell to the enemy on the night 26th/27th March. H.M.S. *Crane* (Captain Marsh),¹ then C.T.U. 95·12·1, bombarded the island when it was clear that the enemy were in possession. She herself was hit by the Wolsa-ri battery, and sustained minor damage, but no casualties. After this the enemy activity declined. Though their gun positions were bombarded by all the ships in the area at different times, there was no reply till 27th April, when a few rounds were fired at Sok to. U.S.S. *Brush* promptly silenced the battery on this occasion, and things then remained comparatively quiet until July.

Meanwhile, in the Pengyong do and Haeju areas, after the activities at the beginning of February already mentioned, all remained quiet. An unfortunate episode occurred at Pengyong do on 22nd February. Admiral Dyer had arrived there in U.S.S. *Rochester* in the course of a short tour of the west coast islands, and was at Leopard's headquarters with some of his staff, when a bomb exploded. Considerable damage was done to the H.Q. building; fortunately there were no casualties. One of U.S.S. *Bairoko*'s aircraft while dropping a message for Leopard had released the bomb at the same time.

At Haeju, too, a fortnight later there was an accident which had more serious results, when an L.C.P.(L) belonging to Swanny Force was lost with all hands, including two Royal Marines on loan from H.M.S. *Belfast*, Lieutenant-Commander T. B. Brooks, U.S.N. (C.T.E. 90·30), Major Maus, U.S.A. (Wolf-pack), and his relief, Major Keenan, U.S.A., on 3rd March. Exactly what happened is unknown; it was thought that the L.C.P. either hit a submerged rock south of Yong Pyong do, or foundered in the prevailing rough weather.

Towards the middle of April, just after things had quietened down in the Choda area, a period of considerable activity commenced in the Haeju area, which lasted till the end of August. On 16th March H.M.S. *Concord* (Commander Mills) had prevented an attempt by the enemy across the mud-flats on Yong Mae do (ten miles to the north-eastward of Yong Pyong do), which was held by guerrillas. Another attack on this island was foiled on the night of the 12th/13th April—this time by H.M.A.S. *Bataan* (Commander Bracegirdle), using star-shell and spotting by the local garrison. Co-operation with Wolf-pack, which now had been taken over by Captain Lamm, U.S.A., was extremely good on this occasion. A week later, intelligence reports indicated that yet another attack was brewing, as a preliminary to a three-phase attack in that area. To help counter this, the *Bataan* laid a controlled minefield in the mud-flats, using depth-charges as mines; flares dropped by the 5th Air Force, too, proved an effective deterrent and the attack never materialized.

In the latter part of April and the beginning of May, a large number of bombardments without spotting facilities and mainly at night were carried out by U.N. forces in the adjoining Pengyong do area, one destroyer from the Carrier Element participating with the ships in T.U. 95·12·2.

Two P.T. boats recently handed over to the R.o.K. Navy by the United States had been placed under Admiral Scott-Moncrieff's operational control early in April. They were fine, well-armed boats and the R.o.K. crews were 'intensely

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keen and proud of them'.¹ After some teething troubles they were based on the R.F.A. tanker at Techong do, who did everything possible to assist them. Their first operational sortie took place on the night of 18th/19th April, when they assisted H.M.C.S. *Nootka* to silence some guns in the Kirin do neighbourhood. Later, they carried out a successful sweep against the harbour installations at Haeju, which caused considerable damage and casualties. After some five weeks' service with T.E. 95·12 they were withdrawn from Admiral Scott-Moncrieff's command and returned to Chinhae early in May, where they were employed in ferrying and patrol duties in the Koje do prisoner-of-war area.

Throughout May and June there was great activity by both sides in the Haeju area. On 1st May, guerrillas under Lieutenant Saum, u.s.m.c., landed in fog on the west side of the bay, overran a company position, killed the company commander and captured twelve prisoners. The Communists were reported as suffering from the after-effects of their May-Day celebrations. The next day, a raid on the mainland north of Yong Mae do on the opposite side of the bay resulted in the capture of communication equipment and documents; 24 of the enemy, including a C.C.F. advisor, were killed. Both these raids were supported by H.M.S. *Whitesand Bay* (Commander Craig-Waller). Numerous small-scale raids by Wolf-pack followed under the energetic leadership of Captain Lamm, u.s.a., supported by H.M.A.S. *Bataan* (Commander Bracegirdle) who relieved the *Whitesand Bay* as C.T.U. 95·12·4 on 6th May.

During this period two searches were carried out for aircraft that had come down in the Haeju area. One, an American F-94 fitted with special equipment, could not be located. The other, a Firefly from H.M.S. *Ocean*, was floated across from the mud-flats in the north part of Haeju Bay to Taesuap to by guerrillas, using motor junks, sampans, and oil drums. The Firefly was, however, found to be too badly damaged to be repaired, and was abandoned after all valuable equipment had been removed.

About the middle of May there was a brief recrudescence of enemy artillery activity in the Choda area. On the 17th, a few rounds were fired at H.M.S. *Belfast* while she was bombarding targets on the north shore of the Taedong estuary. Commodore J. C. Hibbard, Chief of Canadian Naval Personnel, who was visiting the Canadian ships in the war zone, chanced to be on board at the time, and Captain Duckworth 'was glad to be able to demonstrate to him *Belfast's* retaliatory measures to this impertinence'. A couple of days later, U.S.S. *Lowry* rather rashly anchored in daylight in the prohibited anchorage south-east of Choda. After she had been there about four hours the Wolsa-ri batteries opened fire; about 50 rounds were fired, and she was lucky to escape without hits or casualties. Thereafter, the enemy again subsided, and T.U. 95·12·1 continued its operations unmolested. Between 23rd May and 3rd June one of its destroyers carried out a night patrol, known as Ebony, in the Yalu Gulf. A considerable measure of success was achieved by H.M.S. *Constance* (Commander Lyle), who, on four separate occasions, intercepted and sunk a number of sailing junks. Useful intelligence was obtained from some of the prisoners taken out of them.

But the centre of interest remained in the Haeju area. There, in the latter part of May, two very satisfactory large-scale raids planned by Captain Lamm in collaboration with C.T.U. 95·12·4 were carried out. On 19th May, some 400

¹ F.O. 2i/c R.o.P. No. 50.

guerrillas landed in junks on the west side of Haeju Bay on the peninsula abreast of Yuk to. Naval gun-fire was provided by H.M.A.S. *Bataan* and air support by aircraft from H.M.S. *Ocean*. Remaining ashore for up to five hours, the guerrillas inflicted about 150 casualties on enemy troops, captured several small junks and a fair amount of loot in the form of livestock and grain, and destroyed or damaged a number of buildings. Casualties to the guerrillas amounted only to one killed and two wounded. H.M.A.S. *Bataan*, directed by U.S. Marine shore spotters on an adjacent island, destroyed one 75-mm gun and three mortar-control positions, and air spot from H.M.S. *Ocean* destroyed one complete command post, killing 40 Chinese Communists, one mortar, and three machine-guns. About a week later (25th May) a similar raid was carried out, this time supported by H.M. Ships *Belfast* and *Whitesand Bay* (who had relieved H.M.A.S. *Bataan*), U.S. L.S.T. *1089* and aircraft from U.S.S. *Bataan*. About 120 of the enemy were killed by small-arms fire, and a large quantity of enemy correspondence and files, small-arms and cattle were captured. The guerrillas lost seven killed and fourteen wounded. No reliable estimate could be made of enemy casualties and the destruction caused by naval gun-fire and aircraft, but both appeared to be very effective.

These guerrilla raids had Admiral Scott-Moncrieff's full support; they were good for the morale of all U.N. forces concerned and kept the enemy on tenter-hooks, but he was much concerned by an unconfirmed report that the guerrillas had shot 50 of their prisoners in cold blood. Such uncivilized behaviour could only give the United Nations a bad name, to say nothing of inviting reprisals, and the matter was referred to Admiral Dyer to take up with the South Korean Government and U.S. Army authorities.

While all this activity was going on, there was a major seasonal problem in the control of the fishing in the Haeju approaches. At one time there were some 700 junks and other vessels employed on this peaceful pursuit, 'making navigation by night and in fog (which was very prevalent) a nightmare to H.M. ships', wrote Captain Duckworth. 'Thanks to the admirable co-operation of the local fishing guild and the addition of four R.o.K.N. patrol craft, the organization and discipline of this vast fishing fleet was excellent and interfered little with our primary anti-invasion duties.'¹ By the end of May the fish had moved to the south, and the fleet melted away in pursuit, so this particular problem was over for the nonce.

The Han area was visited by H.M.S. *Amethyst* (Commander A. R. L. Butler) on 27th May in order to contact the local guerrilla leaders. As a result of a conference with Major Ripley, U.S.A., she returned on 31st May and supported a not very successful guerrilla raid that night. Only one out of three teams succeeded in getting ashore for a few minutes, before they were beaten off by strong counter-attacks. The *Amethyst* was unable to fire on the beaches for fear of hitting the guerrillas, and the situation was saved only by the fine support given by aircraft from H.M.S. *Ocean*.

At about this time important changes took place in the high command of the U.N. naval forces. On 7th May, General Mark Clark succeeded General Ridgway as Supreme C.-in-C., on the appointment of the latter to command the NATO forces in Europe. Vice-Admiral R. P. Briscoe, U.S.N., who had succeeded Vice-Admiral Martin as Commander, 7th Fleet,² left to take over from Vice-Admiral

¹ H.M.S. *Belfast*, R.o.P. 11th May—3rd June 1952 in M.01975/52.

² 3rd March 1952.

Joy as Commander, Naval Forces, Far East,¹ and Vice-Admiral J. J. Clark then became Commander, 7th Fleet, on 17th May. Lastly, Rear-Admiral J. E. Gingrich replaced Rear-Admiral Dyer as C.T.F. 95 on 31st May. 'Admiral Gingrich has gone out of his way to be nice to us . . .', wrote Admiral Scott-Moncrieff some three weeks later. 'He told me many times that he agrees wholeheartedly with my appreciation of the situation out here.'² Admiral Scott-Moncrieff had long been critical of the static commitments—e.g., the long-drawn-out demonstration in the Han in 1951—that impaired the mobility of his forces, and also of the various subsidiary tasks that were detrimental to the performance of the main tasks, defined as *a.* blockade including prevention of mining; *b.* protection of sea communications with friendly bases off enemy territory;³ *c.* support of troops ashore with naval gun-fire. He was also concerned at the heavy and increasing expenditure of ammunition⁴ and doubted whether it was being used to the best advantage. After consultation with Admiral Gingrich he issued a memorandum⁵ in which he pointed out that though (except in special cases) unobserved fire was rarely effective, no less than 30 per cent of rounds in the past had been fired without any form of observation, and while being careful to leave discretion to the man on the spot, urged commanding officers to ensure that maximum value was obtained from every shot fired, whether in practice or in action. A few days later Admiral Clark and Admiral Gingrich sent instructions to the blockade and escort forces in similar vein.

To return to the west coast. Little of importance occurred during the early part of June. A good deal of fog was encountered, as is normal at this time of the year. Between 9th and 13th June enemy attacks took place across the mud-flats on Yong Mae do and Mu do in the Haeju area; these were beaten off by the garrisons, supported by H.M.C.S. *Athabaskan* (Commander King), reinforced by H.M.S. *Ceylon*. On the 14th, guerrillas retaliated by raiding the mainland in the Yong Mae do area, supported by the *Athabaskan* and aircraft from U.S.S. *Bataan*. A similar raid supported by H.M.S. *Amethyst* took place on 19th June.

On 15th June, Field-Marshal Lord Alexander of Tunis, Minister of Defence, accompanied by Mr Selwyn Lloyd, Minister of State, and General Van Fleet paid a visit to the Fleet. In perfect weather, H.M. Ships *Belfast*, wearing Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff's flag, *Ocean*, *Ceylon*, *Consort*, and *Amethyst* were assembled in the anchorage at Inchon. Lord Alexander visited each cruiser and the *Ocean*, and addressed very representative gatherings. The actual speech was not particularly

¹ The appointment took effect on 3rd June.

² Admiral Scott-Moncrieff's views are stated at length in an appreciation dated 1st December 1951. This appreciation, together with Admiral Dyer's comments, is in M.0397/52.

³ At the time this was written, entire responsibility for the defence of the islands had not yet been laid on the Navy.

⁴ During May 1952, 14 970 rounds of 4- to 6-inch. Previous highest expenditure was 10 935 rounds in April, and before that the average had been 8000 rounds monthly.

⁵ F.O. 2i/c No. 52, Appendix. As a guide, worth-while tasks for bombardment on the west coast under existing circumstances were listed as follows: *a.* Observed shoots in support of ground forces (including a reasonable number to train ships) or island shore fire-control parties; *b.* Observed shoots to neutralize enemy batteries, either actually firing or which might fire when own forces were in the vicinity—e.g., when covering inshore minesweeping operations; *c.* Suppression of flak; *d.* Direct fire at short range on *occupied* gun positions and bunkers, road and rail bridges and military installations; *e.* Observed shoots on vehicles, trains, troops, and junks; *f.* Observed harassing shoots on area targets—e.g., billeting areas.

popular with the ships' companies because it was entirely confined to praise of our front-line troops and General Van Fleet.

Between 24th to 28th June, extra precautions were taken, when according to 'reliable information' the Communists intended to make an all-out assault on the islands. This was a period during which moon and tides were favourable to the enemy. However, as had happened before, there was practically no enemy activity. There were, however, a couple of U.N. guerrilla raids that should be mentioned. One on the 26th/27th June in the Choda area, when some 200 guerrillas landed opposite Choda and came off in daylight supported by gun-fire from R.o.K. mine-sweepers and L.S.S.(L) 108, without Captain Coleridge (*Cardigan Bay*), who was then C.T.U. 95·12·1, the island commander, or CCRAK co-ordinating officer knowing anything about it until the guerrillas were returning. Investigation failed to disclose who was the 'higher authority' who had ordered the raid.

The other raid took place in the Haeju area early on 29th June, when Wolf-packs made a dash across the mud-flats from Yong Mae do to find out enemy strength and deal a blow. The raid took place in a gale of wind and heavy rain and some of the guerrillas had a narrow escape from drowning since the wind caused the tide to rise more quickly than had been expected. A short, sharp bombardment by H.M. Ships *Ceylon*—who had carried out a series of bombardments on the 25th and 26th—*Amethyst*, and *Comus* was laid on just before the guerrillas reached the mainland, and they reported finding a number of enemy dead as a result. The raid was witnessed from H.M.S. *Amethyst* by Colonels Blakeney, Ives, and Vanderpool of CCRAK who were visiting the west coast at the time, and this enabled Captain Thring to take up the question of keeping the C.T.U. concerned informed of all contemplated raids in advance, over which Colonel Blakeney was most co-operative.

This was H.M.S. *Ceylon*'s last patrol as C.T.E. 95·12. 'Looking back over the last fourteen months of this rather unusual and most useful experience', wrote Captain Thring,

'the one outstanding and encouraging fact that comes to light is the remarkable degree of co-operation between Royal Navy ships (especially those of the Dominions), and the American and Dutch vessels which have been attached to this command. Differences and misunderstandings have been "ironed out" in no time (an argument for ships not being "dry") and all have shown the greatest keenness. It has been particularly noticeable how much they appreciated being allowed and expected to use their initiative.'¹

On 4th July, H.M.S. *Ceylon* left Pengyong do—where Admiral Sir Guy Russell, who was visiting the war zone, and Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff bade her God-speed—for the East Indies Station, after refitting at Singapore *en route*. She had then spent 470 days at sea in the war area, steamed over 80 000 miles, fired nearly 7000 rounds of 6-inch ammunition at the enemy, and acquired a great reputation for helpfulness and encouragement among ships of all nations working on the west coast. 'Captain Thring's wise and thoughtful leadership', wrote Sir Guy Russell, 'has kept her a happy and efficient unit to the very end of an extremely long spell in this war, which can be tedious for the cruisers' ships' companies.'²

¹ H.M.S. *Ceylon*, R.o.P., in M.02227/52.

² C.-in-C., F.E. Station, covering letter in M.02227/52.

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Meanwhile, on the east coast the war continued on its accustomed pattern. Task Force 77 concentrated its efforts on the interdiction programme, while destroyers and frigates from Task Force 95 maintained the 'siege' of Wonsan, and patrols off the bomb-line, Hungnam and Songjin as far north as Changjin. It was with this last patrol that the Commonwealth ships were mainly concerned.¹ Their work was very much in the nature of a routine, including frequent bombarding, anti-minelaying patrols, and support of the R.o.K. Marine garrison in the island of Yang do (just north of Songjin); though strenuous, little of special interest occurred. Some few occurrences, however, deserve mention—for example, on 7th February, H.M.S. *Alacrity*, after carrying out a routine sweep, closed the shore and had reduced speed to engage a locomotive when a 45-mm tank gun opened fire on her at 3000 yards range and scored seven hits before she could get clear. Fortunately, there were no casualties and the damage was negligible. Commander Bayly remarked that the episode gave a considerable boost to the morale of the ship's company.

On 20th February the island of Yang do was attacked by sampans, supported by heavy gun-fire from the mainland. The attack was repulsed by the R.o.K. garrison. The U.S. destroyers *Endicott* and *Shelton*, and H.M.N.Z.S. *Taupo* (Lieutenant-Commander Cradock-Hartopp), engaged the sampans, and the *Taupo* sank fifteen of them, a good performance for any ship, remarked Admiral Scott-Moncrieff, but particularly so for one fitted with only one 4-inch gun and no fire control. The *Taupo* suffered superficial damage from near misses; the *Shelton* was hit twice, and her fore peak was flooded.

As time went on the enemy shore batteries became steadily more aggressive, especially those in the Changjin vicinity. H.M.A.S. *Warramunga* was fired on by them at a range of 5000 yards on 3rd March, and was straddled up to 11 000 yards. On 7th March, H.M.A.S. *Warramunga* picked up Rear-Admiral Dyer at Wonsan, and took him to Sasebo, wearing his flag while on passage. H.M.S. *Morecambe Bay* (Commander Farnol), who took her place as C.T.E. 95·22, was fired on by the Changjin batteries on 10th and 16th March; her aerials were shot away, otherwise the ship was undamaged. H.M.S. *Cossack* (Captain Adair), who relieved the *Morecambe Bay*, speedily made herself a reputation for her anti-train activities, 'bagging' three trains and 'winging' four others in three consecutive nights.

By the beginning of April, the enemy guns were opening fire on any ship which came within range. H.M.S. *Concord* (Commander Mills) was hit on Y gun by a

¹ The following Commonwealth ships operated on the east coast from January to June 1952:

H.M.S. *Charity* (Commander Henley), 1st–4th January.

H.M.N.Z.S. *Taupo* (Lieutenant-Commander Cradock-Hartopp), 4th–12th January; 7th–25th February.

H.M.C.S. *Athabaskan* (Commander King), 12th–20th January.

H.M.S. *Alacrity* (Commander Bayly), 20th January–7th February.

H.M.A.S. *Warramunga* (Commander Ramsay), 25th February–7th March: 12th–28th May.

H.M.S. *Morecambe Bay* (Commander Farnol), 7th–26th March.

H.M.S. *Cossack* (Captain Adair), 26th March–9th April.

H.M.S. *Concord* (Commander Mills), 9th–27th April.

H.M.S. *Amethyst* (Commander Butler), 27th April–12th May.

H.M.C.S. *Nootka* (Commander Steele), 28th May–8th June.

H.M.S. *Constance* (Commander Lyle), 8th–10th June.

H.M.A.S. *Bataan* (Commander Bracegirdle), 11th–21st June.

H.M.S. *Whitesand Bay* (Commander Craig-Waller), 21st June–6th July.

76-mm shell, which killed two men and wounded four others on 23rd April. The gun was not put out of action. Several American ships, too, received damage and casualties about this time, for example U.S.S. *J. C. Owens* was fired at by sixteen guns and received twelve hits, which killed four and wounded seven of her company.

H.M.S. *Constance* (Commander Lyle) had the misfortune to ground off the southern side of Yang do in a fog while running in to anchor on 10th June, and damaged her hull and asdic dome, propellers, and shafts. As a result, she was ordered to Kure for docking,¹ and H.M.A.S. *Bataan* took her place on the east coast.

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All this time the carrier force (T.E. 95·11) had continued to play its important role on the west coast. Its operations became almost a matter of routine—TARCAP over the island defence forces, reconnaissance and interdiction in Hwanghae, strikes on request by commanders of the task units of T.E. 95·12, and of course the normal anti-submarine and combat air patrols. By the end of February the Rivers Taedong and Chaeryong were largely free from ice; junk and sampan traffic was starting again and provided additional targets. Owing to the break up of ice, too, the coastal reconnaissance was extended to the north as far as Hanchon (latitude 39° 15' N.).

U.S.S. *Badoeng Strait* carried out her last patrol between 25th January and 6th February, when she left for the United States, on relief as C.T.E. 95·11 by H.M.S. *Glory*, newly returned from Australia. For this patrol her executive officer, Commander R. L. Alexander, was in temporary command, Captain Colquhoun being in H.M.H.S. *Maine*, recovering from a minor injury.

'H.M.S. *Glory* immediately got into her operational stride and started off on her operations just as if she had never been away.'² Despite the absence of six Firefly pilots, who had been disembarked before sailing to carry out deck-landing practice, an average of over 50 sorties per full flying-day was maintained. She was fortunate in the weather, which, except for the last day, was uniformly good.

The whole coastal area including the entrance to Chinnampo was by this time heavily protected by coastal batteries the enemy had erected during the winter, but there were only two casualties to aircraft. On 12th February Lieutenant A. A. Knight suffered loss of oil pressure in a Sea Fury after being hit and made a forced landing at Pengyong do. The ship's helicopter retrieved him uninjured later in the day. Another Sea Fury piloted by Lieutenant R. J. Overton was hit on 13th February after attacking a gun position, and had to ditch near Choda. He escaped from the cockpit without much difficulty, and was picked up unharmed after only a

¹ Repairs were completed most satisfactorily by the Haruma dockyard by 26th July.

² F.O. 2i/c R.o.P. No. 48.

Lieutenant-Commander F. A. Swanton had relieved Lieutenant-Commander S. J. Hall in command of No. 14 C.A.G. in December 1951, and Lieutenant-Commander J. M. Culbertson succeeded Lieutenant-Commander Swanton in command of No. 812 Squadron. Lieutenant-Commander J. S. Bailey remained in command of No. 804 Squadron.

few minutes by R.o.K. A.M.S. 501, which got under way very promptly to go to his rescue.¹

U.S.S. *Bairoko* (Captain R. D. Hogle, U.S.N.) took the place of U.S.S. *Badoeng Strait* on the west coast; she relieved H.M.S. *Glory* on 16th February and continued operations on the same lines. It was during this, her first patrol, that one of her aircraft inadvertently bombed Leopard's headquarters at Pengyong do at a most inopportune moment, as already recounted. Three Corsairs and one pilot were lost to enemy gun-fire. An average of 40 sorties a day were flown.

H.M.S. *Glory*² relieved U.S.S. *Bairoko* on 24th February and started operating next day. Captain Colquhoun, having recovered from his injury, was once more in command. The weather during the patrol was cold, but good for flying except for a few periods when snow-storms shortened visibility. Carrier-controlled approach was used operationally for the first time on one such occasion.

A successful experiment was carried out with a Sea Fury fitted with two F-24 cameras mounted in a specially modified drop-tank, one facing forward, the other aft. This gave a far better picture of attack results than the normal vertical camera, since photographs were taken both in the attack and the pull-out.³

On 1st March, a Sea Fury returning from an operation suffered engine failure due to loss of oil pressure, probably as the result of small-arms fire, and was forced to ditch close astern of the ship. The U.S.N. helicopter, which was airborne and on deck, picked up the pilot, Lieutenant J. R. Fraser, unharmed, within 60 seconds of his hitting the water.

During this patrol, the 5000th deck-landing of the commission was recorded and 'centuries' of operational sorties were scored by five Sea Fury pilots. Leaking pipes rendered the catapult unserviceable on two occasions and RATOG had to be resorted to once; despite this and the absence of five pilots,⁴ a daily average of 50 sorties was achieved, and a total of 168 500-lb and 24 1000-lb bombs and 1440 rocket projectiles were expended on the enemy.

H.M.S. *Glory* turned over the duties of C.T.E. 95·11 to U.S.S. *Bairoko* in the evening of 4th March, and proceeded to Kure accompanied by H.M.C.S. *Nootka*, where they remained till 12th March, when they left again for the west coast. On the way round they met H.M.S. *Concord* with Admiral Scott-Moncrieff on board, who had been visiting the Governor of Nagasaki, at a rendezvous off that port, and the Admiral transferred his flag to the *Glory* to witness her flying operations for a few days.

Flying commenced early on 14th March. Operations followed the usual lines, but strikes against enemy troops, transport and store concentrations met with greater success than during the two previous patrols, owing to greater activity on the part of the enemy and good targets reported by Leopard. The weather

¹ Lieutenant Overton lost his life a month later when his aircraft was shot down in the Chinnampo area. See p. 234.

² H.M.S. *Concord*, H.M.C. Ships *Athabaskan* and *Nootka*, and U.S.S. *Southerland* formed the screen at different times.

³ Admiral Scott-Moncrieff subsequently remarked that the oblique photographs taken with cameras mounted thus considerably helped in the difficult problem of accurately locating well-camouflaged targets, such as the guns in the Amgak and Wolsa-ri areas which had been menacing the ships of T.E. 95·12. (Covering letter to H.M.S. *Glory* R.o.P. in M.01136/52.)

⁴ One at Iwakuni. Four had been lent to H.M.S. *Unicorn* to take part in an exercise (Exercise Vortex).

was fine to fair with good visibility on 14th March and 50 sorties were flown. Next day broke fine, but cloud and short visibility compelled the abandonment of flying during the afternoon after 42 sorties. Lieutenant R. J. Overton lost his life when his Sea Fury was hit by A.A. fire while carrying out a strafing run in the Chinnampo area; the aircraft exploded after crashing into a hillside on the Amgak peninsula. The following day was fine with good visibility and 62 sorties were launched, including a continuous air patrol west of Choda to cover aircraft searching for a downed American air crew.

Visibility was extreme on 17th March with light winds from the north. Extra effort was required because of a report of impending attack on Sok to, and a full offensive was launched. Serviceability of aircraft remained good throughout the day, and a total of 105 sorties was achieved.¹ These were all of normal duration (1½ to 2½ hours), the day's flying comprising twenty TARCAP, fourteen C.A.P., seven A/S patrol, and 64 strike sorties, in which 68 500-lb bombs and 408 rockets were expended on good targets. 'A truly remarkable achievement', wrote Admiral Scott-Moncrieff, 'which brought forth congratulatory signals from high quarters—both U.S. and British.'²

Rendezvous with H.M.S. *Belfast* was made early next day, and the Admiral transferred to her for a round of visits to the various areas, including Inchon, returning in her to Sasebo on 24th March. After he had left the *Glory* the carrier force proceeded to Pengyong do and spent the rest of the day fuelling. The weather was steadily deteriorating, and a northerly gale prevented all flying on its return to the operating area on 19th March. Flying recommenced on the 20th and 60 sorties were flown, but the weather was again poor on the 21st, with visibility five or six miles. However, 53 sorties were flown, including support for a guerrilla raid on the north bank of the Han. The next day—the last day of the patrol—the weather was worse than ever, rainy with short visibility and the wind gusting up to 50 knots. No flying was possible, and that evening H.M.S. *Glory* accompanied by H.M.C.S. *Nootka* and H.M.A.S. *Warramunga* left the area, U.S.S. *Bairoko* taking her place.

H.M.S. *Glory* again took over as C.T.E. 95·11 on 31st March. After a stormy passage from Sasebo, during which speed had to be reduced on account of the destroyers,³ flying started early on 1st April from a position some 50 miles south of the normal area, and except for two days continued till the evening of the 9th. On 5th April the element refuelled, and on the 8th thick fog precluded flying. In the seven flying-days a daily average of over 58 sorties was maintained, and 568 bombs were dropped on the enemy. In addition to the usual missions close air support was provided for the British Commonwealth Division or U.S. 1st Corps on three occasions.⁴

For some time past it had been found that the 60-lb rockets carried by the Sea Furies lacked sufficient hitting power for many of the available targets, and on this

¹ Actually 106 aircraft were launched and landed on, but one Firefly had a rough-running engine and was obliged to jettison the bombs and to return early.

² F.O. 2i/c R.o.P. No. 50.

³ H.M.C.S. *Athabaskan*, H.M.A.S. *Warramunga*; U.S. Ships *Isbell* and *Munro* formed part of the screen at different times during the patrol.

⁴ These missions were not essential for the prosecution of the land battle, but served as good training for the pilots; they were also of excellent value for the troops from the morale angle.

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patrol they were fitted to carry two 500-lb bombs instead. The experiment was a great success; the Sea Fury proved to be an accurate dive-bomber, and at once achieved a measure of success against the well-dug-in gun positions. The bombs were fused for 30 seconds' delay; this enabled the pilot to deliver his attack from a lower altitude, with corresponding increase in accuracy.

No aircraft was lost through enemy action, but two Sea Furies experienced engine failure and force-landed on Pengyong do. In each case the important equipment was saved, but full salvage was not worth while owing to immersion.

U.S.S. *Bairoko* relieved H.M.S. *Glory* on 9th April and remained on patrol till the 18th. This was her last patrol before her departure from the west coast. A fine effort on her last day produced the figure of 80 sorties. 'This for an aircraft complement of 20', remarked Admiral Scott-Moncrieff, 'is highly creditable and compares well with H.M.S. *Glory*'s 105.'¹

The *Glory*'s time in the war area, too, was drawing to a close, and she started her final patrol on 18th April. The weather during the first four days was overcast, and fog reduced the number of sorties to 22 on two of them. However, 55 were flown on the 21st, and 56 the following day. A forced landing on Pengyong do was made on each of these days by a Sea Fury suffering from engine trouble; each eventually returned to the ship after repairs.

On 22nd April, Captain T. A. K. Maunsell arrived on board H.M.S. *Glory* in an Avenger aircraft,² and assumed command next day in succession to Captain Colquhoun, who left that afternoon.

Admiral Scott-Moncrieff gave great credit to Captain Colquhoun for his work in the war. 'By his leadership and drive he has worked up his ship's company and air group to the highest peak of efficiency.'

The element returned to the operating area on 24th April after completing with fuel. For two days all went well; then the weather broke and fog, rain, and low cloud restricted flying for the next three days. Acting Sub-Lieutenant D. G. L. Swanson had to ditch his Sea Fury after flak damage off Choda on the 28th; he was picked up unharmed by a helicopter from the island after about fifteen minutes in his rubber dinghy.

The last day of the patrol was fine with good visibility; 52 sorties were flown, and that evening the *Glory* left the operating area for Sasebo. During her two spells in Korean waters she had flown 4835 sorties for the loss of 27 aircraft and nine air crew. She had steamed 59 730 miles (north of Hong Kong), and expended 886 330 rounds of 20-mm, 13 098 rocket projectiles, 3114 500-lb bombs and 126 1000-lb bombs.³ Serviceability was excellent throughout.

'I consider H.M.S. *Glory* and her air groups have made an outstanding contribution to the prestige of British naval aviation during her two spells in the Korean theatre, and she will certainly be missed, not least by the Communists . . .'⁴, wrote Admiral Scott-Moncrieff. 'I was always very happy to fly my flag in H.M.S.

¹ F.O. 2i/c R.o.P. No. 51.

² The U.S.N. operated Avengers in the Carrier Onboard Delivery Service (C.O.D.), a most efficient organization which proved to be very useful.

³ Various other statistics are contained in F.O. 2i/c R.o.P. No. 51. The following approximate figures for targets hit are of interest: 796 junks, 2364 buildings, 1031 ox-carts, 308 rail trucks, 43 vehicles, 158 gun positions, 21 tunnels, 66 bridges, 111 store dumps, 61 rail-cuts, 1572 observed casualties.

⁴ Covering letter to H.M.S. *Glory* R.o.P. in M.01605/52.

Glory, whose atmosphere of efficiency and cheerfulness combined with very hard work by all hands was a tonic and most refreshing.¹

After turning over to H.M.S. *Ocean* (Captain C. L. G. Evans) at Hong Kong, H.M.S. *Glory* left Singapore and the Far East Station on 11th May for the Mediterranean.

It thus happened that the month of May saw two new carriers operating on the west coast. U.S.S. *Bataan*, which took U.S.S. *Bairoko*'s place, had embarked the latter's air group (VMA312), so her pilots were familiar with the terrain.

H.M.S. *Ocean* (Captain C. L. G. Evans) started her first patrol on 11th May. She carried No. 17 Carrier Air Group (Commander A. F. Black), consisting of No. 802 Squadron, Sea Furies (Lieutenant-Commander S. F. F. Shotton) and No. 825 Squadron, Fireflies (Lieutenant-Commander C. K. Roberts.)

This first patrol was remarkable for the high average sortie rate. On the first day 87 sorties were flown, and in 7½ flying-days, 569 sorties—an average of 76 per day. On 17th May she handsomely surpassed the *Glory*'s 105 sorties by flying 123, a new high record for a light fleet carrier. The high sortie rate made armament replenishment necessary during the patrol; this was carried out on the night of 17th May at Pengyong do, from an L.S.T. loaded with rocket projectiles.

Two aircraft were lost owing to unexplained engine failure, both on 11th May—a Sea Fury, piloted by Lieutenant H. M. McEnery, who was unhurt, which crash-landed on Pengyong do, and a Firefly which came down in Haeju Bay. The crew, Lieutenant S. G. Gandey, and Sub-Lieutenant A. Bishop, were picked up suffering from shock by an American amphibian provided by the J.O.C., Korea. Five aircraft were lost owing to enemy action. A Sea Fury was damaged on 11th May, and came down in the sea; the pilot, Lieutenant M. E. Scott, R.A.N., was picked up by U.S.S. *Lowry*. On 14th May another Sea Fury was hit by flak; it exploded on impact with the ground on the Amgak peninsula, the pilot, Lieutenant (E) Kenneth Macdonald, losing his life. A Firefly was hit on 16th May and ditched well to seaward; Lieutenant-Commander C. K. Roberts and Lieutenant W. J. Cooper were recovered by an American amphibian, as was Lieutenant N. E. Peniston-Bird on the 18th, who baled out when his Sea Fury was set on fire after a low-level attack. Another Firefly was hit while giving close air support to the Commonwealth Division on 19th May; it crashed and exploded approximately seventeen miles north-east of Kaesong. Lieutenant-Commander T. J. C. Williamson-Napier and Aircrewman I L. M. Edwards lost their lives. On the same day an unfortunate accident occurred on board the *Ocean*, when an aircraft handler was blown overboard by the premature ignition of RATOG. U.S.S. *Marsh* promptly lowered a boat, but he sank before it could reach him, and subsequent search failed to find his body.

Captain Evans remarked on 'the gratification shown by air crew when they first saw the highly efficient American rescue service in operation The direct result of an efficient rescue service on air-crew morale cannot be overstressed'.²

H.M.S. *Ocean* left the operating area in the evening of 19th May on relief by U.S.S. *Bataan*. Her second patrol took place between 29th May and 6th June. The weather was generally favourable, though for the first few days there were periods of low cloud and fog over the coast. The supply of bombs and rocket

¹ Covering letter to H.M.S. *Glory* R.o.P. in M.01519/52.

² H.M.S. *Ocean* R.o.P. in M.01893/52.

projectiles was limited, so it was decided to restrict the number of sorties to 68 each day. Should the weather on any particular day reduce this number, the sorties on the following day would be correspondingly increased. This formed the basis of an easy and comfortable programme; 544 sorties were flown in the eight days.

It was noticeable that as the pilots became more familiar with the area, their accuracy in finding and destroying targets improved considerably; but the ingenious camouflage used by the enemy still proved very effective.

One Sea Fury and one Firefly made forced landings on the beach at Pengyong do. In the case of the Firefly, this was due to a connecting-rod failure. In the last three months, No. 825 Squadron had suffered three such failures, and a further three aircraft ditched in circumstances which pointed strongly to the same cause. 'It is indeed unfortunate', remarked Captain Evans, 'that air crew should have to fly over enemy territory in aircraft powered by such unreliable engines.'¹

Two Sea Furies were lost on 4th June. One, piloted by Sub-Lieutenant D. G. L. Swanson, had its tail shot off. The pilot baled out at about 1000 feet and landed in the water 200 yards off the enemy coast near Choda, whence he was picked up by helicopter under fire, suffering from burns. The other had an engine failure and ditched; the pilot, Lieutenant McEnery, was rescued by helicopter.

H.M.S. *Ocean* left the west coast on 6th June for Kure, returning to Inchon on the 15th. There she was visited by Field-Marshal Lord Alexander, after which she proceeded on patrol. Bad weather and fog hampered flying at first, but things were better during the second half of the patrol, and extra sorties were flown. No aircraft was lost through enemy action, but a Sea Fury ditched owing to power failure, the pilot being rescued by helicopter. Another Firefly connecting-rod failure occurred; Lieutenant-Commander Roberts succeeded in bringing the aircraft back to the ship.

As already mentioned, the month of June saw a change of policy with regard to aircraft targets in North Korea, and on 18th June all restrictions on attacks on electrical power installations were lifted. The 23rd June was chosen as D-Day for co-ordinated attacks by the 5th Air Force and Task Force 77 on the main complexes of Chosin, Fusen, Kyosen, and Suiho. These attacks were successfully carried out on 23rd June with the loss of only one aircraft. H.M.S. *Ocean* played her part by attacking transformer stations in her area of operations; six of these were struck on 24th June with excellent results.

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On 25th June 1952 the war entered in its third year, and a fortnight later the armistice negotiations—now virtually suspended—in their second year. On shore, the front lines remained static, and on both coasts, naval operations had assumed the form that was to remain unchanged for the remainder of 1952, and indeed for the rest of the war.

At the beginning of July 1952, the British Naval C.-in-C., Admiral the Hon.

¹ H.M.S. *Ocean* R.o.P. in M.01977/52.

Sir Guy Russell, paid one of his periodical visits to the war area. Arriving by air at Tokyo on 29th June, he called on General Mark Clark and Admiral Briscoe, and after spending the night at the British Embassy, flew next day to Iwakuni. Thence he took passage in H.M.S. *Cardigan Bay* to Kure, where he transferred to H.M.S. *Belfast*, in which Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff was awaiting him. Accompanied by the Rear-Admiral, on the 2nd July he flew from Iwakuni to visit the Commander, 7th Fleet, Vice-Admiral Clark, in U.S.S. *Iowa* off the east coast. After watching a shoot on the bomb-line, the two British Admirals transferred by helicopter to U.S.S. *Boxer* for the night. Unfortunately the weather was so bad that they were unable to witness flying from this imposing task force, then consisting of the fleet carriers *Boxer*, *Enterprise*, and *Bon Homme Richard*. H.M.S. *Belfast*, meanwhile, had proceeded to Inchon, and they rejoined her there in the afternoon of 3rd July. That evening, Major-General Cassels and officers of the Commonwealth Division dined on board the *Belfast*. The next few days were spent by Admiral Russell in visiting the Pengyong do and Choda areas, including a couple of hours on board H.M.S. *Ocean* to witness the flying. On 6th July he joined H.M.S. *Unicorn*, which had accompanied the *Ocean* to the operating area for deck-landing practice, and in her proceeded to Sasebo, where he visited ships in harbour and the new shore offices, finally leaving for Tokyo on 9th July.

During all this time things were unusually quiet on the west coast, partly owing to fog, which hampered friend and foe alike. But on 9th July a combined gun/air strike was carried out by H.M.S. *Belfast*, H.M.A.S. *Warramunga*, U.S.S. *Kimberley*, and H.M.S. *Ocean*'s aircraft against positions on the north side of the Taedong estuary. Each air strike was preceded by flak suppression and bombardment.

On 10th/11th July, Vice-Admiral Clark and Rear-Admiral Gingrich visited the west coast in U.S.S. *Iowa*. Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff, flying his flag in H.M.S. *Belfast*, met them at Inchon. After luncheon in U.S.S. *Iowa* at which General Van Fleet, General Kembell, commanding the 1st Corps, and General Selden, commanding the U.S. 1st Marine Division were present, the *Iowa* and her escorting destroyer were placed under Admiral Scott-Moncrieff's operational control, and the force sailed for Choda with H.M.S. *Belfast* leading. Early on 11th July, Admirals Clark and Gingrich transferred to H.M.S. *Belfast*, and visited Sok to—where they were joined by Lieutenant-Colonel Wilbur, u.s.m.c., the commander of the West Coast Island Defence Element—and later Choda. While this inspection of the islands was going on, U.S.S. *Iowa* using air spot from H.M.S. *Ocean* treated the Amgak guns to 50 rounds of 16-inch ammunition. An A.A. position was destroyed and the coastal defence battery was damaged.¹

In the afternoon Admiral Scott-Moncrieff and the two American Admirals spent some time on board H.M.S. *Ocean*. Apart from their normal activities, the *Ocean*'s aircraft were taking part that day in heavy attacks on Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, by T.F. 77 and the 5th Air Force, co-ordinated by the latter. The *Ocean* flew 39 sorties in two attacks, her target being a railway marshalling yard. Results were excellent and all aircraft returned safely to the ship, despite heavy A.A. fire. The three Admirals witnessed the afternoon strike returning from this attack. 'I

¹ Admiral Scott-Moncrieff considered that the shoot would have been more successful if the *Iowa* had lain a danbuoy. As it was, the initial salvo based on positions obtained from radar fixes was 2500 yards out for line, and when the target was found, incorrect estimation of tide caused the fall of shot to move away from the target. The shoot took nearly two hours.

was very pleased', wrote Admiral Scott-Moncrieff, 'that Admiral Clark, an experienced airman, should see H.M.S. *Ocean* operating; she did very well, and our guests were suitably impressed.'¹

About the middle of July there was some recrudescence of enemy activity in all the areas on the west coast. This started in the Pengyong do area, usually the quietest, where batteries on the south side of Choppeki Point took to firing on friendly small craft and the island of Yuk to.² On 13th July, H.M. Ships *Belfast* and *Amethyst*, U.S.S. L.S.T. 883 and aircraft from U.S.S. *Bataan* supported a successful guerrilla raid, which put an enemy gun out of action in this region; but early on 16th July the enemy occupied Changnin do. This gave Captain Duckworth an opportunity. The *Belfast*, *Amethyst*, and P.C. 702 promptly surrounded the island, which was then attacked by U.S.S. *Bataan*'s aircraft, and recaptured by guerrillas on the 17th. Out of about 156 North Koreans landed, 80 were killed, 30 drowned, and 38 captured. Thereafter, enemy activity died down in this area, but on 23rd July the Amgak batteries in the Choda area opened fire on L.S.M.R. 536. H.M.S. *Newcastle* (Captain Rutherford), who was carrying out her first patrol as C.T.E. 95·12, and H.M.S. *Mounts Bay* (Captain Lewis) returned the fire. U.S.S. *Strong* was fired on by the Amgak guns on 28th July and 1st August, and H.M.S. *Belfast*, who relieved the *Newcastle* on 29th July, was hit forward by a 76-mm round fired from a new position on Wolsa-ri, which holed her side killing one and wounding four Chinese ratings. After this, except for an occasional round fired from Amgak at Sok to and Choda, all was quiet till September.

In the Haeju area, as usual, there was rather more activity. On 22nd July the enemy were observed digging trenches and building gun-pits on the west side of the gulf, and several engagements with H.M.C.S. *Nootka* and R.o.K. P.C. 701 took place. On 28th July the enemy fired 150 rounds at Sosuap to, and intelligence reports indicated that they were determined to prevent our ships operating in the Haeju Gulf. For the next week constant air cover was provided for the ships in the area, but though Mu do was fired at almost daily, no serious attack materialized.

On the night of 12th/13th August, the enemy massed in strength opposite Cho do (off the west coast, eight miles north of Yong Pyong do), but H.M.S. *Concord* (Commander Mills) broke up the attacks before they could be launched, her guns being directed by a shore fire-control party in the island. Two enemy guns, one each side of Haeju Gulf fired over 100 rounds at Sosuap to on 21st August; H.M.S. *Concord* and U.S.S. *Strong* neutralized the guns. Heavy air attacks were carried out, and enemy casualties were estimated at 400 to 500.

Meanwhile, in the adjacent Pengyong do area on the night of 14/15th August, what was described as a 'model' guerrilla raid was launched on Ongjin, near Kirin do. Supported by H.M.N.Z.S. *Rotoiti* (Lieutenant-Commander Graham) and H.M.C.S. *Crusader* (Commander H. V. W. Groos), 120 men under Lieutenant MacBride, U.S.A., landed in junks, penetrated four miles inland, inflicted 80 casualties on enemy troops, and destroyed a gun, returning unscathed with four prisoners after spending five hours on shore. A fortnight later, on 29th August, two raids were carried out simultaneously in this area. Each was supported by aircraft from H.M.S. *Ocean*. One, five miles east of Choppeki Point had as its objective 400 North Korean troops; gun-fire support was provided by H.M.S. *Newcastle*.

¹ F.O. 2i/c R.o.P. No. 53.

² Not to be confused with the Yuk to in Haeju Bay.

The guerrillas inflicted about 50 casualties on the enemy and captured some equipment, returning without loss to themselves. The other raid, supported by H.M.N.Z.S. *Taupo* and H. Neth. M.S. *Piet Hein*, was directed on a command post on the peninsula north of Sunwi do, but there the enemy was on the alert and met the landing party with mortar fire; not much was accomplished. But a useful raid was carried out in the Haeju area, where all had been unusually quiet for some weeks, on 10th September. Supported by the *Belfast* and *Iroquois*, and aircraft from U.S.S. *Sicily*, the guerrillas landed on the peninsula north of Yong Mae do; the enemy was caught off balance, losing 30 casualties, and much valuable intelligence about an impending attack on Yong Mae do was obtained. The only enemy activity in this area occurred on 29th September and again on 4th October when they tried to capture the island of Tok Som, attempts easily frustrated by H.M.A.S. *Condamine* (Lieutenant-Commander R. C. Savage.)

Since the beginning of September there had been several bombardments of Choda by guns mounted on Wolsa-ri. The R.o.K. Marines were forced to shift their camp out of range, and anxiety was felt for the 5th Air Force radar station. The enemy was perfectly aware of the improbability of naval guns being able to hit his emplacements in the absence of aircraft overhead, and timed his bombardments accordingly.

On 2nd September 1952 there was a change in the command of the Commonwealth forces; Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff fell ill and was obliged to haul down his flag to undergo treatment in H.M.H.S. *Maine*. In these circumstances Captain Rutherford of H.M.S. *Newcastle* assumed duty as C.T.G. 95·1, and Captain J. H. Meares, who had succeeded Captain Villiers as Chief Staff Officer, continued to run the administration and routine operations. Admiral Scott-Moncrieff rehoisted his flag in the *Ladybird* on 12th September, but suffered a relapse, and was obliged to strike it finally on the 16th; pneumonia was diagnosed and he sailed for Hong Kong, in the *Maine*. Actually his time on the station was almost up, and Rear-Admiral E. G. A. Clifford was on his way to relieve him. Admiral Clifford arrived at Hong Kong in S.S. *Canton* on 22nd September; he hoisted his flag in H.M.S. *Newcastle* next day, and at once proceeded to the war area, arriving at Sasebo on 26th September where he transferred to H.M.S. *Ladybird*, while the *Newcastle* proceeded to the west coast to relieve the *Belfast* as C.T.E. 95·12.

This was H.M.S. *Belfast's* last appearance in the theatre of operations before her return to the United Kingdom. A veteran of the war she first saw service there in July 1950, since when she had steamed more than 80 000 miles, spent 404 days at sea, and fired well over 8000 rounds of 6-inch shells.

Between 3rd and 7th October Admiral Clifford visited the west coast in H.M.S. *Constance* (Commander Bayly), where he found things unusually quiet. Frequent bombardment of the guns on Wolsa-ri had apparently discouraged the enemy, and they had not fired on the islands since 22nd September. There had been a recurrence of mining in the Cigarette route, however. This was discovered when H.M.C.S. *Nootka* (Commander Steele) captured a sampan in the act of laying mines in the north part of the channel on the night of 28th September. Prisoners stated that they had laid four mines in the southern part on 19th/20th September. As a result of this episode, Cigarette was declared a dangerous area, and sweeping operations were undertaken.

On 9th October, the First Sea Lord of the Admiralty, Admiral Sir Rhoderick McGrigor, accompanied by Admiral Sir Guy Russell, arrived by air in Tokyo

for a ten-day visit to Japan and the war area. After calling on General Mark Clark, Vice-Admiral Briscoe, the Prime Minister of Japan, Mr Yoshida, and others, the First Sea Lord left for Iwakuni by air on the 10th, where he was met by Rear-Admiral Clifford and took passage to Kure in H.M.S. *Cossack*. There he stayed with Lieutenant-General W. Bridgeford, of the Australian Army, the C.-in-C. of the British Commonwealth forces in Korea. Next day he visited all ships and naval and military establishments in the Kure area, and on 12th October with Admiral Clifford flew from Iwakuni to Seoul in a Dakota kindly put at his disposal by Admiral Briscoe. There he met Major-General Alston-Roberts-West and visited the British Commonwealth Division area, and later had discussions with General Van Fleet and General Barcus, the commander of the 5th Air Force. In the evening he joined H.M.S. *Birmingham* at Inchon, and proceeded to sea to rendezvous with the carrier force next morning, when the First Sea Lord and Admiral Clifford transferred to H.M.S. *Ocean* by jackstay and witnessed flying operations during the forenoon, returning to the *Birmingham* by helicopter. In the afternoon she anchored off Pengyong do, where the First Sea Lord visited H.M.S. *Newcastle* and H.M.N.Z.S. *Hawea*, and met the Island Defence Element Commander, Colonel Wilbur, U.S.M.C., afterwards returning to Inchon.

On 14th October the First Sea Lord and his naval assistant, Captain Malins, flew from Kimpo airfield to U.S.S. *Bon Homme Richard* off the east coast, where they lunched with Rear-Admiral Hickey, U.S.N., commanding the Carrier Division, and Vice-Admiral Clark, the Commander, 7th Fleet, and witnessed air operations. Admiral McGrigor rejoined the *Birmingham* at Inchon that evening and sailed for Choda, where she arrived next morning. At anchor there were H.M. Ships *Newcastle*, *Mounts Bay*, *Charity*, and *Constance*, H. Neth. M.S. *Piet Hein*, and U.S. Ships *Yarnall* and *Mataco*. Visits to all these ships, as well as to the islands of Choda and Sok to had been planned, but these had to be abandoned owing to very rough weather. In the afternoon, however, all ships carried out bombardments of known enemy positions, which were witnessed by the First Sea Lord. After this, the *Birmingham* sailed for the Haeju area, anchoring off Yong Pyong do in the morning of the 16th. There the First Sea Lord visited H.M. Ships *St Bride's Bay* and *Morecambe Bay*, U.S.S. *Competent*, and three R.o.K. patrol vessels operating under the orders of the *St Bride's Bay*. He also met the island commander and some guerrilla leaders.

H.M.S. *Birmingham* arrived at Sasebo at 0900, 17th October, and that day the First Sea Lord met Rear-Admiral Gingrich and Rear-Admiral Biggs (Commander, Service Squadron 3), and later visited British and Commonwealth ships in harbour and the naval establishments in Sasebo. The last day (18th October) of his visit to the forward area was devoted to discussions with Admiral Sir Guy Russell, who had arrived the day before in H.M.S. *Unicorn*, Rear-Admiral Clifford, and various senior members of his staff; and on 19th October the First Sea Lord left Sasebo for Itazuke to emplane for Tokyo and return to England via Canada.

On the conclusion of the First Sea Lord's visit, H.M.S. *Birmingham* (Captain Luce) relieved the *Newcastle* as C.T.E. 95·12, and Admiral Clifford left Sasebo in the latter on 21st October for Yokosuka. From there he visited Tokyo and made the acquaintance of H.B.M. Ambassador, Sir Esler Denning, General Mark Clark, Admiral Briscoe, the Commonwealth representatives in Japan, and various other officials.

Throughout the last quarter of 1952, though there was very heavy and bitter

fighting on shore along the whole front with little change in its position, there was little enemy activity on the west coast. Choda was bombed by three or four single-engined enemy aircraft on the night of 12th/13th October. Fifteen small bombs fell near the radar station, which was undamaged, but four Koreans were killed and three Americans wounded.

About a month later, on 16th November, H.M.A.S. *Anzac* (Captain Gatacre) was shelled off Choda; then, except for some sporadic firing on the minesweepers working in route Cigarette, the enemy batteries in this area remained quiet till 23rd December.

In the Pengyong do area, two R.o.K. motor-gunboats operated at intervals in November and December. Under the direction of H.M.N.Z.S. *Hawea* (Commander Davis-Goff) they proved themselves most useful, penetrating the shallower inlets and carrying out surprise attacks before dawn on troops and gun positions. An unusual calm continued in the Haeju area.

On the east coast, operations had continued on the usual pattern, but in July there was a change in the American bombardment policy, the indiscriminate bombardments hitherto indulged in being discontinued, and firing only carried out when proper observation of the fall of shot was available.¹ Throughout the latter part of 1952 the enemy firing technique was greatly improving, especially in the Songjin area and for some 70 miles to the southward, and a good many ships of T.G. 95·2 suffered damage and casualties. At first, TARCAP and air spotting, though frequently asked for, was seldom available for these ships. This was not due to reluctance on the part of the fast carrier force, but because the 7th Fleet directive to it laid emphasis on the air interdiction programme, while making no mention of support for the small ships operating inshore.

The policy of sending destroyers and frigates² from the west coast one at a time went on. They were almost exclusively employed with T.E. 95·22, off Songjin and to the northward.

As already mentioned the enemy's fire in this area was becoming increasingly effective. On 20th July U.S.S. *Orleck* was hit by a 75-mm gun at a range of about five miles and suffered casualties, and on 6th August U.S.S. *Pierce* received seven hits at a range of one mile while lying stopped off shore. H.M.S. *St Bride's Bay* was able to assist her by sending her medical officer on board, as the *Pierce* carried none. The *St Bride's Bay* was relieved by the *Mounts Bay* (Captain Lewis) on 8th August. Two days after taking over she was hit three times, losing one killed and four seriously wounded. Altogether damage and casualties were

¹ See p. 229.

² The following Commonwealth and Dutch ships operated on the east coast from July to December 1952:

H.Neth.M.S. *Piet Hein* (Commander von F. Drabbe) 6th–22nd July.

H.M.S. *St Bride's Bay* (Commander Western) 22nd July–8th August.

H.M.S. *Mounts Bay* (Captain Lewis) 8th–23rd August.

H.M.A.S. *Condamine* (Lieutenant-Commander Savage) 24th August–11th September.

H.M.S. *Charity* (Commander Gatehouse) 11th–29th September.

H.M.C.S. *Iroquois* (Commander Landymore) 29th September–14th October.

H.M.C.S. *Crusader* (Lieutenant-Commander Bovey) 14th–29th October.

H.Neth.M.S. *Piet Hein* (Lieutenant-Commander van Ellemeet) 29th October–17th November.

H.M.S. *Constance* (Commander Bayly) 17th November–2nd December.

H.M.C.S. *Haida* (Commander Lantier) 2nd–20th December.

H.M.A.S. *Anzac* (Captain Gatacre) 20th December–3rd January 1953.

inflicted on five U.S. ships¹ during the month of August. Towards the end of the month a further complication was added; heavy weather due to a typhoon caused a large number of moored mines to break adrift in the Changjin and Hungnam areas. About 30 were sighted and sunk, but on 28th August U.S. tug *Sarsi*, while lying to off Hungnam, bumped one and sank almost immediately with the loss of five lives.² Attempts to save the *Sarsi* had to be abandoned on 5th September, after the ships so engaged had come under fire three times from shore batteries at 5000 yards range. The salvage operations had one good effect, however; TARCAP had to be provided for them, and this—together with air support generally—was continued for the inshore ships, with the result that the enemy opposition was very much reduced in September. But, on 2nd October, H.M.C.S. *Iroquois* (Commander Landymore), while bombarding the railway line at Tanchon south of Songjin with U.S.S. *Marsh*, received a hit at 5000 yards range, which killed one officer (Lieutenant-Commander Quinn, R.C.N.) and two ratings, and wounded eight; and on 20th October U.S.S. *Lewis* was hit by a shell which entered one of her boilers. The escaping steam killed six and wounded two.

On 15th October a large-scale diversion³ was carried out north of Kojo, just behind the enemy's front line. The Amphibious Force, supported by the 7th Fleet and T.F. 77 went through with the full landing organization until the landing group was about 3000 yards from the shore, when they were turned round and re-embarked. About 2500 rounds of 16-inch, 8-inch, and 5-inch were fired at the enemy in the vicinity by the supporting forces. Little is known of the enemy's reactions, but the arrangements worked smoothly, and as an exercise the operation was a success.

For the rest of the year little worthy of mention occurred on the east coast. 'Train-busting' had become a recognized sport, ships endeavouring to destroy a train travelling at full speed on an exposed length of line between cuttings and tunnels. The North Korean engine-drivers had become highly proficient at stopping and reversing, and even when some of the trucks were hit kept going at full speed. Admiral Clifford remarked that it was always the biggest train that got away, but H.M.C.S. *Haida* (Commander Lantier) and H. Neth. M.S. *Piet Hein* (Lieutenant-Commander H. de Jonge van Ellemeet temporarily in command) achieved distinction by the complete destruction of good-sized trains.

Between 26th and 29th November Admiral Clifford paid a visit to Pusan in H.M.S. *Unicorn* (Captain Pennefather). There he met the British minister, Mr W. G. C. Graham, Vice-Admiral Sohn, Chief of Naval Operations, R.o.K. Navy, and others. On 30th November he transferred his flag to H.M.S. *Newcastle* at Kure, and on 2nd December left for the operational area, where he visited each island area and met the new island commander, Colonel Totman, U.S.M.C., with whom he discussed the prevailing situation.

¹ U.S. Ships *Pierce* (three killed, twelve wounded), *Barton* (one killed, one wounded), *Grapple* (no casualties, hit below waterline), *Porter* (seven wounded), *Thompson* (three killed, ten wounded). Several other ships, including H.M.S. *Mounts Bay* were near-missed.

² 'The sinking of the *Sarsi* was an unfortunate affair', remarked Admiral Scott-Moncrieff, 'and the lesson to be re-learned is that in areas where there are known to be a large number of floating mines broken adrift after heavy weather, it is safer to keep under way at a moderate speed and use a minimum amount of wheel. The ship's wash helps to keep the floating mines clear of the ship's side.' F.O. 2i/c R.o.P. No. 56.

³ A fleet of 112 ships comprising a battleship, six carriers, four cruisers, 36 destroyers, minesweepers, transports, supply ships, and landing-craft was employed on this operation.

With the concurrence of Admiral Gingrich, Admiral Clifford flew his flag between 8th and 10th December in U.S.S. *Badoeng Strait* (Captain H. L. Ray, U.S.N.) then operating as C.T.E. 95·11. The Admiral met with a cordial welcome, and while on board visited all sections of the ship, attended briefings and witnessed flying operations. He was impressed by the quality of the senior ratings of all branches on board. On 12th December he returned to Sasebo in H.M.A.S. *Anzac*, but left for the west coast again on 22nd December in H.M.S. *Cockade*. On Christmas eve he visited H.M.S. *Glory* (C.T.E. 95·11) and then proceeded in H.M.S. *Birmingham* to the Choda area, where there had been unwonted activity the day before (23rd December) when enemy guns after weeks of quiescence had fired about 500 rounds at Choda and Sok to. There were no casualties or damage, and H.M. Ships *Cossack* (Captain Adair), *Consort* (Commander Yonge) and *Constance* (Commander Bayly), as well as two 90-mm guns recently installed in Choda silenced the enemy guns.

Admiral Clifford had intended to spend Christmas-Day in the Choda area and to visit all the ships in T.U. 95·12·1; but during the evening of the 24th trouble in the Haeju area was reported. The guerrillas in Taesuap to had mutinied, and an invasion of that island seemed possible; Mu do had also been shelled. H.M.S. *Birmingham* accordingly sailed for Haeju, where she arrived early on Christmas morning, and carried out a successful bombardment of the guns opposite Mu do, with air spot from H.M.S. *Glory*. The mutiny was quelled by 1000, and the position restored to normal, enabling Christmas luncheon to be enjoyed. Admiral Clifford remarked that the generous gift by the *Daily Mail* of a bottle of beer, twenty cigarettes, and a bar of chocolate to each officer and man in the forward area was much appreciated.

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Turning to the activities of the west coast carrier force (T.E. 95·11) during the latter half of 1952, H.M.S. *Ocean* continued to operate as the Commonwealth carrier till 31st October, when her place was taken by H.M.S. *Glory* again. Towards the end of July, U.S.S. *Bataan* was required to operated troop-carrying helicopters in assault exercises being carried out by the U.S. Marine Corps. Her Corsair squadron was disembarked to an airfield about 30 miles south of Seoul, and continued to act from there as T.E. 95·11, on a reduced scale, in the absence of the carrier.

H.M.S. *Ocean*¹ was on patrol from 21st to 31st July. Weather was largely unfavourable, and for the first time her average daily sortie rate fell below 68.

Two aircraft were lost early in the patrol. On 24th July, Lieutenant-Commander R. A. Dick, who had recently succeeded Lieutenant-Commander Shotton in command of No. 802 Squadron was shot down over the River Taedong and lost his life. 'The loss of this very gifted pilot, inspiring leader, and in all respects most able officer, by flak was a sad blow to the ship and to the Service', wrote

¹ Screened by H.M.S. *Concord*, H.M.C.S. *Iroquois*, U.S.S. *Craig*, relieved by U.S.S. *Hubbard*.

Captain Evans. Lieutenant-Commander P. H. London succeeded him as Commander, No. 802 Squadron. Later that same day a Firefly force-landed in the sea west of Choda; the crew, Lieutenant S. G. Gandey and Sub-Lieutenant A. Bishop were rescued by helicopter.

The Element replenished on 26th July, and for the remainder of the patrol the weather was bad, most of the mainland being blanketed in low cloud, fog, and drizzle, which rendered the airfields in South Korea unusable. Captain Evans shifted the *Ocean* 70 miles north of the usual operating area, where he found entirely suitable conditions, with the northern part of North Korea clear. This, he remarked, well illustrated one of the inherent advantages of a carrier over an airfield as an operating base. For the first time—encouraged, possibly, by the knowledge that the 5th Air Force was grounded—enemy aircraft attempted to interfere with the *Ocean's* aircraft. Four MiGs, supported by ten others at various heights, attacked three Fireflies who were escorting a fourth, badly damaged by flak, to the coastline where he could ditch. Two of the Fireflies received damage before breaking off the action by entering cloud. Another Firefly was damaged by flak and forced to ditch half a mile west of Choda; the crew, Lieutenant P. Watkinson and Lieutenant C. J. Fursey were picked up by small craft. Later in the day, a division of Sea Furies was attacked by four MiGs; the Sea Furies saw them in the early stages of the attack and out-maneuvred them, damaging their leader before entering cloud. During the last three days of this patrol, flying was much hampered by the weather. On the last day (30th July) there was no break till 1630, when two strikes were got off. The *Ocean* left the area that evening, her place being taken by U.S.S. *Bataan*.

H.M.S. *Ocean*¹ started her next patrol on 8th August. The weather was uniformly good throughout this spell, enabling her to fly 600 sorties—the highest number then reached for a single patrol—at a daily rate of 75. The opening days were enlivened by the attentions of MiG-15s. These operated mainly over the Hanchon–Chinnampo–Pyongyang triangle, strategically the most important area to the enemy in the whole of western Korea. As targets in this area were attacked by the *Ocean's* aircraft at least twice a day, it was not long before air encounters occurred.

Flying started at dawn on 9th August; at 0636, Lieutenant P. Carmichael leading four Furies was attacked by eight MiGs north of Chinnampo. No Fury was damaged, but one MiG was shot down and exploded on hitting the ground. Later on the same day Lieutenant H. M. McEnery was leading four Furies with three new pilots² on a tour of the TARCAP area, when they were attacked out of the sun by four MiGs. One of the new pilots, Lieutenant Clark, received a hit which set one of his drop-tanks on fire. He had to break away from the formation, which turned towards the MiGs to cover him. Lieutenant McEnery got a long burst of fire in on one MiG, which was damaged, and the enemy broke off action. Lieutenant Clark managed to jettison his burning tank and put out the remaining fire by side-slipping, eventually landing on the carrier after a somewhat rugged debut in

¹ Screened by H.M.S. *Charity*, U.S. Ships *Kimberley*, *Yarnall*, *Strong*.

² Three pilots of the R.N. Volunteer Reserve, all members of No. 1832 Fighter Squadron based at Culham, Berkshire, had volunteered for service in Korea, and recently joined H.M.S. *Ocean*. They were Lieutenant Jocelyn Buxton, Lieutenant Timothy Adkin, and Lieutenant Ralph J. Clark.

Korean operations. While this action was going on, two Furies were attacked by MiGs over Chinnampo; one piloted by Lieutenant R. H. Hallam was badly damaged, and made a wheels up landing on Choda; Lieutenant Hallam was uninjured.

The next day (10th August) Lieutenant Carmichael's flight was again attacked, this time by eight MiGs. Two MiGs were hit, and they all withdrew, one of them on fire; no damage was sustained by the Sea Furies.

On 11th August two Fireflies sighted MiGs over Haeju. The MiGs dived to attack, but after evasive action by the Fireflies broke off the attack and left the area.

The result of these encounters was on balance favourable to the Sea Furies, but it was realized that this was largely due to the stupidity of the MiGs in sacrificing height and remaining at low altitude to 'mix it' with the Furies. If they were to learn to adopt the proper tactics of diving to the attack and then using their vastly superior performance to climb away for the next attack, Captain Evans had no doubt that the balance would immediately shift in favour of the MiGs. He therefore asked the 5th Air Force to provide jet cover, preferably Sabres, for our aircraft when operating north of the River Taedong,¹ but owing to other commitments this could not be arranged. Captain Evans was convinced, however, that any diminution in the scale of interdiction in this important area would be of great advantage to the enemy, so he decided to time the strikes to coincide with a scheduled Sabre sweep and that in these circumstances Fireflies could accompany the Sea Furies. Sometimes there was only one Sabre sweep in a day; in this event the other strike would still be carried out, but by Furies only and not less than eight of them. However there was no further MiG activity in the area after the 11th August, so this plan was not put to the test.²

On 17th August H.M.S. *Ocean* left the area, steering at first towards the China coast to avoid a threatening typhoon; this was successfully accomplished and the following day course was set for Kure.

H.M.S. *Ocean's* next spell on the west coast lasted from 26th August to 4th September.³ The weather was poor on the fifth day when the element refuelled, but excellent for the first six flying-days, when 80 or more sorties were flown each day. A Firefly was hit in the radiator by flak and ditched off Choda on 27th August; the crew, Lieutenant W. le G. Jacob and Aircraftsman Hearnshaw, were recovered unhurt and were flying again next day. There were no other losses and only superficial damage from flak; no enemy fighters were encountered. On 1st September H.M.S. *Unicorn* joined, but next day the force ran into rough weather; the *Unicorn* had to heave to, rejoining on 3rd. On 4th September the weather was again perfect; 97 sorties were flown, bringing the total for seven days up to 583. That evening, U.S.S. *Sicily*, which had replaced U.S.S. *Bataan* on the west coast, took over, and the two British carriers returned to Sasebo.

¹ Not to be confused with Taedong (Tatong) Bay some 40 miles to the southward in the Pongyong do area. The River Taedong flows into Ping Yang inlet in the Choda area.

² The activity of the MiGs revealed inadequacies in the system of radar reporting and exchange of information between the 5th Air Force and T.E. 95.11. Certain *ad hoc* arrangements were made to cover the period till 17th August, when a large meeting between the Commanding General, 5th Air Force, and the Commander, 7th Fleet, at which Admiral Scott-Moncrieff and Captain Evans were represented, effected improvements in navy/air force co-operation.

³ Screened by H.M.S. *Comus*, relieved by H.M.C.S. *Nootka*, H.M.S. *Charity*, H.Neth.M.S. *Piet Hein*, U.S.S. *Marsh*.

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H.M.S. *Ocean*'s next patrol lasted from 13th to 23rd September. The weather was excellent throughout; 749 sorties were flown in nine days, an average of 83 a day. No aircraft was lost owing to enemy action, but several were damaged by flak. MiGs operated in the area on most days of the patrol, but did not in any way interfere with the *Ocean*'s aircraft. On 16th September Captain Evans was able to report that all rail bridges on the main line from Pyongyang to Chinnampo had been destroyed.

Photographic reconnaissance on previous patrols had revealed the existence of sluice-gates in three positions at the mouths of rivers. There were extensive rice fields in the vicinity, which were also very near the enemy's front line. It seemed that the rice might be intended to play an important part in the enemy's menu. It was not known whether the function of the sluice-gates was to retain fresh water to irrigate the fields or to exclude salt water at high tide, or both, but whatever their object, it would be defeated if the gates were destroyed. Accordingly, Sea Furies attacked the gates with 1000-lb and 500-lb bombs on 17th September, which was the period of spring tides; all the gates were breached, and a number of bombs with delayed-action fuzes were dropped to discourage any attempts to repair them at the next low water.¹

Though the rail bridges were out of action for the time being, there were indications that the enemy might be using road transport by night, overcoming the lack of road bridges by fording the rivers, which were mostly dry at that season. Captain Evans therefore decided to fly a night reconnaissance. A number of lorries with headlights burning were detected and immobilized, and the first light revealed a number of laden ox-carts on the road. Thereafter, further attention was paid to this traffic on subsequent patrols.

A number of Canadian and Australian officers, and other ranks, were embarked in H.M.S. *Ocean* as guests for the patrol, and parties from the ships of the screen² spent occasional days on board. 'These pleasant social contacts', wrote Captain Evans, 'the equable climate and the abundance of good bombing targets made the patrol a particularly enjoyable one.'³

The *Ocean*⁴ was again on patrol between 3rd and 13th October. The weather was good, though strong winds delayed the start of flying on 11th October. Again no aircraft was lost owing to enemy action, but a number were damaged by flak. MiGs were in the area, but they made no attempt to interfere. In all 767 sorties were flown in nine flying-days, giving a daily average of 85. As already mentioned, the First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Rhoderick McGrigor, visited the ship on the last day of this patrol.

H.M.S. *Ocean*⁵ started her tenth and last patrol before the arrival back of H.M.S. *Glory* on 23rd October. The weather was not so good as it had been of late, but she flew 493 sorties in six flying-days, a daily average of 82. On 27th October, Lieutenant (E) D. G. Mather's Sea Fury was damaged by flak and

¹ H.M.S. *St Bride's Bay* happened to be in the vicinity when one of these bombs exploded. It was interesting to learn that the explosion took place within six minutes of the fourteen-hour delay set in the fuze.

² H.Neth.M.S. *Piet Hein*, H.M.C.S. *Nootka*, relieved by H.M.C.S. *Iroquois*, U.S.S. *Marsh*, relieved by U.S.S. *Sproston*.

³ H.M.S. *Ocean*, R.o.P. in M.02958/52.

⁴ Screened by H.M.C.S. *Nootka*, H.M.A.S. *Anzac*, U.S.S. *Vammen*.

⁵ Screened by U.S.S. *Swenson*, H.M.C.S. *Iroquois*, H.M.S. *Charity*.

landed well inland far north of the bomb-line, where there were many enemy troops. A U.S. helicopter, flown by Lieutenant Christy, U.S.N., supported by ten aircraft from the *Ocean* and two U.S.M.C.s promptly rescued the pilot; the *Sea Fury* was destroyed. Another *Sea Fury* was forced to ditch and was lost on 30th October, owing to water in the petrol; the pilot, Lieutenant (E) C. M. Jenne was rescued by helicopter. That evening, H.M.S. *Ocean* left the operating area after holding a short memorial service at which wreaths were dropped overboard for the eight shipmates who had lost their lives during the operations.

'*Ocean's* record in Korean operations', wrote Rear-Admiral Clifford, 'is outstanding, and is an example of what can be achieved by bold leadership and good teamwork. The spirit, courage, and skill of her well-led squadrons have resulted in much damage to the enemy and have been backed up by the consistently high standard of the conduct and tempo of her maintenance and deck operations.' The subsequent award of the Boyd Trophy for 1952 jointly to Nos 802 and 825 Squadrons for their operations in the Korean war zone need cause no surprise.

H.M.S. *Glory* (Captain T. A. K. Maunsell), accompanied by H.M. Ships *Comus* and *Consort*, and U.S.S. *Taylor*, left Sasebo early on 10th November 1952 for the first patrol of her third tour of duty in the war area, and took over as C.T.E. 95·11 that evening. Rear-Admiral Clifford hoisted his flag in the *Glory* for the passage, transferring to H.M.S. *Comus* next day to join T.E. 95·12.

Captain Maunsell had experienced a few days' operations on the west coast in April, but the air complement, now consisting of No. 801 Squadron (21 *Sea Furies* XI) commanded by Lieutenant-Commander P. B. Stuart, and No. 821 Squadron (twelve *Fireflies* V) under Lieutenant-Commander J. R. N. Gardner were new to it; as much reconnaissance as possible was therefore planned for the first three days, in order to familiarize them with the area and to provide up-to-date target information.

During the early part of the patrol, much bad weather was experienced; low cloud, rain, and short visibility with strong winds from the north-east curtailed flying. The usual support was given to the island defence forces, and systematic attacks were carried out on bridges and tunnels, road and rail transport, transformer stations, as well as on troop concentrations, as opportunity offered.

Two aircraft were lost during the patrol. A *Sea Fury* was shot down on 18th November in the course of an attack on a railway bridge south of Sariwon; the pilot, Lieutenant R. Nevill Jones lost his life. On the same day a *Firefly* piloted by Lieutenant (E) D. Robbins suffered engine failure owing to a coolant leak probably caused by enemy fire, and he ditched in Tatong Bay. Lieutenant Robbins was picked up uninjured by a helicopter from Pengyong do. Nine *Sea Furies* and six *Fireflies* were damaged by enemy fire, and one *Firefly* by a shell exploding in her gun.

A total of 431 sorties was flown, giving a daily average of 54.

H.M.S. *Glory's* next patrol started on 28th November. Captain Maunsell was suffering from gastritis, and was obliged to return to Sasebo in H.M.S. *Consort* on the 30th; the Executive Officer, Commander D. E. Bromley-Martin was appointed in temporary command with the rank of acting captain. Unusually bad weather was experienced, and flying had to be cancelled on 3½ days on that account. A sudden drop in the temperature had a marked effect on serviceability, especially as regards the *Fireflies*, contraction of the coolant pipes causing a number of leaks. A *Firefly* had an engine failure owing to this cause, and ditched sixteen

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miles east of the ship on 6th December; the pilot, Lieutenant Marshall was picked up unhurt ten minutes later by helicopter. Nine Sea Furies and one Firefly were damaged by flak; there were also four deck-landing accidents. Owing to the weather, only 327 sorties were flown, giving a daily average of 47.

Captain E. D. G. Lewin assumed command of H.M.S. *Glory* at Kure on 14th December and left next day for the west coast. The weather was much better during this patrol, flying being restricted on one day only; but the Fireflies continued to experience trouble in coolant leaks, owing to the low temperatures.

The patrol started with an unfortunate accident when the helicopter was caught in a cross-wind on the flight-deck and started to topple to starboard. The pilot, Lieutenant A. P. Daniels, made a snatch take-off, but the aircraft crashed into the sea; Lieutenant Daniels and A.C.1 E. R. Ripley lost their lives.

On 17th December the permanent TARCAP was discontinued in the Choda area. Though possibly a deterrent to enemy batteries, TARCAP was by no means fully effective, and it was felt that the aircraft could be better employed in attacks on other targets. From then on, TARCAP was provided only for special operations such as minesweeping close to enemy coasts or unloading L.S.T.s on beaches opposite the mainland.

The improved weather allowed of more target information from photographic interpretation, and this was especially valuable in selecting rocket targets for the Fireflies. The main effort of the Sea Fury attacks was directed at bridges. This was particularly successful, and in the latter part of the patrol an unusual amount of rolling-stock was found stranded; this provided lucrative targets. Close air support for the Commonwealth Division was provided on 22nd and 24th December.

Casualties were rather heavy. On 18th December an explosion occurred in the port inner gun bay of a Sea Fury piloted by Lieutenant Leahy, who forced-landed on Pengyong do. An explosion also occurred in the wing of a Firefly while attacking a junk on the 20th. The aircraft crashed into the sea, and the pilot, Lieutenant P. G. Fogden, lost his life. On the same day a Sea Fury piloted by Sub-Lieutenant Baynes landed at Pengyong do with an oil leak. Two days later a Firefly was damaged by flak and forced to ditch; the pilot, Lieutenant Mitchell, was rescued by an amphibian from a shore airfield. Another Firefly, piloted by Lieutenant Sherbrooke, forced-landed on Pengyong do on 24th December, and on Christmas-Day Lieutenant R. E. Barrett lost his life when his Firefly was shot down while attacking a bridge north of Haeju; the aircraft exploded and caught fire on striking the ground. Four Fireflies and twelve Sea Furies suffered damage from flak.

H.M.S. *Glory* left the operating area on relief by U.S.S. *Badoeng Strait* in the evening of 26th December. She had flown a total of 566 sorties during the patrol, giving a daily average of 61. Thirty-two 1000-lb and 508 500-lb bombs, 1148 rocket projectiles, and 52 500 rounds of 20-mm ammunition had been expended on the enemy.

From the foregoing, it will be seen that the general situation at the close of 1952 differed little from that at the beginning of the year. On shore, the front line, despite bitter fighting—especially in the latter part of the year—remained practically

CHAPTER 10

unchanged. The U.N. attempt at interdiction by air attack, though inflicting much damage and inconvenience on the enemy, had failed to achieve its purpose. Operations at sea still pursued their monotonous course. The armistice talks had been hanging fire for months. On 1st December the United Nations¹ approved a plan for their resumption based on proposals put forward by India. On the same day General Eisenhower, President-elect of the United States since 4th November, arrived in Korea for a three-day visit to study the situation on the spot. On 14th December he stated in New York that a satisfactory solution could be reached, but on the 18th the North Koreans rejected the U.N. resolution. Incidentally, it was equally unpopular in South Korea. On the last day of 1952 stalemate still held sway.

¹ The United Nations at this time lacked a Secretary-General, Mr Trygve Lie having resigned on 10th November. He was eventually succeeded by Mr Dag Hammarskjold, who did not take office till 31st March 1953.

CHAPTER 11

End of Hostilities

Section

- 90 Progress of truce negotiations, 1953.
- 91 Surface operations, January–May.
- 92 Carrier operations, January–May.
- 93 A festive interlude.
- 94 Preliminary evacuation of islands.
- 95 The last phase: naval operations, July.
- 96 Armistice concluded: final evacuation of islands.

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THE year 1953 opened, as has been indicated, with but little hope of a speedy conclusion of hostilities. Nor, for the first three months of the year, were there any signs of its likelihood.

During January and February the fighting on shore consisted of harassing probes and limited-objective offensives. On 14th January the biggest air battles since 4th September 1952 took place over north-west Korea, 40 Sabres and 38 MiG-15s being involved. On 29th January Lieutenant-General Maxwell D. Taylor, U.S.A., arrived in Tokyo to take over the command of the 8th Army in succession to General Van Fleet. There was not much change in the situation till towards the end of March. Several attacks by the Chinese on front-line positions yielded no gains of ground. A die-hard Communist riot took place in the prisoner-of-war compounds on Yongcho and Koje islands.

Further afield, in the United States, the Eisenhower Administration took over on 20th January and on 2nd February the President announced that the 7th Fleet would no longer neutralize Formosa. On 6th March in the United Nations Assembly Mr Vyshinsky announced the death of Stalin, and then left for Russia, returning on the 26th as permanent Russian delegate; three weeks later he accepted the West's peace proposals.

Meanwhile, on 23rd March the heaviest fighting since the autumn flared up south-west of Chorwon. Whether the course of this battle, or the change of leadership in the Soviet Union affected the views of the Chinese Communists cannot be stated with certainty, but on 28th March to the surprise of the world the Chinese and North Korean commanders accepted a United Nations proposal for the exchange of sick and badly wounded prisoners, and also suggested the immediate reopening of the armistice talks. Little time was lost, and on 6th April talks on the exchange of disabled prisoners commenced at Panmunjon, which led

to agreement on 11th April;¹ the exchange of 6670 such Communist against 684 U.N. prisoners was effected on the 20th.

Encouraged by this speedy agreement, the U.N. Command agreed to reopen the main truce talks and on 26th April, the 199-day recess of armistice negotiations came to an end for the time being. There was only one major obstacle to a truce: what to do with the 114 500 Chinese and 34 000 North Korean prisoners who refused to return to their homelands. The Communists insisted on their return, by force if need be; the United Nations were even more determined that no prisoner who refused repatriation should be returned to Communist control against his will.

For weeks the discussions revolved around this thorny issue. The negotiations were further complicated by the attitude of President Syngman Rhee, who announced that his Government would accept no armistice that would leave Korea divided, and threatened to withdraw all the R.o.K. divisions from the U.N. Command and to continue the war independently if a truce was signed. On 6th June, President Eisenhower offered him a mutual defence treaty, but the R.o.K. member of the truce team was ordered to boycott their meetings.

Eventually, it was agreed that a neutral nations repatriation commission, consisting of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, and India should be formed to take custody of the prisoners in Korea. Under the supervision of these five Powers, the Communists had the right for a limited period to interview each prisoner who refused repatriation and try to induce him to return to the blessings of his Communist homeland; but the final choice would rest with the prisoner himself. This agreement was signed at Panmunjon on 8th June 1953.

All that remained, then, before declaring a truce was the readjustment of the military demarcation line on which the armistice was to be based. As previously, whenever the truce prospects had improved, the enemy increased his efforts to gain ground along the main line of resistance. This was largely a question of 'face' so dear to the oriental mind; they wished to appear on the offensive when the armistice was signed, and to gain enough ground to give colour to the claim that the United Nations had signed in order to avoid military defeat. Early in June, many concentrations of Communist armies in the forward area were noticed; attacks along the line increased, ranging from company to divisional in size, and on 11th June the Chinese attacked in strength. They succeeded in breaking through the eastern central sector of the main Allied line, but after fierce fighting—in which aircraft from T.F. 77 bore an important part—the situation was restored.

Meanwhile, the truce talks at Panmunjon had continued satisfactorily, and a truce agreement was finalized on 16th June. All that remained was to translate the terms into the various languages, and it was expected to be signed in three or four days. At this juncture, President Syngman Rhee elected to throw a spanner into the works, which came nigh to wrecking all that had been so patiently achieved. Some 25 000 North Korean anti-Communist prisoners of war held by the South Koreans were suddenly released on 18th June. Understandably, the Communists were indignant, accusing him of freeing the prisoners so that they could be enlisted in the R.o.K. Army, and the United States of complicity in the affair. Actually

¹ On 9th April the North Korean authorities released from internment six British civilians, who, besides the Bishop in Korea, included George Blake of the Consular Service, who, having imbibed the virus of communism during his captivity, was to achieve a melancholy notoriety eight years later by his conviction as a Russian spy. He was again in the news, when, in October 1966, he made a spectacular escape from Wormwood Scrubs prison.

END OF HOSTILITIES

the United States, in common with the remainder of the United Nations, were taken aback and deeply concerned.¹

The immediate reaction of the Communists was to launch the heaviest offensive since 1951 against the R.o.K. east-central front on 13th July. Attacking with some 40 000 men, they at first made some penetrations, but their troops were insufficiently prepared for a general offensive. The South Koreans withdrew in good order, and on the 15th—again powerfully supported by the aircraft of T.F. 77—counter-attacked with success. By the 19th the momentum of the enemy onslaught had expended itself. Further counter-attacks were gradually reducing the initial penetration, and on this day the Communists at Panmunjon agreed to begin preparations immediately for the actual signing of an armistice.

President Syngman Rhee's frolic with the prisoners of war had prolonged the war by five weeks, during which the United Nations sustained 46 000 casualties—mainly South Koreans—and the Communists an estimated 75 000. But at long last the end was at hand.

On 27th July 1953—three years 33 days after the outbreak of hostilities—an armistice was signed at Panmunjon at 1000 local time (0200 B.S.T.) and became effective twelve hours later.²

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While the armistice negotiations with all their exasperating ups and downs were slowly drawing to a successful conclusion there was little change in the naval operations.

On 1st January 1953 a new task unit organization, or rather nomenclature, for the duties remained much the same, came into force on the west coast, viz.,

OLD NAME	DUTY	NEW NAME
C.T.E. 95·11	Carrier force	C.T.U. 95·1·1
C.T.E. 95·12	Inshore cruiser	C.T.U. 95·1·2
C.T.U. 95·12·1	Choda (naval)	C.T.U. 95·1·4
C.T.U. 95·12·2	Pengyong do (naval)	C.T.U. 95·1·5
C.T.U. 95·12·4	Haeju (naval)	C.T.U. 95·1·6
C.T.E. 95·15	Island defence (shore)	C.T.U. 95·1·3
C.T.U. 95·15·1	Sok to defence	Sok to Garrison
C.T.U. 95·15·2	Choda defence	Choda Garrison
C.T.U. 95·15·3	Pengyong do defence	Pengyong do Garrison
C.T.U. 95·15·4	Yong Pyong do defence	Yong Pyong do Garrison
C.T.U. 95·15·5	Tok Chok to defence	Tok Chok to Garrison

At about the same time, the guerrillas were reorganized, and were designated the Partisan Command. Five partisan infantry regiments³ were allocated to the west

¹ On 22nd June the United Kingdom sent a note of protest to the South Korean Government, and on the 25th—the third anniversary of the outbreak of war—Mr W. Robertson, President Eisenhower's envoy, arrived in Korea with a secret message from Mr Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State. On 30th June President Syngman Rhee dismissed his Defence Minister, who was held responsible.

² At the time of writing, the armistice is still in force.

³ The 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 6th Partisan Infantry Regiments.

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coast with their headquarters respectively at Pengyong do, Kangwha do, Yo do, Yong Pyong do, and Choda.¹ Each of these had a projected regimental strength of 7500. There was also the 1st Partisan Airborne Infantry Regiment based at Seoul.

For the first two months of the year, the winter weather—snow showers and blizzards, bitter cold, and ice floes, especially in the Choda area—hampered all operations. H.M.S. *Birmingham* (Captain Luce, succeeded by Captain C. W. Greening, 12th January) and H.M.S. *Newcastle* (Captain Rutherford) alternated as C.T.U. 95·1·2; on two occasions, in order to ease the pressure on the cruisers, this duty was carried out satisfactorily by smaller ships—H.M.S. *Crane* (Captain Marsh) and H.M.A.S. *Anzac* (Captain Gatacre).

Early in January, Vice-Admiral Clark, accompanied by Rear-Admiral Gingrich, wearing his flag in U.S.S. *Missouri* and escorted by U.S.S. *Tingey*, paid another short visit to the west coast. Their programme followed almost exactly the same lines as their visit six months previously. Rear-Admiral Clifford with his flag in H.M.S. *Birmingham* met them at Inchon on 5th January, where General Van Fleet and army and air force commanders lunched on board the *Missouri* and exchanged views on the war situation. The three ships then proceeded to Choda under Admiral Clifford's operational command, and next day bombarded Amgak, Wolsa-ri, and the mainland batteries, the *Missouri* firing 72 rounds of 16-inch, with air spot provided by H.M.S. *Glory*. In the afternoon the three admirals visited the *Glory*, taking passage in the *Missouri*'s helicopter, and witnessed flying operations.

On the conclusion of this visit, Admiral Clifford proceeded to Hong Kong in H.M.S. *Birmingham*, where the C.-in-C., Admiral the Hon. Sir Guy Russell, arrived in H.M.S. *Alert* on 13th January. Admiral Russell, whose time on the station was drawing to a close, left Hong Kong in H.M.S. *Birmingham* with Rear-Admiral Clifford on 19th January for a farewell visit to Japan and the war area. On arrival at Sasebo on the 23rd, Admiral Clifford transferred his flag to H.M.S. *Ladybird*, and the C.-in-C., after visiting the ships in harbour and meeting the United Nations authorities there, proceeded to Kure in H.M.S. *Newcastle* to continue his farewells.

Of the events on the west coast in January and February little need be said. Possibly as a result of the bombardment by the heavy ships on 6th January, and subsequent bombardments by the ships of T.U. 95·1·4, enemy activity in the Choda area was negligible. Their guns opened fire on two occasions only—once on U.S.S. *Pelican* while she was sweeping in route Cigarette on 15th January, and once on Choda for a few minutes on the 24th.

In the Pengyong do area, apart from firing on Wollae do and Yuk to on 6th January, the enemy was quiescent. The ships of T.U. 95·1·5, on the other hand, assisted on occasions by the *Newcastle* and *Birmingham*, bombarded a large number of targets. The R.o.K. P.T. boats, too, operated in this area, with periodical spells at Chinhae for maintenance.

In contrast with the other areas, the enemy was fairly active in the Haeju area, Mu do and Changjae do being fired on several times. The ships of T.U. 95·1·6 returned the fire and carried out a number of harassing bombardments. On 15th

¹ The area of this (6th) regiment's operations extended as far as the River Yalu.

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January H.M.S. *Sparrow* (Commander W. J. P. Church) was hit on the quarter-deck; there were no casualties and damage was superficial.

The Han estuary was visited by H.M.S. *Opossum* (Commander J. C. Cartwright) between 10th and 12th January. The opportunity was taken to make a running survey between Kyodong do and Kangwha do.¹ After making contact with the U.S. authorities the *Opossum* bombarded targets on the north bank, using her own fire-control party to spot from an island.

On 11th February, 1953 Rear-Admiral C. E. Olsen, U.S.N., became commander of the Blockade and Escort Force (T.F. 95) in succession to Rear-Admiral Gingrich, who had been appointed to the post of Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Administration) at Washington. Admiral Gingrich, like Admiral Allan Smith, had always been most appreciative of, and co-operative with, the Commonwealth contingent, and Admiral Clifford remarked that it had been a 'pleasure and privilege to serve under him'.²

Towards the end of February, Vice-Admiral E. R. Mainguy, the Canadian Chief of Naval Staff, and Commodore L. G. Durlacher, Chief of Staff to Admiral Russell since 30th October 1952, paid visits to the operational area.

Mention should be made here of a more humanitarian activity than normally fell to the lot of those employed on the west coast. H.M.S. *Maine* was refitting at Hong Kong at this time, and in her absence from the war area a medical unit from her consisting of Surgeon-Commanders D. W. Pratt and B. W. Walford with two S.B. ratings was established at Pengyong do on 7th March. Their services to the garrisons and local inhabitants were much appreciated.

As the winter drew to an end, activities increased in most areas. Ice persisted in the Choda area till the middle of March when it began to disperse, and on the 14th Sok to was visited for the first time for three months by C.T.U. 95·1·4, then H.M.S. *Cardigan Bay* (Captain B. C. Durant.)

Rear-Admiral Clifford spent the latter part of March on the west coast. Leaving Kure on the 19th, where he had made the acquaintance of Lieutenant-General H. Wells, newly appointed C.-in-C., British Forces in Korea, he proceeded to Inchon with his flag flying in H.M.S. *Newcastle*.³ There he called on the new commander of the 8th Army, General Maxwell Taylor. The General was much interested in the west coast operations and arranged to pay a visit there with the Admiral in April. On 21st March, Admiral Clifford left Inchon, taking with him as his guest Major-General Alston-Roberts-West to see what the navy was doing. The General's trip was disappointing owing to the weather; a full gale prevented landing at Choda and it was too bad for flying operations when he visited H.M.S. *Glory*, but he witnessed a bombardment by H.M.S. *Newcastle* of enemy troop and gun positions in the Pengyong do area on 26th March before returning by air to his headquarters.

During the next few days Admiral Clifford, accompanied by Colonel C. O. Totman, U.S.M.C., the West Coast Island Defence Commander, landed at Sok to, Choda, and Yong Pyong do, and met the local commanders. The latter had been unusually quiet, enemy activity during the last month being limited to a few bombardments of Mu do—once on 4th March, replied to by H.M.S. *Whitesand*

¹ See Plan 3.

² F.O. 2i/c R.o.P. No. 59.

³ The *Newcastle* relieved the *Birmingham* as C.T.U. 95·1·2 en route.

Bay and U.S.S. *McCord*, and again on the 16th and 28th, when H.M.A.S. *Anzac* silenced the enemy guns.

Admiral Clifford arrived back at Sasebo on 1st April and transferred his flag to H.M.S. *Ladybird* (Commander D. G. Clark, who had relieved Commander Pond in June 1952) for the last time. For at last a depot ship, albeit with reduced complement, was available to take her place. H.M.S. *Tyne* (Captain A. J. F. Milne-Home) arrived at Sasebo on 7th April—the day after the resumption of the truce talks which led to the cessation of hostilities some three months later—and took over from the *Ladybird*, which in due course was returned to her owners at Hong Kong. ‘ During her time as headquarters ship of the British Commonwealth naval forces ’, wrote Admiral Clifford, ‘ H.M.S. *Ladybird*, though quite inadequate for the job, has done yeoman service to a degree far above that which could have been expected. The undoubted prestige of her name amongst all United Nations forces is a tribute to all those who served and worked in her under trying and crowded conditions.’¹

With the advent of the improved spring weather, a sharp increase in coastal activity occurred in early April. This first manifested itself in the Choda area, and during the month Choda and Sok to were fired at on a number of occasions, the heaviest bombardment taking place on 5th April, when the former received 330 rounds of 76-mm. Only a few casualties and slight damage resulted. H.M.S. *Cardigan Bay* (Captain Durant) and the two 90-mm guns mounted on the island returned the fire. Aircraft from the 5th Air Force and H.M.S. *Glory* also attacked the enemy gun positions. Just after this bombardment, Admiral Clifford arrived in the area in H.M.S. *Birmingham* (Captain Greening) accompanied by General Taylor, the commander of the 8th Army. The Admiral took the opportunity of pressing him to provide Sok to with some artillery to retaliate on the batteries which were frequently taking the island under fire. As a result, two 90-mm guns from 8th Army Headquarters were soon forthcoming, and, apart from proving a strong deterrent to enemy action, they appreciably raised the morale of the island garrison.

At about this time enemy aircraft started to carry out periodical light bombing raids at night in the Choda area—an activity later extended to Seoul. The aircraft used were Russian-built Yak-18s or PO-2s, old aircraft with a speed of only about 100 knots, capable of carrying one or two small bombs. Flying as low as possible to avoid radar detection, they presented a difficult problem, as neither the 5th Air Force nor the 1st Marine Air Wing possessed night fighters that could slow down sufficiently to engage them, and they were careful to keep clear of ships stationed in the area. The damage they inflicted was usually trivial, but the nuisance value was considerable. It was not till the end of June that naval Corsairs landed from T.F. 77 succeeded in checking their activities.

The scale of enemy activities in the Pengyong do area also was on the increase. Several of the partisan-held islands were shelled and mortared, and H.M.S. *Whitesand Bay* (Commander Craig-Waller), H.M.A.S. *Condamine* (Lieutenant-Commander Savage) and H.M.C.S. *Haida* (Commander Lantier) all came under fire at different times, though without suffering casualties or damage.

The visit of General Taylor was followed by an extensive tour of the west coast by Rear-Admiral Olsen under the guidance of Rear-Admiral Clifford in H.M.S.

¹ F.O. 2i/c R.o.P. No. 61.

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Birmingham. This was the first occasion on which Admiral Olsen had been able to visit the west coast since assuming command of T.F. 95 in February.

Between 19th and 27th April Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Lambe who had hoisted his flag as C.-in-C., Far East Station, on 20th March in succession to Admiral Russell, made a tour of the theatre of operations. During this period he visited all the principal islands and ships in the west coast operational area, and subsequently Sasebo and Japan to meet senior officers of the United Nations and British Commonwealth forces and to see the ships and establishments in Japan.

In May, the enemy attention in the Choda area turned to two partisan-held islands, Hachwira do and Sangchwira do,¹ in the Chinnampo estuary. Over 600 rounds were fired at these two islands in two weeks, but the partisans suffered few casualties and remained in possession. H.M.S. *Morecambe Bay* (Commander Hamer) and R.o.K. L.S.L. 107 were also fired on, the latter receiving two hits. Retribution came on 25th May when U.S.S. *New Jersey*, wearing Vice-Admiral Clark's flag, accompanied by Rear-Admiral Clifford in H.M.S. *Newcastle* arrived on the scene.² The *New Jersey* fired 32 rounds of 16-inch at Amgak and the batteries on the north shore of the River Taedong, while the *Newcastle*, further inshore, neutralized two enemy batteries with her 6-inch guns, and stood by to engage A.A. batteries which might interfere with the spotting aircraft. After the bombardment, U.S.S. *New Jersey* left for the east coast, having first transferred Admiral Clark to H.M.S. *Ocean* (Captain B. E. W. Logan)³ to witness flying operations. The next day, the guns on the north shore were again engaged by H.M. Ships *Newcastle* and *St Bride's Bay*, and by H. Neth. M.S. *Johan Maurits van Nassau*, who came under fire from 105-mm and 76-mm guns, and were repeatedly straddled but not hit. For this bombardment, as for that of the *New Jersey*, air spot was provided by H.M.S. *Ocean*; several hits were scored on the enemy gun positions, which were also attacked from the air. H.M.S. *Newcastle* then proceeded to the Pengyong do area, where she carried out a concentrated bombardment of a particularly active battery, sited in caves, on 28th May.

Little of interest happened in the Haeju area. The enemy seems to have been expecting an amphibious attack, for he doubled his forces on the west coast, stationing 36 000 Chinese troops in the Haeju area, and 4500 North Koreans and Chinese in the Ongjin area. This reinforcement greatly increased the difficulties of partisan operations. The fishing season in this vicinity started at the beginning of May, but there were less than 800 fishing craft instead of the 1200 which had been expected, and careful arrangements with the R.o.K. Government and Navy for the control of these craft worked very well.

The Han estuary was visited twice in May—from 17th to 20th May by H.M.N.Z.S. *Kanieri* (Lieutenant-Commander L. G. Carr) and from the 24th to the 26th by H.M.S. *Sparrow* (Commander Church); on each occasion bombardments of the mainland north of Kyodong do were carried out.

¹ See Plan 6.

² Admiral Clark had arrived at Inchon on one of his periodical visits to the west coast on 23rd May, where he was met by Admiral Clifford. The usual amenities took place there. On this occasion they included a luncheon on board U.S.S. *New Jersey* to President and Mrs Syngman Rhee and the U.S. Ambassador to Korea, in addition to the usual senior naval, military and air force officers, followed by a visit by helicopter to the presidential mansion in Seoul.

³ H.M.S. *Ocean* had just replaced H.M.S. *Glory* on the station.

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Throughout this period there were persistent rumours that the enemy were about to operate submarines in the Yellow Sea, and special vigilance was ordered; but there is no evidence that any were ever present.

On the east coast, enemy gun activity was confined mainly to the Wonsan area, where a number of U.S. ships suffered damage and casualties. Increased use of gunnery radar by the enemy led to much greater interest in electronic counter-measures by the U.S. authorities. The naval effort was mainly concentrated on fitting search and D/F receivers in ships, and a regular programme of 'window' dropping exercises by all U.S. carriers was initiated. Apart from this there was no significant change so far as the ships of T.G. 95.2 were concerned.

British Commonwealth ships¹ continued to operate in turn in the Songjin area and to the north. The main preoccupation was the security of Yang do; that, and the fact that there was a shortage of U.S. destroyers for T.E. 95.22 in the early part of the year, limited the range of operations on this stretch of coast. The enemy, too, showed little activity and not much worthy of mention occurred; Commander Gatehouse, for example, described the *Charity's* patrol between 27th February and 14th March as 'intensely disappointing . . . no enemy activity whatsoever . . . and in consequence not a shot fired in anger'. As the spring wore on there was slightly more activity. H.M.S. *Consort* captured a sampan on 6th April, which was presented to the garrison in Yang do, and considerable success was obtained in 'trainbusting'² by night, H.M.C.S. *Crusader* achieving a record score of three trains in 24 hours on 15th April. This record was however equalled by U.S.S. *Endicott* shortly afterwards. On 2nd May, H.M.S. *Cockade* destroyed one and badly damaged two large sampans on the beach north of Yang do, and on the 6th, after scattering two rail repair parties south of Songjin, she destroyed three box-cars. This stung the enemy to retaliation, who opened fire on her with 105-mm and 75-mm guns. The *Cockade* was steaming down the edge of a fog-bank which lay about two miles to seaward of the coast and into this she promptly withdrew. Nevertheless, she was under fire for about 3½ minutes, during which 45 to 50 rounds fell within 100 yards of her, some within 20 or 30 yards, and she was straddled continuously till fire ceased at about 6000 yards range in the fog. No damage was sustained.

¹ The following Commonwealth ships operated on the east coast from January to June 1953:

H.M.S. *Comus* (Commander Parker) 3rd–20th January.
H.M.C.S. *Crusader* (Lieutenant-Commander Bovey) 20th January—9th February;
12th–27th April.
H.M.S. *Cockade* (Commander Hayes) 9th–27th February: 27th April—12th May.
H.M.S. *Charity* (Commander Gatehouse) 27th February—14th March.
H.M.S. *Consort* (Commander Yonge), 14th March—12th April.
H.M.A.S. *Anzac* (Captain Mesley) 12th–26th May.
H.M.C.S. *Haida* (Commander Lantier) 26th May—8th June.
H.M.S. *Cossack* (Captain Adair) 8th–21st June.

² In July 1952, the 'Trainbusters Club' of T.F. 95 was organized. Many ships which had destroyed trains before that date were not included. Each ship in the club received a certificate of her prowess signed by C.T.F. 95. Members with number of trains credited to them were as follows:

H.M.C.S. <i>Crusader</i> ..	4	H.M.S. <i>Charity</i> ..	2	U.S.S. <i>Kyes</i> ..	1
U.S.S. <i>Endicott</i> ..	3	U.S.S. <i>Porter</i> ..	1	U.S.S. <i>Chandler</i> ..	1
U.S.S. <i>Orleck</i> ..	2	U.S.S. <i>Jarvis</i> ..	1	U.S.S. <i>McCoy Reynolds</i>	1
H.M.C.S. <i>Haida</i> ..	2	U.S.S. <i>Boyd</i> ..	1	H. Neth.M.S. <i>Piet Hein</i>	1
H.M.C.S. <i>Athabaskan</i>	2	U.S.S. <i>Traten</i> ..	1	U.S.S. <i>Carmick</i> ..	1
U.S.S. <i>Pierce</i> ..	2	U.S.S. <i>Eversole</i> ..	1	U.S.S. <i>Maddox</i> ..	1

Meanwhile, the carrier operations on the west coast had followed their usual routine. H.M.S. *Glory* and U.S.S. *Badoeng Strait* alternated as C.T.U. 95·1·1 till February 1953, when the latter's place was taken by U.S.S. *Bataan*.

H.M.S. *Glory* carried out her first patrol in the new year between 4th and 13th January.¹ The weather was unpropitious; haze with short visibility over the land was very prevalent and there were frequent snow showers and gales. This occasioned the loss of the equivalent of two full flying-days.

A somewhat different form of interdiction was adopted. Attacks on roads or road bridges would have been unprofitable; with the rivers and ground both frozen hard, road transport could easily drive round any damage inflicted. It was well known that railway bridges were always quickly repaired with material kept near at hand for the purpose. Attacks were thus directed on railway lines in inaccessible parts of the routes, and 33 rail-cuts of this nature were effected. At first, little attempt at repair was made, but during the last two days of the patrol it was seen that cuts on the Chaeryon-Haeju line had been repaired in 48 hours. For the rest, the usual air activities took place—attacks on troops and store dumps, air spot for bombardments, reconnaissance, and occasional TARCAP, and of course C.A.P. for the carrier force. On the last day of the patrol, a pre-dawn armed reconnaissance was flown. During this air-raid, warning fires were lit on the ground; these appeared two or three miles ahead of the aircraft, and the air crew, looking back, could see a long line of them stretching behind.

The patrol started badly, three officers being lost on the first flying day (5th January). A Sea Fury piloted by Lieutenant (E) D. G. Mather was hit by enemy flak and caught fire after an attack on a railway bridge north of Chaeryon. The pilot baled out, but the parachute was lost sight of before it reached the ground. For 90 minutes aircraft searched for him in vain. A U.S.A.F. helicopter, escorted by two Sea Furies, was dispatched to the scene, but was forced by bad weather to turn back. This led to a second loss; one of the escorting Sea Furies, piloted by Sub-Lieutenant B. E. Rayner, lost R/T contact and was not seen again. Later in the day, Sub-Lieutenant J. M. Simonds, R.N.V.R., while endeavouring to form up on his divisional leader at 3000 feet got into a spin from which he failed to recover; on striking the ground the aircraft disintegrated and burst into flames. In addition to these fatal casualties, Lieutenant Foster made a wheels-up landing at Pengyong do, owing to a rough-running engine and electrical failure in his Sea Fury, and two other aircraft were damaged by flak. The next day (6th), a Firefly was hit by flak and ditched north of Kirin do; the pilot, Lieutenant W. R. Heaton, was picked up from his rubber dinghy by a U.S.A.F. helicopter from Pengyong do.

The remainder of the patrol went more happily, but three other aircraft were damaged by enemy fire on 11th January. That evening, H.M.S. *Glory* left the area. A total of 317 sorties had been flown, giving a daily average of 53.

H.M.S. *Glory*² was back on patrol again on 20th January, and flying started next day. Uninterrupted fine weather, except for the last day, prevailed throughout

¹ H.M.C. Ships *Haida* and *Crusader*, and U.S. Ships *Porterfield*, *Rooks*, *Erben* and *Hancock* served in the screen at different times.

² The screen was drawn from H.M.S. *Cockade*, H.M.C. Ships *Athabaskan* and *Haida*, and U.S. Ships *Erben* and *Rooks*.

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this patrol, and as a result 393 sorties were flown—a daily average of 65. The main effort was directed against troop concentrations and store dumps reported by CCRAK and the partisan regiments, but the railways were not neglected.

There was a marked decrease of flak damage, only three aircraft being hit. It was thought that this was due partly to the safer height at which aircraft could fly in the finer weather, and partly to the policy of attacking rail targets at isolated points, away from known flak areas.

The last day of the patrol, 28th January, the weather broke and no flying could be carried out.

H.M.S. *Glory* was not so fortunate in the weather on her next patrol,¹ which took place between 5th and 15th February; flying was restricted on the 10th and 11th, stopped altogether on the 15th, but 491 sorties were flown. The main effort was again directed on troops and stores. Special attention was paid to villages SSW. of Chinnampo, said to be housing about 1400 troops for 'partisan subjugation', and to the Ongjin peninsula, where troops were reported to be massing with rubber boats for attacks on friendly islands. About two strikes a day attacked the rail system. Pre-dawn strikes of four Sea Furies and four Fireflies each, on 8th and 14th February, caught a large number of lorries with their lights on in the northern part of the area and did considerable execution. Four Sea Furies were attacked by two MiG-15s on 6th February; no damage was caused.

In view of intelligence reports that submarines might be operating in the area, Captain Lewin decided to fly an A/S screen of one Firefly during daylight. This resulted in a number of contacts being reported, all of which eventually proved 'non-sub.', and in future patrols this precaution was discontinued, when there were three or more destroyers on the screen.

There were two fatal casualties during the patrol. On 11th February, a Sea Fury piloted by Lieutenant C. A. MacPherson was hit while carrying out a low-level straffing attack on a stores dump; the aircraft crashed on a hillside, exploded, and burst into flames. Another Sea Fury was lost on the 14th. Its engine cut out, and the pilot, Sub-Lieutenant R. D. Bradley ditched close to the ship. The aircraft struck the water nose down at about 145 knots, broke in two, and sank within ten seconds. Immediate search by destroyers failed to find the pilot.

Four other aircraft were lost from various causes. On 8th February, a Sea Fury piloted by Sub-Lieutenant Belville force-landed at Pengyong do with engine trouble. On the 9th, Sub-Lieutenant Millett, while landing on, swung to starboard and his Firefly went over the side. The pilot and his passenger, Captain Bury, R.A., were picked up by a destroyer. The same day a Sea Fury, piloted by Sub-Lieutenant Hayes, suffered flak damage and ditched a mile south of Choda; the pilot was rescued by helicopter. Another Firefly was lost on the 10th, when it was forced to ditch owing to a coolant leak soon after taking off; the pilot, Lieutenant Dallosso, and Sub-Lieutenant Harrison were picked up by U.S.S. *Hanna*. In addition, two Fireflies and two Sea Furies were damaged by enemy fire.

Throughout H.M.S. *Glory*'s² next patrol—25th February to 6th March—she

¹ H.M.A.S. *Anzac*, U.S. Ships *Collett* and *Hanna*, H.M. Ships *Consort*, *Comus* and *Charity* were employed on the screen at different times.

² H.M.A.S. *Anzac*, H.M.C. Ships *Athabaskan* and *Haida*, H.M.S. *Cockade*, U.S. Ships *McCord* and *Hanson*, formed the screen at different times.

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experienced the worst weather since her return to the station. Rain, snow with extensive low cloud, and gales accompanied by a steep sea and heavy swell, were encountered; and the foggy season had started. Flying was severely curtailed on two days and impossible on one. A total of 371 sorties was flown, giving a daily average of 53.

The main air effort was again focused on troop concentrations and stores. Since the *Glory* had returned to Korean waters, efforts had been made to work up a close liaison with the guerrillas, and these efforts were now bearing fruit. Far more information was received from the partisans, and the results of the strikes left little doubt of its authenticity and value. A good piece of work, which greatly pleased the partisans, was carried out by Lieutenant-Commander P. B. Stuart, commanding officer of No. 801 Squadron, and Lieutenant E. R. Anson on 2nd March. The weather was so bad that only defensive sorties were being flown, and these two pilots were being briefed for C.A.P., when an urgent request was received for an immediate air strike in support of partisans who were being attacked on an island north of Sunwi do.¹ In order to avoid delay while a strike was got ready, it was decided to send the C.A.P. at once. Lieutenant-Commander Stuart's section dealt with all they could see so severely that it was not necessary to follow up with a strike. CCRAK subsequently signalled thanks for this exploit.

As part of a co-ordinated plan for the east and west coasts, H.M.S. *Glory* was ordered to drop a number of leaflet bombs supplied by the U.S. authorities. The bombs required some adaptation before they could be released from the British aircraft; when this had been effected they were dropped without incident on towns and some of the larger villages on 4th, 5th, and 6th March.

After inviting the special attention of U.S.S. *Bataan* to an enemy radar station, which had been damaged by a strike that morning, H.M.S. *Glory* left the area on 6th March. No aircraft had been lost on this patrol, and only five, three Fireflies and two Sea Furies, suffered damage from enemy fire.

Even worse weather prevailed during H.M.S. *Glory's*² next patrol, which started on the 15th and ended on 24th March. Haze persisted almost the whole time. Mist and fog at sea, fog in the valleys, low cloud over the hills, and low overcast conditions with some rain were general. There were also gales, with wind gusting to 45 knots and a heavy swell. On two days no flying was possible at all, and on another day it was limited to a single weather reconnaissance by two Sea Furies. A total of 455 sorties was flown, with a daily average of 76.

The spring thaw was exploited as much as possible by attacks on road and rail bridges, tunnels, railways, and transport. Most of the remainder of the air effort was devoted to troop concentrations and stores. Four Fireflies and two Sea Furies were damaged by enemy fire.

Similar targets were attacked during the *Glory's* next patrol,³ which lasted from 3rd to 12th April. Six of the seven flying-days were fine (one day was taken up by fuelling); on one day, haze and sea fog hampered operations. In all, 467 sorties were flown, giving a daily average of 67. The usual targets were attacked and support was given to the partisans when requested.

¹ See Plan 7.

² Screening duties were carried out by H.M.S. *Charity*, H.M.C.S. *Athabaskan* and U.S. Ships *Coroell* and *Higbee*.

³ H.M.C. Ships *Haida* and *Athabaskan* and U.S. Ships *Herbert J. Thomas* and *Higbee* provided the screen.

It had been calculated that theoretically a carrier equipped with 33 aircraft flying sorties of one hour twenty minutes duration, should be able to launch about twelve sorties for every daylight hour. On 5th April an experiment was carried out to test the validity of this estimate: 101 aircraft were launched in eight hours, which afforded supporting evidence of its accuracy. A further 22 sorties were flown during the remaining five hours and a half of daylight, to equal—but not surpass—the previous record (123). As the result of this experiment and of his own experience, Captain Lewin recorded his considered opinion that an efficient light fleet carrier with 33 aircraft and 50 pilots ought to be able to fly 200 sorties in a sixteen-hour day, as a setpiece.

Damage was slight during this patrol. One Sea Fury forced landed on Peng-yong do with a jammed aileron on 11th April, and two aircraft were damaged by enemy action.

The practice of entertaining visitors in the *Glory* while on patrol has been mentioned. On this occasion a record number—33 officers (including General Maxwell Taylor, U.S.A., Admiral Olsen, and Admiral Clifford) and sixteen ratings—availed themselves of the opportunity.

H.M.S. *Glory*¹ sailed about twelve hours earlier than usual for her next patrol, in order to allow time for deck-landing practice for four new pilots on the way to the operating area. She took over as C.T.U. 95·1·1 in the evening of 19th April. It was on 20th April that the exchange of sick and disabled prisoners of war was taking place at Panmunjon. This somewhat upset the routine of the *Glory*'s first few days on patrol, as, to ensure that no *contretemps* should take place, the Commander, 7th Fleet, issued instructions that the west coast carrier was to assign all offensive sorties to the Joint Intelligence Centre, Korea. Accordingly all offensive air effort was offered to the J.O.C. on the 19th. That evening the Commander, 7th Fleet, gave permission for air attacks to be carried out west of a line Chinnampo–Amgak–Haeju, but stipulated that 'position identification was obtained from the appropriate tactical aircraft direction centre or Mosquito aircraft' that the strike aircraft was west of this line. As there were no Mosquitos in the area, and it was not possible for technical reasons to obtain a T.A.D.C. fix, the *Glory* was unable to take advantage of this concession. However, at the request of the J.O.C. close air support for troops was provided by 24 Sea Furies on 21st April, and the next day the restrictions were lifted. The usual bridges, troop concentrations, and store dumps were then attacked, but close air support for troops by twelve Sea Furies was continued for the rest of the patrol.

On 23rd April, four Sea Furies were fired at by four unidentified aircraft with swept-back wings; they were first seen diving from about 8000 feet after the attack had started, and one Fury received superficial damage in the port main-plane.

Two Sea Furies were lost with their pilots on 25th April. Lieutenant J. T. McGregor was dive-bombing a railway bridge when he went into a spiral dive—believed to have been caused by flak—and crashed to the ground. An hour later Sub-Lieutenant W. J. B. Keates, after dive-bombing a cave, started to pull out, but lost control; the aircraft burst into flames on hitting the ground. Three Fireflies and another Sea Fury were damaged by enemy fire in the course of the patrol.

¹ H.M. Ships *Charity* and *Consort*, H.M.A.S. *Anzac*, and U.S. Ships *Southerland*, *Cowell* and *Thomas* served on the screen.

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The weather was uniformly fine till the night of 26th April, and a total of 447 sorties was flown, giving a daily average of 74, during which 448 500-lb bombs, 904 rocket projectiles, and 47 450 rounds of 20-mm were expended. On the last day, 27th April, thick fog followed by heavy continuous rain, and overcast prevented all flying.

Two jackstay transfers were undertaken in the fog. The first was to return a rating for whom cell accommodation had been provided to H.M.S. *Consort*. Visibility was estimated as two cables. The *Consort* was given positional data from the *Glory*'s pilotage radar (Type 974) using tactical common primacy. The *Consort* reported holding the *Glory* visually at 2½ cables, but she was not visible from the latter's bridge (60 feet above the waterline) till she was less than two cables away.

The second transfer was with U.S.S. *Southerland*, to send turnover material to U.S.S. *Bataan* and twelve ratings on an exchange agreement between the two carriers. A similar procedure was followed, but as 'cables' are not in use in the U.S. Navy, ranges were passed in yards. The *Southerland* reported visual contact at 300 yards. In addition to thick fog, this operation was accompanied by strong winds, an electrical storm and heavy rain. In spite of these conditions the manoeuvre was most satisfactorily executed.

H.M.S. *Glory*'s third tour of duty in Korean waters was now drawing to a close, and on 5th May 1953 she assumed duty as C.T.U. 95·1·1¹ for her twenty-fifth² and last patrol. As so frequently before, flying was much restricted by the weather, which was very variable, ranging from cloudless days through overcast and low cloud to thick fog. Even on the finest days there was haze and short visibility, which made it impossible to do much photographic reconnaissance; this resulted in a shortage of target information.

Targets were mainly troops and stores. Some bridges were attacked, but the rivers were by this time drying up and they were ceasing to be worth the effort. Attacks were also made on coastal guns, and a radar station reported by partisans was bombed. Photographs showed that it was destroyed; they also revealed another station near by, which was similarly dealt with.

The flying intensity was slightly less than the two previous patrols—417 sorties, a daily average of 60—but the armistice talks were progressing well at the time and this was found quite adequate in the state of 'unnatural calm'³ which prevailed in the area.

Aircraft casualties were light. One Firefly ditched off Yong Pyong do owing to engine failure probably caused by small-arms fire. The pilot, Lieutenant W. R. Sherlock, was rescued uninjured by H.M.S. *St Bride's Bay*. No other aircraft suffered damage.

After holding a memorial service for the twelve shipmates who had given their lives, H.M.S. *Glory* left the operating area for the last time in the evening of 14th May. Since leaving the United Kingdom in January 1951, the ship had spent 530 days at sea and steamed 157 000 miles. This period included fifteen months of

¹ H.M.S. *Cossack*, H.M.C.S. *Crusader*, and U.S. Ships *Southerland* and *Thomas* carried out screening duty.

² Including the two previous tours of duty.

³ H.M.S. *Glory* R.o.P. in M.01738/53.

war service and 316 days at sea in Korean waters. Of a total of 13 700 flights from her deck, 9500 were operational sorties over North Korea.

'Through the severe weather of her second winter "on the line"', wrote Admiral Clifford, '*Glory* has kept up a most creditable tempo of air operations and has inflicted much damage on the enemy. This ship has fully maintained the reputation built up by our carriers in this war.'¹

H.M.S. *Ocean* (Captain B. E. W. Logan) arrived at Sasebo on 17th May. Embarked in her were No. 807 Squadron, 21 Sea Furies XI (Lieutenant-Commander T. L. M. Brander) and No. 810 Squadron, twelve Fireflies V (Lieutenant-Commander A. W. Bloomer). Training had been energetically carried out during the month's passage from Malta, flying programmes being arranged latterly to simulate Korean operating conditions, and Captain Logan felt reasonably confident that H.M.S. *Ocean* would be able to maintain the effort made by her predecessors.

H.M.S. *Ocean*² left Sasebo for the first patrol of her second tour of duty in the war area on 21st May, and that evening took over from U.S.S. *Bairoko* as C.T.U. 95·1·1. To the disappointment of all on board, no flying was possible on the 22nd; low cloud, rain, and fog persisted all day. Fog was a constant source of anxiety throughout the patrol, and curtailed flying on two other days. However, 560 sorties were flown on the seven days when flying was possible.

Operations were directed mainly against enemy communications, stores, troops, guns, and buildings. Close air support was provided for the Commonwealth Division and for partisans on demand, and bombardment spotting for U.S.S. *New Jersey* and H.M.S. *Newcastle*. As already mentioned, Vice-Admiral Clark and Rear-Admiral Clifford visited the ship and watched some flying on 25th May. No aircraft was damaged by enemy action, but deck-landing accidents resulted in damage to two.

On 30th May, Admiral Clifford transferred his flag from H.M.S. *Newcastle* to H.M.S. *Ocean* for passage to Sasebo, and that evening she left the area. It had been intended to disembark fourteen Sea Furies to Iwakuni on the 31st, so that they might carry out a fly-past over the Commonwealth Division on Coronation day (2nd June), but this had to be cancelled owing to low cloud, short visibility, and heavy rain.

June 1953 opened with a festive occasion for the Commonwealth forces, which came as a welcome change from the drudgery of the west coast—the celebration with fitting ceremonial and rejoicings of the coronation of H.M. Queen Elizabeth II.

Arrangements had been made for all Commonwealth ships that could be spared from the operational area to be disposed between Sasebo, Kure, and Tokyo. Present at Sasebo from T.G. 95·1 were H.M. Ships *Tyne*, wearing Rear-Admiral Clifford's flag, *Ocean*, *Cossack*, *St Bride's Bay*, *Telemachus*³ and H. Neth. M.S. *Johan Maurits van Nassau*. The Commander, 7th Fleet, Vice-Admiral Clark,

¹ Covering letter to H.M.S. *Glory* R.o.P. in M.1738/53.

² H.M. Ships *Cossack* and *Cockade*, H.M.C.S. *Crusader*, and U.S. Ships *Higbee* and *Taylor* served on the screen at different times.

³ H.M.S. *Telemachus* (Lieutenant-Commander S. Jenner) was in the war area to take part in A/S exercises.

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brought his flagship, U.S.S. *New Jersey*, there for the occasion, and Rear-Admiral Olsen was also present in U.S.S. *Dixie*.

On 2nd June—Coronation Day—ships of all nations were dressed over all from morning till evening colours. A parade and service, in which representatives from all H.M. ships present took part, was held in the *Ocean*; the United States and Netherlands ships also sent contingents. It had been hoped to hold the parade on the flight-deck, but—as in London that day—wet weather prevailed, and the hangar had to be used instead. The Vice-Governor of Nagasaki, Mr Katsuye Sato (in the unavoidable absence of the Governor) and a number of Japanese authorities and senior United Nations officers, with their wives, attended. Admiral Clark accompanied Admiral Clifford on his inspection of the parade. A royal salute was fired by H.M. Ships *Ocean*, *Tyne*, and *St Bride's Bay*, and U.S. Ships *New Jersey* and *Dixie*. Afterwards, Admiral Clifford had a luncheon party for the principal guests in the *Tyne*, while the remainder were entertained in the *Ocean*.

In the evening, by order of the senior naval officer present, Admiral Clark, a searchlight display was given by all ships, and at a reception attended by some 200 guests in H.M.S. *Tyne*, it was he who proposed the health of Her Majesty. There were celebrations, too, at the Chief Petty Officers' and Petty Officers' Club and the Fleet Canteen, where bands played and members of the U.S. and Dutch forces were entertained; at each the royal toast was honoured.

Great interest and goodwill was shown by the Americans in everything connected with the Coronation. Special relays of radio programmes were made by the Armed Forces Radio Service, and news of it figured largely in their forces newspaper; of their genuine willingness to participate and co-operate there was no doubt. Japanese interest, too, was most marked. Banners with the royal crown and the inscription, 'Long live Queen Elizabeth II', appeared in the main streets of Sasebo. Many gifts of flowers were sent to Admiral Clifford and H.M.S. *Tyne* by the Governor, the Mayor, and leading Japanese business organizations. The local Chamber of Commerce erected a bar which served free drinks to U.N. personnel on Coronation Day and the day after, and the Mayor gave a dinner to Admiral Clifford, his senior staff officers, and the commanding officers of all British Commonwealth ships.

At Kure and Tokyo there were similar celebrations on a smaller scale. At the former, H.M.C.S. *Athabaskan*, H.M.N.Z. Ships *Hawea* and *Kanieri*, and H.M.S. *Sparrow* represented the Commonwealth Navies. Platoons from all four ships were landed to take part in a parade organized by H.Q., British Commonwealth Forces, Korea, the salute being taken by Lieutenant-General H. Wells, Australian Regular Army.

At Tokyo, H.M.S. *Mounts Bay* and H.M.A.S. *Anzac* berthed alongside Shibaura Pier, and occasioned much interest among the Japanese on this, the first 'goodwill' visit of H.M. ships since World War II. Parties from both ships attended a Coronation drumhead service ashore, followed by a parade. Later a combined official reception was held by the two ships. H.B.M. Ambassador subsequently described their visit as an outstanding success.

The ships in the war area, too, celebrated the occasion as far as circumstances permitted. H.M. ships were dressed with masthead flags and U.S. ships flew white ensigns at the masthead as a courtesy. At Choda, H.M. ships *Newcastle* and *Morecambe Bay* held services and the former fired a royal salute to the accompaniment of 90-mm fire from Sok to. The main brace was duly spliced later in

the day. Captain Schanze, U.S.N. (Chief of Staff to Admiral Olsen), who was visiting the area, the garrison commanders of Choda and Sok to, and three U.S.A.F. officers were entertained in both the *Morecambe Bay* and *Newcastle*. At Pengyong do, H.M.S. *Modeste* (Commander R. D. Ritchie) and R.F.A. *Wave Knight* dressed ship with masthead flags and spliced the main brace. After a short service in the *Modeste*, some of her ship's company landed at Pengyong do with £10 worth of sweets for the orphanage there—the result of a collection on board. Her officers and men felt that this gift was the best they could do to accord with the spirit of the day, in the somewhat limiting circumstances in which they were spending it.

Except for short bombardments of Hachwira do in the River Taedong and Mahap to in the Pengyong do area the enemy took no part in the celebrations; but during the next few days things were more lively in the Choda area. Frequent bombardments of gun positions and troops were carried out by the ships of T.U. 95·1·4—H.M.S. *Morecambe Bay* (Commander Hamer, C.T.U.), U.S.S. *Cocopa* and L.S.M.R. 409, H. Neth. M.S. *Johann Maurits van Nassau*, on her return from Sasebo on 4th June, and later H.M.C.S. *Crusader*. The enemy retaliated. On 3rd June H.M.S. *Morecambe Bay* was fired on and had to slip her cable in her night anchorage west of Sok to to get clear. After dark, three low-flying aircraft made four attacks on Choda, dropping light fragmentation bombs from 500 feet. No damage resulted. On each of the next three nights these aircraft visited the area, but made no attacks. On 5th June, L.S.M.R. 409, on completion of a bombardment with rockets and 5-inch, came under fire; 30 rounds fell around her and two hits were scored, which caused damage and five casualties. Temporary repairs were soon effected and the ship remained fully operational.

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Just a week after the Coronation-Day celebrations, the Commonwealth naval forces were faced with a large-scale operation of a very different nature—the evacuation of all operational islands to the northward of a line drawn in a south-westerly direction from the Han estuary, with the exception of Yong Pyong do, Udo (Yong Mae do), Pengyong do, Techong do, and Sochong do, which were to remain in the hands of the United Nations. Those to be evacuated included the garrisoned and fortified islands of Choda and Sok to, and seventeen minor islands held by partisans; in many cases, these contained inhabitants who were anxious to leave before the Communists took over. The armistice terms required the evacuation to be completed within five days of their signature. It was estimated that a total lift of 45 000 people and 2300 tons of material would have to be undertaken.

An operation plan (code-named Pandora) had been prepared, but on 5th June a directive was received from the C.-in-C., U.N. Command, to the effect that the armistice terms forbade any civilian to cross to the U.N. side of the armistice line who had not been resident south of it prior to 25th June 1950. This involved two radical alterations in Pandora at the last moment, as all the inhabitants who so wished, refugees, partisans and their dependants would have to be evacuated *before* the armistice was signed; it therefore became essential that Admiral Clifford

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should receive notice several days before the signature date. The task to be completed in the five days following the signature would be greatly facilitated, as only the military forces, installations and equipment in Choda and Sok to would remain to be dealt with.

The operation was planned to be conducted in two phases. First, all evacuees were to be collected in staging areas, as follows:

STAGING AREA	EVACUEES
Pengyong do	6th P.I.R. ¹ Civilian refugees from Choda and 'Worthington' areas.
Techong do	1st P.I.R.
Yong Pyong do	5th P.I.R. Refugees from Haeju area.

In the second phase they would be moved to their final destinations, viz., for the P.I.R.s and their dependants the islands of Taemuui do and Yong Yu do (ten miles to the westward of Inchon)² and Anmyong do (30 miles north of Kunsan).³ All civilian refugees were to be transported to reception centres on the South Korean mainland.

In order to cope with this large evolution, the number of L.S.T.s in the west coast operational area was increased to six (later seven),⁴ so fortunately it was not necessary for H.M. ships to embark either refugees or partisans; but beach parties were landed, and the loading of individual craft was closely supervised. On 15th June, the assault transport U.S.S. *Lenawee* (Captain McCrae, U.S.N.) (A.P.A. 195) arrived on loan from T.F. 90. She carried one L.C.P.R., one L.C.P.L., 22 L.C.V.P.s, and two L.C.M.s, and these craft were of the greatest value in the later stages of the evacuation.

It was realized that the whole operation would stand or fall by the weather. In the event this proved ideal, except for temporary interference with the *Lenawee's* landing-craft on two days (20th and 23rd June).

The signing of the prisoner-of-war agreement on 8th June seemed to bring the armistice very near indeed, and during the night of 9th/10th the P.I.R. commanders were directed by the Commanding General, CCRACK (Brigadier-General Stuart, U.S.A.) to start evacuating the outer islands. Captain Greening was then C.T.U. 95·1·2 in H.M.S. *Birmingham*, the area commanders being H.M.S. *Modeste* (Commander Ritchie, C.T.U. 95·1·4) at Choda, H.M.N.Z.S. *Hawea* (Commander Davis-Goff, C.T.U. 95·1·5) at Pengyong do, and H.M.S. *Sparrow* (Commander Ellis, C.T.U. 95·1·6) in the Haeju area. Captain Greening lost no time in conferring with the garrison and P.I.R. commanders at Choda and Pengyong do, and in arranging detailed plans with them. The 6th P.I.R. began to withdraw in their own boats from the islands north of Sok to on 10th June, and on the same day routine movements of the three logistic L.S.T.s already on the coast were suspended and they were diverted for evacuation purposes. The next day,

¹ Partisan Infantry Regiment.

² See Plan 1.

³ See reference map.

⁴ Five United States, two R.o.K.

CHAPTER 11

L.S.T. 836 started loading the 6th P.I.R. at Choda; civilians and the 1st P.I.R. started to leave islands in the Pengyong do area in their own boats, and a similar movement from the minor islands to Yong Pyong do began in the Haeju area.

On 12th June, Admiral Clifford was informed that the armistice was considered imminent. H.M.S. *Newcastle* (Captain Rutherford), though she had only just reached Sasebo from patrol, was sailed for Yong Pyong do to take charge as C.T.U. 95·1·6 in the Haeju area, and that evening Admiral Clifford sailed in H.M.S. *Tyne*¹ (Captain Milne-Home) with his whole staff² embarked for this occasion, and on arrival at Pengyong do on the 14th assumed the duties of Officer in Tactical Command, West Coast, the *Birmingham* then proceeding to Choda as C.T.U. 95·1·4. Much good work had already been done by the ships under Captain Greening's operational command, and the evacuation was proceeding smoothly according to plan. That day (14th) there sailed from Choda L.S.T. 516 with 1200 6th P.I.R. for Yong Yu do, L.S.T. 840 with 1500 of the 1st P.I.R. for Techong do, and L.S.T. 806 with about 2000 refugees for Pengyong do. The following day the evacuation of P.I.R. dependants and refugees in the Haeju area to Yong Pyong do was completed; and so the work went on in the days which ensued, despite some reluctance on the part of the 1st and 5th P.I.R. to complete the evacuation of some of the outer islands.

During this period there was a marked change in the attitude of the R.o.K. vessels under Admiral Clifford's command and on occasions there was reluctance to co-operate, but no serious incident or interference with planned operations took place. On 18th June came President Syngman Rhee's dramatic release of the anti-Communist prisoners of war and the prospect of an early armistice immediately faded, but evacuation of the islands continued, though certain islands had to be reoccupied by reduced partisan forces to avoid their falling into enemy hands prematurely.

Military activity on the coast continued at much the usual level during these operations. Single-engined enemy aircraft visited the Choda area periodically at night and on 10th June included Pengyong do, where they dropped eight small bombs, killing and wounding a few villagers. H.M. and Allied ships kept up the usual counter-battery and harassing fire and engaged targets of opportunity, but the enemy guns were only occasionally active, and though much movement necessarily took place in daylight under his nose, his interference with the evacuation was negligible. Nor did he make much attempt to exploit the withdrawal from the outer islands. On 14th June, junks threatened a landing at Changnin do and were repulsed by H.M.N.Z.S. *Hawea* and R.o.K. A.M.S. 309. His only other attempt was on Yong Mae do. Troops were observed to be concentrating opposite this island on the 20th. They were shelled from the sea and attacked from the air, and suffered casualties, but late on 23rd June about 300 Chinese troops landed on the island and the small P.I.R. holding force withdrew, assisted by H.M.A.S. *Culgoa*'s motor-cutter. However, two days later the enemy in his turn retired to the mainland.

By 22nd June the evacuation movements were over except for the onward lifts

¹ The not inconsiderable number of extra hands required before she could go to sea were taken from the various ships at Sasebo at the time.

² Except the Chief Staff Officer, Captain R. F. Leonard (who had succeeded Captain Meares in November 1952), who was sick in H.M.H.S. *Maine*.

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of refugees to the mainland ports of Mokpo and Kunsan,¹ for which there was no immediate hurry. H.M.S. *Birmingham* was sailed for Sasebo that day, and at midnight 23rd/24th Admiral Clifford followed her in the *Tyne*, leaving the *Newcastle*² (Captain Rutherford) as C.T.U. 95·1·2 in control of the west coast. Over 1000 refugees left Pengyong do in a R.o.K. L.S.T. for Mokpo on 27th June, and a similar movement to Kunsan took place on the 30th.

Between 10th and 30th June, a total of more than 40 000 persons had been moved, in addition to substantial quantities of personal belongings and partisan equipment. Many people travelled in their own craft, but well over 17 000 were moved in U.S.S. *Lenawee* and the L.S.T.s. Except for a lift of the 6th P.I.R. weapons in H.M.N.Z.S. *Kaniere* (Lieutenant-Commander L. G. Carr) it was not necessary for combatant ships to be employed as transports. 'The evacuation', remarked Admiral Clifford,

'proceeded remarkably smoothly considering the attitude of non-cooperation of the R.o.K. Government . . . and the fact that the chances of an immediate armistice vanished during the process. Although hostilities had to continue during the evacuation, anxieties about the time limit became less acute as the prospect of an early armistice receded³ . . .

Much outstanding work was done by ships on the coast during this period. Improvisation, initiative, and infinite patience were the main ingredients of the operation; planning, accurate timing, and disciplined movement are things outside the comprehension of the people with which the Task Group had to deal.⁴

The Admiral gave great credit to the Island Defence Commanders and the C.T.U.s—Captain Greening (H.M.S. *Birmingham*), Commander Ritchie (H.M.S. *Modeste*), Commander Davis Goff (H.M.N.Z.S. *Hawea*), and Commander H. D. Ellis (H.M.S. *Sparrow*)—immediately prior to the evacuation, who between them made the final plans which laid such a sound basis for what was actually done. 'Perhaps the most outstanding services', he added,

'were performed by Commander H. D. Ellis, R.N., and the officers and men of H.M.S. *Sparrow*, as in their area around Yong Pyong do were by far the largest numbers of refugees, and due to the shallow water and the numerous islands a great deal of the movement had to be improvised in native craft with utterly undisciplined people, and in the face of negligible landing facilities, language difficulties and critical tidal conditions.'⁵

H.M.S. *Sparrow* left the Haeju area on 19th June for Hong Kong and ultimately South Africa.

¹ Arrangements had been made for each of these ports to receive 3000 a week to a total of 14 000 and it was intended to use U.S.S. *Lenawee* and the L.S.T.s to complete the movement. In the event, the numbers fell far short of this estimate.

² This was H.M.S. *Newcastle*'s last spell of war service. She left the area early in July for a refit at Singapore.

³ The postponement of the signing of the armistice helped in two ways: *a.* Combatant ships could not, and did not need to be used as transports; and *b.* many of the moves could be carried out with less urgency than originally envisaged, thus allowing most of the refugees and partisan dependants to take with them the bulk of their personal chattels.

⁴ F.O. 2i/c. Report on Evacuation of West Coast Islands, in M.02494/53.

⁵ F.O. 2i/c. Report on Evacuation of West Coast Islands.

Admiral Clifford also commended the excellent work of U.S.S. *Lenawee* and the L.S.T.s:

'The people which they carried were completely without knowledge of hygiene or sanitation. On each voyage the ships were rendered foul, but they reported back for more work, clean, zealous, and cheerful. The landing craft carried by the *Lenawee* were invaluable for this type of operation. It is a matter for regret that this well-equipped and highly-efficient ship could not be offered cargoes of people more nearly approaching her own standard . . . All who saw her at work were impressed with her enthusiasum . . .'¹

While these exacting operations were taking place, it had fallen to the lot of a British officer to supervise a small evacuation at Yang do, the only island on the east coast affected at that time.² Captain Adair had arrived in H.M.S. *Cossack* to relieve H.M.C.S. *Haida* on 8th June, just as the evacuation problem came to the fore, and automatically became C.T.U. 95·2·2, which then consisted of U.S. Ships *Buck*, *Chandler*, and *Endicott*. The usual patrols and trainbusting activities continued, but the *Cossack* remained in the vicinity of Yang do, and Captain Adair lost no time arranging plans with the Island Defence Commander. The evacuation was of course on a very small scale compared with those on the west coast, but it was complicated by persistent fog and various difficulties had to be overcome. For example, the island commander held no crypto system. This was overcome by the *Cossack*'s landing a liaison party of one officer and one communication rating with a Fleet Code, signal lantern, and portable wireless set. 'During the next few days their services were invaluable.'³

R.o.K. L.S.S.L. 109 and some CCRAK craft were allocated for the evacuation. The latter ran true to form in their dislike of disclosing their movements.⁴ However, L.S.S.L. 109 arrived on 12th July; she loaded promptly with civilians and stores, and sailed that evening in convoys with three CCRAK motor-sampans and a R.o.K. Marine fishing boat for Sokho-ri, escorted by U.S.S. *Buck*.

After the convoy had sailed, there remained—apart from the garrison—74 intelligence personnel and 27 civilians. These were evacuated in CCRAK *Sea Turtle* and U.S.S. *Chandler* on the 14th. About 63 tons of stores followed on the 16th, and this brought the operation to a close, the garrison consisting of two officers and five O.R.s, U.S. Marine Corps, and eleven officers and 261 O.R.s, Korean Marine Corps, remaining in the island till the armistice was actually signed.

¹ F.O. 2i/c. Report on Evacuation of West Coast Islands.

² The islands in Wonsan harbour were not to be evacuated till after the signing of the armistice, as they were required for the prosecution of the 'siege', which continued till the end of hostilities.

³ H.M.S. *Cossack* R.o.P. in M.02195/53.

⁴ For example, there was the case of the CCRAK *Arlene*. On 12th June, Captain Adair was informed that this vessel would arrive at Yang do at 1800 that day, from Yo do (Wonsan). Later, this was amended to 0600, 13th. As she did not turn up then, Captain Adair enquired of C.T.U. 95·2·1 at Wonsan whether she had in fact sailed. The reply was that she would sail at 0830, 13th, and arrive at 2130. At 1600 the *Cossack* proceeded to the south-west in an attempt to contact her before dark. There was a thick fog, but a vessel was soon picked up by radar, which proved to be another CCRAK ship, the *Sea Turtle*, also on her way to Yang do, about which nothing had been previously known. The *Cossack* searched some 45 miles to the south-west, but failed to find the elusive *Arlene*. Eventually U.S.S. *Wiltsie* reported at 0130, 14th, that she had picked up the crew of the *Arlene*. They had abandoned ship after running ashore at 2315, 12th June—some nine hours before she had left Yo do, according to C.T.U. 95·2·1. This discrepancy was never cleared up.

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A sad event marred the return of Admiral Clifford to Sasebo from the west coast, for on 24th June his Chief Staff Officer, Captain R. F. Leonard, had died in H.M.H.S. *Maine* after an operation for duodenal ulcer. He was buried at sea off Sasebo from H.M.S. *Tyne* with full honours on 27th June. Captain Leonard had been very popular with all members of the U.N. naval forces, and many kind messages of sympathy were received from a large number of senior U.N. officers. Acting Captain W. J. Parker was appointed Chief Staff Officer in his place.

Meanwhile, the carrier force had not been idle during the evacuation of the islands. H.M.S. *Ocean*¹ (Captain Logan) had relieved U.S.S. *Bairoko* on 8th June, the day of the signing of the prisoner-of-war agreement.

The pattern of operations on this patrol was changed, a large proportion of sorties being employed on close air support for the army. As already mentioned the Chinese were exercising increased pressure on the main line of resistance at this time, which culminated in a heavy attack on the eastern central sector on 11th June, and by direction of Admiral Clark both T.F. 77 and T.U. 95·1·1 devoted much of their effort to providing close support for the troops.² The *Ocean*, too, flew many more sorties than usual for TARCAP to cover the withdrawals from the inshore islands, or to assist in silencing shore batteries. The usual attacks on enemy communications, supplies, troops, guns, and buildings, were therefore on a reduced scale.

Much fog was encountered, and on four of the eight days of air operations flying was curtailed on this account; on one day, for example, only twenty sorties could be flown; roughly a quarter of the normal air effort. A total of 539 sorties was, however, flown during the patrol, and on 17th June on completion of flying, H.M.S. *Ocean* turned over the duties of C.T.U. 95·1·1 to U.S.S. *Bairoko* and proceeded to Kure.

H.M.S. *Ocean* sailed from Kure again on 25th June and after a very foggy passage took over as C.T.U. 95·1·1³ in the evening of the 27th. Fog, rain, and low cloud cut down the number of sorties on four days of the patrol, and on three other days, though flying was possible, many targets were obscured. On 27th June only two sorties were flown, and on 5th July only eight. In all 474 sorties were flown during the patrol, a daily average of 86½ when a full programme was possible.

Considerable effort was again expended on close-air-support operations over the front line, and attacks were continued on the usual targets.

Two aircraft were forced to ditch: a *Firefly*, piloted by Lieutenant B. V. Bacon, which had been hit by small-arms fire, on 29th June, and a *Sea Fury*, piloted by Sub-Lieutenant C. C. B. Hill owing to engine failure the following day. The efficiency of the search and rescue organization was again demonstrated, each pilot being speedily rescued by a helicopter from Pengyong do. Another *Firefly* was unable to lower its undercarriage owing to complete hydraulic failure, and made a wheels-up landing on Pengyong do; the pilot was uninjured.

¹ H.M.C. Ships *Crusader* and *Athabaskan*, H.M.S. *Cockade*, H.M.A.S. *Anzac*, and U.S. Ships *Thomason*, *Chevalier*, *Preston* and *Southerland* served in the screen at different times.

² The organization for dealing with this large number of aircraft proved unsatisfactory and many missions were not controlled on to targets.

³ H.M.S. *Cockade*, H.M.C.S. *Huron*, H.M.A.S. *Tobruk*, and U.S. Ships *Buck*, *Preston* and *Chevalier* formed the screen at different times.

U.S.S. *Bairoko* took over on completion of flying on 5th July and the *Ocean* proceeded to Sasebo.

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With the preliminary evacuation of the islands completed at the end of June, things settled down to the usual routine at sea for the few remaining weeks of the war. On the west coast the enemy was unusually quiet; his guns did not take any U.N. ships under fire, nor did he show any activity in the coastal area, apart from occupying the islands of Yuk to and Sunwi do near Pengyong do after their evacuation by the partisans in mid-June. This gave rise to a few sharp encounters. A small partisan reconnaissance landed on Yuk to and failed to return, so a stronger patrol landed on the night of 1st/2nd July in search of them. The patrol ran into heavy opposition and had to withdraw, its leader, Lieutenant Badroghy, U.S.A., being wounded. H.M.S. *Ocean's* aircraft bombed the enemy in the island on the 2nd, and that night another patrol under Captain Betelli, U.S.A., landed, to be greeted with fire from enemy mortars and two 76-mm guns. Again the patrol had to withdraw; on this occasion extremely accurate supporting fire was provided by H. Neth. M.S. *Johan Maurits van Nassau*. A week later (8th July) R.o.K. A.M.S. 506 ran ashore on the north-east corner of Pengyong do in a dense fog; good work was done in refloating her by U.S.S. *Chickasaw* and the Island Defence L.C.M.

In the Choda area a considerable number of bombardments of enemy gun positions was carried out by U.N. forces during the first three weeks of July, H.M. Ships *Morecambe Bay*, *Cossack*, *Crane*, and *Cockade*, H.M.N.Z.S. *Kaniere*, H. Neth. M.S. *Johan Maurits van Nassau*, and U.S. L.S.M.R. 409 taking part at different times. A particularly successful shoot was carried out by the *Cossack* (Captain Adair) on 13th July, who approached to within 2800 yards of the gun caves on the north of Wolsa-ri peninsula at first light. Complete surprise was achieved and major damage was inflicted.

H. Neth. M.S. *Johan Maurits van Nassau* visited the Han estuary between 9th and 11th July, and at the request of the local P.I.R. bombarded mortar positions on the mainland. There was no activity in the Haeju area, apart from a bombardment by H.M.C.S. *Athabaskan* on 20th July, and a small P.I.R. raid, supported by H.M.S. *Ocean's* aircraft, on the 21st.

H.M.S. *Ocean*¹ carried out her last war patrol between 15th and 23rd July. Once again the weather was most unfavourable. On five of the eight flying-days fog, rain, and low cloud, either in the vicinity of the ship or over the whole target area, seriously interfered with flying; a total of 434 sorties was flown. The standard of deck landing in these difficult conditions was very satisfactory. During the patrol the thousandth accident-free landing was made, and by the end of it, 1197 had been achieved.

The patrol started badly, when on the first flying-day, 15th July, the catapult became temporarily unserviceable. The 8th Army had asked for all possible air support at the time, and it was important to keep to the flying programme so the

¹ Screened by H.M. Ships *Cockade* and *Cossack*, and U.S. Ships *Southerland*, *Buck*, *Preston* and *Chevalier* at different times.

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next mission consisting of four Sea Furies and four Fireflies was launched by RATOG. The pilot of the second Sea Fury to take off, Lieutenant J. J. Mulder, R. NETH. N., fired his rockets too soon; he failed to gain flying speed and hit the water just ahead of the ship, whence he was recovered unhurt by helicopter. The remaining Sea Furies took off satisfactorily, but the first Firefly crashed into the sea, and sank immediately, taking with it the observer, Lieutenant K. M. Thomas. The pilot, Lieutenant A. J. D. Evans, was promptly picked up by U.S.S. *Southerland*, but despite prolonged artificial respiration, failed to regain consciousness, and died on board her.

Later that day, with six Sea Furies due to land on, the ship found herself in an extensive fog patch which developed suddenly without warning. The Sea Furies were diverted to Kimpo airfield, but one of them, piloted by Sub-Lieutenant P. R. Sheppard was short of fuel and a C.C.A.¹ landing was attempted. At the end of the second attempt Sub-Lieutenant Sheppard found himself on the port beam of the ship; realizing that if he did not land then he would have to ditch; he circled the ship to starboard and made a successful landing from that quarter after only an occasional glimpse of her until the last moment. He had some six gallons of fuel remaining.

On the completion of the flying programme that evening a combined memorial and burial service for Lieutenants Thomas and Evans was held in the *Ocean*. In the gathering dusk the ships of the screen—the *Buck*, *Southerland*, and *Cockade*—closed in astern and on the quarter to take their part. 'We all appreciated their courtesy and sympathy deeply', recorded Captain Logan.

After this unfortunate start, things went better. There were no more losses, and subject to the weather, close air support was provided for the army, and the usual offensive sorties flown against enemy communications, troops, guns, and so on. Photographic reconnaissance once more paid good dividends.

A new commitment was undertaken during this patrol at the request of the 5th Air Force. A small unit consisting of three Firefly aircraft, seven officers, and sixteen ratings was disembarked on 17th July to K6 Airfield (40 miles south of Seoul) for use as night fighters against the slow, low-flying enemy aircraft. The Fireflies had previously been fitted with APX-6 (I.F.F. Mk 10) loaned by the Far East Air Force. A total of 21 hours' day and eight hours' night training, and 26 hours' night operational flying was successfully carried out, though no 'kills' were achieved before the signing of the armistice. 'The success of this venture, laid on at short notice and with little material backing', wrote Captain Logan, 'reflects great credit on the air crew concerned and in particular on Lieutenant-Commander Bloomer, Commanding Officer, 810 Squadron, who carried out all the initial flying tests and inspired the whole unit with enthusiasm by his own personal example.'²

U.S.S. *Bairoko* took over the duties of C.T.U. 95·1·1 in the evening of 23rd July and H.M.S. *Ocean* proceeded to Kure.

On the east coast, in contrast to the west, the Chinese shore offensive was accompanied by increased activity and intensity of coastal gun-fire. Several U.S. ships were hit at Wonsan and elsewhere; and on 8th July, Captain Jack Maginnis,³

¹ Carrier-controlled approach.

² H.M.S. *Ocean* R.o.P. in M.02342/53.

³ Captain Maginnis was the most senior naval officer wounded during the war.

Commander, Destroyer Squadron 24, and four others were seriously wounded by a shrapnel burst on the main mast of U.S.S. *Irwin* (Commander G. M. Slonim,) ten miles south of Songjin. The U.S. ships gave as good as they got, however. In addition to the destroyers of T.G. 95·2, the battleship *New Jersey*, heavy cruisers *St Paul* and *Bremerton*, the light cruiser *Manchester*, and twelve destroyers of the 7th Fleet operated at the bomb-line during this final period. During the last two months of the war, 1774 rounds of 16-inch, 2800 of 8-inch, 700 of 6-inch, and 13 000 rounds of 5-inch were fired at the enemy positions.

During this period, H.M.C. Ships *Athabaskan* (Commander Reed) and *Huron* (Commander Chenoweth), operated in the Songjin area. The *Huron's* war service came to an unfortunate end when she grounded in clear weather on the south-west tip of Yang do at 0100(I) on 13th July. The ship struck the rocks at twelve knots and sustained very heavy underwater damage from the stern to about station 30. She succeeded in refloating before dawn and was towed by U.S. rescue tugs to Sasebo at five knots, where she arrived four days later and was taken in hand for repairs.

H.M.A.S. *Tobruk* (Commander McDonald) took the *Huron's* place on the east coast and remained there for the rest of the war.

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Meanwhile, since President Syngman Rhee's release of the prisoners of war on 18th June the Chinese had been preparing a punitive offensive against the South Koreans. On 13th July they struck with some 40 000 men against the R.o.K. east-central front. The South Koreans withdrew in good order, inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy. For some days there was bitter fighting, but the attack was held. Task Force 77 concentrated their air effort on support of the Army in the threatened sector, and by 19th July counter-attacks were restoring the situation. On that day, the Communists agreed to begin preparations for the actual signing of the armistice. Thereafter, negotiations proceeded apace and their final stages were completed quicker than had been expected.

At about that time, the C.-in-C., Far East Station, Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Lambe, had arranged to visit the war area and Japan. He arrived at Iwakuni on 24th July, where he was met by H.M.S. *Birmingham* (Captain Greening) in which he took passage to Sasebo. Barely five minutes after his arrival there on the 25th, information was received that the armistice would probably be signed very shortly. H.M.S. *Birmingham* at once proceeded to the west coast to take over the duties of C.T.U. 95·1·2 from H.M.S. *Crane* (Captain Marsh), and Rear-Admiral Clifford, accompanied by the C.-in-C., followed in H.M.S. *Tyne*.¹ While on passage, a signal was received from the Supreme Commander, General Mark Clark, desiring the attendance of Admiral Clifford at the signing of the armistice. As the message was sent only about an hour before the ceremony it was quite impossible for him to

¹ On this occasion the additional ratings required to man the *Tyne* were very willingly provided by the Royal Canadian Navy from H.M.C.S. *Huron*. Admiral Clifford remarked that with a ship's company comprising British, Canadians (one or two of whom could speak only French), and Chinese, it was a tribute to the patience and common sense of the ship's officers, chief petty officers and petty officers that the ship worked so smoothly.

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comply.¹ The armistice was signed at Panmunjon at 1000 local time (0200 B.S.T.) on 27th July 1953, and became effective twelve hours later.²

So far as the Commonwealth naval forces were concerned, the final evacuation of the west coast islands then became the main consideration. H.M.S. *Tyne* arrived at Pengyong do on 28th July. There, Admiral Lambe transferred to H.M.S. *Charity* (Lieutenant-Commander C. M. Harwood in temporary command) for passage to Kure, and the *Tyne*, wearing Admiral Clifford's flag, went on to Choda. No substantial changes in the numbers in the islands had occurred since June, and the task of evacuation on this second occasion was considerably easier. The small P.I.R. garrisons on the outer islands were able to use their own transport, and four L.S.T.s had been retained on the coast. The main body of partisans and refugees having already left, only disciplined men under proper leadership and with their own food supplies remained to be dealt with, and in the finalized armistice terms the period allowed for the evacuation had been increased from five to ten days—i.e., till 6th August.

Under the direction of Captain Greening in H.M.S. *Birmingham* the operation proceeded smoothly, and by the time Admiral Clifford arrived at Choda on 29th July, all the P.I.R. elements in the three areas had withdrawn from the outlying islands,³ and the evacuation of the regular units from Sok to under the supervision of H. Neth. M.S. *Johan Maurits van Nassau* had been completed that morning. There remained only the final stages of the evacuation of Choda to be accomplished, and the Admiral decided to leave the direction in Captain Greening's hands.

Dismantling of equipment on Choda had started at 2200, 27th July, twelve hours after the armistice was signed. Lieutenant-Commander R. G. Shaw, with a small signal section, was landed from the *Birmingham* as Liaison Officer with the Island Defence Commander. Three beaches were available, known as Air Force, Pol, and Sosari beaches; beach parties from H.M.S. *Birmingham* were landed on Air Force beach, and from H.M.S. *Crane* on the other two, on 28th July. The U.S. L.S.T.s 516 and 840 arrived that forenoon and beached on Pol and Air Force beaches respectively. In the afternoon the R.o.K. L.S.T. 802 arrived and after some trouble⁴ beached on Sosari beach and started loading the R.o.K. Marines and their equipment—a slow business, as the Marines found the demolition of their bunkers more to their taste than handling heavy stores. The *Crane's* beach party was considerably embarrassed by a bonfire near by, into which the Koreans threw grenades and

¹ Vice-Admiral Briscoe, COMNAVFE, and Vice-Admiral Clark, Commander, 7th Fleet, subsequently both expressed their regret that more notice had not been given to enable Rear-Admiral Clifford to attend, and added that had they known that Admiral Lambe was on board the *Tyne* a similar invitation would have been extended to him.

² Four items had been agreed:

- a. Demarcation line and demilitarized zone.
- b. Arrangements for carrying out the armistice.
- c. The exchange of prisoners of war.
- d. Recommendations to Governments.

The demarcation line was the battle line at the time of the armistice; the demilitarized zone was two and a half miles wide, each side withdrawing two kilometres within 72 hours of the cease-fire.

³ Except 200 R.o.K. Marines in Yong Mae do and Taesup to, who were delayed by persistent fog for some days.

⁴ High water was about 2115 and her captain did not like manoeuvring after dark. The difficulty was got over with the help of the C.O., L.S.T. 516.

rifle ammunition from time to time. Meanwhile, at Pol beach the U.S.A.A. Regiment worked all night loading L.S.T. 516, and by 0700, 29th July, all the A.A. equipment and stores were embarked—‘no mean achievement’, remarked Captain Marsh, ‘considering the weight of the loads that had to be transported in the dark on rough tracks with fearful gradients.’¹ During 29th/30th July L.S.T. 516 loaded all the island stock of petrol, oil, and lubricants. The only hitch in the evacuation plan occurred on the 29th. The Tactical Air Direction Centre had been dismantled and most of the equipment embarked in L.S.T. 840 when information was received that the 5th Air Force required it to resume operations. It was then not practicable to re-erect it in the ten-day period, and after much argument it was agreed that the evacuation should continue. Some of the T.A.D.C. personnel was embarked in H.M.S. *Birmingham*, and she provided the radar coverage up to the River Yalu required by the air force.

During the forenoon of 30th July L.S.T.s 516, 840, and 802 retracted fully loaded and sailed for Pengyong do. L.S.T. 1073 then beached on the Air Force beach and loaded the rest of the air force and U.S. Marines, leaving only a demolition party. At 2100, 31st July, the flag on the headquarters of the Island Defence Commander was struck, and during the night the demolition of concrete emplacements, timber and rubbish was carried out. In the morning, H.M.C.S. *Iroquois* (Captain Landymore), who had taken the place of the *Crane* on 29th July, embarked the Island Defence Commander and demolition party. Save for ten elderly civilians who resolutely declined to leave, Choda was deserted. Having provided them with food for six weeks and a few simple medicines, H.M.C.S. *Iroquois* sailed for Pengyong do at 0950, 1st August, and Admiral Clifford reported the evacuation of the west coast islands complete.

Admiral Clifford remained at Pengyong do in the *Tyne* for a few days. In the evening of 3rd August H.M.S. *Ocean* joined his flag there. On her way from Kure she had grounded on an uncharted shoal in Shimonoseki Strait; no damage was sustained except to the bottom log, and she got clear in half an hour. In the *Ocean* were a number of press correspondents who had flown out from Seoul earlier in the day. The Admiral held a short press conference on board the *Tyne*, which was attended by available island defence commanders. On the next day he sailed for Sasebo in the *Tyne*, leaving Captain Greening in the *Birmingham* as C.T.U. 95·1·2 and O.T.C., West Coast.

Little remains to be told. H.M.C.S. *Iroquois* returned to the Choda area, and remained there till 6th August (the end of the ten-day period) when she was withdrawn and T.U. 95·1·4 ceased to exist. On the same day, H.M.S. *Birmingham* left the operating area for Hong Kong, and H.M.S. *Ocean* (Captain Logan) took over as Officer in Tactical Command. Surface and air patrols were continued outside the three-mile limit of the North Korean coast for most of August, in order to remind the Communists that U.N. naval forces were still on the alert. Things were much more comfortable for the ships’ companies, as from the moment of the cease-fire various relaxations had been permitted. Ships were no longer darkened at night and scuttles and blackout screen doors were opened, a great relief in the hot and humid conditions of the Korean summer. Watchkeeping duties, too, were reduced, as instant readiness of full armament was no longer necessary.

¹ H.M.S. *Crane* R.o.P. in M.02418/53.

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No enemy activity was observed during these patrols, but an unsatisfactory position existed, as numerous small, unrelated American intelligence agencies continued to operate from the U.N.-held islands. Admiral Clifford received instructions that 'no cognisance whatever' was to be taken of these activities. Consequently, the task unit commanders had orders on the one hand to prevent possible infringement of the armistice terms, and on the other hand to take no notice of what was the most obvious, indeed, at the time the only potential infringement that they encountered. However, no 'incident' on this account occurred, and on 25th August the surface patrols were discontinued, but British and U.S. carriers continued to work in a nine-day cycle carrying out flying training off the west coast till the middle of September. Gradually, this was extended to a six-week cycle with one carrier at 24 hours' notice for operations, and the other at not more than a week.

During September, the U.S. carrier *Point Cruz* spent a number of days at Inchon, acting as a staging platform for Indian troops destined for the demilitarized zone in Korea. On arrival of the troop transports, the troops were moved to the *Point Cruz* and lifted thence by helicopter direct to the demilitarized zone, thus avoiding any unfriendly demonstrations that might have attended their movement overland. Over 6000 troops were moved in this way. H.M.S. *Ocean* acted in a similar capacity for a small contingent in October.

An aircraft-carrier, cruiser, and ships of the destroyer and frigate squadrons of the Commonwealth Navies were kept within easy reach of Korean coastal waters for some time longer, but though no peace treaty succeeded the armistice as had been expected, there was no recurrence of hostilities. Rear-Admiral Clifford, after a farewell visit to South Korea and Japan, hauled down his flag as Flag-Officer, 2nd in Command, Far East Station, at Hong Kong on 18th November 1953, and with this event the participation of H.M. Naval Forces in the Korean War could be considered at an end.

CHAPTER 12

Comment and Reflection

Section

- 97 General naval conditions.
- 98 System of naval command.
- 99 Communications.
- 100 Naval intelligence.
- 101 Remarks on operations.
- 102 Failure of interdiction.
- 103 Enemy mining offensive.
- 104 Conclusion: British Commonwealth naval effort.

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THE various reports on this, the first large-scale war waged by the United Nations, naturally teem with lessons, suggestions, and recommendations. Many of these are of a topical or technical nature, and have either been confirmed or rendered obsolete by the march of time. As far as the British Commonwealth Navies were concerned, these lessons were enshrined in a valuable series of contemporary reports, initiated by Admiral Andrewes and continued by his successors, entitled *Report of Experience in the Korean Operations*.¹

In reading these reports it must always be borne in mind that, so far as the navies were concerned, everything was in their favour in the Korean War. The physical configuration of the country rendered it singularly susceptible to the exercise of sea power. Except for mining there was practically no enemy opposition at sea. Enemy surface forces were virtually non-existent, and though the possibility of submarine attacks had always to be envisaged, in the event they never materialized. Attacks from the air against ships, too, were negligible. These conditions are perhaps unlikely to recur in any future war.

Apart from mines, the only serious opposition with which the ships of the

¹ Four of these reports were issued:

I. July–December 1950 (Rear-Admiral Andrewes): M.01178/51.

II. January–June 1951 (Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff): M.02231/51.

III. July 1951—June 1952 (Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff): M.02937/52.

IV. July 1952—April 1953 (Rear-Admiral Clifford): M.378/1/53.

Each report is divided into four parts, viz.,

- a. A brief historical summary to enable the general course of the war to be traced.
- b. A command and staff section, in which the complicated processes of United Nations Command are set out.
- c. Operational and administrative sections.
- d. A morale and disciplinary section.

United Nations had to contend came from shore batteries in inshore operations. Engagements of this sort were of almost daily occurrence; of these it can be said that the ships gave far more than they received, and—all things considered—suffered extraordinarily little damage and few casualties.¹

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From the point of view of the British Commonwealth Navies, perhaps the most important aspect of the campaign was the system of command. As already mentioned,² partly because there was already a United States high command in Japan (the legacy of the Second World War) and partly because it was clear that the United States would take by far the heaviest share in the war, the contributions of the remainder of the United Nations naturally came under this command system as they arrived. General MacArthur was speedily appointed United Nations C.-in-C., and thereafter flew the U.N. flag on his headquarters. The weakness of this United States set-up in having no joint headquarters has been commented on. The lack of real liaison between the Services occasioned misunderstandings and complications throughout the war.

Turning to the naval command, it will be convenient to consider first the system under which the U.S. Navy worked. Each ship came under three separate command organizations, viz., Operational, Logistical, and Type (Administration).

- a. The Operational Command in the Korean War was exercised by COMNAVFE, Vice-Admiral Joy, and later Vice-Admiral Briscoe, through a chain which was gradually adapted to circumstances as the war progressed.
- b. U.S.N. Logistics depended on:
 - (1) A service squadron command under Captain B. L. Austin, U.S.N., afloat in a depot/repair ship, responsible for both over-all afloat logistics in the west Pacific, and directly for the 7th Fleet.
 - (2) A service division command under Captain J. P. M. Wright, U.S.N., also afloat in a depot/repair ship at Sasebo and nominally under Captain Austin, responsible for all logistics in Japanese waters, i.e., for all except the 7th Fleet.
 - (3) Though not actually responsible for logistics, a fleet activities command at Yokosuka, responsible for bases and base facilities in Japan and Korea, which included:
 - (4) Fleet activities, Sasebo, responsible for all shore facilities, administration of the port, co-ordination of naval defence (under the general direction United States senior naval officer present afloat).

¹ *United States*: 73 ships damaged, five sunk (four minesweepers, one tug). Casualties to naval personnel: *fatal* 458, *wounded* 1576, *missing* (unaccounted for) 9. *Total* 2043.

British Commonwealth: Thirteen ships damaged. Casualties to naval personnel (exclusive of R.M. Commando ashore): *fatal* 47, *wounded* 35, *missing* 3. *Total* 85.

² See p. 12.

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- c. Type Command dealt with such things as personnel, training, drafting, alterations, additions, and so on. This command was exercised by Rear-Admiral McManus, Type Commander of all cruisers and destroyers in the Pacific (COMCRUDESPAC).

This three-legged system no doubt worked well in the case of an entirely self-contained and mobile fleet in which all ships worked from one base, but with the scattered nature of the operations and the multiplicity of separate commands of the Korean War, it introduced various complications, and senior U.S. commanders who had suffered inconvenience by it did not hide their envy of the close relations that existed between the Operational, Maintenance, and Technical Branches of the staff of the British flag-officer.

Of the three commands, it was the Operational Command that chiefly affected the Commonwealth ships.¹ The development of this command, together with some of the difficulties encountered, will be briefly reviewed. In considering these difficulties, it must not be imagined that personal relations between the British and American officers were anything but cordial throughout. Misunderstandings and difference of outlook were almost invariably dissipated by personal discussion. Many of them indeed arose only through the difficulty of arranging verbal contact with the American commanders, owing to their predilection for exercising their commands from afloat. And there was a reluctance on the part of junior commanders to represent up through the chain of command the effect of changing circumstances on the instructions previously issued by the senior commanders. It often became clear, when Commander, 7th Fleet or COMNAVFE, were met, that they had no conception of the real implications of their directives and the difficulties the rigid application of them produced, nor had they any strong opinions as to the value being obtained from them.² These things had just not been represented.

The chief difference between the American and British systems lay in the rigidity of the former. In itself, the task force, group, etc. system³ was comparatively flexible, in that the juggling of decimal places could cater for almost any situation. It was the manner in which it was operated that was so inflexible. Orders were extremely detailed, and direct communication on a junior level with another Service or even task force was frowned on, all intercommunication being supposed to go back up the chain of command through the top and down again. 'Information' addressees did not take action till told to 'comply' by the immediately superior authority, even when it was obvious where the action would have to be taken. In fact practically no discretion was left to the man on the spot.

¹ A good liaison was always maintained with the Logistics Command. Type Command was involved only so far as the use of U.S. training facilities were concerned.

² For example, the protracted operations in the Han estuary (July–November 1951).

³ There were two basic methods of handling the system:

- a. Task group (element unit) numbers would be assigned to individual C.O.s, so that any junior officer joining a senior officer would be assigned to the S.O.'s task group.
- b. Task group numbers would be assigned to specific tasks, e.g., carrier group, bombardment group, and so on.

Experience showed that the latter, i.e., 'permanent' numbers to tasks was preferable, because signals then arrived at the man who had to know, because of his job, which ships might be present.

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In the British Commonwealth Command, the normal British anticipation was exercised and action was initiated at once.¹ This at first caused surprise, but before the middle of 1951, both Commander T.F. 95 (Blockade and Escort Force) and Commander, 7th Fleet, specifically authorized this procedure, as a local order.

Another difference in the exercise of command was a rule in the United States Navy that the officer in tactical command of a carrier force or group must himself be an aviator. The United States Navy accepted less efficient A.A. and A/S screening and co-ordination of carrier groups, including duplication of combat air patrols, rather than place a non-aviator senior admiral in charge of such a force, unless he agreed to take over-all command and to relinquish tactical command to his aviator junior.² The fact that Admiral Scott-Moncrieff was not an aviator made it difficult for the Commander, 7th Fleet, to understand how he could command a group that contained two light fleet carriers. At one time it was suggested that they should be taken out of T.F. 95, and—though continuing to operate in the same area in the Yellow Sea—should be put under the operational control of T.F. 77 (the heavy carriers) which was usually in the Sea of Japan. Fortunately, this was vetoed.

Yet another interesting difference was that whereas Admirals Andrewes, Scott-Moncrieff, and Clifford were able and prepared to exercise their command from Sasebo, only proceeding to the operational area with a small staff on special occasions, the Americans were reluctant to control things in this way.³ The Commander, 7th Fleet, found it difficult to realize that a second flag-officer to work opposite watches with Admiral Scott-Moncrieff, in order to keep an admiral in continuous tactical command on the west coast, was not only unnecessary, but positively undesirable on the grounds of continuity. And although the Air Support and Blockade Elements normally operated in different areas, he insisted that the Carrier Element Commander should be nominated 'Officer in Tactical Command' whenever Admiral Scott-Moncrieff was not present in person.

Bearing in mind these differences in conception of the exercise of command, it will be of interest to consider briefly the evolution of the naval chain of command. It will be remembered that at the beginning of hostilities Admiral Joy entrusted the blockade to two groups, that on the west coast ('international' forces) under Rear-Admiral Andrewes, and that on the east coast (United States forces) under Rear-Admiral Higgins, U.S.N., while he himself retained the escort forces under his direct control. The 7th Fleet, which included the heavy carriers, had various commitments, e.g. Formosa, and was a separate command, only coming under Admiral Joy's operational control when in Korean waters. This became increasingly the case as the war progressed.

From the first, Admiral Andrewes advocated the creation of a central authority at Sasebo to co-ordinate the operations on both coasts of Korea, and a step in this

¹ It is worth noting that the United States ships periodically attached to the British Command (particularly the Blockade Group) very much appreciated being allowed to exercise their own initiative, without being subjected to signals, instructions, and demands for situation reports.

This drew attention, possibly with benefit to later relations, to the fundamental difference in U.S.N. and R.N. operational concept.

² This system naturally tended to lack of appreciation of non-flying factors, e.g., gunnery and screening requirements.

³ The split-staff system evolved by Admiral Andrewes has already been mentioned; this worked very smoothly throughout this particular war.

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direction was taken at the end of July 1950 when Rear-Admiral Hartman, U.S.N., was appointed C.T.F. 96·5, which comprised the task elements already operating on each coast; but as Admiral Hartman was himself frequently away from Sasebo conducting operations on the east coast, this arrangement did not go far towards meeting the situation.

During the Inchon landings in September 1950 there was a special command set-up, which has been described.¹ After this operation was completed the Blockade and Escort forces were reorganized as T.F. 95 under Rear-Admiral A. E. Smith, U.S.N., who flew his flag in U.S.S. *Dixie* (destroyer depot ship) at Sasebo. Rear-Admiral Andrewes's forces became T.G. 95·1 and Rear-Admiral Hartman's T.G. 95·2, and remained responsible for the west and east coasts respectively. At the same time three other task groups were added to Admiral Smith's command—T.G. 95·5, escorts (Captain Unwin, R.N.), T.G. 95·6, minesweepers (Captain Spofford, U.S.N.) and T.G. 95·7, R.o.K. forces (Commander Luosey, U.S.N.). This organization—interrupted by the premature departure of Admiral Andrewes in November and the various redeployments consequent on the Chinese intervention—remained in force till 19th February 1951, when Vice-Admiral Andrewes was directed to take over T.F. 95 from Rear-Admiral Smith.

This presented Admiral Andrewes with what at first sight looked a difficult problem—the operation of some 85 ships, with his small staff and limited communications; but by arrangement between the two Admirals, Admiral Smith retained operational control of the American forces on the east coast, while Admiral Andrewes retained control of his west coast task group, and at the same time was responsible for the direction of the task force as a whole. This solution was satisfactory as a temporary arrangement,² but had it been permanent, some increase in the number of staff-officers and communications personnel would have been necessary. In the light of the experience then gained it was considered that if the situation had arisen again it could have been met fairly easily by the integration of a few U.S. officers in the operational staff, and that a combined communications set-up could have been arranged without undue difficulty.

During this period (February–March 1951) the intense interdiction and siege operations on the east coast were commencing, and there the disadvantages of divided command began to show up, because there was no co-ordination between the operations of the Surface Force Commander (C.T.F. 95) at Wonsan and elsewhere and those of the heavy carrier force (T.F. 77) under the Commander, 7th Fleet. The former remained responsible for all interdiction by gun-fire, while the latter was responsible for interdiction by air—not only of the coastal routes, but of the whole of the eastern part of Korea. Difficulties developed over such things as the provision of spotting aircraft for the bombarding ships, photographic reconnaissance, assessment of targets, and soon. COMNAVFE (Admiral Joy) laid down special areas to receive attention and relative priorities, but took no part in the day-to-day co-ordination. To Vice-Admiral Andrewes it seemed that there should be closer liaison between C.T.G. 95·9 (Rear-Admiral Smith, then flying his flag in U.S.S. *Manchester*), and C.T.F. 77 (Rear-Admiral Ofstie), and he

¹ See pp. 49, 52–55, 74 (footnote).

² Admiral Andrewes held the command for only about seven weeks—from 19th February to 3rd April 1951.

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favoured co-ordination of the day-to-day programme by the carrier Admiral. This procedure, however, did not commend itself to either of the two American admirals, and of course Admiral Andrewes did not wish to initiate a policy which Admiral Smith clearly would not want to perpetuate when he again took over T.F. 95 in a few weeks' time; nor was he in a position to give any directive to C.T.F. 77, who belonged to Admiral Struble's 7th Fleet. So the matter rested.

The difficulties were, however, appreciated by Admiral Joy, and when the time came for Admiral Andrewes to turn over the command of T.F. 95 again to Admiral Smith, it was arranged that the whole of Task Force 95, together with the logistic forces (formed into a self-contained task force—Task Force 92) should come under the direct command of the Commander, 7th Fleet. It was hoped that this new set-up would not only ensure a closer co-ordination of operations on the east coast, but would also allow a greater degree of flexibility by rotating ships from one duty to another, allowing planned periods for training and maintenance and so forth.¹ There was, however, one drawback to the arrangement: since the Commander, 7th Fleet and Task Force 77, always operated from Yokosuka, while the Blockade and Escort Force operated from Sasebo, there was very little personal contact and the exchange of information and intelligence became much worse.

The introduction of this new chain of command, which survived virtually unaltered for the remainder of the war, coincided with the relief of Vice-Admiral Struble by Vice-Admiral Martin as Commander, 7th Fleet. In pursuance of the policy of conservation and rotation of ships, Admiral Martin proposed at first to separate British Operational and Administrative Command by attaching the British R.F.A.s to the Logistic Force, T.F. 92. This, however, would have divided Admiral Scott-Moncrieff's command and entailed a completely new organization, which even then would not have been acceptable, because the chain of supplies through the C.-in-C., F.E. Station, and Admiralty was completely different from the American system. Liaison with the U.S. Service Force was particularly fortunate as regards personalities, and British and U.S. replenishment ships had always provided services for each other in various ways, without any need for the unification of the Logistic Command being apparent. The suggestion was therefore dropped, as was another somewhat similar proposal, that the Commonwealth ships should be rotated among the various American task groups.

These problems eventually sorted themselves out, and it was finally agreed that the forces on the west coast should remain autonomous, subject, however, to the directions of the two superior commanders, C.T.F. 95 and Commander, 7th Fleet. By the end of the war this was fully accepted and worked well, largely owing to the tact and sympathy of the last commanders, T.F. 95, Rear-Admirals Gingrich and Olsen. 'It is remarkable', commented Rear-Admiral Clifford in his final report on the subject, 'that so apparently rigid a system is so much at the mercy of personality.'

From the exercise of command it is but a short step to some consideration of communications. It is beyond the scope of this book to go into the technicalities

¹ This applied particularly to the U.S. destroyers of T.F. 95, which had seldom stopped running and were showing signs of strain.

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of the systems in use,¹ but a few remarks on some of the lessons of general interest which were learnt will not be out of place.

A great deal of the success in co-operation between the British and U.S. Navies was of course due to the similarity of language, but this in itself sometimes raised difficulties of its own. Although superficially the language is the same, there are occasions when some words mean something entirely different. For example, to an American, *presently* means *now*, to the British *later on*; the word *available* to an American meant that a ship was available for maintenance and not for operations, whereas to the British, unless specifically stated otherwise, it meant she was available for operations. The American predilection for slang, too, often caused misunderstandings, particularly on voice communications with new arrivals. Once these differences were realized, they presented no difficulty.

The rigidity of the U.S. system of command threw a heavy strain on communications. This affected them in two ways:

1. U.S. operation orders and plans reached prodigious dimensions. Superbly produced at very short notice, they contained so much detail that 'some of the wood was inevitably lost in the trees'. In communication orders, for example, it was customary to print long extracts from U.S. publications held by all ships and authorities concerned, and sometimes to duplicate or even triplicate them. For instance, the same orders for air spotting for naval gun-fire would appear in air, gunnery, and communications sections.
2. Much time was wasted while orders were passed down the long chain of command via the task fleet, force, group, element and even unit commanders till the ship concerned was reached. The use of many abbreviations, e.g., R.F.S. (ready for sea) sometimes caused confusion, and the absence of paragraphing did not facilitate either reading or reference; but on the whole little difficulty was experienced in understanding American signals.

Other allies were not so happily placed. The speed of modern war is such that they could not operate in the same tactical formation with U.S. and British ships unless they had a nucleus of English-speaking personnel or liaison teams. The alternative was to operate in separate task groups whose activities were co-ordinated at a shore headquarters, with consequent delays, or between task group commanders provided with liaison teams.

The United States Navy ships were equipped with more circuits and operators than their British counterparts.² In Korean waters the British Commonwealth ships were under United States Navy command, and the solution to the communications problems was for them to use the U.S. basic system, which of course had been devised to suit their own outfits of equipment and communications complement. This led to the overwork of both the equipment and complements in the Commonwealth ships, and in the course of the war the complements were augmented. The U.S. ships' normal complements, too, were increased by an

¹ These are dealt with in Reports of Experience in Korean Operations, and in some cases formed the subject of additional special reports.

² The R.C.N. was slightly superior to the R.N., the other Commonwealth ships much the same, and the remainder of the United Nations tailed away behind.

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increment based on the command function, e.g., C.T.E., C.T.U., and so on, when the ship assumed such duties. In the case of the Commonwealth ships, this need was met in the Korean War by using the 'large flag addition' for the purpose, but this of course was detrimental to F.O. 2i/c's communications; and the formation of a pool of communication ratings at the forward base for temporary loan to private ships assigned for duty as element or unit commanders was strongly recommended for any future operations.

The strain on communications was amplified by the large number of situation reports, reports of intentions, action taken, and so on, customarily required from ships at sea by U.S. commanders. This was due to the necessity, for political reasons, to go on record as doing whatever the army or air force asked, irrespective of its value—the direct result of unification of command without integration between the three Services. In addition, great importance was attached to 'opsums' of ever increasing length and journalistic style, all addressed 'priority' or even 'immediate' for the benefit of the press. This, too, was influenced by political factors; the need to 'tell the folks' and at the same time not to be outdone by the other Services. 'Truly', wrote Admiral Scott-Moncrieff, 'the premium placed on public information was often higher than that placed on security of cyphers, or even of current operations.'¹

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A weakness in the naval command set-up lay in the U.S. Navy intelligence arrangements. A very large staff dealt with this work at COMNAVFE's office in Tokyo, but apart from the dissemination of a certain amount of information in the form of summaries and letters, this centre had little contact with the various naval forces. The U.N. naval forces operated almost entirely from Sasebo, and the lack of a local intelligence centre there was keenly felt. Each task force or group had its own intelligence organization, working for its particular elements; they relied entirely on their own resources, and co-operated with each other well, but had no central department to refer to. In these circumstances the British Commonwealth ships had to rely entirely on S.O. (I) afloat for intelligence liaison. For this purpose he was normally accommodated in H.M.S. *Ladybird*, only proceeding to sea in the flagship for large-scale operations requiring all ships.

Lack of co-ordination between the various intelligence organizations produced situations which sometimes had serious consequences—for example, areas behind the enemy lines in which R.o.K. intelligence teams were operating were sometimes bombed by friendly aircraft; and cases of special intelligence parties working on the west coast without the knowledge of the Naval Blockade and Patrol Task Group were of not infrequent occurrence. These difficulties have already been mentioned.²

The Covert Clandestine and Related Activities, Korea (CCRAK), organization with advanced headquarters at Seoul was established at the end of 1951, and then constituted a clearing house for intelligence. It distributed information in the form of copious reports, which were mailed to the west coast Carrier and

¹ Report of Experience in Korean Operations, January–June 1951, Part II (in M.02231/51).

² See Section 51.

Blockade Elements, but the reports bore little or no evaluation or comment, and the sources of information were usually Korean nationals, whose reliability was always doubted by the British Command.¹ As far as the ships were concerned these reports contained no more than background information; air and gun targets were transmitted direct to the patrolling ships by the appropriate island-based guerrilla headquarters.

Until the end of 1952, the United States organization never supplied information of naval forces that, though outside the Korean war theatre at the time, might well participate, should the routine and tempo of the fighting change. However, in this respect the Commonwealth forces were well served by their own sources. At the end of 1952 and early in 1953 several CCRAK reports indicated that Soviet submarines from Vladivostok might be about to take a hand; these reports were never graded very high and in fact were not fulfilled, but they naturally caused some increased precautions against S/M attack to be taken.

It seemed to the British naval commanders that in any future war, co-ordination of the Services and many private intelligence organizations should be undertaken at a high level, and that it should be the responsibility of the chief of each Service intelligence organization to ensure that the other Services were provided with all intelligence germane to their operations.

One of the greatest difficulties of the war was the supply of maps to the Fleet. This was an American responsibility, but all ships, U.S. as well as Commonwealth, had to rely on their own resourcefulness and ingenuity to get the various maps when and how they could. 'The production of maps, particularly to aircraft carriers whose consumption rate is high, is a problem that must be borne in mind on future occasions',² wrote Admiral Scott-Moncrieff.

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Turning to the operational aspect of the war, it was encouraging to find how smoothly the units of the various United Nations navies worked in with each other from the start. British, Commonwealth, American, and Dutch destroyers combined well tactically on A/S screens, British and American carriers found no difficulty in operating in one tactical unit without any previous special arrangement, and such combinations as a British Army officer in a U.S. Air Force aircraft spotting for a British frigate and a Canadian destroyer were commonplace.

So far as the British Commonwealth forces were concerned, the most conspicuous role was played by the light fleet carriers. Their performances were admitted on all sides to be outstanding, but this was rendered possible only by the virtual absence of enemy air activity. Had there been opposition on an appreciable scale, so much effort would have been required for fighter defence and escort that offensive operations would have been severely curtailed; in any case, the effect of those of one light carrier on the war as a whole could be but negligible. Nor, as things

¹ The oriental, if not deliberately deceptive, usually likes to give information which he thinks the recipient wants to hear. Hence, the distrust of the British Command.

² Report of Experience in Korean Operations, January-June 1951, Part III, Section 7 (in M.02231/51).

were, were they achieved without extremely hard work, much improvisation, the driving of machinery to the limit on occasions, and the acceptance of other calculated risks. Admiral Andrewes was careful to stress that it would be 'wrong to regard the single light fleet carrier as an adequate representative of naval aviation in any theatre.'¹

The general pattern of the operations carried out by the Fleet Air Arm in the different stages of the war has already been recorded, but a word should be said on one or two special points. Photography was used extensively, being particularly useful for harbour reconnaissance in the enforcement of the blockade, and for assessing the results of the interdiction missions. In the middle of 1952 a photographic interpretation officer was appointed to the operational carrier. His services were described as 'invaluable', and the hundreds of photographs taken when expertly interpreted, revealed many ingeniously camouflaged targets. 'A photographic interpreter', wrote Admiral Clifford, 'is an essential member of the complement of an aircraft-carrier operating against land targets.'²

The value of the helicopter as a short-range rescue aircraft was amply demonstrated both on land and sea. As a plane guard it was unrivalled for efficiency and economy. This was due as much to its ubiquity as to its peculiar capabilities. For instance, at different times Royal Navy air crew were rescued by helicopters operating from bombarding cruisers at Wonsan and Inchon, from the L.S.T. mine-sweeping tender, and from U.S. Air Force airfields, as well as by those operating from their own carriers.³ Their actual and morale value in the sea/air rescue work was very great, and for general utility purposes, such as mine spotting, guard mail, and personnel transfers they were invaluable.

The flying of pre-dawn missions instituted by H.M.S. *Ocean* in the latter part of her tour⁴ proved pleasantly productive of targets, as the aircraft found the enemy's road transport still on the move. Many lorries were destroyed in this way and the experience gained by air crew from this type of operation was of great value. The enemy were not slow to react, however, and the *Glory's* aircraft, though achieving some success at first, were soon having difficulty owing to a very simple but effective air-raid warning system.⁵ A low approach was then tried to

¹ Report of Experience in Korean Operations, July–December 1950, Part III, Section 1. The Admiral listed the shortcomings of the class as follows:

- a. Low maximum speed.
- b. Susceptibility to weather damage in head seas.
- c. Liveliness in swell conditions.
- d. Single catapult with only a month's operating endurance.
- e. Inadequate accommodation for crew and air group, let alone a flag-officer and operational staff.
- f. Structural weakness, e.g., both the *Triumph* and *Theseus* suffered stern-gland trouble.

² Report of Experience in Korean Operations, July 1952—April 1953, Part III, Section 1.

³ The helicopter suffered from various limitations, which had to be appreciated. Radius of action over the sea was affected by one or all of the following factors. A 30-knot head wind reduced the cruising ground speed to little more than that of a surface vessel. Dead-reckoning navigation was subject to large errors, and instrument flying capabilities were nil. V.H.F. communication ranges were not at all good. It is for these reasons that ubiquity was an important factor, and there is little doubt that some of the air crew rescued by helicopter would not have been recovered if only the carrier-borne helicopter had been available.

⁴ See pp. 246–7.

⁵ See p. 259.

deceive the enemy radar, but the foggy season intervened before the effectiveness of this method could be gauged.

The pilots had not been trained in night deck-landings, so a procedure had to be evolved for ditching in the event of engine failures. Two destroyers of the screen, burning three lights in a triangle, were stationed each at 3000 yards, 15 degrees on either bow of the carrier. If forced to ditch immediately after launching, the pilot transmitted 'ditching ahead', and the destroyers illuminated the sea between them. If the necessity to ditch was not urgent, the pilot transmitted 'delayed ditching'. The port-hand destroyer then illuminated the sea on her port bow, the aircraft ditching in this area. The starboard-hand destroyer was then available to come round and back up the other in the rescue.

Regarding the operations of the surface ships, as might be expected in the absence of any enemy opposition at sea except mining,¹ they were entirely successful in maintaining a complete blockade throughout the war, and (except on one occasion) in ensuring the free use of the sea by the U.N. shipping. They also played a useful part in the interdiction operations on the east coast, and in providing gun-fire support for the army and bombardment when the situation on shore called for it. It may, however, be questioned whether the best use was made of them. One calls to mind, for example, the static commitments that were such a feature of the war. The principal asset of a warship is her mobility, and to employ ships for months on end in static roles—as at Wonsan, the River Han, and in the defence of the strategic islands—was to rob the war effort of that asset. It would seem that the provision of shore guns and suitable garrisons for such purposes would have been sounder policy, thereby freeing the ships for their blockade and escort duties, and for operations (including support for the strategic islands, and so on, in emergencies) wherever desired in the war area. No doubt this policy stemmed in the first place from the weakness in the United States set-up already noticed, viz., the lack of a properly-integrated joint headquarters, where the implications of any course of action could be thrashed out between the three Services before it was actually undertaken. Had a submarine offensive compelled escorting on a serious scale, or the enemy been more enterprising in attempting to break the blockade, it is very certain that these static commitments could not have been maintained.

Many lessons were drawn from the numerous bombardments that took place. The first, which was apparent very early in the war, was the necessity for standardizing the British procedure with that of the U.S. Navy and Army. There was not a great deal of difference, and the advantages of establishing mutual confidence between the two countries in the ability of each to spot or provide support for the other outweighed all the theoretical advantages claimed for particular methods. Standardization was achieved in Korea by using the U.S. communication procedure exclusively.

In the first month of the war, when the North Koreans advanced down the narrow coastal strip on the east coast, the R.o.K. and U.S. forces that opposed them had at their disposal a naval support force, but the U.S. Army forces had no immediate method of communicating with it. This resulted in thousands of rounds being fired from the ships unobserved into a country of which the maps

¹ See Section 103.

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were notoriously inaccurate.¹ The lesson drawn from this was that no military force in a position where it can receive naval supporting fire should be without a forward officer, bombardment, and the equipment to spot naval gun-fire.

As regards the British ships, a detachment² of the Combined Operations Bombardment Unit, normally stationed at Hong Kong, was with the Fleet during the early months of the war, and was invaluable for training the Fleet in bombardment, for acting as bombardment liaison officers in ships during operations, and as air spotters from U.S. aircraft for British ships.

The peculiar features of the terrain on the east coast enabled the naval forces engaged on blockade duties to co-operate with the naval air forces in the interdiction³ of the coastal road and rail system, and consequently there was much more bombardment there than on the west coast. The interdiction campaign started in February 1951, when aircraft made the initial cut by bombing road and rail bridges at Wonsan, Songjin, and Changjin. The surface ships maintained the cut with harassing fire, also engaging any transport seen; later this was extended to include round the clock harassing fire on cross-roads and communication centres at these three places, but a large part of this harassing fire was carried out without observation.

The interdiction campaign undoubtedly restricted the enemy's east coast communications considerably, especially the railway system and road traffic by day, but he was always able to move vehicles by night. Admiral Scott-Moncrieff was of the opinion that very nearly the same results could have been obtained for a much smaller expenditure of ammunition.⁴ In particular, he considered that the night interdiction of roads with predicted harassing fire and no observation, paid only a very meagre dividend⁵—an opinion subsequently confirmed by enemy sources.⁶

For some months the enemy reaction was remarkably small. Then the shore batteries were considerably strengthened, especially at Wonsan. The guns were mostly field guns of between 75-mm and 105-mm calibre, and were extremely well concealed; when inactive they were pulled back into caves or on to reverse slopes, where they were virtually immune from ships' fire. The increased activity

¹ The U.S. Navy was always prepared to fire a great deal more ammunition, much of it unobserved, than the British considered necessary for the object to be achieved, and regarded the number of rounds fired as the criterion. H.M. ships working directly under U.S. commanders had to conform generally with the U.S. policy. In June 1952, a reduction in the ammunition expenditure was effected by directions from the Commander, 7th Fleet, to use ammunition 'to the best advantage; make every shot a winner'.

² One officer, two telegraphists, two army signallers with W/T equipment for setting to F.O.B. positions.

³ The dictionary definition of the word *interdict* is to *prohibit*; no reducing, delaying, or hindering is implied, but a complete stoppage. In Korea, however, *interdiction* was interpreted as meaning attacks on enemy road and rail communications.

⁴ Statistics of ammunition expenditure for various purposes at different times are given periodically in Report of Experience in Korean Operations.

⁵ The normal practice was for a destroyer to fire ten rounds an hour at a cross-road throughout the night. Under the most favourable conditions only three per cent of the rounds fired were likely to hit the cross-road, and the direct damage to well-spaced vehicles could be only very small. Nor was the effect on the morale of the well-trained troops who drove them likely to be great. Similar harassing fire on civilian bridge-repair parties was probably worth while.

⁶ See p. 290.

of these batteries compelled ships to remain under way in daylight, and diverted a considerable amount of fire from interdiction to themselves. The difficulty of getting air spotting from T.F. 77 on a satisfactory basis has already been mentioned.

Star-shell was fired on occasions at night to assist aircraft in identifying bombing targets, to enable aircraft to observe naval gun-fire, to harass the enemy by making him take cover in anticipation of further bombing or shelling, and to illuminate shore targets for direct bombardment. As was found in World War II, marker-shell was required for use when bombarding in country where observation was difficult owing to scrub and mountainous terrain.

As the war progressed, the number of bombardments for various reasons increased on each coast. It was hard to assess the effect of all these bombardments; the enemy made skilful use of camouflage, and identification of targets was often very difficult, intelligence reports by guerrillas were unreliable, the results observed from firing ships or spotting aircraft were sometimes misleading, and on the east coast many of the industrial targets were already so badly damaged by air attack that it was impossible to establish what proportion of the damage was due to naval gun-fire. Information obtained in 1952 from a North Korean artillery colonel who deserted, is of interest in this connexion as regards Wonsan. The siege had then been going on for well over a year, and hardly a day passed without 200 rounds or more being fired at gun positions, bridges and other targets. According to the colonel, only six enemy guns out of a reported 100 had been damaged, and five of these were soon repaired and back in action; the sixth was completely destroyed and the crew of nine killed. The enemy paid little attention to bombardment by anything smaller than a cruiser. Unobserved interdiction of cross-roads, bridges, and so forth was of only minor harassing value and the five-inch rockets of L.S.M.R.s did practically no damage. He also stated that about 30 per cent of the U.S. bombs, shells, and rockets failed to function, and that Russian experts examined the duds with great interest.

Be that as it may at Wonsan, there was plenty of positive evidence of the value of naval gun-fire—fires, secondary explosions, locomotives hit, batteries silenced, guerrillas effectively supported, and so forth.

Frequent reference has been made to the United Nations interdiction campaign against the Communist supplies. Complete interdiction of the battlefield has always proved difficult; but circumstances in Korea seemed to offer special opportunities. The complete blockade enforced by the overwhelming U.N. naval forces entirely ruled out supply by sea; the meagre rail and primitive road communications of North Korea seemed very vulnerable to the almost undisputed United Nations air power, and in addition important communications centres on the east coast were open to naval bombardment. The vulnerability of the railways seemed enhanced by the large number of bridges and tunnels forced on them by the mountainous terrain of North Korea; for example, the eastern network (destined to be the scene of the navy's long interdiction effort) included 956 bridges and causeways, and 231 tunnels in 1140 miles of track.

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So after the situation produced by the Chinese intervention had been partially stabilized, the main effort of the U.N. air power—the American 5th Air Force and Allied contingents and all available naval and U.S. Marine aircraft¹—was concentrated on interdiction; and from January 1951, except on occasions when the course of the fighting on land or other reasons dictated other employment of aircraft temporarily, this policy was maintained for twenty months. Immense damage was unquestionably inflicted on the enemy communication system, and all movement by rail or road was confined to dark hours, but interdiction of the battlefield was never achieved, and throughout the campaign the enemy always had strength to launch an offensive, if he wished to do so.²

The causes of this failure were partly due to inhibitions voluntarily accepted by the United Nations for political reasons, and partly to tactical and operational conditions. In the former category the ban on attack on sources of supply in Manchuria robbed the aircraft of targets which many well qualified to judge thought might have been decisive; and the static war, accepted during the long drawn-out armistice negotiations, enabled the Communists to keep their strongly fortified front lines sufficiently supplied in a way they never could have done in a war of movement. 'If we had ever put on some pressure and made him fight', stated General Van Fleet, 'we would have given him an insoluble problem. Instead we fought the Communist on his own terms, even though we had the advantages of flexibility, mobility, and fire power. We fought *his* way, which was terrible'³ The use of the atomic bomb—at that time held by the United States alone among nations—was vetoed; and what its effect might have been cannot be certainly known.

The result of these self-imposed limitations was to confine the interdiction attacks virtually to railways, roads, and rolling-stock. As already mentioned, these attacks inflicted great damage and forced the enemy to restrict movement to hours of darkness. But at night, and in thick weather, the aircraft could not find and attack the small, individual targets they were able to destroy by day. And the Communists possessed unlimited manpower, which they exploited to the full. They moreover proved themselves to be adepts in the art of camouflage and all sorts of tricks to impede and mitigate the attacks, and in effecting repairs to any damage with incredible rapidity.⁴

In order to cope with the maintenance of highways and railroads, two permanent organizations existed—the N.K. Department of Military Highway Administration, numbering some 20 000, organized in twelve regiments of three or more battalions each; and the N.K. Railway Recovery Bureau, consisting of three brigades numbering some 26 000. Units of these organizations were assigned to various sections of North Korea, special provision being made at important points. At key bridges

¹ The conduct of interdiction on land was primarily the responsibility of the U.S. Air Force, but the interdiction efforts of the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy were never co-ordinated at theatre level. Gradually, it came to be accepted that, broadly speaking, the U.S. Navy would deal with the east coast rail and highway systems, while the air force dealt with the western network.

² The whole problem is discussed at length, with the reasons for its failure, in Chapter 8 of *The Sea War in Korea*, Cagle and Manson.

³ *The Sea War in Korea*, Cagle and Manson.

⁴ As an example, 400 feet of railway track near Wonsan were destroyed on 4th April 1952, yet on 5th April the track was repaired and in operation. Cuts made in the morning would frequently be repaired by the same afternoon.

and tunnels in emergencies, local labour, including women and children, would be drafted to reinforce their efforts. Special equipment, such as welding apparatus, jacks, levers, and cranes were kept at key repair points, and prefabricated wooden bridges, metal spans, as well as building material, were stock-piled, much of it kept in tunnels and the thousands of caves with which the country abounds. When bridges across rivers were too badly damaged for repair, they frequently laid a temporary bridge across the bed of the stream itself, or if this was not feasible, constructed a lengthy by-pass to cut out the bridge altogether. They also adopted a shuttling system of rail traffic at night between the many breaks made in the line.

Every possible trick of concealment, deception, and camouflage was employed. If a truck convoy had to be left exposed it would be covered with straw or foliage, in winter with white canvas, or concealed in caves or tunnels. Damaged trains and trucks were left in plain view, often brightly painted to invite attack; operating trucks carried oily rags that, in the event of an attack, the drivers would light to give an impression of destruction. Rail breaks were simulated by strewing debris, mud, and straw across the tracks, or sections of rails would be hidden in tunnels during daylight hours, leaving gaps that appeared from the air as unrepaired breaks.

By these means, a nightly flow of traffic was maintained by road and rail and this was supplemented by horses, mules, camels, and almost unlimited coolie manpower, using tracks and trails over the mountains, a means of transport almost impossible for air power to counter.

In addition to their organized repair systems, their clever use of concealment and camouflage, and the other factors referred to, the Communist anti-aircraft fire steadily increased. By August 1952, practically all the interdiction targets in North Korea were heavily defended, and C.T.F. 77 directed that attacks south of Wonsan should not be carried out from an altitude of less than 3000 feet. It became the rule, too, for aircraft to include the A.A. guns themselves with the interdiction targets.

It remains to consider how far this prolonged effort at interdiction was justified. When initiated in January 1951 with the object of impeding the advance of the Communist armies and their supplies while the U.N. forces were reorganizing to cope with the situation created by the Chinese intervention, it was doubtless worth trying, though from the first it had its opponents.¹

But its continuation throughout the procrastinated armistice negotiations savoured dangerously of trying to win the war by air power alone, while the army and navy were relegated to comparatively static and defensive roles. It is difficult to resist the conclusion that this strategy (which certainly suited the Communist book) was persisted in far too long, and that better results would have been obtained by the adoption of a more aggressive strategy,² implemented by the three Services working in the closest co-operation in support of each other. It would seem in retrospect that the exertion of the mobility and flexibility—conferred on the United Nations by their command of the sea and air—to enforce a war of

¹ Admiral Struble, for example, was strongly of the opinion that the carrier-borne aircraft of T.F. 77 would be better employed in providing close air support for the army, but he was overruled by General Ridgway, acting on the advice of Major-General Partridge, then commanding the F.E. Air Force.

² For example, large-scale landings behind the enemy front-line positions, as advocated by General Van Fleet.

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movement on shore, might well have compelled the Communists to accept more satisfactory armistice conditions, and at an appreciably earlier date.¹

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From the nature of the war and the overwhelming naval forces deployed against them, there was little the enemy could do at sea. But some remarks on their mining campaign, which was sustained throughout the greater part of the war, will be of interest.

Ever since the Russo-Japanese War the Russians have cherished a predilection for mine warfare, so it was not surprising that mines were used by a satellite country that had no chance of disputing the command of the sea by any other means. Perhaps the most striking fact was the ease with which the campaign was mounted using local resources and personnel who had probably never seen a mine before.

The decision to use mines in Korea seems to have been taken before it was known that United Nations forces were going to take an active part in the war, and as early as May 1950 three schools were set up², and the Russians started training North Korean personnel in the preparation and laying of mines. In the course of the next four months 4000 mines were sent to Korea. This was accomplished almost entirely by rail and road over a country with poor transport facilities—a tribute to the U.N. control of sea communications from the start.

Minelayers presented no problem, motor-junks, coasters, or barges with crude angle-irons for rails bolted to the deck, being used. The motor-junks carried fifteen mines and the barges about eight.

With the exception of 200 ground magnetic mines, all the mines sent to Korea were moored contact mines.³ Of these, the M-26 was most commonly used. The characteristics of this mine were found to be:

- a. The sinker was extremely light, and in strong tides the mine tended to 'walk'—sometimes to a position as much as a mile from where it was laid.
- b. The fitting mechanism, being inertia, it lent itself for use as a floating mine.
- c. The inertia firing mechanism laid the mine open to counter-mining by shock from explosive charges.
- d. The hydrostatic switch to render the mine safe on being cut did not always operate correctly. It was by no means always fitted.
- e. There were no swivels fitted in the mine mooring wire next to the mine. Consequently, in the strong tides the life of the mine was short, owing to the oscillation and subsequent parting of the mooring wire.

¹ It must be remembered that political considerations, both international and national, as opposed to purely strategical considerations, exercised much influence on the decisions taken. This, of course, was by no means peculiar to the Korean War, but it largely influenced the manner in which it was fought.

² At Wonsan, Chinnampo, and Changjin.

³ Mk M-26 . . . Moored, contact, percussion firing. No horns.

Mk M-KB . . . Moored, contact, chemical, horn type.

Mk M-AG . . . Moored, contact, chemical, horn type, fitted in addition with upper or lower antennae, or both.

The only ground mines recovered were all of the magnetic-induction type. They carried a large explosive charge weighing about 1600 lb, and had a very sensitive firing mechanism.¹ This mine could be laid from submarine torpedo tubes, surface craft, and possibly aircraft. Great precautions were taken to destroy them if there was likelihood of their capture, and there was a case of the Koreans handling them being shot by the Russians to ensure that they would give nothing away under interrogation. Despite these drastic measures, several of these mines, as well as the moored variety, were captured during the rapid advance of the U.N. forces in September 1950—a fortunate circumstance, which revealed the types of mines already laid.

Although the North Koreans were responsible for preparing and laying the mines, there seems no doubt that the Russians carried out all planning and staff work. The initial minelaying was the provision of defensive minefields covering the entrances to all the major ports.² The only form of offensive mining that occurred was the discharge of floating mines, which followed the tidal streams round the coasts. It is not known how many floating mines were discharged on the east coast, but on the west coast, fifteen mines were set adrift each night over a period of about two weeks. They proved to be no particular menace to ships by day, provided lookouts were placed, but by night they were undetectable, and achieved a certain measure of success in forcing the ships to keep a respectful distance from the coast, which thereby relaxed the close blockade in some areas.

At first, there was a lot of exuberance in the ships at finding something to shoot at, and a lot of ammunition was wasted; but soon, as was discovered in World War II, the answer was found to be either single shots with a Bofors in hand training and elevation, or rifle-fire using armour-piercing ammunition. Air patrols established to spot the positions of mines were often able to destroy them by their own machine-gun fire, and the Americans employed their helicopters as scouts ahead of their ships with great success. But it was unfortunate that the sea abounded with jelly-fish that looked exactly like mines just under the surface.

The other problem posed by the mining was the clearance of the harbours as they were required by the United Nations. There were no British minesweepers in commission on the station, and the Americans were very short of them; most of the sweeping was carried out by a combination of American and Japanese sweepers. Useful lessons were learnt, especially at Haeju, Chinnampo, and Wonsan.

Haeju, which was swept by Japanese sweepers under British supervision, was a slow and laborious business, though there were only 30 mines all told. The sweepers lacked speed, their gear was rather primitive, and their navigation very bad. A frigate had to follow up as control and directing ship. In the face of these difficulties a good job was done, and a swept channel was established in eleven days. The whole area was cleared in eighteen days, but this could have been done in about three days by a flotilla of M/S M.L.s.

¹ It is interesting to note that the principle of the firing mechanism was an exact copy of the British magnetic mine laid in the Second World War, but the mechanism was more sensitive than had hitherto been believed possible (1.5 mg as opposed to 2.5 mg in the British counterpart), and this had a major effect on the mine countermeasures problem. Incidentally, it rendered all new-construction U.S. and British minesweepers potentially obsolescent. The component parts were a mixture of British, German and Russian design.

² This was accomplished at Chinnampo, Wonsan, and Changjin, but owing to transport difficulties and slowness of laying from junks, Inchon, Ongjin, Haeju, and Kunsan were only lightly mined.

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At Chinnampo the enemy made a bad mistake in leaving behind the coxswain of the tug that had towed the minelaying barges. From him, the exact position of all lays was obtained. Some time elapsed before advantage could be taken of this, as the port was taken over by the U.S. Army, which was not aware of the importance of such information. Had a naval port party taken over as soon as it was captured, events could have been speeded up. Only two lines of magnetic mines were laid, and it was particularly fortunate that their positions were known, as there were no sweepers available with the required safe depth to sweep any channels containing such mines. Owing to the shortage of minesweepers and the tidal conditions, a lot of improvisation had to take place, and various techniques were evolved. These included:

- a. Normal sweeping by D.M.S, A.M.S., and J.M.S.
- b. L.C.V.P.s fitted with an improved wire-sweep.
- c. L.C.V.P.s towing-wire sweep with bar-magnets suspended.
- d. Helicopter search at low water in conjunction with an underwater detection team (U.D.T.), who buoyed the mine.
- e. Destruction of mines thus buoyed or 'watching' mines by cannon-fire from a flying-boat.
- f. Countermining, using depth-charges dropped in pairs from the air.

The flying-boat and the helicopter/U.D.T. combination were responsible for the destruction of most of the mines,¹ but this was due to the unsuitability of moored mines for a place with such a large range of tide. Though extremely successful, this method was resorted to only because of the shortage of minesweepers; it was necessarily a slow business, and normally it would be far quicker to sweep in the usual way. An extremely important fact that emerged from these operations was the value of the flying-boat for disposal of mines cut by sweepers. A setback encountered in the Chinnampo sweeping was the predilection of the M-26 mines to 'walk'. Mines were found in places where they had not been laid, and sometimes they shifted into channels which had already been swept.

The clearance of Wonsan proved the toughest nut of all. The intelligence about the minelays obtained at Chinnampo was not forthcoming, and with the smaller range of tide, the mines did not 'watch' on the surface. Also there were many more mines; out of the 4000 mines supplied to North Korea, at least 2600

¹ The number of mines accounted for was as follows:

<i>Moored mines</i>	Flying-boat (cannon-fire):	31
	Helicopter and U.D.T.:	27
	L.C.V.P. (wire-sweep):	5
	A.M.S.:	4
	J.M.S.:	1
	Weather conditions:	12
<i>Magnetic mines</i>	D.M.S.:	0
	Flying-boat (depth-charges)	4

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were believed to be laid there.¹ In this case it was a straight sweeping operation, which—as not infrequently happens—took considerably longer than had been planned. As has already been mentioned, a large assault force was held up for eleven days while the sweeping was in progress, and casualties were suffered by the sweepers.²

After the initial mining operations of the autumn of 1950, the enemy seemed to realize the futility of laying moored mines in the strong inshore tides (with their large rise and fall) of the west coast, and except for some defensive lines close in to Chinnampo, their minelaying was entirely devoted to the east coast, mainly at Wonsan and the approaches to Hungnam, Chaho, and Songjin. At Wonsan, determined attempts were made by sampans and other small craft to lay mines in the actual swept areas, but on the few occasions on which they were successful, the mines were detected either by helicopter spot or premature detonation. Outside the swept areas very heavy defensive minefields were laboriously built up, but the U.S. minesweeping organization had been greatly improved, and these would not have been unduly difficult to sweep had it been desired to move closer inshore, provided the attentions of the shore batteries could be diverted and silenced. Minesweeping was continuous on the east coast, the main effort being the sweeping and check sweeping of the Wonsan channels and the east coast route inside the 100-fathom line.

On the west coast, check-sweeping of route Cigarette was carried out by two R.o.K. A.M.S.s fitted with wire-sweeps, until the defence of the strategic islands became the major commitment. The areas around Sok to, Choda, and Yong Pyong do were known to be dangerous, and they were then cleared by part of U.S. Mine Squadron Three, of which three A.M.S.s a division of M.S.B.s,³ and an L.S.D. headquarters ship were used.⁴ No new methods or material aids had been introduced in the U.S. minesweeping squadron, but Admiral Scott-Moncrieff was impressed by the importance of two major features of this force. These were:

- a. The invaluable L.S.D., which could embark and maintain a division of sixteen M.S.B.s, provide accommodation for maintenance crews and boat personnel, M.S.B. control radars, adequate plotting facilities and the staff of the task group commander.
- b. The equally invaluable L.S.T., which carried all the advanced logistic requirements for the whole force, other than those in the L.S.D., and acted as a mobile platform for the essential helicopter.

After this mine clearance, two or three American A.M.S.s were added to the two R.o.K. sweepers on the west coast and carried out a schedule of check-sweeping. Actually, except for a few mines laid in route Cigarette in September 1952 by a

¹ See Plan 2.

² See Section 36.

³ L.C.V.P.s converted for moored and ground minesweeping.

⁴ The whole force consisted of:

One L.S.D.

One L.S.T.

Two D.M.S.s

Twelve A.M.S.s

Sixteen M.S.B.s

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sampan which was intercepted by H.M.C.S. *Nootka*, no offensive mining was attempted in these areas.

Commenting on the mining campaign, Admiral Andrewes¹ made the following points:

- a. The importance of early intelligence of a mining campaign. Early intelligence is required of mining schools, railway movements, conversion of small craft, and so on.
- b. A mining campaign can be mounted at short notice using local resources. Control of fishing traffic and movement of small craft is a necessity in time of war.
- c. The capacity for offensive minelaying may be poor at first owing to inexperience. This may provide the only opportunity for developing counter-mining measures in the light of enemy mistakes. Adequate personnel with technical knowledge must be available on the spot to take advantage of them.
- d. The possibilities of improvisation both in laying mines and encountering them must be fully exploited.
- e. The life of the present Russian moored mine will be short in tidal waters.
- f. The design of the present magnetic ground-mine renders it liable to destruction by counter-mining.
- g. It is essential that the capture of enemy mines or particular methods of dealing with them be kept secret.
- h. There is need in the Fleet for a handbook giving details and silhouettes of Russian mines.
- i. Mine-spotting aircraft, and in particular helicopters, are invaluable. The use of aircraft for mine destruction is well worth future consideration.
- j. Care must be taken to check swept channels when light mine-sinkers are used in tidal waters.
- k. Standardized settings were used for magnetic mine counts, though obviously this cannot be relied on.
- l. Permanent D.G. ranges must be available on all stations so that ships can check that their degaussing is efficient when operating in waters where magnetic mines are likely to be used at short notice.
- m. The possibility of using mines offensively as a blockade weapon are obvious. In the Far East, where land communications are often poor and much coastal traffic is carried in junks and other small wooden craft, the use of a small anti-junk moored mine, preferably aircraft laid, is worthy of consideration.

¹ Report of Experience in Korean Operations, July-December 1950, Part III, Section 4.

The signing of the armistice at Panmunjon on 27th July 1953 brought to a close hostilities which had lasted 1128 days, and involved many nations. Naval forces had been contributed by Australia, Canada, Colombia, France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, and the United States of America. By far the largest contribution was of course that made by the United States, but the Commonwealth effort was by no means insignificant.

During the war, a total of 76 ships of the Commonwealth Navies and the Fleet auxiliary services served in the war area for varying periods.¹ These comprised 32 warships of the Royal Navy (five carriers, six cruisers, seven destroyers, fourteen frigates), nine of the Royal Australian Navy (one carrier, four destroyers, four frigates), eight destroyers of the Royal Canadian Navy, and six frigates of the Royal New Zealand Navy, two headquarters ships, one hospital ship, sixteen Royal Fleet auxiliaries and two merchant fleet auxiliaries. Some statistical information will indicate the scale of the contribution made by these forces to the United Nations cause.

Taking the Royal Navy first, the warships (including H.M.S. *Tyne*) between them steamed a total of 2 100 550 miles and expended 632 150 tons of fuel,² while ships of the R.F. Auxiliary Service steamed more than 300 000 miles. During the operations, 23 000 rounds of six-inch, 148 000 rounds of 4·7- or 4-inch shells were fired in bombardments; 15 200 bombs of various weights were dropped and 57 600 3-inch rocket shells and 3 300 000 rounds of 20-mm ammunition were fired from aircraft in nearly 23 000 operational sorties.

On the basis of Korean War medals and United Nations service medals, 17 000 officers and men of the Royal Navy, Royal Marines, and R.F.A. Service served afloat in Korean waters, and a further 4300 served in Japan. Decorations for distinguished services against the enemy were awarded to 165 of these officers and men, and a further 289 were mentioned in dispatches.

Casualties suffered by the Royal Navy and Royal Marines amounted to 182, made up as follows:

CASUALTIES	OFFICERS			RATINGS AND OTHER RANKS			GRAND TOTAL
	R.N.	R.M.	TOTAL	R.N.	R.M.	TOTAL	
Killed	25	1	26	15	17	32	58
Died of wounds ..	—	—	—	1	1	2	2
Died in captivity ..	—	—	—	1	9	10	10
Missing	1	1	2	—	1	1	3
Wounded	5	3	8	14	63	77	85
P.o.W.	2	—	2	2	20	22	24
	33	5	38	33	111	144	182

More than half these casualties were suffered by the 41st Independent Commando

¹ See Appendix B.

² See Appendix J.

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in the operations between Hagaru-ri and Hungnam after the Chinese intervention in November 1950. Air operations in the carrier-borne aircraft accounted for a large proportion of the remainder; in attacks on troop concentrations and various targets, 22 pilots of the Fleet Air Arm lost their lives, and a further thirteen in accidents. Considering that the ten squadrons involved flew nearly 23 000 operational sorties, these losses were mercifully light.

The work of the carrier and blockading forces has been dealt with in some detail, but little mention has been made of that of the fleet auxiliaries.¹ Of some 70 fleet auxiliaries operated by the Admiralty, about one-third contributed to the Korean war effort, carrying a fuel and other military stores to the Far East and distributing them to the ships in the zone of operations. Before two years were out, some 90 000 tons of fuel had been transferred at sea, and a further large quantity to ships in port. And it should be remembered that the smallness of the Royal Fleet auxiliaries' complements compelled the employment of cooks, stewards, and all hands to assist in the fuelling operations—an arduous and never-ending job. R.F.A. *Wave Chief*, for example, in the course of 66 oiling-at-sea operations pumped 37 000 tons of oil and aviation spirit into ships of the Commonwealth and Allied navies. On her return to the United Kingdom in March 1952, her master, Captain F. A. Shaw, received a message of congratulation from the Admiralty.

Nor was the *Wave Chief* an exception. Writing in February of that year, Rear-Admiral Scott-Moncrieff remarked, ' *Wave Premier* has done an extremely good job, like *Wave Chief*. These tankers have spent many weeks on end on the west coast, often operating in vile and, recently, cold weather . . . with practically no harbour time . . . every call has been answered with willingness and efficiency' . . . 'It is perhaps an appropriate moment to pay tribute to the excellent service given by all the R.F.A.s in the operational area, including R.F.A. *Fort Rosalie* and *Fort Charlotte* and the Ranger-class tankers'.²

To the men of the British Commonwealth Fleet, the *Fort Rosalie* (master, Captain S. C. Kernick) was possibly the best-known Royal Fleet auxiliary. She operated in the area for more than eighteen months, returning to the United Kingdom in June 1952. During her service in Korean waters she supplied a large proportion of the ammunition used by Commonwealth ships, and inspected, repaired, and replaced guns worn out by the heavy bombardments. Nearly 9000 tons of bombs, rockets, and ammunition were supplied by her. She was relieved by R.F.A. *Fort Sandusky*.

Turning to the other Commonwealth Navies, H.M.A.S. *Sydney* and the eight Australian destroyers and frigates steamed over 419 000 miles⁴ during the hostilities. Ammunition expended amounted to 9615 rounds of 4·7-inch, 5576 rounds of 4·5-inch, 9983 rounds of 4-inch, 50 417 40-mm shells, and 9921 two-pounder shells. In addition to the foregoing, H.M.A.S. *Sydney*'s aircraft fired 269 249 20-mm cannon-shells and 6359 rocket projectiles, and dropped eighteen 1000-lb and 784 500-lb bombs.

¹ See Appendix B(1).

² F.O. 2i/c R.o.P. No. 47.

³ F.O. 2i/c R.o.P. No. 48.

⁴ No figures are available for H.M.A.S. *Tobruk*'s second tour of duty, and for H.M.A.S. *Culgoa*.

A total of 311 officers and 4196 ratings served in these Australian ships against the Communists.

Casualties amounted to one officer killed, two officers missing (presumed killed), and one officer and five ratings wounded. Fifty-seven officers and men received decorations for their war services.

The eight Canadian destroyers that served with the United Nations forces carried out tours of duty varying in length from six to thirteen months. When the armistice was signed they had steamed 723 886 miles and fired 50 000 rounds of main armament and 70 000 rounds of close-range ammunition. The great value of the H.D.W.S. radar fitted in these ships for the detection of small craft has been mentioned.

More than 5300 officers and men of the Royal Canadian Navy saw active service, and a total of 42 awards was made to officers and men. The only operational casualties suffered were in H.M.C.S. *Iroquois* when she was hit by shore batteries near Songjin; one officer and one rating were killed, one died of wounds, and ten were wounded, seven of them slightly.

Three days after the New Zealand Government decided to contribute to the U.N. naval forces, two frigates, the *Pukaki* and *Tutira* left Auckland. They reached Sasebo on 1st August 1950, and three hours after their arrival sailed again with a supply convoy. From then until the cease-fire the Royal New Zealand Navy maintained two frigates continuously in the war area, an effort which involved all six of New Zealand's frigates, and eight tours of duty. Between them they steamed 339 584 miles and fired 71 625 rounds of ammunition. Approximately 1350 officers and men—or about one-half of the Navy's average manpower strength—served in them. The only casualty sustained was one rating killed during the *Rotoiti's* first tour of duty. Awards to personnel included seven D.S.C.s and two D.S.M.s.

When the armistice was signed the following ships of the Commonwealth Navies and fleet train were in Korean or Japanese waters: H.M. Ships *Birmingham*, *Ocean*, *Unicorn*, *Cossack*, *Charity*, *Crane*, *Cockade*, *Whitesand Bay*, and *Tyne*; H.M.A. Ships *Culgoa* and *Tobruk*; H.M.C. Ships *Athabaskan* and *Huron* (damaged); H.M.N.Z. Ships *Kanieri* and *Haweia*; R.F.A.s, *Brown Ranger*, *Green Ranger*, *Wave Prince*, *Wave Sovereign*, *Wave Knight*, *Fort Charlotte*, and *Fort Rosalie*; M.F.A. *Fort Langley*, and H.M. Hospital Ship *Maine*.

Only two of these ships served in the Far East throughout the war, the *Maine*, and the repair-and-maintenance carrier *Unicorn*.

Particularly fine work was carried out by H.M. Hospital Ship *Maine*, (master, Captain S. G. Kent, relieved by Captain W. W. Peddle in January 1951). She was at Kobe when the war broke out, and proceeded to Pusan in July 1950, to assist in the evacuation of casualties. She was then the only hospital ship on the scene of operations. Eight trips entailing 702 hours steaming and over 7600 miles were made between Pusan and Japan in those early days, and 1849 casualties—all but four of whom were United States officers and enlisted men—were evacuated and treated by the medical staff under Surgeon-Captain T. B. Lynagh¹ between 16th July and 16th August 1950. During the years of hostilities that followed these ferrying trips, 2902 persons were treated in the *Maine*, 1105 of whom were wounded in action. A total of 1006 operations were performed in the ship's operating theatre.

¹ Surgeon-Captain Lynagh was relieved by Surgeon-Captain J. C. Gent in April 1952.

COMMENT AND REFLECTION

Those treated included personnel of the Commonwealth Navies and Royal Fleet auxiliaries, Royal Marines, and Commonwealth and United States armies. On 21st May 1953, H.M.H.S. *Maine* was awarded the United States Presidential Citation for her good work.

H.M.S. *Unicorn* had left the United Kingdom for the Far East on 22nd September 1949, and at the outbreak of war in June 1950 was under orders to return home that autumn. The important, if unspectacular, contribution she could make to the war effort was speedily recognized and she was retained on the station for the whole three years of hostilities.¹ The *Unicorn's* main function was to carry replacement aircraft and stores from Singapore to Japan, where she replenished the operational carrier either by flight delivery, direct transfer, or to the advanced air base at Iwakuni. In addition, she provided a reserve of aircraft and air stores when in the forward area. But this was by no means the limit of her usefulness. Her two large hangars and facilities rendered her very suitable for carrying all types of cargo, stores, ammunition, R.A.F. equipment, aircraft, troops, and passengers between Singapore, Hong Kong, Japan, and the forward area. In the anxious days of August 1950, for example, one of the first two British battalions to land in Korea took passage in her from Hong Kong to Pusan. Such lasting friendship sprang up between this battalion—the 1st Battalion, Middlesex Regiment (Duke of Cornwall's Own)—and the ship that a regimental order of the day subsequently bestowed on H.M.S. *Unicorn* the rare distinction² of the right to play the regimental marches of the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the regiment on all suitable occasions.

H.M.S. *Unicorn* supported all five of H.M. light fleet carriers, on several occasions accompanying the operational carrier to the forward area, flying her own aircraft and acting as a spare deck. On one occasion, it will be remembered, she engaged enemy positions with her 4-inch guns, and thereby became more closely engaged than any of the other carriers.

During her four years' service in the Far East, H.M.S. *Unicorn* steamed over 130 000 miles (110 000 during hostilities), spent over 500 days at sea, carried more than 6000 troops and passengers, and handled some 600 aircraft.

A satisfactory aspect of the Commonwealth effort lay in the fine morale maintained throughout. Despite long periods at sea, the drudgery of patrols, escort work, anti-submarine screening, and the monotony of the island defence measures continued through the tropical heat of the summers and the extreme of cold in the winters, the morale and keenness of the ships' companies—whether from Canada, New Zealand, Australia, or Great Britain—never wavered or flagged. Reports of proceedings repeatedly stress the high standard maintained.

While highly creditable to all concerned, this fine morale in the first place was no doubt due to the obvious concern of the flag-officers, particularly Admiral Andrewes and Admiral Scott-Moncrieff in the early days, to do all they could to make life as tolerable as circumstances allowed.

The seal of royal approval was set on the Commonwealth effort two days after the armistice was signed when the following message from Her Majesty the Queen to the Board of Admiralty was signalled to the Fleet:

¹ She paid off and recommissioned at Singapore in October 1951, the relief crew being sent out in H.M.S. *Warrior*. She eventually returned to Devonport in November 1953.

² Only two other of H.M. ships hold a similar privilege.

CHAPTER 12

Please express to all serving in Commonwealth Fleet my deep appreciation of the splendid service they have given throughout the fighting in Korea.


(Signed) ELIZABETH R.

APPENDIX A

Composition and Disposition of British Far East Fleet¹ at Outbreak of the Korean War, 25th June 1950

C-in-C, Far East Station
(H.Q. Singapore: Flag flown ashore, Singapore)
Admiral Sir E. J. Patrick Brind, K.C.B., C.B.E.

C.O.S. Commodore G. F. Burghard, D.S.O.



F.E. Fleet (administered by F.O. 2i/c F.E.S.) (Operational Training Base, Hong Kong)

1st A/C SQUADRON

H.M.S. *Triumph*, Ominato to Hong Kong.
H.M.S. *Unicorn* (repair ship), refit, Singapore

3RD FRIGATE FLOTILLA

H.M.S. *Black Swan* (F3), Tokyo
H.M.S. *Alacrity*, Tokyo
H.M.S. *Hart*, Hong Kong to Yokosuka

5TH CRUISER SQUADRON

H.M.S. *Belfast* (flag), Hakodate
H.M.S. *Jamaica*, Hong Kong, leave for Kure 24th June
H.M.S. *Kerya*, refit, Singapore, complete 24th June

4TH FRIGATE FLOTILLA

H.M.S. *Mounts Bay* (F4), Malaya patrol
H.M.S. *Moresambe Bay*, Malaya patrol
H.M.S. *St Bride's Bay*, Yangtze patrol
H.M.S. *Cardigan Bay*, refit, Singapore
H.M.S. *Whitesand Bay*, refit, Hong Kong

8th DESTROYER FLOTILLA

H.M.S. *Conack* (D8), Ominato, leave 22nd June for Amoy patrol
H.M.S. *Charity*, patrol
H.M.S. *Cochadu*, Hong Kong
H.M.S. *Comus*, Amoy patrol
H.M.S. *Consort*, Ominato
H.M.S. *Constance*, Malay patrol
H.M.S. *Concord*, refit, Singapore

DISPATCH VESSEL

H.M.S. *Alert* (flag, C.-in-C.), Okinawa

MINESWEEPER

H.M.S. *Jasur* (temporarily in commission), Malaya patrol

HOSPITAL SHIP

H.M.H.S. *Mains*, Ominato

¹ H.M.A.S. *Shoalhaven* was in Japanese waters, and H.M.A.S. *Bataan*, on passage from Australia to relieve her, was due at Hong Kong 28th June.

APPENDIX B

H.M. Ships employed in the Korean War 25th June 1950 — Armistice, 27th July 1953

Flag of F.O. 2i/c F.E. Station shifted as necessary for operations.

1. Rear-Admiral W. G. Andrewes, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O. (Vice-Admiral 1 December 1950, K.B.E. 1 January 1951.)
2. Rear-Admiral A. K. Scott-Moncrieff, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., 10 April 1951—16 September 1952.
3. Rear-Admiral E. G. A. Clifford, C.B., 23 September 1952—18 November 1953.

NOTE.—Ships are listed alphabetically according to type. Short absences from war area (minor defects, recreation, and so on) are not shown.

a. Royal Navy

LIGHT FLEET CARRIERS

SHIP: TIME IN WAR AREA	MAIN ARMAMENT	COMMANDING OFFICER	REMARKS
<i>Glory</i> April 1951—September 1951 January 1952—May 1952 November 1952—May 1953	24 2-pdr pom-poms No. 804 Squadron No. 812 Squadron No. 801 Squadron No. 821 Squadron 24 2-pdr pom-poms No. 802 Squadron No. 825 Squadron No. 807 Squadron No. 810 Squadron	Captain K. S. Colquhoun, D.S.O. Captain T. A. K. Maunsell Acting Captain D. E. Bromley-Martin Captain D. Lewin Lieutenant-Commander J. S. Bailey, O.B.E. Lieutenant-Commander F. A. Swanton D.S.C. Lieutenant-Commander J. M. Culbertson Lieutenant-Commander P. B. Stuart Lieutenant-Commander J. R. N. Gardner Captain C. L. G. Evans, D.S.O., D.S.C. Captain B. E. W. Logan Lieutenant-Commander S. F. F. Shotton, D.S.C. Lieutenant-Commander D. A. Dick, D.S.C. Lieutenant-Commander P. H. London, D.S.C. Commander C. K. Roberts, D.S.O. Lieutenant-Commander T. L. M. Brander Lieutenant-Commander A. W. Bloomer	23 April 1952 Tempy: December 1952 14 December 1952 December 1951 November 1952 November 1952 May 1953 July 1952: killed in action. July 1952 May 1953 May 1953

¹ Armistice, 27th July 1953.

H.M. SHIPS EMPLOYED IN THE KOREAN WAR

SHIP: TIME IN WAR AREA	MAIN ARMAMENT	COMMANDING OFFICER	REMARKS
<i>Theseus</i> October 1950—April 1951	24 2-pdr pom-poms No. 807 Squadron No. 810 Squadron	Captain A. S. Bolt, D.S.O., D.S.C. Lieutenant-Commander M. P. G. Smith, D.S.C. Lieutenant-Commander K. S. Patison, D.S.C.	August 1950: killed
<i>Triumph</i> July 1950—September 1950	24 2-pdr pom-poms No. 800 Squadron	Captain A. D. Torless, D.S.O. Lieutenant-Commander I. M. MacLachlan Lieutenant T. D. Handley	
<i>Urnicorn</i> ¹ July 1950—July 1953	No. 827 Squadron 8 4-inch 16 2-pdr pom-poms	Lieutenant-Commander B. C. Lyons Captain H. S. Hopkins, O.B.E. Captain J. Y. Thompson Captain R. R. S. Pennefather	November 1950 May 1952
CRUISERS			
<i>Belfast</i> June 1950—August 1950 January 1951—September 1952	12 6-inch 8 4-inch	Captain Sir Aubrey St Clair-Ford, Bt, D.S.O. Captain A. C. A. C. Duckworth, D.S.O., D.S.C.	November 1951
<i>Birmingham</i> September 1952—July 1953 ¹	9 6-inch 8 5-inch	Captain J. D. Luce, D.S.O., O.B.E. Captain C. W. Greening, D.S.C.	January 1953
<i>Ceylon</i> August 1950—July 1952	9 6-inch 8 4-inch	Captain C. F. J. Lloyd-Davies, D.S.C. Captain G. A. Thring, D.S.O. Captain J. C. Stopford, O.B.E.	April 1951 August 1952
<i>Jamaica</i> June 1950—October 1950	9 6-inch 8 4-inch	Captain J. S. C. Salter, D.S.O., O.B.E.	
<i>Kenya</i> July 1950—August 1951	9 6-inch 8 4-inch	Captain P. W. Brock Captain T. E. Podger	April 1951
<i>Newcastle</i> July 1952—July 1953 ¹	9 6-inch 8 4-inch	Captain W. F. H. C. Rutherford	

¹ Armistice.

² On station: frequent visits to war area.

APPENDIX B

a. Royal Navy—continued

DESTROYERS

SHIP: TIME IN WAR AREA	MAIN ARMAMENT	COMMANDING OFFICER	REMARKS
<p><i>Charity</i></p> <p>July 1950—January 1951 July 1951—September 1951 December 1951—March 1952 August 1952—November 1952 February 1953—April 1953 June 1953—July 1953¹</p>	4 4·5-inch	Lieutenant-Commander P. R. G. Worth, D.S.C. Commander J. A. C. Henley Commander R. Gatehouse, D.S.C.	November 1950 June 1952
<p><i>Cockade</i></p> <p>July 1950—November 1950 March 1951—August 1951 October 1951—December 1951 January 1952—March 1952 December 1952—February 1953 April 1953—July 1953¹</p>	4 4·5-inch	Lieutenant-Commander H. J. Lee, D.S.C. Commander J. T. Kimpton, D.S.C. Commander H. S. Hayes, D.S.C.	January 1951 August 1952
<p><i>Comus</i></p> <p>July 1950—August 1950 January 1951—June 1951 September 1951— December 1951 May 1952—September 1952 November 1952—February 1953</p>	4 4·5-inch	Lieutenant-Commander R. A. M. Hennessy Commander C. E. Pollock Commander W. J. Parker, D.S.O.	Bombed, August 1950 May 1951 November 1952
<p><i>Concord</i></p> <p>September 1950—January 1951 April 1951—May 1951 August 1951—November 1951 January 1952—April 1952 July 1952—August 1952 May 1953—July 1953</p>	4 4·5-inch	Lieutenant-Commander J. D. McLaughlan, D.S.C. Commander C. P. Mills, D.S.C.	December 1951

¹ Armistice.

H.M. SHIPS EMPLOYED IN KOREAN WAR

SHIP: TIME IN WAR AREA	MAIN ARMAMENT	COMMANDING OFFICER	REMARKS
<i>Consort</i> June 1950—April 1951 June 1951—September 1951 May 1952—August 1952 November 1952—February 1953 March 1953—May 1953	4 4.5-inch	Commander J. R. Carr Commander G. B. Rowe Commander P. E. Yonge, D.S.C.	February 1951 December 1952
<i>Constance</i> October 1950—March 1951 June 1951—July 1951 November 1951—February 1952 June 1952—December 1952	4 4.5-inch	Commander A. G. L. Seale, D.S.C. Commander A. V. Lyle Commander P. U. Bayly, D.S.C.	June 1951 September 1952 Grounded, June 1952
<i>Cossack (D8)</i> June 1950—October 1951 February 1952—May 1952 July 1952 September 1952—January 1953 May 1953—July 1953 ¹	4 4.5-inch	Captain R. T. White, D.S.O. Captain V. C. Begg, D.S.O., D.S.C. Captain W. A. Adair, O.B.E., D.S.O.	August 1950 February 1952
FRIGATES			
<i>Alacrity</i> June 1950—August 1950 February 1951—June 1951 December 1951—February 1952	6 4-inch	Commander H. S. Barber Lieutenant-Commander N. R. Turner Commander H. A. I. Luard	November 1950 October 1951
<i>Alert</i> August 1950—October 1950 October 1951	2 4-inch A.A.	Commander R. de L. Brooke, D.S.O., D.S.C. Commander J. R. L. Moore, D.S.C.	December 1951

¹ Armistice.

a. Royal Navy—continued

FRIGATES—continued

SHIP: TIME IN WAR AREA	MAIN ARMAMENT	COMMANDING OFFICER	REMARKS
<i>Amethyst</i> February 1951—June 1951 September 1951—January 1952 April 1952—July 1952	6 4-inch	Commander P. E. Fanshawe Commander A. R. L. Butler	December 1951
<i>Black Swan</i> (F3) June 1950—August 1950 February 1951—June 1951 September 1951—November 1951	6 4-inch	Captain A. D. H. Jay, D.S.O., D.S.C. Captain G. A. F. Norfolk, D.S.O.	September 1950
<i>Cardigan Bay</i> (F4) November 1950—January 1951 June 1951—September 1951 January 1952—April 1952 June 1952—September 1952 January 1953—July 1953 ¹	4 4-inch	Captain W. L. M. Brown, O.B.E., D.S.C. Captain H. C. B. Coleridge, D.S.C.	August 1951
<i>Crane</i> (F3) March 1952—June 1952 August 1952—September 1952 November 1952—March 1953 July 1953 ¹	6 4-inch	Captain R. L. H. Marsh, D.S.O.	
<i>Hart</i> June 1950—August 1950 February 1951—March 1951	6 4-inch	Commander H. H. H. Mullencux, D.S.C.	
<i>Modeste</i> April 1953—July 1953 ¹	6 4-inch	Commander R. D. Ritchie, M.V.O.	

¹ Armistice.

H.M. SHIPS EMPLOYED IN KOREAN WAR

SHIP: TIME IN WAR AREA	MAIN ARMAMENT	COMMANDING OFFICER	REMARKS
<p><i>Morecambe Bay</i> October 1950—January 1951 June 1951—September 1951 March 1952—May 1952 August 1952—November 1952 May 1953—July 1953</p>	4 4-inch	Commander C. C. B. Mackenzie Commander J. J. E. Farnol, D.S.C.	December 1950
<p><i>Mouints Bay (F4)</i> August 1950—November 1950 December 1950—January 1951 June 1951—September 1951 December 1951—April 1952 June 1952—November 1952 March 1953—June 1953</p>	4 4-inch	Captain J. H. Unwin, D.S.C. Captain J. B. Frewen Captain A. F. P. Lewis	November 1950 April 1952
<p><i>Opussum</i> November 1952—April 1953</p>	6 4-inch	Commander J. C. Cartwright, D.S.C.	
<p><i>St Bride's Bay</i> December 1950—January 1951 August 1951—December 1951 July 1952—October 1952 April 1953—June 1953</p>	4 4-inch	Commander A. H. Diack, D.S.C. Commander W. G. C. Elder, O.B.E. Commander J. G. T. Western	July 1950 December 1951
<p><i>Sparrow</i> December 1952—February 1953 April 1953—June 1953</p>	6 4-inch	Commander W. J. P. Church, D.S.O., D.S.C. Commander H. D. Ellis	March 1953
<p><i>Whitesand Bay</i> August 1950—December 1950 June 1951—July 1951 October 1951—February 1952 April 1952—July 1952 February 1953—July 1953¹</p>	4 4-inch	Lieutenant-Commander J. V. Brothers Commander A. N. Rowell, O.B.E. Commander M. W. B. Craig Waller, D.S.C.	September 1950 February 1952

¹ Armistice.

a. Royal Navy—continued

HEADQUARTERS SHIPS, SASEBO

SHIP: TIME IN WAR AREA	MAIN ARMAMENT	COMMANDING OFFICER	REMARKS
<i>Ladybird</i> September 1950—April 1953		Commander A. H. Diack, D.S.C. Commander N. H. Pond Commander D. G. Clark	October 1950 June 1952
<i>Tyne</i> April 1953—July 1953 ¹		Captain A. J. F. Milne-Home	

HOSPITAL SHIP

<i>Maine</i> June 1950—February 1952 May 1952—July 1953 ¹		Master, Captain S. G. Kent, O.B.E. Master, Captain W. W. Peddle	January 1951
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b. Royal Australian Navy

LIGHT FLEET CARRIER

<i>Sydney</i> September 1951—January 1952	12 40-mm Bofors No. 805 Squadron No. 808 Squadron No. 817 Squadron	Captain D. H. Harries, C.B.E., R.A.N. Lieutenant-Commander W. G. Bowles, R.A.N. Lieutenant-Commander J. L. Appleby Lieutenant-Commander R. B. Lunberg	
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¹ Armistice.

H.M. SHIPS EMPLOYED IN KOREAN WAR

DESTROYERS

SHIP: TIME IN WAR AREA	MAIN ARMAMENT	COMMANDING OFFICER	REMARKS
<i>Ansac</i> August 1951—September 1951 September 1952—June 1953	4 4·5-inch	Commander J. Plunkett-Cole, R.A.N. Captain G. O. Gatacre, D.S.O., D.S.C., R.A.N. Captain J. S. Mesley, D.S.C., R.A.N.	March 1953
<i>Bataan</i> July 1950—May 1951 January 1952—September 1952	6 4·7-inch	Commander W. B. M. Marks, D.S.C., R.A.N. Commander W. S. Bracegirdle, D.S.C., R.A.N.	September 1951
<i>Tobruk</i> September 1951—January 1952 May 1953—July 1953 ¹	4 4·5-inch	Commander R. I. Peek, O.U.F., D.S.C., R.A.N. Commander I. H. McDonald, R.A.N.	March 1953
<i>Warramunga</i> August 1950—August 1951 January 1952—July 1952	6 4·7-inch	Commander O. H. Becher, D.S.O., D.S.C., R.A.N. Commander J. M. Ramsay, D.S.C., R.A.N.	Promoted Captain, 31st December 1950 October 1951

FRIGATES

<i>Condamine</i> July 1952—March 1953	4 4-inch	Lieutenant-Commander R. C. Savage, D.S.C., R.A.N.	
<i>Culgoa</i> April 1953—July 1953 ¹	4 4-inch	Lieutenant-Commander D. A. H. Clarke, R.A.N.	
<i>Murchison</i> May 1951—January 1952	4 4-inch	Lieutenant-Commander A. N. Dollard, D.S.C., R.A.N.	
<i>Shoalhaven</i> June 1950—August 1950	4 4-inch	Lieutenant-Commander I. H. McDonald, R.A.N.	

¹ Armistice.

c. Royal Canadian Navy

DESTROYERS

SHIP: TIME IN WAR AREA	MAIN ARMAMENT	COMMANDING OFFICER	REMARKS
<i>Athabaskan</i> August 1950—May 1951 September 1951—June 1952 November 1952—July 1953 ¹	8 4-inch	Commander R. P. Welland, D.S.C., C.D., R.C.N. Commander D. G. King, D.S.C., C.D., R.C.N. Commander J. C. Reed, D.S.C., C.D., R.C.N.	July 1951 November 1952
<i>Cayuga</i> August 1950—March 1951 July 1951—May 1952	8 4-inch	Captain J. V. Brock, D.S.O., D.S.C., C.D., R.C.N. Commander J. Plomer, O.B.E., D.S.C., C.D., R.C.N.	May 1951
<i>Crusader</i> June 1952—June 1953	4 4·5-inch	Lieutenant-Commander J. H. G. Bovey, D.S.C., C.D., R.C.N.	
<i>Haida</i> November 1952—June 1953	6 4·7-inch	Commander D. Lantier, R.C.N.	
<i>Huron</i> March 1951—August 1951 June 1953—July 1953	6 4·7-inch	Commander E. T. G. Madgwick, D.S.C., C.D., R.C.N. Commander R. C. Chenoweth, M.B.E., C.D., R.C.N.	November 1952 Grounded, July 1953
<i>Iroquois</i> June 1952—November 1952 June 1953—July 1953 ¹	6 4·7-inch	Captain W. M. Landymore, C.D., R.C.N.	
<i>Nootka</i> January 1951—July 1951 February 1952—November 1952	6 4·7-inch	Commander A. B. F. Fraser-Harris, D.S.C., C.D., R.C.N. Commander R. M. Steele, D.S.C., C.D., R.C.N.	October 1951
<i>Sioux</i> August 1950—January 1951 May 1951—February 1952	4 4·7-inch	Commander P. D. Taylor, D.S.C., C.D., R.C.N.	

¹ Armistice.

d. Royal New Zealand Navy

FRIGATES

SHIP: TIME IN WAR AREA	MAIN ARMAMENT	COMMANDING OFFICER	REMARKS
<i>Hawaia</i> April 1951—January 1952 September 1952—July 1953 ¹	1 4-inch A.A.	Lieutenant-Commander F. N. F. Johnston, D.S.C., R.N.Z.N. Captain G. R. Davis-Goff, D.S.C., R.N.Z.N.	June 1952
<i>Kariere</i> March 1953—July 1953 ¹	1 4-inch A.A.	Lieutenant-Commander L. G. Carr, R.N.Z.N.	
<i>Pukaki</i> August 1950—November 1950	1 4-inch A.A.	Lieutenant-Commander L. E. Herrick, D.S.C., R.N.	
<i>Rotaiti</i> November 1950—November 1951	1 4-inch A.A.	Commander B. E. Turner, D.S.C., R.N.Z.N. Lieutenant-Commander G. O. Graham, D.S.C., R.N.	November 1951
<i>Taupo</i> January 1952—February 1953	1 4-inch A.A.	Lieutenant-Commander K. A. Craddock-Hartopp, M.B.E., D.S.C., R.N.	
<i>Tutira</i> September 1951—September 1952	1 4-inch A.A.	Lieutenant-Commander P. J. H. Hoare, R.N.	
August 1950—May 1951	1 4-inch A.A.		

¹ Armistice.

APPENDIX B (1)

Ships of Fleet Train employed in the Korean War

NOTE.—Ships are listed alphabetically according to type.

a. Tankers (13)

SHIP	MASTER
R.F.A. <i>Birchol</i>	Captain W. H. S. Hine
R.F.A. <i>Brown Ranger</i>	Captain S. W. Camamile, D.S.C. Captain W. H. S. Hine Captain W. R. Holt, O.B.E.
R.F.A. <i>Echodale</i>	Captain G. S. Perry
R.F.A. <i>Green Ranger</i>	Captain E. Payne Captain F. G. Evans
R.F.A. <i>Oakol</i>	Captain H. Oakley
R.F.A. <i>Wave Chief</i>	Captain R. Grimes Captain F. A. Shaw, R.D. Captain A. E. Curtain, O.B.E., R.D.
R.F.A. <i>Wave Conqueror</i>	Captain R.D. Almond
R.F.A. <i>Wave Knight</i>	Captain H. W. Flint Captain B. Smith
R.F.A. <i>Wave Laird</i>	Captain R. K. Hill, O.B.E.
R.F.A. <i>Wave Premier</i>	Captain J. M. Humphrey, O.B.E., D.S.C.
R.F.A. <i>Wave Prince</i>	Captain H. Jolly Captain H. F. Colbourne
R.F.A. <i>Wave Regent</i>	Captain R. V. Boodle
R.F.A. <i>Wave Sovereign</i>	Captain H. F. Colbourne Captain F. C. Holt Captain D. J. S. Newton

b. Stores and Victualling (5)

M.F.A. <i>Choysang</i>	Captain J. S. G. Fotheringham Captain D. E. Reeve
R.F.A. <i>Fort Charlotte</i>	Captain D. B. C. Ralph, O.B.E., D.S.C. Captain F. G. Edwards
M.F.A. <i>Fort Langley</i>	Captain H. Mackinnon
R.F.A. <i>Fort Rosalie</i>	Captain S. C. Kernick Captain A. R. Wheeler, R.D.
R.F.A. <i>Fort Sandusky</i>	Captain R. K. Hill

APPENDIX C

Allied Ships (other than U.S.) that served under British Command

NOTE.—Ships are listed alphabetically according to type. Short absences from war area for various reasons (minor defects, recreation, and so on) are not shown.

a. Colombia

FRIGATE

SHIP: TIME IN WAR AREA	MAIN ARMAMENT	COMMANDING OFFICER	REMARKS
<i>Almirante Padilla</i> April 1951— March 1952	3 3-inch	Lieutenant-Commander Reyes	

b. France

FRIGATE

<i>La Grandière</i> August 1950— November 1950	3 5·4-inch	Commander Urbain E. Cabanie	
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c. Netherlands

DESTROYERS

<i>Evertsen</i> July 1950— August 1950 November 1950— April 1951	4 4·7-inch	Lieutenant-Commander van Doorninck	Grounded, 9th August 1950
<i>Van Galen</i> May 1951— January 1952	6 4·7-inch	Commander A. M. Valkenberg	
<i>Piet Hein</i> March 1952— July 1952 September 1952— January 1953	4 4·7-inch	Commander A. H. W. von Freytag Drabbe	

FRIGATE

<i>Johan Maurits van Nassau</i> January 1953— July 1953 ¹	2 4-inch A.A.	Commander N. W. Sluijter	
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¹ Armistice.

APPENDIX D

U.S. Naval Forces in Far Eastern Waters at Outbreak of the Korean War, 25th June 1950

a. Japanese Waters

Commander, Naval Forces, Far East
Vice-Admiral C. Turner Joy (COMNAVFE)

AMPHIBIOUS FORCE

Rear-Admiral J. H. Doyle
Flagship (A.G.C.), U.S.S. *Mount McKinley*
Assault transport (A.P.A.) U.S.S. *Cavalier*
Assault cargo ship (A.K.A.) U.S.S. *Union*
Tank landing ship (L.S.T.) U.S.S. L.S.T.
611
Fleet ocean tug (A.T.F.) U.S.S. *Arikara*

SUPPORT FORCE

Rear-Admiral J. M. Higgins (COMCRUDIV 5)
Cruiser, U.S.S. *Janeau*, 12 5-inch HA/LA

DESTROYERS (DESDIV 91)

U.S.S. *Mansfield*, 6 5-inch HA/LA
U.S.S. *de Haven* 6 5-inch HA/LA
U.S.S. *Collett* 6 5-inch HA/LA
U.S.S. *Swenson* 6 5-inch HA/LA

MINESWEEPERS (MINRON 3)

U.S.S. *Redhead*
U.S.S. *Mockingbird*
U.S.S. *Osprey*
U.S.S. *Partridge*
U.S.S. *Chatterer*
U.S.S. *Kite*

b. Seventh Fleet

(Sangley Point, Subic Bay, Hong Kong)

Vice-Admiral A. D. Struble (Commander, 7th Fleet)
Rear-Admiral J. M. Hoskins (COMCARDIV 3)

Fleet carrier U.S.S. *Valley Forge*
Cruiser U.S.S. *Rochester* 9 8-inch; 10 5-inch HA/LA

DESTROYERS

U.S.S. *Shelton* 6 5-inch HA/LA
U.S.S. *Eversole* 6 5-inch HA/LA
U.S.S. *Maddox* 6 5-inch HA/LA
U.S.S. *S.N. Moore* 6 5-inch HA/LA
U.S.S. *Brush* 6 5-inch HA/LA
U.S.S. *Taussig* 6 5-inch HA/LA
U.S.S. *Fletcher* 2 5-inch HA/LA
U.S.S. *Radford* 2 5-inch HA/LA

APPENDIX E

U.N. Commanders in Chain of Command
controlling Commonwealth Naval Forces

See overleaf

**U.N. Commanders in Chain of Command
controlling Commonwealth Naval Forces**

**Commander-in-Chief
Pacific Fleet,
(Pearl Harbour)**
Admiral A. W. Radford,
U.S.N.

Supreme Commander, U.N. Forces (Tokyo)
General of the Army D. MacArthur, till 11th April 1951
General M. B. Ridgway, U.S.A., 11th April 1951—7th
May 1952
General Mark Clark, U.S.A., 7th May 1952—

**Commander-in-Chief
F.E. Station
(Singapore)**
Admiral Sir P. Brind till
7th February 1951
Vice-Admiral the Hon.
Sir G. Russell 7th
February 1951—20th
March 1953 (Admiral,
10th April 1952)
Vice-Admiral Sir C.
Laambe 20th March
1953—

Commander, Naval Forces, Far East (COMNAVFE)
Vice-Admiral C. T. Joy, U.S.N., 6th June 1950—4th
June 1952
Vice-Admiral R. P. Briscoe, U.S.N., 4th June 1952—
27th July 1953

Commander, 7th Fleet¹
Vice-Admiral H. M. Martin, U.S.N., 28th March 1951—
3rd March 1952
Vice-Admiral R. P. Briscoe, U.S.N., 3rd March 1952—
17th May 1952
Vice-Admiral J. J. Clarke, U.S.N., 17th May 1952—27th
July 1953

Commander, Blockade and Escort Force (T.F.95)¹
 Rear-Admiral J. M. Higgins, U.S.N., 25th June 1950—
 25th July 1950
 Rear-Admiral C. C. Hartman, U.S.N., 25th July 1950—
 12th September 1950
 Rear-Admiral A. E. Smith, U.S.N., 12th September
 1950—19th February 1951
 Vice-Admiral Sir W. Andrewes, 19th February 1951—
 3rd April 1951
 Rear-Admiral A. E. Smith, U.S.N., 3rd April 1951—
 20th June 1951
 Rear-Admiral G. C. Dyer, U.S.N., 20th June 1951—
 31st May 1952
 Rear-Admiral J. E. Gingrich, U.S.N., 31st May 1952—
 12th February 1953
 Rear-Admiral C. E. Olson, U.S.N., 12th February 1953—
 27th July 1953

**Commander, Commonwealth and Allied Forces,
 West Coast (T.G. 95.1)**
 Rear-Admiral W. G. Andrewes, 6th July 1950—30th
 November 1950
 Vice-Admiral W. G. Andrewes, 1st December 1950—
 10th April 1951
 Rear-Admiral A. Scott-Moncrieff, 10th April 1951—
 16th September 1952
 Rear-Admiral E. G. A. Clifford, 23rd September 1952—
 18th November 1953

¹ Vice-Admiral A. D. Struble commanded 7th Fleet from outbreak of hostilities till 28th March 1951. T.F. 95 did not come under the operational control of 7th Fleet till a few days after he left (3rd April 1951).

² Originally Japan/Korea Support Group: U.N. Blockade and Escort Force was organized 12th September 1950.

APPENDIX F
COMNAVFE Staff
(1st November 1950)

Chief of Staff: Rear-Admiral A. K. Morehouse
 Deputy Chief of Staff: Rear-Admiral A. A. Burke
 Assistant Chief of Staff (Ops, Intell., Plans): Captain W. H. Benson

U.S.N.										U.S.M.C.			TOTAL
Captain	Commander	Lieutenant-Commander	Lieutenant	Lt. jg.	Ensign	Chief Bosun	Chief Photography	Chief Radio	Staff Clerk	Lieutenant-Colonel	Major	1st Lieutenant	
	3									1			4
2	6	7	17	4	1								37
1	1	4	11	4			1				1		23
1	3	2	1	2									9
	1	2		2									5
1		4											5
1	2	3	9	14	18			1					48
1	2	2	4	2	2								13
	1	2	3	2								1	10
	1								1				2
	1	4	1	1	1				1				9
1	1	1		6									9
1	2	4	6										13
1		1	11										13
	2	1	4										7
10	26	37	67	37	22	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	207

¹ Supreme Command, Allied Powers, Japan.

APPENDIX G

U.S. Battleships, Carriers, Cruisers, Destroyers, Frigates mentioned in Text, with Main Armaments

NOTE.—All guns were dual purpose, except those marked A.A.
(anti-aircraft only).

Battleships

Iowa, 9 16-inch; 20 5-inch
Missouri, 9 16-inch; 20 5-inch

New Jersey, 9 16-inch; 20 5-inch
Wisconsin, 9 16-inch; 20 5-inch

Carriers

Badoeng Strait (C.V.E.)
Bairoko (C.V.E.)
Bataan (C.V.L.)
Bon Homme Richard (C.V.A.)
Boxer (C.V.A.)
Enterprise (C.V.A.)
Essex (C.V.A.)
Leyte (C.V.A.)
Phillippine Sea (C.V.A.)
Point Cruz (C.V.E.)
Princeton (C.V.A.)
Rendova (C.V.E.)
Sicily (C.V.E.)
Valley Forge (C.V.A.)

C.V.A.s carried about 90 aircraft;
C.V.E.s and C.V.L.s: 24 to 28 aircraft

Cruisers

Bremerton, 9 8-inch; 12 5-inch
Helena, 9 8-inch; 12 5-inch
Juneau, 12 5-inch; 14 3-inch; 32 1·57-inch A.A.
Los Angeles, 9 8-inch; 12 5-inch
Manchester, 9 8-inch; 12 5-inch
Rochester, 9 8-inch; 12 5-inch
St Paul, 9 8-inch; 12 5-inch
Toledo, 9 8-inch; 12 5-inch
Worcester, 12 6-inch; 24 3-inch

Destroyers

<i>Agerholm</i> , 6 5-in.; 4 3-in.	<i>Brinkley Bass</i> , 6 5-in.; 4 3-in.
<i>Arnold J. Isbell</i> , 6 5-in.; 4 3-in.	<i>Brush</i> , 6 5-in.; 4 3-in.
<i>Barton</i> , 6 5-in.; 4 3-in.	<i>Buck</i> , 6 5-in.; 4 3-in.
<i>Bausell</i> , 6 5-in.; 4 3-in.	<i>Carmick</i> ¹ , 3 5-in.; 4 1·57-in. A.A.
<i>Borrie</i> , 6 5-in.; 4 3-in.	<i>Chandler</i> , see <i>Theodore E. Chandler</i>
<i>Boyd</i> , 5 5-in.; 14 1·57-in. A.A.	<i>Chas. S. Sperry</i> , 6 5-in.; 4 3-in.
<i>Bradford</i> , 5 5-in.; 14 1·57-in. A.A.	<i>Chevalier</i> ² , 6 5-in.; 4 3-in.

¹ Destroyer-minesweeper.

² Specially-fitted radar picket.

APPENDIX G

Destroyers—continued

<i>Colahan</i> ,	6 5-in.; 14 1·57-in. A.A.	<i>McKean</i> ,	6 5-in.; 4 3-in.
<i>Collett</i> ,	6 5-in.; 4 3-in.	<i>MacKenzie</i> ,	4 5-in.; 12 1·57-in. A.A.
<i>Cowell</i> ,	6 5-in.; 14 1·57-in. A.A.	<i>Maddox</i> ,	6 5-in.; 4 3-in.
<i>Craig</i> , see <i>John R. Craig</i>		<i>Marsh</i> ² ,	2 5-in.; 3 3-in.
<i>de Haven</i> ,	6 5-in.; 4 3-in.	<i>Massey</i> ,	6 5-in.; 4 3-in.
<i>Edmonds</i> ³ ,	2 5-in.; 8 1·57-in. A.A.	<i>Moore</i> , see <i>Samuel N. Moore</i>	
<i>Endicott</i> ,	3 5-in.; 4 1·57-in. A.A.	<i>Norris</i> ,	4 5-in.; 4 3-in.
<i>English</i> ,	6 5-in.; 4 3-in. A.A.	<i>Orleck</i> ,	6 5-in.; 4 3-in.
<i>Erben</i> ,	5 5-in.; 14 1·57-in. A.A.	<i>Ozbourn</i> ,	6 5-in.; 4 3-in.
<i>Ernest G. Small</i> ,	6 5-in.; 4 3-in.	<i>Parks</i> , see <i>Floyd B. Parks</i>	
<i>Eversole</i> ,	6 5-in.; 4 3-in.	<i>Perkins</i> ³ ,	6 5-in.; 4 3-in.
<i>Evans</i> , see <i>Frank E. Evans</i>		<i>Pierce</i> , see <i>John R. Pierce</i>	
<i>Fechteler</i> ,	6 5-in.; 4 3-in.	<i>Porter</i> ,	5 5-in.; 14 1·57-in. A.A.
<i>Fiske</i> ,	6 5-in.; 4 3-in.	<i>Porterfield</i> ,	5 5-in.; 14 1·57-in. A.A.
<i>Fletcher</i> ,	2 5-in.; 4 3-in.	<i>Preston</i> ,	5 5-in.; 14 1·57-in. A.A.
<i>Floyd B. Parks</i> ,	6 5-in.; 4 3-in.	<i>Radford</i> ² ,	2 5-in.; 4 3-in.
<i>Forrest B. Royal</i> ,	6 5-in.; 4 3-in.	<i>Rooks</i> ,	5 5-in.; 14 1·57-in. A.A.
<i>Frank E. Evans</i> ,	6 5-in.; 4 3-in.	<i>Rowan</i> ,	6 5-in.; 4 3-in.
<i>Gurke</i> ,	6 5-in.; 4 3-in.	<i>Rupertus</i> ,	6 5-in.; 4 3-in.
<i>Hank</i> ,	6 5-in.; 4 3-in.	<i>Shelton</i> ,	6 5-in.; 4 3-in.
<i>Hanna</i> ³ ,	2 5-in.; 10 1·57-in. A.A.	<i>Shields</i> ,	5 5-in.; 14 1·57-in. A.A.
<i>Hanson</i> ² ,	6 5-in.; 4 3-in.	<i>Small</i> , see <i>Ernest G. Small</i>	
<i>Hawkins</i> ² ,	6 5-in.; 4 3-in.	<i>Southerland</i> ² ,	6 5-in.; 4 3-in.
<i>Henderson</i> ,	6 5-in.; 4 3-in.	<i>Sperry</i> , see <i>Chas. S. Sperry</i>	
<i>Henry W. Tucker</i> ² ,	6 5-in.; 4 3-in.	<i>Sproston</i> ³ ,	2 5-in.; 4 3-in.
<i>Herbert J. Thomas</i> ² ,	6 5-in.; 4 3-in.	<i>Stickell</i> ,	6 5-in.; 4 3-in.
<i>Higbee</i> ² ,	6 5-in.; 4 3-in.	<i>Strong</i> ,	6 5-in.; 4 3-in.
<i>Hollister</i> ,	6 5-in.; 4 3-in.	<i>Swenson</i> , see <i>Lyman K. Swenson</i>	
<i>Hyman</i> ,	6 5-in.; 4 3-in.	<i>Taussig</i> ,	6 5-in.; 4 3-in.
<i>Irwin</i> ,	6 5-in.; 14 1·57-in. A.A.	<i>Taylor</i> ,	5 5-in.; 14 1·57-in. A.A.
<i>Isbell</i> , see <i>Arnold J. Isbell</i>		<i>Theodore E. Chandler</i> ,	6 5-in.; 4 3-in.
<i>Jarvis</i> ,	5 5-in.; 14 1·57-in. A.A.	<i>Thomas</i> , see <i>Herbert J. Thomas</i>	
<i>James C. Owens</i> ,	6 5-in.; 4 3-in.	<i>Thomason</i> ³ ,	2 5-in.; 3 3-in.
<i>James E. Kyes</i> ,	6 5-in.; 4 3-in.	<i>Thompson</i> ¹ ,	3 5-in.; 4 1·57-in. A.A.
<i>John R. Craig</i> ,	6 5-in.; 4 3-in.	<i>Tingey</i> ,	5 5-in.; 14 1·57-in. A.A.
<i>John R. Pierce</i> ,	6 5-in.; 4 3-in.	<i>Trathen</i> ,	5 5-in.; 14 1·57-in. A.A.
<i>Kidd</i> ,	5 5-in.; 14 1·57-in. A.A.	<i>Tucker</i> , see <i>Henry W. Tucker</i>	
<i>Kimberley</i> ,	5 5-in.; 14 1·57-in. A.A.	<i>Vammen</i> ³ ,	3 3-in.; 6 1·57-in. A.A.
<i>Kyes</i> , see <i>James E. Kyes</i>		<i>Walke</i> ,	6 5-in.; 4 3-in.
<i>Lewis</i> ³ ,	2 5-in.; 8 1·57-in. A.A.	<i>Wiltsie</i> ,	6 5-in.; 4 3-in.
<i>McCord</i> ,	5 5-in.; 14 1·57-in. A.A.	<i>Yarnall</i> ,	5 5-in.; 14 1·57-in. A.A.
<i>McCoy Reynolds</i> ³ ,	2 5-in.; 8 1·57-in. A.A.	<i>Zellars</i> ,	6 5-in.; 4 3-in.

Frigates

<i>Bayonne</i> ,	3 3-inch; 2 1·57-inch A.A.
<i>Bisbee</i> ,	3 3-inch; 2 1·57-inch A.A.
<i>Burlington</i> ,	3 3-inch; 2 1·57-inch A.A.
<i>Evansville</i> ,	3 3-inch; 2 1·57-inch A.A.
<i>Everett</i> ,	3 3-inch; 2 1·57-inch A.A.
<i>Gallup</i> ,	3 3-inch; 2 1·57-inch A.A.
<i>Glendale</i> ,	3 3-inch; 2 1·57-inch A.A.
<i>Gloucester</i> ,	3 3-inch; 2 1·57-inch A.A.
<i>Hoquiam</i> ,	3 3-inch; 2 1·57-inch A.A.
<i>Newport</i> ,	3 3-inch; 2 1·57-inch A.A.
<i>Sausalito</i> ,	3 3-inch; 2 1·57-inch A.A.
<i>Tacoma</i> ,	3 3-inch; 2 1·57-inch A.A.

¹ Destroyer-minesweeper.

² Specially-fitted radar picket.

³ Patrol vessel.

APPENDIX H

Appendix I to the Flag-Officer's, Second in Command, Far East Station letter FO2FE/2960/11 dated 19th January 1950.

CARRIER OPERATIONS

1. The attached tables show very interesting comparisons of the operations carried out by our aircraft carriers in the Pacific War and those carried out by H.M.S. *Theseus* in the Korean War.

2. The object of this is to indicate the very great pressure at which this single light fleet carrier has been operating. It is fully realized that there are great differences in the types of operation, casualties and so on, but from a purely operational point of view it is interesting to note that in the Pacific, T.F. 57 had to use 58 per cent of its flying effort defensively, while in Korean waters the percentage of defensive sorties was 56 per cent.

3. T.F. 57 consisted of:

H.M.S. <i>Indomitable</i>	29 Hellcats	15 Avengers	(44)
H.M.S. <i>Victorious</i>	37 Corsairs	14 Avengers	(51)
H.M.S. <i>Indefatigable</i>	40 Seafires	20 Avengers	9 Fireflies (69)
H.M.S. <i>Illustrious</i>	36 Corsairs	16 Avengers	(52)
H.M.S. <i>Formidable</i>	Relieved H.M.S. <i>Illustrious</i> and is believed to have carried 36 Corsairs and 18 Avengers.		

4. H.M.S. *Theseus* carried a varying number:

8th—22nd October; 18 Furies, 9 Fireflies, total 27.

27th October—5th November; 13 Furies, 8 Fireflies, total 21.

5th December—28th December; 21 Furies, 12 Fireflies, total 33.

5. Both the Furies and the Fireflies showed themselves to be good, hardworking aircraft. In particular it has been a great relief not having Seafires.

6. The attached tables show interesting comparative periods. I don't know if anything particular can be drawn from them except that it is possible to make a small but well-trained air group in a good light fleet carrier undertake very prolonged and intensive periods of operations.

APPENDIX H

Page 2 of the Flag-Officer's, Second in Command, Far East Station, letter FO2FE/2960/11 of 19th January 1950.

APPENDIX I

TASK FORCE 57				H.M.S. <i>THESEUS</i>			
March 1945				October 1950			
23	Sailed from Ulithi			7	Sailed from Sasebo		
24	—			8	11
25	—			9	41
26	297	10	45
27	251	11	21
28	—			12	24
29	—			13	46
30	—			14	41
31	183	15	27
April 1945				16	15
1	184	17	—		
2	74	18	48
3	—			19	8
4	—			20	38
5	—			21	37
6	189	22	} Sasebo replenishing		
7	190				
8	—						
9	—						
10	—						
11	—			27	6
12	218	28	34
13	166	29	39
14	—			30	17
15	—			31	34
16	213	November 1950			
17	172	1	40
18	—			2	41
19	—			3	16
20	06	4	—		
21	Leyte for replenishment			5	41
Total sorties 2343				Total sorties: .. 670			
Sorties per carrier .. 585				Sorties per carrier .. 670			
Average number of aircraft per carrier about 54				Average number of aircraft in H.M.S. <i>Theseus</i> 28			
Days operating .. 12				Days operating (<i>but in separate periods at sea</i>) .. 22			
Period from first operational day .. 26 days				Period from first operational day .. 29 days			

FLAG-OFFICER'S LETTER FO2FE/2960/11

Page 3 of Appendix I to the Flag-Officer's, Second in Command, Far East Station, letter FO2FE/2960/11 of 19th January 1951.

TASK FORCE 57 May 1945				H.M.S. <i>THESEUS</i> December 1950			
1	Sailed from Leyte			4	Sailed from Sasebo		
2		—		5	12	
3		—		6	31	
4	135		7	51	
5	184		8	45	
6		—		9	4	
7		—		10	4	
8		—		11	38	
9	238		12	48	
10		—		13	54	
11		—		14	48	
12	246		15		—	
13	232		16		—	
14		—		17		—	
15		—		18	18	
16	265		19	45	
17	226		20	48	
18		—		21	35	
19		—		22		—	
20	154		23	35	
21	231		24	44	
22		—		25	29	
23		—		26	43	
24	141		27		—	
25	197		28	Operation ended, re- turned to Sasebo		
26		—					
Operation ended							
Total sorties		2249		Total sorties		632	
Sorties per carrier		562		Sorties per carrier		632	
Average number of air- craft per carrier		54		Average number of aircraft in H.M.S. <i>Theseus</i>		33	
Days operating		11		Days operating		18	
Period from first opera- tional day		21 days		Period from first operational day		22 days	

APPENDIX J

Fuel Consumption and Mileage steamed by H.M. Ships of the Royal Navy during the Korean War

Ship	Fuel	Miles Steamed
<i>Kenya</i>	33 000	64 000
<i>Jamaica</i>	14 250	31 000
<i>Ceylon</i>	51 500	86 000
<i>Newcastle</i>	20 000	28 000
<i>Birmingham</i>	12 000	18 000
<i>Belfast</i>	57 000	82 500
<i>Triumph</i>	9 500	20 000
<i>Ocean</i>	31 000	65 000
<i>Glory</i>	20 000	44 000
<i>Theseus</i>	17 250	40 000
<i>Unicorn</i>	50 500	110 000
<i>Cockade</i>	28 250	105 500
<i>Comus</i>	31 400	123 400
<i>Consort</i>	29 300	113 000
<i>Constance</i>	26 000	109 500
<i>Concord</i>	22 500	95 500
<i>Cossack</i>	29 500	92 300
<i>Charity</i>	29 000	126 000
<i>Mounts Bay</i>	15 300	88 000
<i>Morecambe Bay</i>	15 200	84 300
<i>Whitesand Bay</i>	13 500	67 000
<i>Cardigan Bay</i>	14 000	62 000
<i>St Bride's Bay</i>	13 000	72 000
<i>Alert</i>	9 000	50 000
<i>Alacrity</i>	7 900	69 300
<i>Amethyst</i>	7 400	78 000
<i>Black Swan</i>	6 000	41 000
<i>Hart</i>	3 000	41 000
<i>Opossum</i>	2 750	24 000
<i>Sparrow</i>	1 850	10 750
<i>Crane</i>	6 400	37 200
<i>Modeste</i>	2 400	17 300
<i>Tyne</i>	2 500	5 000
	632 150	2 100 550

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
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
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
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






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
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
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


APPROACHES TO HAEJU





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
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MUDFLATS DRY AT LOW WATER
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SCALE : SEA MILES



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
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0 30 60 90 120

KEY
Main Roads ——— Railways - - - - -
Normal Naval Dispositions Shewn in Red



CARRIER FORCE
T.E. 95.11
T.U. 95.1.1
(Jan. '53)

T.U. 95.12
Ping Yang Inlet
(Jan. '52)

T.U. 95.14
Chon-dong
(Jan. '53)

T.U. 95.15
Fankochi P.Y.
(Jan. '53)

T.E. 95.21
Wonsan Unit
NAN DO
Kojo

T.E. 95.28
Bomblines Unit

T.F. 77

T.E. 95.22
Songjin and Yang do
Defence Unit

T.E. 95.24
Hungnam Unit

RESTRICTED